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WAR DEPARTMENT — OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
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American Campaigns

By

MATTHEW FORNEY STEELE

Major Second United States Cavalry

IN TWO VOLUMES

VOLUME I — TEXT

WASHINGTON: BYRON S. ADAMS, 1909⁵

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PREFACE.

These volumes represent a part of my three years' work as lecturer in military history at the Army Service Schools at Fort Leavenworth. It is with a great deal of reluctance that I have consented to let the lectures be printed in their present form, for no one can know better than I how far they fall short of being a finished work. No doubt, however, I should not feel entirely satisfied with them if I had spent twenty years, instead of only a part of three, upon them.

No man can feel that he has thoroughly mastered any campaign or battle, or is fully equipped to lecture upon it, until he has studied everything that has been written upon it. Hence I do not feel that I have mastered a single campaign or battle discussed in this series, because I have not had time to study the tenth of what has been written upon any one of them. The Rebellion Records have virtually been a closed book for me; I have hardly dared to open them, lest I might yield to the temptation to read on, from one report to another, far beyond the time I have had to spare. Fortunately, however, this great mine of fact—and fiction—has been industriously worked, and its contents have been carefully sifted and reduced, by such skilful craftsmen as Mr. John Codman Ropes, General E. P. Alexander, and dozens of others, who have given many years of their lives to the task; and the product of their expert labor has been placed at the disposal of students having less time to spare, like myself.

There is so much, however, I could do to improve the lectures and make them more valuable and acceptable, that I regret I cannot put one more year's work upon them before sending them forth; but they cannot wait longer, for some work of this kind is sadly needed by the students at the Service Schools in connection with their course in military history. These volumes are intended to occupy a space not filled by any other single work, and, until something better shall be provided, they must answer the purpose.

In preparing the lectures for publication I have been assisted directly or indirectly by many persons without whose aid I should never have succeeded at all. It would be impossible even to name them all. To no one else do I feel so much indebted as to Captain Edwin T. Cole, 6th Infantry, Senior

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History, Records 14 My 15 McClurg. 475

Instructor, Department of Engineering, at the Service Schools, under whose direction and supervision the maps were made. Indeed, I believe I may say that Captain Cole was the initiator of the whole project. The volumes are the outcome of my course of lectures, which were illustrated by means of the stereopticon. For this series of lectures Captain Cole with his own hand made more than six hundred lantern-slides, nearly all of which had troops represented upon them in colors laid on by hand under the magnifying glass. In the preparation of the maps, Captain Cole was assisted by Sergeant John Howry, Co. D, 1st Battalion of Engineers, a skilful draftsman, and Sergeant Frank Arganbright, Co. A, Signal Corps, an expert photographer. The final tracings of all the maps were done by Mr. W. J. Jacobi and Mr. A. B. Williams, expert draftsmen in the Military Information Committee, Second Section, General Staff, U. S. Army. For the excellence of the plates I am indebted to the personal care of Mr. W. Palmer Hall, of The Maurice Joyce Engraving Co., and for the accurate "registering" of the color-plates to the painstaking of Mr. D. S. White and Mr. William E. Browne, of the house of Byron S. Adams. To Mr. S. C. Williams, clerk in the office of the Secretary of the Service Schools, I am particularly obliged for the speed and accuracy with which he made the fair copy of my manuscript for the printer.

None of the maps were drawn originally for these lectures; all are photographic reproductions of either official maps or maps accompanying works that have been consulted in the preparation of the lectures. For the privilege of reproducing the maps of other works I have had to ask several authors and almost every leading publisher in the country, all of whom, both authors and publishers, have been kind enough to give their consent. Since, however, the maps have been taken from many different sources, they will be found to possess no sort of uniformity in method or in quality. Better maps, no doubt, are in existence than many of those reproduced, but the best one available has been taken in every case. In most cases the colored blocks and lines representing troops and routes of march have been added specially for the lectures.

It has seldom been possible to represent the troops to a scale, the main purpose having been merely to suggest, by means of blue and red blocks, the relative positions of hostile troops on a battle-field or in a theater of operations.

All things considered, it has been deemed best to present the maps in a separate volume of the same size as the volume of lectures, and to limit them to such dimensions that none of them shall require folding; but in reducing some of them to a scale small enough to meet these requirements, many of the geographic names have been made rather small to read with the naked eye; but it may be remarked, in passing, that no one can hope to keep his eyes unimpaired who undertakes the serious study of military history without the aid of a reading-glass. Many of the names and details of the originals not mentioned in the lectures have been left out of the reproductions and great pains have been taken to see that no important geographic names mentioned in the lectures should be omitted from the corresponding maps.

While reference is made in foot-notes throughout the text to works that have been quoted or taken as authority, I must here invite the attention of students of American military history to a few works that I believe will be of special interest to them:

For the study of the colonial period of our history Francis Parkman has left an immortal work in his series of volumes.* His *Montcalm and Wolfe* and *A Half Century of Conflict* are of particular interest to the student of American military history.

Upon the Revolutionary War, *The American Revolution*, by John Fiske,† is too well known to require any recommendation from me. Its popularity is due largely to Mr. Fiske's charming style. Sydney George Fisher's *True History of the American Revolution*, and his later and more extensive work, *The Struggle for American Independence*,‡ are invaluable to the American who wishes to get an unbiased view of our

*Published by Little, Brown and Company, Boston.

†Published by Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston.

‡Both published by J. B. Lippincott Company, Philadelphia.

forefathers' struggle for freedom. The author breaks out of the usual rut of American historians, and gives us a view of the quarrel from the Englishman's side as well as from the American's. To the military student in search of the lessons of the Revolutionary War that relate to his own chosen profession, *Battles of the American Revolution*,* written by General Henry B. Carrington, soldier and student of the science of war, makes a special appeal.

Excellent accounts of the War of 1812 are contained in Henry Adams's *History of the United States*,† and *A History of the People of the United States*, by John Bach McMaster.

The two little volumes of *The Great Commander Series*‡—*General Taylor*, by General O. O. Howard, and *General Scott*, by General Marcus J. Wright—taken together, give a very pleasing and instructive, but brief, narrative of the Mexican War; but the fullest and most satisfactory history of that war, in a single volume, is General Cadmus Wilcox's *History of the Mexican War*.§ This work is based upon accounts written from both American and Mexican points of view.

When we come down to the Civil War, a mere glance at the library shelves given to its literature makes one appreciate to the full the words of The Preacher, "Of making many books there is no end"; yet there is no single work that covers the whole war concisely and in a way to satisfy the military student. The subject is so vast that, thus far, no person that has undertaken it has lived to finish his task. The Comte of Paris, in his *History of the Civil War in America*,|| brought the narrative in full detail well forward into the year 1863. This is a great work.

John Codman Ropes, in *The Story of the Civil War*,|| only lived to complete Parts I. and II., which carry the story through the campaigns of 1862; but I am informed by his publishers that Part III., prepared "from the data which Mr. Ropes left behind," will soon be issued. Could Mr. Ropes have been spared to finish his great work it would have proved an invaluable boon for the student of the military history of that great conflict. No other work that I have seen reviews

*Published by A. S. Barnes and Company, New York.

†Published by Charles Scribner's Sons, New York.

‡Published by D. Appleton and Company, New York.

§Published by The Church Publishing Company, Washington.

||Translation published by Porter and Coates, now the John C. Winston Company, Philadelphia.

||Published by G. P. Putnam's Sons, New York.

the main campaigns of 1861 and 1862 as scientifically and convincingly as that of Mr. Ropes. And withal the author's writing is easy and delightful to read.

In his *Military Memoirs of a Confederate** General E. P. Alexander has written an absorbing narrative and critical review of the campaigns that he himself took part in,—which include most of the important campaigns of the Civil War,—together with a brief account of some of the others. It is a most scientific and scholarly criticism of the operations. The only cause of quarrel one can find with the able and unprejudiced author is that he has not pointed out the faults of his enemies as plainly and fully as he has pointed out those of his friends. Every military student must be thankful to General Alexander for these memoirs, as everyone must lament that General Stephen D. Lee did not find time to publish a similar memoir of the campaigns that he bore a part in. Such a work along with General Alexander's would have made almost a complete critical review of the great campaigns of the war.

The Battles and Leaders of the Civil War,† made up of the great series of war papers that appeared a few years ago in *The Century*, stands unique in the world's histories of war. It covers every event of any importance from the beginning to the end of the great struggle. Told by the very actors themselves, great and little, these narratives have for the American reader an interest that no other history of the Civil War could possess. So long as there shall be Americans to read the story of those times they must remain grateful to The Century Company for these volumes. Precisely the right moment was chosen by the company for carrying out the great work. Had it been undertaken earlier, the time would have been too soon, for the vision of the actors would still have been blurred by the prejudice of section and the smoke of battle; had it been postponed longer, too many of the actors would already have passed away.

*Campaigns of the Civil War** is another excellent history of the main campaigns, issued in a series of small, handy volumes, each written by a man chosen on account of his special fitness. In the list of the contributors we find the names of John H. Nicolay, General Alexander S. Webb, John Codman Ropes, General Winthrop PalFREY, General Abner Doubleday, General Henry M. Cist, General Jacob D. Cox, Captain Francis V.

*Published by Charles Scribner's Sons, New York.

†Published by The Century Company, New York.

Greene, Mr. George E. Pond, and General Andrew A. Humphreys.

The bookshelves of the young American officer should not long be without the last-named four works—*The Story of the Civil War*, *Military Memoirs of a Confederate*, *The Battles and Leaders of the Civil War*, and *Campaigns of the Civil War*. Having first read these carefully, following out every movement upon the map, the student will have gained a general knowledge and appreciation of the main operations of the Civil War; then, if he pleases, he can find interesting and instructive biographies, memoirs, and histories, too numerous for me to attempt to list, with which to fill in the details of campaigns and battles. Of these books, one of the most valuable is the *History of the Army of the Cumberland*, by Thomas B. Van Horne and Edward Ruger.* Few histories that I have seen contain so many excellent maps as accompany this volume.

Of our war with Spain, no complete history, such as the military student desires, has as yet appeared. Captain Sargent's work, *The Campaign of Santiago de Cuba*,† treats the main part of the operations with a fulness and skill that place it among the great military histories that have been written in English, and put its author in the class with Napier and Henderson. The only regret one can have in laying the work down is that its author did not include in it a review of the operations in Porto Rico and the Philippines.

M. F. S.

ARMY WAR COLLEGE,

WASHINGTON, *September 23, 1909.*

*Published by Robert Clarke & Company, now The Robert Clarke Company, Cincinnati.

†Published by A. C. McClurg and Company, Chicago.

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LECTURE I.

COLONIAL WARS.

(1*) Almost at the beginning of the seventeenth century Canada became the battle-ground of the French and the British. The territory had been in dispute from the earliest discoveries.

John Cabot, sailing under the flag of Henry VII. of England, in 1497, gave the British their claim to this part of America; but he only touched at the Island of Newfoundland. The French rested their claim upon the discoveries of Verrazzano, who planted their flag on the St. Lawrence in 1524. Jacques Cartier followed, in 1534, and, in the name of France and the Holy Roman Church, carried the flag and the cross higher up the St. Lawrence.

In 1608 the French, under Champlain, established a trading post at Quebec, which soon became an important town. In 1629 Admiral Kirk, with a British squadron, entered the St. Lawrence and captured Quebec; but it was restored to France at the peace of St. Germain-en-Laye, in 1642.

Before the end of the seventeenth century the French had pushed westward as far as Lake Superior, and, under the direction of the governor-general, Count de Frontenac, had, by 1680, built military posts at Niagara, Michilimackinac and in the Illinois country. Later, Frontenac directed French and Indian attacks against the English frontier of New England and New York, and the English posts in the Hudson Bay country; and, in 1690, repulsed the attack of Sir William Phips, the first royal governor of Massachusetts, who had sailed with a fleet from Boston. A land force under General Winthrop of Massachusetts was to have coöperated with the fleet under Phips; but it marched no farther than Lake Champlain. From there "Winthrop, finding it impossible to do anything with the disorderly forces of the main body, marched them back to Albany."† A few months before, Phips had sailed with a fleet from Boston, and captured Port Royal (now Annapolis, Nova Scotia). A bloody border warfare, known in our history as King William's War, was kept up until the year 1697.

*The numerals appearing in this volume refer to the maps numbered serially in the volume of maps.

†Rossiter Johnson, *The Old French War*.

QUEEN ANNE'S WAR.

In 1702 the War of the Spanish Succession, known in American history as Queen Anne's War, broke out, and was the occasion of a renewal of hostilities between the French and English colonists. At length, to put an end to the depredations of the French and Indians along their frontier, the English colonists resolved to capture Canada itself by a combined invasion by land and sea. The mother-country was asked for aid, and she promised to send a fleet. This was to proceed from Boston, while the land force, composed of colonial militia and Indian allies, of the Five Nations [Iroquois], was to march northward, by way of Lake Champlain and the Richelieu River, under Colonel Nicholson, the lieutenant-governor of New York. Nicholson gathered his troops together and established a camp on the upper Hudson; and militia was collected and drilled for months at Boston, pending the arrival of the squadron from England. This squadron was also going to bring several regular British regiments. At last, late in the autumn, word came that the squadron and regulars could not be sent—they had to be dispatched to the Continent of Europe instead. Nicholson's force on the upper Hudson, meanwhile, tired of waiting for the order to advance, had dispersed.

The next year, however, 1710, a British squadron came over and escorted Colonel Nicholson, with some 1,500 provincial militia and 400 British marines, to Port Royal. Nicholson captured the town and changed its name to Annapolis Royal, in honor of Queen Anne. "Port Royal had twice before been taken by New England men—once under Major Sedgwick in 1654, and again under Sir William Phips" (as we have seen) "in the last war; and, in each case, it had been restored to France by treaty. This time England kept what she had got; and as there was no other place of strength in the province, the capture of Port Royal meant the conquest of Acadia."*

The following year, 1711, the British government undertook in earnest the conquest of Canada. Seven veteran regiments, five of which came from Marlborough's army, were sent over, under General John Hill; and a fleet, under Admiral Sir Hovenden Walker. Hill, known at court as "Jack Hill," was perfectly incompetent; the only reason for his appointment, was the fact that he was a brother of Lady Abigail Masham, at that

*Parkman, *A Half Century of Conflict*.

time the favorite woman of Queen Anne's bed-chamber. Admiral Walker was no better than Hill.

Besides the seven regiments of regulars, with artillery, about 5,500 men, there were some 800 marines and 1,500 provincial militia. The fleet with this force was to sail for the St. Lawrence and Quebec, while another force of militia, some 2,000, under Colonel Nicholson, was to assemble near Lake Champlain and move against Montreal.

The fleet sailed from Boston, with its army, on the 30th of July; but it never reached Quebec. In the lower St. Lawrence it was caught in a gale, several of the transports were wrecked, and nearly 900 soldiers perished. Discouraged by this mishap, Walker and Hill, both of whom were faint-hearted, withdrew. The British fleet, with the regulars, sailed back to England, and the American militiamen returned in their transports to Boston.

Report of the disaster and return was dispatched to Colonel Nicholson, whose army had not gone beyond Lake Champlain. Parkman says, when the colonel "heard what had happened, he was beside himself with rage, tore off his wig, threw it on the ground and stamped upon it, crying out 'Roguery! Treachery!' When his fit was over, he did all that was now left for him to do—burned the wooden forts he had built, marched back to Albany, and disbanded his army." Thus ended the second attempt to invade Canada by land and sea, and the monks and nuns at Quebec were, no doubt, sure that Canada had been saved from the heel of the unbeliever by their prayers. This was the last serious effort against the French in Canada during Queen Anne's War, which closed with the Treaty of Utrecht in 1713.

After this treaty, a few years of peace followed between France and England, during which the French in America gradually "extended their dominion in the great West and the Valley of the Mississippi, forming a complete cordon of settlements about the English, who now saw that they must either break the chain, or content themselves with the limitation of their territory to the east of the Alleghanies."*

Canada was linked to the other French province, Louisiana, by a chain of settlements in the Mississippi Valley; and, toward the middle of the eighteenth century, French forts occupied points controlling all the chief waterways between these two widely separated colonies. "Niagara held the passage from

**Historians' History.*

Lake Ontario to Lake Erie; Detroit closed the entrance to Lake Huron, and Michilimackinac guarded the point where Lake Huron is joined by Lakes Michigan and Superior; while the Fort called La Baye, at the head of Green Bay, stopped the way to the Mississippi by Marquette's old route of the Fox River and the Wisconsin. Another route to the Mississippi was controlled by a post on the Maumee to watch the carrying-place between that river and the Wabash, and by another on the Wabash, where Vincennes now stands. La Salle's route, by way of the Kankakee and the Illinois, was barred by a fort on the St. Joseph; and even if, in spite of these obstructions, an enemy should reach the Mississippi by any of the northern affluents, the cannon of Fort Chartres would prevent him from descending it."*

GEOGRAPHY.

It is now time to study the military geography of Canada, before taking up the next invasion. We shall not consider its geography of to-day, with its numerous cities and its great systems of railways and canals. Canada then, as now, was contiguous to the northern frontier of New England and New York; all the territory north of the St. Lawrence and the Great Lakes was acknowledged to belong to the French. From the lakes southward the territory was claimed by both the French and the English; and the boundary between Canada, on the one side, and New England and New York, on the other, had not been fixed, and was a constant cause of trouble and border war.

The country of the Iroquois or Five Nations† and the Algonquins lay between the frontiers of the English and the French settlements. The Algonquins were always allies of the French, and the Iroquois were generally allies of the English.

Canada was then a vast wilderness, without roads or routes of travel, except its waterways and such trails as the Indians had made. Quebec and Montreal were the only towns in the interior; and, as Quebec was the capital, besides absolutely commanding the St. Lawrence, any invasion of Canada must have this town for its main objective. And, as there were no roads, any invasion of Canada must confine itself mainly to

*Parkman, *A Half Century of Conflict*.

†The original Five Nations were the Mohawks, Oneidas, Onondagas, Cayugas, and Senecas. In 1713 the Tuscaroras from North Carolina joined the confederacy and formed "The Six Nations."—Sloane.

water routes. The first of such routes, in importance, was, of course, the St. Lawrence, by which ships could ascend right to Montreal, if not stopped by hostile fleets or the cannon of Quebec.

An examination of the map shows a water-shed, about midway between the Atlantic coast of New England and the St. Lawrence, in which a number of rivers rise; they flow toward the Atlantic and the St. Lawrence, respectively. This watershed was the carrying-place between all the water routes connecting these parts of the old French and English provinces, between the ocean and the great river.

Starting in the east, first we see the St. John River, whose headwaters are within ten miles of water that flows to the St. Lawrence. The St. John, however, could never be available as a line of invasion, because, in the first place, its mouth and the greater part of its course lie in territory always acknowledged to be a part of Canada. Its mouth is too far away from Boston, or any other base, to reach by land; and it does not compare to the St. Lawrence as a line of invasion to be taken by a fleet. Furthermore, its mouth was guarded by a French fort. The next river is the Penobscot; but its headwaters are not as near the Chaudière, or any other stream emptying into the St. Lawrence, as are the headwaters of the Kennebec. Then comes the Connecticut River, with the St. Francis on the opposite side of the carrying-place. Next and last is the Hudson, with Lake Champlain and the Richelieu River on the St. Lawrence slope. This was the shortest and easiest route, and the one usually taken by the Five Nations, on their incursions into the French settlements of the St. Lawrence. This route, however, if followed to the mouth of the Richelieu, would have Montreal on its flank; hence an expedition by this line should have Montreal, and not Quebec, for its primary objective.

The other two water routes by which Montreal and Quebec and the heart of Canada could be approached from the south, were: first, the route by way of Lake Ontario and down the St. Lawrence; and second, the route across Lake Huron and Georgian Bay, and thence by French River, Lake Nipissing and the Ottawa River. These two routes were, of course, not available in the early days. They were too far away from the English settlements, and too long, and they were perfectly guarded by French forts. Besides, the rapids in the St. Lawrence above Montreal were a serious obstacle to the passage down this river.

KING GEORGE'S WAR.

"The Peace of Utrecht had left unsettled the perilous questions of boundary between the rival powers in North America, and they grew more perilous every day . . . yet it was, as before, a European and not an American quarrel that" was to bring the colonists to blows again. "The War of the Austrian Succession broke out in 1744. When Frederick of Prussia seized Silesia and began that bloody conflict, it meant that packs of howling savages would again spread fire and carnage along the New England border."*

This was known in America as King George's War. Besides the bloody border warfare, its principal event was the capture of Louisburg by a bold expedition of New England militia, under William Pepperrell. Next to Quebec, Louisburg was the strongest fortress in America. It was also a French naval station, and, situated as it was on the Island of Cape Breton, it commanded the entrance to the Gulf of St. Lawrence.

(2) Pepperrell's expedition, about 4,000 strong, sailed out of Massachusetts Bay on the 24th of March, 1745, and, on the 2nd of May the first troops landed near Louisburg. The fortress was garrisoned by 560 regular soldiers and some 1,300 or 1,400 militia. The New Englanders captured an outlying battery by assault, and turned its guns on the main fort. Then they laid siege to the place. On the 17th of June the commander surrendered, and the New Englanders took possession. The fortress was returned to the French by the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, which terminated the war, in 1748.

FRENCH AND INDIAN WAR.

(1) Eight years of peace followed, during which the English strengthened their position in America by founding the fortified city of Halifax, in 1749; and the French established a new line of forts closer about the English frontier on the west.

The English did not regard these encroachments of the French with complacency. So, late in 1753, Governor Dinwiddie of Virginia dispatched Major George Washington, Adjutant-General of the Virginia militia, to Fort Le Bœuf to demand of the French commander, that the French should withdraw from Virginia soil. Early in 1754 Washington was

*Parkman.

sent back to the country of the Monongahela River, with some militia and one company of British regulars, to oppose the advance of the French. Here he came into contact with the French, near a place called the Great Meadows. This was the opening of the French and Indian War. A few weeks later, Washington was attacked in the fort which he had built and named Fort Necessity; he was compelled to surrender to superior numbers, but was allowed to march out with the honors of war.

In February, 1755, General Braddock arrived in Virginia with two regiments of British regulars. He was met at Alexandria by several provincial governors, and a plan of campaign against the French was arranged. The French were to be attacked at four points at once, by independent forces. Braddock was to lead his two regiments and a force of militia against Fort Duquesne; a force of two provincial regiments was to attack Niagara; a body of provincials was to seize the French post at Crown Point; and the fourth column was to operate in Acadia.

Braddock marched his command to Fort Cumberland, where his troops, all told, numbered some 2,200. He had remarked to Benjamin Franklin, "I shall hardly need to stop more than three or four days at Fort Duquesne; then I shall march on to Niagara, and from there to Frontenac." He was a veteran British soldier, and had hardly less contempt for provincial troops than he had for the Indian allies of the French. He paid little heed to the advice of Colonel Washington, who accompanied his expedition as an aide-de-camp.* With 1,373 picked men, he moved against Fort Duquesne. On crossing the Monongahela River, about ten miles from the fort, without a single scout to give warning, he fell into an ambush set for him by the French and Indians; and in the dense forest, his command was cut to pieces and routed.

(3), (4) This happened on the 9th of July, 1755. Out of eighty-six British officers, sixty-three were killed or disabled, Braddock being mortally wounded; and only 459 of the rank and file came off unhurt. On the other side, only sixteen white men, and about thirty-five Indians, were killed or wounded.

(1) The British fell back to Fort Cumberland, whence the commander who succeeded Braddock marched his regulars to Philadelphia, leaving the few provincials to hold the fort and defend the English frontier.

*Rossiter Johnson.

The expedition to Acadia was entirely successful, and resulted in the capture of the French forts at Beauséjour and St. John.

The force to operate against Crown Point assembled at Albany. In July, 1755, there were present about 3,000 provincials and 300 Indians of the Six Nations. The command of the enterprise was given to a young Irishman, named William Johnson, who "had never seen service and knew nothing of war."* His chief reputation rested upon his knowledge of the Indians and his great influence among them. "While the British colonists were preparing to attack Crown Point, the French of Canada were preparing to defend it."* Baron Dieskau, with 3,537 regulars, Canadians, and Indians, was assigned the task of defending it. He led his command up the Richelieu, and embarked it in boats and canoes for Crown Point.

Johnson's main body moved up the river to the carrying-place between the Hudson and Lake George, where it built a fortified storehouse, and called it Fort Lyman, after one of its officers. The name was afterward changed to Fort Edward. Later the army moved to the head of Lake George, leaving 500 men to garrison Fort Lyman.

(5) "While Johnson lay at Lake George, Dieskau prepared to surprise him." He had no thought of waiting at Crown Point to be attacked by a "mob of countrymen," as he considered Johnson's ununiformed army. So he issued his order for an advance, one paragraph of which directed, that "Indians are not to amuse themselves by taking scalps until the enemy is entirely defeated."* Then he moved upon Ticonderoga, which commanded both of the routes by which Johnson might advance.

A provincial brought in by Dieskau's scouts told him that Johnson's army had fallen back to Albany, leaving but a small garrison at Fort Lyman. Dieskau resolved to capture this garrison. With some 200 regulars, 700 Canadians, and 600 Indians, he embarked in canoes, and went to the head of South Bay; there he began the march through the forest for Fort Lyman. On the way he ran upon some teams from the English camp at the head of Lake George, killed some of the teamsters, and captured two of them. Some fled to their camp. The two prisoners told Dieskau of the large camp of his enemy

*Parkman.

at the head of Lake George. So he resolved to attack the camp with his little force, and turned in that direction. Soon his scouts brought in word that a column of English troops was approaching.

Learning of the advance of the French column from the teamsters that had escaped capture, Johnson sent out two columns, of 500 men each, to cut it off. One detachment marched toward Fort Lyman, and the other toward South Bay. It was the latter which was now reported by Dieskau's scouts. Dieskau prepared an ambush for the column, into which it carelessly walked. Many of the provincials and their Indian allies were slain, and the rest hurried back to their camp. Dieskau then moved against the camp, defended by "between 1,600 and 1,700 rustics" and a lot of Indians, and assaulted it.* Dieskau was wounded and captured, and his force was repulsed and put to flight. "Of the provincial soldiers, he remarked, soon after the battle, that in the morning they fought like good boys, about noon like men, and in the afternoon like devils."*

But the Crown Point expedition was at an end. Johnson did not follow up his success. He thought only of holding his position. He made a solid breastwork to defend his camp, and, as reinforcements arrived, set them at building a fort. Within a fortnight his enemy was intrenched at Ticonderoga in force enough to defy him. Finally, as winter came on, a small garrison was left to hold the fort, which Johnson named William Henry, after one of the King's grandsons, and the rest of Johnson's army dispersed to their homes.

Johnson had shown incompetence from first to last, and what success he had gained, was due to General Lyman. Yet he made no mention of Lyman in his report, but took all the credit to himself;—so Parliament voted him 5,000 pounds, and the King made him a baronet.

NIAGARA EXPEDITION.

(1) The expedition for the capture of Fort Niagara also assembled at Albany, in the summer of 1755. It was about 1,500 strong, and Governor Shirley of Massachusetts took command of it in person. It marched up the Mohawk Valley to Oswego. There Shirley was persuaded that it would not do for him to advance against Niagara, leaving the French garri-

*Parkman.

son at Fort Frontenac to capture Oswego in his rear, and cut him off from his communications and supplies; but his force was not strong enough to attack Frontenac. So the expedition was given up and Shirley returned to Albany.

OPERATIONS OF 1756.

In the summer of 1756 England and France formally declared war against each other. General Montcalm was sent over to command the French, and Earl Loudon was made commander-in-chief of the British forces in America.

In August Montcalm took a force across Lake Ontario, while the English were making preparations at Albany, and captured the little garrison at Oswego. He destroyed the place and returned to Montreal. Montcalm then went to Fort Ticonderoga, where he took station with some 5,000 regulars and Canadian militia.

Loudon had about 10,000 men posted from Albany to Lake George. Neither army took the offensive. The belligerents contented themselves with scouting and minor operations; and, as winter approached, both commanders left small garrisons at their advanced posts, Forts William Henry and Ticonderoga, respectively, and withdrew their armies into winter quarters, the French to Canada, and the British regulars to New York, Boston, and Philadelphia. The provincial militiamen returned to their firesides.

OPERATIONS OF 1757.

The campaign was to be opened in 1757, by the British, with the capture of Louisburg, followed by an advance up the St. Lawrence against Quebec. Accordingly, a squadron sailed from England for Halifax; and Loudon, having stripped the New York frontier of all its best troops, embarked at New York with about 12,000 men.

In the early part of July the fleet and Loudon's army were at Halifax; and all was ready for a descent upon Louisburg, when it was learned that a strong French fleet was in the harbor of Louisburg, and the garrison of that fortress had been increased to 7,000. The enterprise was therefore abandoned, and Loudon sailed back to New York with his army.

But Montcalm had, meantime, taken advantage of the absence of Loudon's army. In July he gathered together a force

of about 8,000 regulars, Canadians, and Indians at Ticonderoga, for a movement against Fort William Henry. (6) In August he laid siege to this fort and compelled its commander to surrender; while the British General Webb rested quietly at Fort Edward, a few miles away, with a considerable force, but refused to march to the assistance of the garrison.

(1) The honors of war were granted in the terms of capitulation, and the paroled English were to be escorted to Fort Edward; but Montcalm and his officers were unable to restrain their savages, who massacred a number of the English. The French destroyed the fort and withdrew. Had Montcalm marched on to Fort Edward, he could have captured it without an effort, so demoralized with fear were General Webb and his provincials.

OPERATIONS OF 1758.

The war kindled in the American forests was now raging in Europe, where it came to be known as the Seven Years' War. England was joined with Frederick the Great of Prussia, against nearly all the rest of Europe, and had suffered many losses and disasters.

Finally the great Pitt was made Premier of England, and he soon brought about a change, as much by putting the right men in command of British armies as anything else. He recalled Loudon from America, though, against his judgment, he had, for political reasons, to leave Abercrombie in command there. His first move in America, in 1758, was to fit out a fleet and army to capture Louisburg, with Quebec as the ultimate objective. Delay had thwarted last year's attempt against Louisburg; it was not going to do so again. So, before the winter had ended, Admiral Boscawen's fleet had sailed. So active was the British navy, also, around the coasts of France that, "of the many ships fitted out this year for the succor of Canada and Louisburg, comparatively few reached their destination."*

At the end of May the fleet, and the army of 11,000 British regulars, were at Halifax. General Jeffrey Amherst was in command of the land forces, and his most active and trusted lieutenant was General James Wolfe. Both had distinguished themselves on the Continent.

(2) Amherst's army sailed for Louisburg, and made a landing, in the early days of June. The fleet guarded the

*Parkman.

entrance to the harbor, in which twelve French men-of-war were shut up. The army invested the fortress, and after considerable fighting, in which Wolfe greatly distinguished himself, the garrison was surrendered as prisoners of war, on the 27th of July, 1758.

(5) Let us now see what was doing on the New York frontier in the meantime. The year before, Loudon had asked the colonies for 4,000 men, and he could hardly get them; this year, Pitt asked them for 20,000, and they responded with alacrity. And now, in June, Abercrombie had an army of more than 15,000 men, over 6,000 of whom were British regulars, encamped about the ruins of Fort William Henry, at the head of Lake George. It was the largest body of troops that had ever been assembled on the American continent. Abercrombie was in command, but the "soul of the army" was young Lord Howe, whom General Wolfe called "the best soldier in the British army." He was a brother of the two British Howes of the Revolutionary War.

Montcalm was at Ticonderoga, with only 3,600 soldiers to defend it. On the morning of July 5 Abercrombie's army embarked in boats for Ticonderoga. (7) By noon on the 6th the army had landed at the north end of Lake George, and was on its way through the forest, to assault the French fort. Lord Howe was in front with the scouts, and was killed almost immediately. And "the death of one man was the ruin of 15,000," says Parkman. At any rate the attack on the fort, made on the 8th, failed. The English made five assaults against a strong line of abatis, and were repulsed with great slaughter; whereupon Abercrombie retreated in panic, and took to his boats. So disgusted were the Americans with their British general, that from this time forth they called him "Mrs. Nabby Crombie."*

(1) In another quarter the English had met with better success. Colonel John Bradstreet had led 3,000 provincials, and some Indians, up the Mohawk to attempt the capture of Fort Frontenac. From Oswego, they crossed the lake, and, on the 25th of August, captured the little French garrison with nine war-ships, and great quantities of supplies. They destroyed the fort and returned to Oswego.

"Next to Louisburg, this was the heaviest blow that the French had yet received. Their command of Lake Ontario

*Parkman.

was gone. New France was cut in two; and, unless the severed parts could speedily reunite, all the posts of the interior would be in imminent jeopardy. If Bradstreet had been followed by another body of men, to reoccupy and rebuild Oswego, thus recovering a harbor on Lake Ontario, all the captured French vessels could have been brought thither, and the command of this inland sea assured at once. Even as it was, the advantages were immense. A host of savage warriors, thus far inclined to France, or wavering between the two belligerents, stood henceforth neutral, or gave themselves to England; while Fort Duquesne, deprived of the supplies on which it depended, could make but faint resistance to its advancing enemy.”*

“Amherst, with five regiments from Louisburg, came, early in October, to join Abercrombie at Lake George”; but the generals decided that it was too late to make another effort against Ticonderoga. Soon afterwards the two opposing armies withdrew, each to its winter quarters.

This year, 1758, saw Fort Duquesne fall into the hands of the British. Brigadier John Forbes spent the whole summer chopping a road through the forests, from Fort Cumberland, but found, when he finally reached the fort, in November, that the French garrison had already abandoned it. The abandonment had, doubtless, been due more to the capture of Fort Frontenac, and the destruction of the French depot at that point, than to fear of Forbes’s provincials. Forbes took possession of the place and changed its name to Fort Pitt, in honor of the great Premier. Two months before, in September, the advanced force of Forbes’s command, under Major Grant, had attacked the French at Fort Duquesne, and met as disastrous a defeat as General Braddock’s. An important achievement of Forbes’s expedition was its winning to the side of the English several large Indian tribes that had hitherto been allies of the French.

“So ended the campaign of 1758. The center of the French had held its own triumphantly at Ticonderoga; but their left had been forced back by the capture of Louisburg, and their right by that of Fort Duquesne; while their entire right wing had been well-nigh cut off by the destruction of Fort Frontenac. The outlook was dark. Their own Indians were turning against them.”*

*Parkman.

WOLFE.

In the winter of 1758 and 1759 Pitt planned an expedition against Quebec which was destined to transfer Canada from the French to the British crown. General Wolfe was placed in command of it. On the 26th of June, 1759, the fleet bearing Wolfe's army anchored off the south shore of the Island of Orleans, just below Quebec, and the army, some 9,000 strong, went into camp on that island.

(8) The French in Canada had expected this movement, and General Montcalm and the governor-general had taken such steps as they could take to oppose it; but they received almost no assistance from France. All available French troops were needed on the Continent; and, furthermore, the British navy kept such close watch over the seas that France did not dare start a fleet of troop-ships for America. But all the Canadian militia were called out, which, with the available regulars, gave Montcalm a force of about 14,000 troops, besides some Indians, for the defense of Quebec.

Quebec, called the "Gibraltar of America," has one of the strongest positions, naturally, in the world, as viewed from the front. It stands upon a high point jutting out into the St. Lawrence, which here suddenly narrows to about 1,200 yards. At the foot of the steep bluff leading down from the Upper City lies a narrow space of flat ground occupied by the Lower City. The place was perfectly protected from the river side by forts and cannon. The principal defensive work was the stone citadel, whose artillery swept the river-front. Just below the town is the St. Charles River, unfordable. Its single bridge was defended by a bridge head, and its mouth was obstructed by a boom of logs. This boom was guarded by a battery of heavy guns, resting upon three sunken ships; and there were earthworks along the shore on either side. Three or four miles down the river are other high cliffs extending all the way to the Falls of Montmorenci. Between the foot of this line of cliffs and the river, lies a strand two or three hundred yards wide.

Montcalm did not seriously consider the probability of an attack on the up-stream side of the city—he did not suppose troops could be passed up in boats. So he stretched his army, below the town, from the St. Charles to the gorge of the Montmorenci. Among other means, the French had prepared a number of fire-ships with which they expected to destroy the

British ships. These were set on fire and started toward the British fleet; but the British sailors grappled them with iron hooks, and pulled them ashore, where they burned without doing any damage.

Wolfe dispatched a detachment to seize Point Levi, and he posted batteries there to shell Quebec. On the 8th of July several British frigates stood out in the stream and bombarded the part of the French lines on the heights just above the Falls of Montmorenci; and that night 3,000 British soldiers made a landing just below the falls. There they intrenched themselves.

On the 18th of July several British vessels safely ran past the batteries at Quebec, and destroyed some fire-ships and other craft above the town. Now, for the first time, Montcalm became alarmed about the defense at the upper side of the city, and dispatched a thousand or more men from his main line to that side. On the other hand, an English detachment dragged a fleet of boats over Point Levi, and made ready to embark in them for the opposite bank of the river.

Wolfe's army was now stretched from the Falls of Montmorenci to a point beyond Point Levi, and occupied four detached camps, no two of which could assist each other in case of attack. Montcalm lost his opportunity in not taking advantage of his condition. But the French stood strictly on the defensive. At the end of July the two armies were still watching each other across the St. Lawrence and the Montmorenci, each waiting for the other to strike. Wolfe resolved to attack the left wing of the French in front and flank.

At low tide the mouth of the Montmorenci could be crossed on the bar. During the day chosen to make the attack, feints were made along the right of the French line; but they failed to deceive Montcalm, who massed his troops on the left. The attack was made toward sunset, when the tide was out; but the British were repulsed with heavy loss.

TICONDEROGA AND CROWN POINT.

(1) Pitt had directed that a column should move by way of Ticonderoga and Crown Point, to operate in conjunction with Wolfe's against Montreal and Quebec. General Amherst commanded this column. Toward the end of June [1759], he had reached the head of Lake George, with 11,000 men, half regulars and half provincials.

Amherst was very cautious and methodical; he moved so slowly, and spent so much time building and repairing forts, as he went along, reconnoitering roads in all directions, and building a fleet on Lake Champlain, that, although the French abandoned Ticonderoga and Crown Point, without an effort to save them, and fell back to Isle-aux-Noix, cold weather had come on, before Amherst was ready to move beyond Crown Point. Here he stopped and spent the rest of the winter.

During the same time, a detachment was operating against the French post at Niagara, which it succeeded in capturing toward the end of the summer. "The capture of Niagara was an important stroke. Thenceforth Detroit, Michilimackinac, Illinois, and all the other French interior posts were severed from Canada, and left in helpless isolation."*

But the expedition against Niagara was none the less a mistake. "If, at the end of Winter [1758-9], Amherst had begun, as he might have done, the building of armed vessels at the head of Lake Champlain, he would have had a navy ready to his hand before August, and would have been able to follow the retreating French without delay, and to attack them at Isle-aux-Noix, before they had finished their fortifications. And if, at the same time, he had directed Prideaux, instead of attacking Niagara, to coöperate with him by descending the St. Lawrence to Montreal, the prospect was good that the two armies would have united at that place, and ended the campaign by the reduction of all Canada. In this case Niagara and all the western posts would have fallen without a blow."*

HEIGHTS OF ABRAHAM.

(8) After his repulse at the Heights of Montmorenci, Wolfe made every effort to induce the French to come out of their intrenchments and fight him in the open; but without avail. He had his detachments lay waste the country, devastating farms and destroying villages—making the war as uncomfortable as possible for the Canadians. But all their appeals for protection could not make Montcalm budge from his position.

Wolfe was desperate. He felt that he must do something; but the French position was so strong, he could find no point to strike with any hope of success. To make matters worse, he

*Parkman.

fell desperately ill. While still confined to his bed, at his camp near the mouth of the Montmorenci, he asked his three brigadier-generals to confer together and select a point of attack. They suggested attacking the upper side of the town, and Wolfe approved their suggestion. Accordingly, "with every fair wind, ships and transports" and lighters "passed the batteries of Quebec" to the upper river, and twelve hundred troops marched overland to embark in the vessels.

To oppose this force, Bougainville with 1,500 Frenchmen was sent to Cap-Rouge, about eight miles above Quebec. The French governor had made the mistake of running his frigates up the river, and taking away their sailors to man land batteries. Had these frigates been available now, they could have destroyed the British ships one at a time, as they came up stream.

British batteries at Point Levi continued to bombard Quebec, and on the 3rd of September Wolfe evacuated his camp at the mouth of the Montmorenci. Demonstrations were made against the French position at Cap-Rouge, and also below the city, at Beauport; and the fleet above the city drifted with the tide first down stream and then up. Meantime, Wolfe had discovered, with his telescope, a trail leading up to the heights above the town from Anse-du-Foulon, about two miles upstream from Quebec. It led up to the Plains of Abraham.

Montcalm had little fear of an attempt to scale these heights. He had said that a hundred men at this point could stop an army; and so they could, if they had stayed awake. The French were greatly perplexed by the movements of Wolfe's troops and ships. Winter was coming on, and they were in hopes it all meant that the English were making ready to sail away, before their ships got caught in the ice. They nevertheless kept watch all along the line. Montcalm believed that, if Wolfe attacked at all, he would attack below the city; so he remained himself at Beauport, and kept the bulk of his force there.

At 2 o'clock on the morning of September 13 [1759], the landing-boats cast off with Wolfe's army; and after twenty-four volunteers had surprised and captured, or put to flight, the company of Canadians guarding the trail leading up the heights from Anse-du-Foulon, the entire British force was put ashore. Up the trail, and through the rocks and brush, the soldiers clambered to the heights above; by six o'clock they were forming line on the Plains of Abraham.

"The plains were a tract of grass, tolerably level in most parts, patched here and there with cornfields, studded with clumps of bushes, and forming a part of the high plateau at the eastern end of which Quebec stood. On the south, it was bounded by the declivities along the St. Lawrence; on the north, by those along the St. Charles. . . . At the place that Wolfe chose for his battle-field, the plateau was less than a mile wide."* Quebec was hardly a mile away, but the view of the town was cut off by a wooded hill, called Buttes-à-Neveu. Upon this hill the first French soldiers appeared at about six o'clock.

All the evening before, the main British fleet had shelled the French camp at Beauport, and Montcalm had kept his troops on the alert there all night, fully expecting an attack. At day-break he heard cannon-fire above the town. The French batteries up the river were firing at the British ships in that quarter. Montcalm mounted his horse and started up the river. Suddenly he caught sight of the British troops on the Plains of Abraham. He had his army brought forward.

Wolfe's army was in line waiting to be attacked—he knew now that the French must come out and try to drive him away.

Montcalm's army was slow in getting up—due mainly to the meddling of the governor-general. Finally it formed, and skirmishing began. At ten o'clock, the French charged in three columns. "The British advanced a few rods, then halted and stood still. When the French were within forty yards," the British opened on them with volleys. "The advancing masses stopped short, and turned into a frantic mob, shouting, cursing, gesticulating."* Then the British charged, driving the French in rout before them. Wolfe led the charge, and was shot three times, and died on the field; Montcalm was carried away in the flight, and was mortally wounded.

But the British had to stop their pursuit, because the French force from Cap-Rouge was coming up in their rear; they had to turn and repel that foe. The British intrenched themselves upon the battle-field. They could not assault the town, which was defended by a wall and fortifications.

In this battle Wolfe had about 3,200 men engaged, and Montcalm, about 5,000. The British had succeeded in dragging one cannon up the heights; the French had but two on the field. The British loss was 664; the French, about 650. In the num-

*Parkman.

bers engaged the combat was a small affair; but in its results, it was one of the world's greatest battles; it gave Canada to England.

Wolfe took great chances. If he had been defeated, he would have been cut off and captured or destroyed. He had no line of retreat, nor way of escape. He fought against superior numbers, and, albeit his British regulars were better soldiers than the Canadians composing the bulk of Montcalm's force, if Montcalm's army had gone into the fight in better shape, and the detachment from Cap-Rouge, 2,000 men, had got up sooner, it is hard to see how the British could have been victorious.

Montcalm ought to have waited for the detachment from Cap-Rouge before assaulting. Moreover, there were other troops at Beauport, and in the city, that he ought to have had at his disposal; they were withheld by the governor. Montcalm also made the mistake of attacking with all his troops, instead of holding some in reserve. A strong reserve, put into the fight at the right moment and place, might have saved the day.

But fortune appears to have been on the side of the British in this engagement. In the first place, the French commander at Cap-Rouge had given orders for some transports to slip down to Quebec, keeping close to the shore, that night; and sentinels all along the shore had been cautioned not to fire on them, and not to attract the attention of the British ships to them. The transports were recalled, but the sentinels were not notified of it. This circumstance enabled the British boats to go along-shore without being fired upon, or causing the French camps to be alarmed. Then the neglect of the guard at the trail up the heights let the British pass. There were other lucky circumstances for the British.

FALL OF QUEBEC.

The death of Montcalm left Vaudreuil, the dishonest, incompetent governor-general, in full military, as well as civil, authority in Canada.

He had his routed army collected at Beauport. Instead of uniting it with the troops from Cap-Rouge, and attacking the small British force besieging Quebec, he fled with his command, and did not halt till he had reached Jacques Cartier, thirty miles up the river. Here he was met by General Lévis

from Montreal, who persuaded him to march back to the relief of the beleaguered city. But hardly had he started the army back, when he received word that the commandant at Quebec had already surrendered. He returned to Jacques Cartier.

The British navy and all troops, except about 3,000, sailed for England. General Murray was left to command the garrison at Quebec.

During the following winter there was continual petty warfare between English detachments from the garrison on one side and French and Indians on the other, and constant rumors of the advance of the French army from Montreal, to attack the garrison. But it was not until the end of April, 1760, that Lévis actually appeared with his army. Murray marched his little force of 3,000 out to meet his enemy, more than twice as strong; attacked him; lost a third of his force; and was driven back within the city walls.

Lévis laid siege to the town; but Murray made a stout defense, and kept him at bay, until a British fleet appeared in the river. The fleet destroyed Lévis's store-ships, which forced the French to raise the siege and retreat to Montreal.

(1) General Amherst, commander-in-chief of the British forces in America, now, in 1760, planned a combined movement of three columns for the capture of Montreal, and the completion of the conquest of Canada. Murray was to move up from Quebec; Haviland, with a column from Crown Point, was to advance by way of the Richelieu River; and he himself, with a column, was to march down the St. Lawrence.

This was a hazardous combination, as it gave the French forces, watching these three armies, the opportunity to unite and fall upon each column separately. But the French failed to take advantage of the opportunity, and opposed little real resistance to the advance of any one of the three British columns.

Early in September, 1760, the three British columns had united around Montreal; and the French army, under Vaudreuil, was invested in the town. On the morning of September 8 Vaudreuil signed articles of capitulation. By these articles Canada and all its dependencies passed to the British Crown. The cession was confirmed by the Treaty of Paris, signed February 10, 1763.

LECTURE II.

THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR.

NORTHERN CAMPAIGNS.

(9) However interesting the causes of the American Revolution and the political events that led up to it may be to us, we cannot, for lack of time, consider them here in detail. Suffice it to say that the wrongs were not all on one side, nor the rights all on the other.

All had gone well in the Colonies up to the close of the French Wars and the cession by France to England of Canada and the territory between the Alleghanies and the Mississippi by the Treaty of Paris in 1763. The colonies had furnished their quotas of men and money for those wars, and there had been no disloyalty. There had been a good deal of hard feeling on account of the contempt shown by the British regulars for their allies of the American militia in the French and Indian Wars, and the arrogance of the British officers; and there had been much discontent and complaint on account of the billeting of British troops upon the people. But there had been no rupture. In all those wars, however, the colonies had done about as they pleased. There were laws for their government, but so necessary had been their good-will and support to the mother country during the wars with France, that the laws which did not please them had practically become a dead letter.

About the only real bond that tied them to the authority of England, was the colonial governors; but they were dependent upon the behest of the colonial legislatures for their pay; so their vetoes were easily bought off. Of a truth, the provincial legislatures brought the governors to terms, by refusing to vote their salaries.*

There were customs laws and various other laws for taxing the colonists; but all of them were ignored. Such a state of things England was obliged to tolerate during all the years during which she had the French on her hands in America.

*Franklin's Works.

But after the Treaty of Paris rid her of this restraint, she set about treating her colonists as real subjects.

She imposed a light tax in the shape of stamps on legal documents; but it was received with such denunciation of word and deed by the colonists that it was soon repealed; not, however, until the stamp office at Boston and the houses of the stamp distributor and Governor Hutchinson had been destroyed by mobs.* She undertook to collect the tariff; but smuggling went on openly by the colonists. There was a tariff of a shilling a pound on tea in England; while the colonists smuggled theirs in free from Holland. When the government undertook to thwart them, by putting a duty of three pence on the tea, to be collected from the East India Company in America, in lieu of the shilling in England, the colonists refused to let it be paid, and forced the consignees of the cargoes to resign. From Philadelphia and New York the ships sailed quietly back to England. "In Charleston the tea was landed, but was seized by the collector and stored in damp cellars, where it rotted."† At Boston the ships were surely between Scylla and Charybdis. Governor Hutchinson would not let them return to England; and that great agitator, Samuel Adams, got up a mob which threw the tea overboard.

Previous to this event British troops had been quartered on the people of Boston, for the purpose of assisting the governor and customs officers to carry out the law. The billeting of troops was one of the colonists' chief grievances. The people jeered at the soldiers, and insulted them, on all occasions; and finally a crowd of them struck a soldier with a missile. This was too much for the British soldiers to submit to. The upshot was, that five or six of Boston's ruffians were killed.

So matters went from bad to worse.

All this while, a large part of the people were loyal to England—probably a majority; certainly a majority of the better classes. Even John Adams admitted that one-third of the people were loyalists. But while the liberty-loving pamphleteers were writing about the "rights of man," thousands of our patriotic ancestors were subjecting innocent, but loyal, persons to every sort of indignity and torture. Tar and feathers were made use of, but there were other methods, one of which was the "water-cure." The water, however, was strengthened with tea; no doubt without sugar. A contemporary English engraving illustrates this process. A loyalist, clad in tar and

*Goldwin Smith.

†Sloane.

feathers, is having tea poured down his throat to overflowing, by five patriots, under a tree labeled "Liberty Tree." Above his head dangles a noose; and in the back-ground the famous Boston Tea Party appears on a ship, casting boxes of tea overboard.* There was absolutely no freedom of press or tongue, save for those that expressed opinions against the government.

Thousands of loyalists, of course, quitted the country and went to Canada or back to England. A Canadian historian has written as follows: "It is but truth to say the loyalists (that is the Tories of the American Revolution) were the makers of Canada. They were an army of leaders. The most influential judges, the most distinguished lawyers, the most capable and prominent physicians, the most highly educated clergy, the members of the council of various colonies, the crown officials, the people of culture and social distinction—these, with the faithful few whose fortune followed theirs, were the loyalists. Canada owes deep gratitude to her southern kinsmen, who thus, from Maine to Georgia, picked out their choicest spirits, and sent them forth to people our northern wilds."†

After the Tea Party, the British authorities closed the port of Boston and demanded that the city should pay for the tea. Closing the port soon threw a great many persons out of employment, and caused much suffering and hardship in Boston. Food and supplies had to be contributed from all parts of the colonies. Then came the Continental Congress, which met in Philadelphia, and passed resolutions, condemning the acts of the government; and drew up a petition, and a bill of rights, to present to the King.

Of course, the colonists got much encouragement from England. There were two political parties there, and many Americans believed that, if the Whigs could get into power and stay in long enough, their grievances would all be redressed; just as the Philippine insurgents believe that, if Mr. Bryan should be elected, "independencia" would be granted to them forthwith. There are, indeed, many points of likeness between the Philippine Insurrection and our own Revolution; but there is one main difference: our Revolution succeeded. Had it failed, it would be in the world's annals merely an insurrection, too, occupying a few pages in British history, and having no national history of its own.

By the winter of 1774, civil government in Massachusetts

*See *The True History of the American Revolution*,—Fisher.

†*Historians' History*.

had ceased. "British officials were driven out of the country by terrorism and mob violence. The rebels had organized a government of their own, independent of General Gage and the charter." They were drilling a militia of their own, seizing arms, ammunition, and artillery; casting cannon balls, and looking for blacksmiths that could forge musket-barrels. Early in 1775 Parliament declared Massachusetts in rebellion, and passed the Fisheries Bill, by which all the trade of the New England colonies was to be confined by force to Great Britain and the British West Indies. It prohibited the New England colonies from trading with one another.

Then fell that 19th of April, 1775, when the first gun was fired at Lexington; and the Revolutionary War was on. General Gage had sent out 800 soldiers in the night, from Boston, for the purpose of seizing a lot of rebel supplies at Concord, as well as those two arch rebels John Hancock and Sam. Adams. But Paul Revere, the silver-smith that rode the galloping horse, had made his famous midnight ride to carry the news. You all know the upshot of it. The British regulars retreated to Boston. (10) Then the patriot farmers shouldered their fowling-pieces or muskets, and flocked to Boston; and soon General Gage's little garrison of British regulars was besieged by a motley collection of rebels.

(11) On May 10, 1775, those two daring spirits, Benedict Arnold and Ethan Allen, had the temerity to attack the two British forts on Lake Champlain, Ticonderoga and Crown Point; and they captured them. Later in this same month, General Sir William Howe, with Generals John Burgoyne and Henry Clinton, arrived at Boston with reinforcements, which raised General Gage's army to 10,000.

(10) On looking over to Breed's Hill, on the morning of June 17, 1775, General Gage saw that it was occupied by a rebel force behind breastworks. It was Prescott with Israel Putnam, and John Stark, and about 1,500 Americans. Gage sent General Howe and Pigott over with about 2,500 red-coats to make the usual English frontal attack, instead of shutting the rebels up by putting troops on the neck of land connecting the peninsula upon which Breed's Hill stood with the mainland. Howe knew better; but he obeyed the order of his commander. After several desperate assaults by the British, the Americans were driven out, for lack of ammunition. The British lost 1,054 men. This was the battle of Bunker Hill.

The rebels went back to their lines. Here George Wash-

ington, by appointment of the Continental Congress, which was again in session at Philadelphia, took command of this Continental Army, on July 2, 1775. It was like many another insurgent force—a rabble without uniforms, without tents, without supplies, without discipline. Washington's task was to turn it into an army, and the only requisite he was to have, was time. Of time there was plenty; for no fighting took place within the northern colonies, until the Battle of Long Island, more than a year later, August 27, 1776.

In the summer of 1775 the Continental Congress passed a resolution raising eight companies of riflemen in Pennsylvania, two in Maryland, and two in Virginia, which were added to Washington's army at Cambridge. The rifles were supposed to be able to kill at 300 yards, while the muskets of the British were hardly dangerous at a hundred paces. Washington's army never numbered, this year, more than 16,000 men, and, as its soldiers came and went about as they pleased, it fell to some 10,000 by the winter of 1775-6; and there were weeks at a time when it had no powder except what was in the powder-horns carried by the men.

At length Washington got a few cannon, and, on the night of March 4, 1776, posted them on Dorchester Heights; a few days later he pushed them forward to Nooks Hill. Thereupon General Howe, who had succeeded Gage, evacuated Boston, and sailed with his army for Halifax. And strangest thing of all, he left there, to be seized by the rebels, "more than 200 cannon, tons of powder and lead, thousands of muskets, and all sorts of miscellaneous military stores."* It was not until the 17th of March that he sailed—twelve days after Washington had seized the heights. He certainly had time to destroy those arms and supplies. This and all of General Howe's subsequent conduct cannot fail to make the impartial student suspect him. He was a Whig, and all the Whigs back in England rejoiced when he withdrew his army to Halifax.

It must be remembered that the Whig party in England was opposed to the war; its members did as much by their speeches and writings to encourage the American insurgents in their struggle for liberty, as we saw the same class of patriots in the United States do for the Philippine insurgents, while we were struggling with them in the tropic bosque.

Why did Howe go to Halifax? Five months before, he had declined the order of the Ministry to take his army to Long

*Fisher.

Island, where it would have been among loyalists, and easily supplied, on the ground that he had not enough shipping. He ought now to have sailed for Long Island or Staten Island. Such a movement would have had the appearance of a change of base, while the withdrawal to Halifax was, in the eyes of the Americans, as much an acknowledgment of defeat, as much a retreat, as if he had sailed for England. So much did it encourage the colonists that the Declaration of Independence followed a few months afterwards.

The British government now redoubled its efforts. It had a plan for the reduction of the colonists.

GEOGRAPHY.

(9) It is seen from the map, that the thirteen original colonies occupied a comparatively narrow strip of the Atlantic coast, 1,000 miles long. There were about fifteen good harbors.* All the important towns were on the seashore, or on large waterways not far inland. Hudson River, and Chesapeake Bay with its tributary the Susquehanna River, divided the country into three parts. If these waters could be held and guarded by the British, the rebellion would be split in three pieces. There were few roads in the country, and those few were poor and lay close to the sea, or in the river valleys. So the British must have their base on the coast, and must stay close to the waterways. Indeed, they never got many miles away from the seashore and the main river valleys.

PLANS OF THE BRITISH.

The general plan which the British Ministry proposed, but never could get carried out, was as follows: "To occupy such portion of the territory as would effectually break up the union of the patriots, and prevent intercourse among them; to blockade the coast and prevent supplies from entering by the sea; to destroy any organized armies the colonists might form; and then to suppress by degrees the guerrilla warfare into which an unsuccessful insurrection usually degenerates.

"The strategy" of the British, "as it gradually unfolded itself, was, first of all, to occupy New York City, and make that the headquarters of British control. From New York City the

*Maine was not one of the separate thirteen original colonies, but was a part of Massachusetts.

line of the Hudson Valley all the way to Canada must be secured, which would immediately isolate New England, the hot-bed of sedition, from the other colonies, and cut off not merely the interchange of ideas, encouragement, and reinforcements of troops; but also the provisions and supplies which New England drew from the more fertile agricultural communities to the south.

"In New England itself they finally decided to hold only one point, Newport, because it was the most convenient harbor south of Halifax for vessels to enter and take shelter in.

"South of New York the strategic position was the line of Chesapeake Bay, with strong positions in Maryland and Virginia, as at Alexandria and Annapolis, with, perhaps, part of the Susquehanna River. This line, if well held, would isolate the middle from the southern colonies and stop communication. As for the South, the best method of controlling it was found to be by occupying Charleston, Georgetown, and two or three points on the Santee River in South Carolina.

"It is easy to see that, if this strategy had been vigorously carried out with sufficient force, aided by the blockade of the coast, there was every probability that the patriot party would soon have been driven to mere guerrillaism, and from that to a retreat beyond the Alleghanies. . . .

"As the war developed, only part of the British plan could be carried out. Newport was held during most of the war, as was also New York, until after the treaty of peace. But . . . the vital line of the Hudson to Canada could not be secured. The position on Chesapeake Bay was not seriously attempted. It would have required a larger force than could be spared from more important places."*

AMERICAN PLAN.

The plan of the Americans was the simple defensive—to oppose the British as best they could at every point, and to hold fast the line of the Hudson. About the only offensive movement made by them, was the joint expedition of Montgomery and Arnold to Canada, in 1775. Montgomery went up by way of Lake Champlain with the main force, and Arnold with 1,100 men marched through the forests of Maine. Montgomery defeated a British force under Carleton and captured Mon-

*Fisher.

treachery. When the two American columns joined in front of Quebec, "there were but a thousand Americans in all, for at the end of their term of enlistment Montgomery's men had left for home in troops." They nevertheless invested the town. Carleton held the citadel with 1,600 men. On the last day of the year the Americans attacked the town and were repulsed. Montgomery was slain. Arnold with the remnant of the force, some 800 men, continued the siege. It did not much incommode Carleton, whose men were well housed and well fed; he patiently allowed the winter's cold and sickness to defeat his courageous foe. In the following spring Washington dispatched eight regiments of reinforcements; a little later a large reinforcement of British also arrived. The Americans then began a retreat, which was turned into a rout by a sortie of the enemy. Early in July the remnant of the Americans were back at Crown Point.*

The double purpose of this expedition was to forestall and prevent an advance of the British southward through the Hudson Valley, and to incite a rebellion against the British among the French Canadians. Neither end was achieved.

(12) The Americans could not keep the British from getting possession of New York City; but, by holding the Highland Passes and the forts near West Point, and by defeating and capturing Burgoyne's army when it came down from Canada, they effectually "prevented the British from securing control of the line of the Hudson Valley. This was the great contention and controlling motive of the first three years of the war." "West Point and the Highland Passes constituted the most important American strategic positions."† If Benedict Arnold's treachery had succeeded in delivering West Point to the British, the war might have ended sooner and otherwise.

OPERATIONS.

(13) After the withdrawal of Howe's army from Boston in March, 1775, Washington transferred the bulk of his force, only about 8,000 men, to New York City and its vicinity, which, it was believed, would be Howe's next objective.

Washington was unable to oppose any resistance to the landing of the British; and by June 28, 1776, General Howe had

*Sloane.

†Fisher.

landed his army on Staten Island. He had about 30,000 troops, supported by a powerful fleet under his brother, Admiral Howe. Washington, whose army now numbered some 18,000 men, knew very well that he could not hold New York, and he ought to have withdrawn at once to the open. But the Continental Congress would not hear to the withdrawal. The city was commanded by Brooklyn Heights, and the only chance Washington had of holding it, was to put his whole force on Brooklyn Heights. But he divided it, keeping part in New York, and placing part in Brooklyn under General Putnam.

(14) On August 22 Howe took 15,000 or 20,000 troops and forty guns over from Staten Island, landed on Long Island, and, after reconnoitering four days, made a skilful turning movement against Putnam, and routed him.

The British fleet was to have pushed up East River to co-operate with the army, but it was prevented by the wind, which was from the northeast. Washington brought reinforcements across from New York next day. Howe made no effort to push his victory, and Washington succeeded in withdrawing his force back to the New York side of East River.

Instead of following up his advantage, Howe remained on Long Island more than two weeks. Then he crossed his army over, and landed it about where Thirty-third street is now, "and drove away the militia posted there in headlong flight."* Washington withdrew his army to the north end of the island and took a position on Harlem Heights. Howe took possession of New York City. On the 16th of September he made a frontal attack upon Washington's position at Harlem Heights, and was repulsed.

(13) Howe now divided his army into three parts. The first was to guard the intrenchments of New York City; the second was to sail up North River and prevent Washington from crossing into New Jersey. Howe with the third and largest force was to land at Throgs Neck and cut off the American line of supply, which had its base in Connecticut. After another long and unnecessary delay, Howe landed his force at Throgs Neck, on the 16th of October. Here he allowed a small creek and a marsh to detain him six days longer; which gave Washington time to withdraw his command to White Plains. Not until October the 28th did Howe attack this position. Three

*Henry Cabot Lodge.

days later Washington withdrew to a very strong position at North Castle, a short way from White Plains.

On November 5 Howe transferred his camp to Dobbs Ferry. He was there in position to move up the Hudson, to unite with a force under Carleton from Canada; to attack Fort Washington; or to cross the river and move against Philadelphia, the Continental Capital. His real purpose was to draw Washington out of his unassailable position at North Castle.

To meet these three contingencies, Washington crossed to the west side of the Hudson with 5,000 men; he sent 3,000 to Peekskill and West Point, to build forts to guard the river; and left 7,000 under General Charles Lee at North Castle, to coöperate in whatever quarter General Howe's next move should threaten. At the same time, he resolved to abandon Forts Lee and Washington, as they had failed to stop the British fleet in its passage up the river, and were therefore of no further use. Congress, however, forbade their abandonment; within a fortnight both were captured by the British. General Greene escaped from Fort Lee, with his little garrison, but at Fort Washington, 150 Americans were killed, and 3,000 captured by the troops under Howe.

Washington established his camp at Hackensack, but, appreciating how unsafe he should be there, between the Hackensack and the Passaic Rivers, in case a large force should come down upon him from the north, he crossed the Passaic River on the 21st of November, and marched to Newark. Here he stayed five days, urging General Charles Lee all the while to bring over his command. Lee made one excuse and another, and delayed until December 1.

On November 28 General Cornwallis, with 5,000 troops, advanced on Newark, and Washington retreated to New Brunswick. Cornwallis pursued, not very vigorously, to New Brunswick, and Washington continued his retreat to Princeton. By this time Washington had lost so many men, mainly by expiration of their terms of service, that, without his having risked a fight, his army was reduced to 3,000.

At New Brunswick General Howe joined Cornwallis with reinforcements, and continued the pursuit of Washington to Trenton. Washington crossed the Delaware, but was pushed no farther by Howe. Howe apparently considered Washington's army so reduced and demoralized as to be unworthy of further pursuit. It had ceased to exert the "power of attraction." So Howe posted his army in comfortable quarters

along a very extended front, with its center at Trenton, and its headquarters twenty miles in rear, at New Brunswick; detached a large force from it to "take possession of Newport as a convenient station for British ships entering Long Island Sound";* and he and Cornwallis repaired to New York City. Here he and his brother, the admiral, issued a proclamation granting pardon to all citizens that would take the oath of allegiance to the British Crown.

Meantime General Charles Lee had brought his command, now reduced to about 4,000, across to Morristown, and, fortunately for the army, and the American cause, had been himself captured by the British; and General Gates, with about 3,000 Americans, was in the northern part of New Jersey. These troops all joined Washington on the right bank of the Delaware, raising his little army to about 6,000 effectives.

Seeing how carelessly the British were guarding their camps, Washington determined to take advantage of it. He planned to cross the Delaware in three columns and attack the enemy at Burlington and Trenton. The column led by himself was the only one that got across; on Christmas night it came down upon the garrison of Hessians at Trenton, surprising them, and capturing 1,000 of them. Washington had two men killed, four wounded, and two frozen to death. He now occupied Trenton.

The victory of Trenton, insignificant as it was in point of the numbers engaged, was a very important one for Washington and the American cause. It was Washington's first victory; it roused the waning spirits of the people, and hushed the epithet of "Fabius Cunctator" which Washington's friends had applied to him in apology, and his enemies, in derision. X

Cornwallis hastened back from New York, and, quickly collecting 7,000 or 8,000 troops at Princeton, set out with them on the 2nd of January, 1777, to attack Washington at Trenton. (15) Washington withdrew to the south side of the Assanpink River, and kept the British back all one day. Cornwallis planned to cross the next morning above the American position, fall upon Washington's right flank, and force him back upon the Delaware. But in the night Washington slipped away to Princeton, where he routed three regiments moving out to reinforce Cornwallis at Trenton. (13) Washington moved on to Morristown, where he established his headquar-

*Fiske's *The American Revolution*.

ters. Here he was on the flank of the British line of communications with New York. To avoid this danger, Cornwallis withdrew in all haste to New Brunswick. A few days later Putnam advanced from Philadelphia and occupied Princeton. After this the line of the American army extended from Princeton to the Hudson River, and the British were confined, in New Jersey, to Paulus Hook, Perth Amboy, and New Brunswick.

Washington spent the rest of the winter in trying to reorganize his army and to make it more efficient.

OPERATIONS OF 1777.

(9) The plans of the British Ministry for their campaign in 1777 contemplated a concerted movement of three columns, to get possession of the Hudson River Valley. Burgoyne, with one column, was to move down from Canada by way of Lake Champlain, and Howe's column was to move up from New York and form a junction with him at Albany. (11) A third column, under Colonel St. Leger, was to move up the St. Lawrence to Lake Ontario, land at Oswego, and, with the assistance of Iroquois Indians and loyalists under Sir John Johnston, capture the American Fort Stanwix, and move down the Mohawk Valley to join the other two columns.

Burgoyne started with about 8,000 men on June 1. and, on July 1. had reached Ticonderoga. He recaptured this fort, and, leaving a garrison in it, continued south with the rest of his column. He sent 1,000 of his German contingent to capture some horses and supplies that the Americans had collected at Bennington; but the detachment was attacked and defeated, and most of them captured, by the Green Mountain militia, under Colonel John Stark of Bunker Hill fame. Meantime St. Leger's mixed command, after a hand-to-hand combat at Oriskany with a body of patriots under Nicholas Herkimer, one of the most desperate and bloody in all our annals, had continued the siege of Fort Stanwix. But Arnold soon came up the valley with a relieving force, and, with wonderful skill and daring, managed to disperse the allies of St. Leger, and send him and his British soldiers back in flight to Canada.

The American forces under General Schuyler had fallen back before Burgoyne, and on August 19 were stationed on the west bank of the Hudson, between Stillwater, and the mouth of the Mohawk; while Burgoyne's were camped on the eastern bank some thirty miles higher up, from Fort Edward down to the

Battenkill. For three weeks no movement was made on either side. Burgoyne was waiting for Howe and St. Leger to join him.

"Burgoyne's situation was now becoming critical. Lincoln, with a strong force of militia was hovering in his rear, while the main army before him was gaining numbers day by day. Putnam had sent up reinforcements from the Highlands; Washington had sent Morgan with 500 sharpshooters; and Arnold was hurrying back from Fort Stanwix. Not a word had come from Sir William Howe, and it daily grew more difficult to get provisions."*

(16) Schuyler had been relieved by the Continental Congress, and General Gates had, by underhand scheming, secured his command. Burgoyne resolved to try to fight his way out of his dilemma. So he crossed the Hudson on the 13th of September, and on the 19th moved against Gates's army in a strongly fortified position on Bemis Heights. Arnold met him and attacked him with 3,000 Americans at Freeman's Farm, while Gates remained in his stronghold with 11,000 more Americans. If Gates had sent reinforcements, as Arnold begged him to do, the Americans would probably have gained a decisive victory. As it was, Burgoyne bivouacked on the battle-field.

(17) Burgoyne renewed the attack on October 7, and tried to turn the American left; but Morgan fell upon his right, and Arnold struck his center, and he was discomfited. (11) In his attempt to retreat Burgoyne was cut off and surrounded by Gates's army, which now numbered more than 20,000. He surrendered at Saratoga on the 17th of October.

HOWE'S CAMPAIGN AT PHILADELPHIA.

(13) Meantime let us see what General Howe was doing, whom the British Ministry expected to coöperate with Burgoyne and St. Leger. Howe's orders were not positive. The Ministry did what is generally the proper thing to do—left him some discretion. It was not, however, best in this case, since Burgoyne had the Ministry's positive order to form a junction with Howe; while Howe made the junction impossible by moving his army in an opposite direction.

Howe started on June 12, and concentrated 18,000 men at

*Fiske.

New Brunswick, for a movement on Philadelphia, the American Capital. Washington moved down 8,000 men from Morristown, and took up a strong position flanking Howe's line of march. Howe then wasted more than two weeks maneuvering, instead of attacking Washington; then, on June 30, he evacuated New Jersey, and withdrew his whole army to Staten Island. "Howe next embarked his men on ships, but kept in the vicinity of New York, making a number of feints, first up the Hudson, then into the sound, then past Sandy Hook, so that people might doubt whether his destination were Albany, Boston, or Philadelphia. Washington reasonably supposed Howe would go up the Hudson; so he moved back to Morristown, sent a division as far as Pompton to coöperate with West Point, and finally himself went to Haverstraw, sending two divisions across the river to Peekskill."*

At last Howe put to sea with 18,000 men, leaving General Clinton with 7,000 to garrison New York, and to assist Burgoyne, "if circumstances warranted." "Clinton did his utmost. He waited for some 1,700 reinforcements that were to arrive, and then started up the Hudson with only two or three thousand men, meeting with some success." But he was too late; and his little command was too small to have saved Burgoyne, even if he had been able to join him.

When Washington was assured that Howe had sailed southward, he marched his army to the Delaware, to meet him.

(9) Howe's ships arrived at the mouth of the Delaware River, then sailed out to sea again; and Washington was again in a quandary, whether he had sailed back to the Hudson or gone to Charleston. In either case Washington could do no good with his army on the Delaware; so he was about to start back to New York, to look after Clinton, when Howe's ships appeared at Elkton, at the head of Chesapeake Bay—thirteen miles overland from the mouth of the Delaware, where they had been twenty-four days before. Howe could have landed and marched to Elkton unopposed, and saved his men that voyage of twenty-four days.

(18) Howe now started toward Philadelphia. Washington met him on the Brandywine, and posted the center of his line at Chadd's Ford. (19) Howe sent Knyphausen against this point, and Cornwallis turned Washington's right flank. The Americans fell back to Chester. This was the Battle of

*Lecture by Capt. Clarke.

Brandywine, September 11, 1777. This action was followed by a fortnight of skirmishing and maneuvering; and Howe was kept out of Philadelphia until September 26. (18) Howe made his headquarters at Germantown, and Cornwallis put his in Philadelphia.

(20) Howe detached a considerable force to aid his brother's fleet in reducing Forts Mifflin and Mercer, which guarded the Delaware below Philadelphia. His camp at Germantown was seven miles from that of Cornwallis in Philadelphia. Washington determined to take advantage of the situation to attack him at Germantown. The attack was made early in the morning of October the 4th, and might have succeeded but for blunders and mishaps due mainly to a dense fog.

(18) Howe's army spent the winter of 1777-8 in Philadelphia; and Washington's, at Valley Forge, in a bend of the Schuylkill River, about twenty-four miles above Philadelphia. Howe resigned, and Sir Henry Clinton took command of the British Army.

The capture and occupation of Philadelphia by the British had no important effect on the war. Philadelphia was the Continental Capital; but the Congress had fled to York, where it performed its functions just as well, and just as ill, as at Philadelphia. And Philadelphia was a poor base from which to operate. Sir Henry Clinton purposed conducting a far more vigorous campaign than Howe had conducted. He determined, therefore, to evacuate Philadelphia and take his army back to New York City. For certain reasons he decided to march it across New Jersey, rather than to take it round by water.

(13) Accordingly he evacuated Philadelphia June 18, 1778, with 10,000 to 15,000 men. Washington's army marched on a road farther north, converging upon the road taken by the British. Clinton's only desire was to get his army into New York; and Washington, whose army was about the size of Clinton's, did not feel like making an attack without an excellent chance of victory. (21) At Monmouth, on the 28th of June, such a chance was offered him, and he attacked; but, owing to the treachery or cowardice of that pusillanimous deserter from the British army, General Charles Lee, he failed to win a victory. Lee led the attack, but at the critical moment, with everything in his favor, he fell back. Washington came up in time to save a rout; but gained nothing by the battle. The fine conduct of the American rank and file in the battle of Monmouth

bore witness to the benefits of the drill and training they had received at Valley Forge, under Baron Steuben.

(13) Clinton marched his army to Sandy Hook, and there embarked it for New York. Washington marched his to White Plains; and after July 20, 1778, the two hostile armies were right where they had started from in 1776.

COMMENTS.

General Howe's conduct of the operations in the American Revolution is still an unsolved mystery; and when we study that war, we can but congratulate ourselves that he, and not Sir Henry Clinton, was in command of the British forces for the first three years; and that Lord George Germain was Colonial Secretary, and not John Chamberlain of the next century.

Judged by the reputation he had already won, General Howe was probably the best general in the British service. He had fought with Wolfe in Canada, and had proved himself a brilliant, courageous, and active soldier. He was still young for his rank, being not yet fifty years old. So his inactivity, his sloth, his apparent timidity, his lack of persistence, make one marvel for an explanation.

When he took command at Boston, he had a splendid little army of 10,000 British regulars; yet he sat there besieged by a motley aggregation of undisciplined Americans; and, in nearly a year, made not a single effort to break the siege. All the while, too, he had full command of the sea. He knew that Dorchester Heights and Nooks Hill commanded the town, yet he never occupied them. When the Americans put a few guns on them, after months of waiting, he evacuated the town, leaving the Americans a large number of cannon and muskets, and vast quantities of ammunition and supplies, which he might just as easily have destroyed.

Howe was a good tactician, too—he knew how to fight a battle. We saw how prettily he turned Putnam's flank on Long Island, and Washington's at Brandywine; but there it ended. He never pushed his victory. He could easily have killed or captured every American soldier on Long Island, if he had tried; and possibly have ended the rebellion then and there. But he gave Washington plenty of time to take his army back across the East River.

General Howe constantly exemplified the worst fault that a soldier or an army can have—the fault of inactivity, of moving,

and doing things, slowly. He landed on Staten Island, June 28, with his whole army; but it was not till August 27 that he attacked the Americans on Brooklyn Heights. Then he waited two weeks and crossed to Manhattan Island; then waited till September 16, before attacking Washington at Harlem Heights. Then he rested again, till the 16th of October, to move his army to Throgs Neck; then, till October 28 before attacking Washington at White Plains. When Washington retreated into New Jersey, instead of pursuing his demoralized little band to its destruction, Howe followed it slowly a short way, and then stopped and gave it time to recruit and reorganize. So it was throughout the time that Howe commanded the British troops. He made no attempt to do anything at all during the winter months but riot in the fleshpots and frivolities of social life in New York or Philadelphia.

The explanation of it all may be that General Howe did not care to punish the Continental army too severely. He kept hoping all the while that the colonists would come to their senses, see the hopelessness of their struggle, and lay down their arms. He and Admiral Howe were Whigs, and their sympathies were with the Colonies. "As a member of Parliament he had pledged himself to his constituents not to fight against the Americans, and he must have been fettered by that pledge."* In America the brothers published proclamations offering amnesty to all who would lay down their arms. It is too much to say that he was unfaithful to the trust imposed upon him, although the evidence certainly points to that verdict.

The plan of capturing the line of the Hudson River, in 1777, by three converging columns was poor strategy. Especially so, because the two columns from Canada had such long lines of march, over such bad roads, and through country in which supplies were so hard to get. It gave the Americans an opportunity to unite their forces and meet the columns one at a time, and defeat them separately—the advantage of "interior lines." Yet, considering that the Americans were but poorly organized insurgents, the British Ministry was probably excusable in adopting such a plan. And the plan probably would have succeeded, if General Howe had marched his army up from New York, to join the other two, as he was expected to do. Instead of which, he took his army to Phila-

*Goldwin Smith.

delphia, and let Burgoyne be captured. There was a time when Burgoyne could have made good his retreat to Canada; but he felt he must push on to form a junction with Howe, who, he supposed, was advancing to meet him.

No doubt the object of St. Leger's expedition was to get the assistance of the Indians and Sir John Johnson's loyalists. But it cannot be seen what advantage the British Ministry hoped to gain by two converging columns with independent lines of operation, and independent bases hundreds of miles apart,—the columns of Burgoyne and Howe,—which they would not have gained by a single column, equal in strength to both of these, advancing up the Hudson from New York. Burgoyne's troops might better have been sent round from Canada to New York by water. The British Ministry was, doubtless, influenced by the fact that every invasion made into New York in the past, during the French and Indian wars, had gone by way of the Richelieu River and Lake Champlain; but the case was different now, in that the British held New York City as a base, while the French never had done so. Another purpose of Burgoyne's column was, of course, to cover Canada.

The British Ministry was a Tory ministry, but so large a part of the British people was opposed to the war and in sympathy with the colonies, that the Ministry undoubtedly wanted to bring about peace with as little bloodshed, and as much conciliation, as possible. Otherwise it would not have tolerated the two Whig Howes as long as it did. It is certain, in fact, that the Ministry instructed General Howe as to the manner of conducting the operations, enjoining conciliatory measures; just as, according to common belief, our Administration at Washington enjoined conciliatory measures upon our commander at Manila, in his early dealings with the Philippine insurgents. The consequences were unfortunate in both cases.

The lesson the British Government learned by the war, was, not to hold out the sword and the olive branch to rebellious colonies at the same time. The sword first and the olive branch afterwards,—this has been the British policy since; and we have seen how well it succeeded in the South African War.

The lesson that the American people might have learned, but did not, is the impossibility of carrying on successfully, sustained operations, extending over many months of time, and many miles of distance, with undisciplined, short-term militia. Washington's complaints of his militia were pathetic. It is not so much the strife of battle that tries the discipline of soldiers,

as it is the fatigue of long, hard marches; the dreariness of prolonged, uncomfortable encampments; the disappointment of defeat; the discouragement and hardship of retreat.

Our history has chosen well in making Washington the hero of the war and the times. It was only his unswerving sense of duty, his patience, tact, strength of purpose, patriotism, and tenacity, that held his little army together during those trying years of defeat and constant retreat. Those qualities of the man and the commander were even more marked in Washington than were his brilliancy and skill as a general. Yet he quickly learned strategy; his attack at Trenton, and his escape from Cornwallis there, afterwards, and his combat at Princeton, and his occupation of Morristown on the flank of the enemy's line of communication, were after the manner of Stonewall Jackson. They were brilliant little feats of strategy; they recovered New Jersey from the British and revived the hopes of the people. His position at Morristown, on the flank of Howe's line of operations from New York to Philadelphia, also thwarted the British commander's overland advance against the Continental Capital in June, 1777, and forced him to take his army round by sea.

It is not hard, however, to point out mistakes made by Washington; it is strange that he made no more. Where is the surgeon that can perform a capital operation without previous study, and training in a hospital? The science of strategy is more complicated than that of surgery, and the masters of strategy have been fewer by hundreds than the masters of surgery. The little actual experience that Washington had gained in the French and Indian War, was no more than the experience of surgery gained by the nurse in a hospital. He was not a student of military history; he had certainly never studied "again and again the campaigns of Alexander, Hannibal, Cæsar, Gustavus Adolphus, Turenne, Eugene, and Frederick," like Napoleon. If he had, he would not have divided his little army between New York and Brooklyn, thus giving Howe the opportunity to beat it in detail. Nor again would he have split his army into pieces, when Howe, finding it impregnable at North Castle, transferred his own command to Dobbs Ferry. Washington ought to have kept his force intact at North Castle, not so much with the view of covering his line of communication with Connecticut, because he could live off the country, but because his strength and his chance of beating the enemy depended upon his keeping his troops in a single body

under his own immediate command. When he divided his force, and led a part of it across the Hudson to stand between Howe and Philadelphia, he did precisely what Howe wanted him to do. He also wholly lost control of the larger part of his army, the part left at North Castle under Lee, and he saw his own detachment become so reduced, as no longer to attract Howe's pursuit. It no way barred Howe's march to Philadelphia, if he had wished to take the city at that time. What it did, incidentally, was to lead the enemy away from New England, and to leave that favored soil free from the ravages of hostile armies, as it has been in every other war the United States have waged. But Washington did not lead Howe's army into New Jersey on purpose; in truth, he wholly neglected to make use of what von der Goltz declares to be the most effective lever that the leader of a retreating army has to guide matters according to his own wishes; namely, "the power of attraction."

Another lesson that American statesmen might have learned from the Revolutionary War, is how not to finance a war. That they did not take this lesson to heart, was evidenced later, in the Civil War, when both the United States and the Confederate governments followed the same fiscal method as that of our Revolutionary fathers; namely, the manufacture of paper money.* The people of the colonies, as a whole, were rich and prosperous; yet the Continental Congress was too weak in authority or in courage to tax them. It preferred to borrow all it could from France, and to make paper money for the balance; which immediately began to depreciate, and soon became a byword for worthlessness. Not to be worth a "continental" was not to be worth anything at all. With such currency the Government paid its troops; and to this cause alone most of Washington's trouble in keeping his ranks filled may be charged. In respect of its finance, the short-lived insurgent government of Aguinaldo was far ahead of that of our forefathers of the Revolution. It manufactured no paper promises-to-pay; but paid its soldiers in silver coin. Hence there was never a time when there were not thrice as many insurgent soldiers in the Philippine bosque as there were arms for them. The government collected its revenue from

*In this respect the United States were even worse than the Confederacy, for they not only manufactured paper money with nothing behind it but the hope and good will of the Government, but they also made it a legal tender for all private and nearly all public debts.

the people according to their means. The rich were made to contribute hard cash. Such was not the case in America during the Revolution.

There is no more shameful page in all our national history than the page that relates that Washington had to pledge his own fortune to sustain his barefooted army in the winter of 1776-'77. John Stark and a few other patriots of the pocket rather than of the lip, followed his example; and Robert Morris collected five hundred dollars from his friends, and, a few days later, raised fifty thousand dollars in cash, by a house-to-house inquest, and placed it at the disposal of the commander-in-chief.*

The battle of Bennington shows how well the American farmer, without any previous service or training, can fight, when he has to do so to defend his own hearthstone. He will not, without training and discipline, fight a long way from home,—he cannot be counted upon for distant and enduring campaigns; but for single battles, with his own church spires in sight, he makes a dangerous foe to meet.

There was practically no American navy during the Revolutionary War; but much damage was done to British commerce by privateers manned by "hardy seamen of New England," "and Paul Jones in his *Bonhomme Richard* made himself the terror of the English coasts."†

*Sloane.

†Goldwin Smith.

LECTURE III.

THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR.

SOUTHERN CAMPAIGNS.

(13) After the surrender of Burgoyne, France formed an alliance with the United States, and Frederick the Great of Prussia showed his friendliness by prohibiting any more Hessian troops from entering the British service. In June, 1779, Spain declared war against England, and in December, 1780, England declared war against Holland.

We saw in the last lecture that, after the Battle of Monmouth, Sir Henry Clinton took his little army into New York City, and Washington stationed his at White Plains. This was in July, 1778. New York and Newport were now the only points held by the British in the United States.

A French fleet under Count d'Estaing, and a force of 4,000 French soldiers, arrived off New York in July [1778]. A plan was formed to attack Clinton in New York, but some of d'Estaing's ships were of too deep draft to pass over the bar at the mouth of the river, and the project had to be abandoned.

(9) Later on, a combined land and naval attack upon the British at Newport was undertaken; it also failed. The French fleet then sailed for the West Indies, to threaten the British possessions there, and immediately 5,000 of Clinton's men had to be withdrawn and sent to those islands. "In the autumn of this year, 1778, Clinton felt himself so much weakened, that he withdrew the garrison from Newport, and concentrated his whole force in New York, which was now the only place held by the British in the rebellious colonies."*

We have seen that the part of the British Ministry's plan which contemplated splitting the rebellious colonies in two by taking the line of the Hudson Valley and holding it, failed through General Howe's bad management,—if not by reason of his treachery, certainly by reason of his inefficiency. Clinton was not left with troops enough to renew the attempt. The only thing he could do was to hold New York as a base, and

*Fisher.

from there to send out raiding expeditions to various places on the American coast.

Outside of the immediate theater of operations, the Americans, up to this time, had suffered few of the discomforts of war. It mattered not much materially to the people of Virginia and the Carolinas, or even to the New Englanders, how many months the war kept up, so long as it was confined to New Jersey. The British had already attempted once to make a lodgment in the South. A combined sea and land force under Admiral Parker and Sir Henry Clinton, after much bungling and delay, had attacked Charleston, toward the end of June, 1776; it was repulsed by the South Carolinians under Moultrie in their fort on Sullivan Island. After this, the southern colonies were not again annoyed by the presence of their enemy until the autumn of 1778.

Clinton believed that the way to make a rebellious people want peace was to make the war uncomfortable to all of them. That was the purpose of the "wearing-out" policy he now adopted. If, in the execution of this policy, his agents resorted to cruelty and barbarity in many instances, it must be admitted that, in their treatment of the loyalists, the patriots set them many examples. Yet it is hard to believe that Clinton had anything to do with the terrible massacre of Wyoming Valley in Northern Pennsylvania, which occurred in July of this year, 1778. This was committed by the Tories and Indians of Central New York. Equally atrocious was the massacre of Cherry Valley, a village in Central New York, in November, 1778. This deed was committed, also, by Tories and Indians.

In pursuance of his plan, Clinton dispatched a raiding force to the coast of New England, and another to Delaware Bay, this year [1778]. (22) "In the autumn, he sent Colonel Campbell, with 3,500 regulars, to Georgia, where he easily defeated the 1,200 militia of the patriots, and took Savannah and Augusta. At the same time, the British General Prevost entered Georgia from Florida; so Georgia was declared to be out of revolt."*

"In the hope of checking the British progress in the South, General Lincoln was sent to Charleston. But South Carolina was so much afraid of a rising among her slaves, that the local militia would render him no assistance. He obtained 2,000 militia from North Carolina, and at the end of February, 1779,

*Fisher.

sent General Ashe with 1,500 men to invade Georgia. The British retired from Augusta, but turned on Ashe at Briar Creek, and defeated him.”*

In April [1779] Lincoln again invaded Georgia, and Prevost promptly entered South Carolina, and devastated it. Prevost, however, could not take Charleston, and was obliged to return to Georgia. This same spring, Clinton sent raiding expeditions into Virginia and Connecticut, which wrought great destruction of property.

“All these severities, heavy, shocking, merciless blows,” says Fisher, “were delivered so as to affect the business and social relations of large districts of country. They were delivered in districts which had heretofore been free from the interference of war, and where the people were enjoying a more or less profitable trade. They told severely on the patriot cause, and Washington was powerless against them.” “It is difficult for us now to realize the deplorable state of the country; devastated and ruined, with paper currency sunk so low that a bushel of corn cost one hundred and fifty dollars, and a suit of clothes two thousand dollars.”*

In September [1779] Lincoln, with the aid of d’Estaing’s fleet, laid siege to Savannah, and assaulted it. He was repulsed with heavy loss. In December Clinton himself sailed from New York with 8,000 men. He landed at Savannah, and getting some reinforcements from Prevost, marched against Charleston. Lincoln, who commanded Charleston, should have abandoned it, and taken to the open, as Washington did when Howe landed at New York. But Lincoln collected all the troops he could, and prepared to defend the town. There was very little fighting; Clinton laid siege, and Lincoln surrendered the town, May 12, 1780, with 5,500 prisoners and a great lot of ordnance and supplies. “Clinton immediately sent out forces which reduced the whole of South Carolina to the possession of the British.”*

General Cornwallis was left by Clinton in command of South Carolina, and “there was now, for a long time, a frightful scene of anarchy and confusion; with the British and loyalists plundering, murdering, and confiscating; the patriots retaliating as best they could.” “It was at this time, during the summer of 1780, that the patriots, who would not take the oath of alle-

*Fisher.

giance, and had retreated to the swamps and mountains on the interior, maintained under Marion, Sumter, Pickens, and Williams, that partisan warfare which became so famous. Their attacking parties were as small as twenty and seldom over one hundred; but the suddenness of their appearance, the fury of their attack, and the swiftness and secrecy of their flight were appalling to European soldiers."*

In June General Gates was appointed to take command of the patriot troops in the South, and repaired to Charlotte. He found things in a deplorable state; there was lack of arms, lack of everything, especially lack of funds.

Lord Rawdon was in command of the British garrison at Camden, which Gates made his objective. Gates had the choice of two roads from Charlotte to Camden, one of which was a little longer than the other, but in every other respect better suited to the march. Against the advice of his officers, Gates took the shorter, apparently in order to reach his objective before it could be reinforced from Charleston.

Rawdon's command was much smaller than Gates's, but he marched it out fifteen miles to meet Gates, and posted it behind a creek blocking the way. At this point the two roads were only ten miles apart. A skilful commander might have occupied Rawdon's attention in front, and made a turning movement by the other road; a bold commander might, with Gates's preponderance in numbers, have crossed the creek and carried the position by direct attack. Gates did neither; he wavered and hesitated for two days, then moved slowly across to the westerly road, and took up a position at Clermont.

Meantime Cornwallis had arrived with reinforcements. The Americans, however, still outnumbered the British. There were 3,052 Americans, only 1,400 of whom were regulars, to 2,000 British. Gates, however, had not learned of the arrival of Cornwallis, and he detached 400 of his best Maryland regulars to join Sumter in cutting the British line of communication with Charleston.

(23) At ten o'clock at night the two little armies advanced toward each other, each hoping to take the other by surprise. The result was the Battle of Camden, August 16, 1780, on a narrow piece of ground with an impassable swamp on each flank. Gates's Virginia and North Carolina militia threw down their arms, and fled without firing a shot. "Within fif-

*Fiske.

teen minutes," says Fiske, "the whole American left became a mob of struggling men, smitten with mortal panic, and huddling like sheep in their wild flight, while Tarleton's [British] cavalry gave chase and cut them down by scores." The Maryland brigade behaved better; but it also was driven from the field. The patriots were badly defeated. (22) General Gates himself escaped to Hillsboro, riding 200 miles in four days.

The day before the battle Sumter had captured a British supply train on its way up from Charleston; but on the 18th that active cavalryman, Tarleton, routed him and retook the train and prisoners that he had captured, and captured 300 of his men besides.

Cornwallis stayed nearly a month at Camden, resting his troops, and then advanced to Charlotte. Meantime he had sent Major Ferguson—"whom, next to Tarleton, he considered his best partisan officer"—on a raid to the west. Ferguson soon found himself surrounded on all sides by bands of guerrillas under such leaders as Williams, and Campbell, and Isaac Shelby, and John Sevier. He was brought to bay at Kings Mountain, where he and about 400 of his men were slain, and more than 700 were captured. Only twenty of his men escaped.* On learning the news of this disaster, Cornwallis fell back to Winnsborough to await reinforcements. "General Leslie had been sent by Sir Henry Clinton to Virginia, with 3,000 men, and Cornwallis ordered this force to join him without delay."**

Meantime Marion and Sumter had kept up an active partisan warfare, and the latter defeated Tarleton at Blackstock Hill, on the 20th November [1780]. Reinforcements from the North were also joining the American forces, which had assembled at Charlotte. Gates was relieved, and on the 2nd December General Greene arrived at Charlotte and took command. Arnold, who, after his treason and escape, was now in the British service, had been sent to Virginia by Clinton, with 1,600 men, to take Leslie's place; and Steuben was in command of the Americans in Virginia.

Greene's army was too weak to risk a battle with Cornwallis; so he divided it, taking 1,100 men himself to Cheraw Hill, and sending 900, under General Morgan, to the westward. Cornwallis could do nothing but divide his army, also. If he

*Fiske.

should march his whole command against Greene, Morgan would capture the British posts in the west; and if he should march his whole force against Morgan, Greene would capture Charleston, and cut him off from the coast. "With his main body, 2,000 strong, he advanced into North Carolina, hoping to draw Greene after him; while he sent Tarleton, with the rest of his army, 1,100 strong, to take care of Morgan."* Morgan fell back to a place called The Cowpens, a sort of "round-up" place for cattle. Here he was attacked by Tarleton. We will quote the description of the battle verbatim from Fisher's *True History of the American Revolution*. Fiske's description is practically the same.

(24) Morgan "placed himself with the river in his immediate rear, which, if he were defeated, would largely cut off his retreat; but he did this, he said, to prevent his militia from running too soon. He then prepared a formation which seems to have been entirely original, the result of careful thought and thorough knowledge of his material.

"He placed the raw militia far in the front to receive the first onset of the British, and told them he expected them to fire only two volleys at killing distance. After that they could run; and he showed them how to run round the left flank of the rest of his troops, and get behind the main body of them, where they could reform at their leisure and recover themselves.

"About 150 yards behind the militia, Morgan placed his picked troops on a slight hill; 150 yards farther back he placed his cavalry, under Colonel Washington.

"Tarleton attacked, in his dashing, eager style, at sunrise. The militia received him better than was expected, and retreated as they had been told. The British instantly spread out and rushed at the second line of Americans, intending to flank them [envelop them] on both sides. The second line avoided this movement by falling back to the position of the cavalry. At the same time the cavalry circled round and attacked the British right flank; and the militia, having been reformed, circled round the other side and attacked the British left. The second line retreated no farther, but, after delivering their fire at thirty yards, charged the British."

Tarleton escaped, but he lost 230 killed and wounded, and 600 prisoners. Morgan's loss was twelve killed and sixty-one wounded.

*Fiske.

(22) Morgan now hastened to rejoin Greene. Cornwallis was between him and Greene, but Morgan beat Cornwallis to the fords of the Catawba River, and, after that, it was a stern-chase for Cornwallis.

Greene learned of Morgan's victory a week after it took place. At once he started his army northward, under General Huger, and with a small mounted escort set out himself to join Morgan, in order to conduct his column to a junction with Huger's. He found Morgan in the Catawba Valley, and Cornwallis pushing him. Cornwallis had no cavalry now to send after Morgan,—Kings Mountain and The Cowpens had stripped him of all his cavalry. But he kept up the pursuit as best he could, and had destroyed his heavy baggage to hasten his march. The weather had been rainy, and the rivers were high and unfordable; but Greene dragged some boats along on wheels to use in crossing the swollen streams.

On the 9th February, 1781, Greene reached Guilford Court House with Morgan's column, and there rejoined the main column under Huger. Here Greene had expected to receive reinforcements from Virginia, but Arnold had kept General Steuben so busy in Virginia that Steuben was unable to send reinforcements. So Greene continued his retreat, and placed his army on the north side of the Dan River, in Virginia, which Cornwallis had no means of crossing. Cornwallis then turned back, and marched to Hillsboro, where he issued proclamations announcing his conquest of North Carolina, and encouraging the loyalists.

Greene's main object had been to draw Cornwallis as far away from his base as possible, and, fearing now that he might return to it, Greene recrossed the Dan into North Carolina. Then Greene played with Cornwallis for three weeks, leading him hither and thither, but never coming to battle with him. Greene was playing for time—until his reinforcements could arrive. At last they came, raising his force to about 4,500. Cornwallis had only 2,200. Greene came to a stand at Guilford Court House, on the 15th of March. (25) He arranged his lines almost exactly like Morgan's at The Cowpens. But Cornwallis fought better and more carefully than Tarleton had fought at The Cowpens. The battle was stoutly contested, and the losses were heavy on both sides. The British had the advantage of the fight, but both sides withdrew from the field.

(22) Cornwallis had suffered too much to risk another engagement. He retreated to Wilmington, the nearest seaport, starting three days after the battle. Greene followed him as

far as Ramsay's Mills; then, supposing that Cornwallis would embark his army at Wilmington and proceed with it by sea to Charleston, he turned south to strike a blow in South Carolina and Georgia, before Cornwallis could get there. He purposed capturing the cantonments by which the British had held the line of the Santee and Congaree, as far as Ninety-Six.

While Greene threatened Camden, Marion attacked and captured Fort Watson, on the 23rd of April [1781]. This broke the British line of communication, and compelled Lord Rawdon to come out of Camden. Greene took up a position at Hobkirk's Hill, about two miles north of Camden. (26) Lord Rawdon attacked him there on the 25th of April. The 2nd Maryland regiment, which had fought splendidly in every other battle of the campaign, behaved badly in this one, and lost the victory for the Americans. Greene was driven from the field. But the victory was of little value to Rawdon, with his line of supplies cut in two at Fort Watson. (22) Rawdon retreated to Monk's Corners, and Greene took possession of Camden.

Within three weeks "Light Horse Harry" Lee and Marion had captured Fort Motte and Fort Granby; Sumter had taken Orangeburg; and, on the 5th of June, Augusta surrendered to Lee. Ninety-Six was besieged by Greene, but held out, until Rawdon got reinforcements from Charleston, and marched to its relief. But it was impossible for Rawdon to hold the post,—he could not keep open his line of communication with Charleston. So he evacuated the place on the 29th of June, and retreated to Orangeburg. Greene followed him; but the weather had become so hot that neither army could keep up the campaign. Greene withdrew his army to the High Hills of Santee to rest, and then the two armies lay watching each other until after the middle of August. Within this interval Rawdon went back to England sick, leaving Colonel Stuart in command of the British forces in South Carolina.

On the 22nd of August Greene, who had spent the time recruiting his army, and putting it in as effective shape as practicable, broke camp, and advanced secretly towards Orangeburg. Stuart did not discover his advance, until he was close upon Orangeburg. Thereupon Stuart fell back and took up a strong position at Eutaw Springs. (27) Greene attacked him on the 8th of September [1781]. The British were driven back from their first position; but they took up a second line, supported by a brick house and a palisaded garden, from which they could not be driven by the Americans. (22) The next

evening the British, however, abandoned the position, and retreated hurriedly to Charleston, with Lee and Marion pursuing them. This was the last battle in the Carolinas, although a sort of partisan warfare kept up for another year. Under the protection of their ships, the British held Charleston till the end of the war.

In his retreat, after the battle of Guilford Court House, Lord Cornwallis reached Wilmington on the 7th of April [1781]. He remained there a little over two weeks, and then, instead of transferring his army by sea to South Carolina, as Greene expected and as Sir Henry Clinton, the commander-in-chief of the British, supposed he would, he marched it northward into Virginia. (28) He reached Petersburg on the 20th of May, and joined his forces with those of Arnold. Arnold himself returned to New York.

At this time Lafayette was in command of the American troops in Virginia. He was at Richmond with about 3,000 men. Cornwallis now had about 5,000 veterans to fight this little force. He moved toward Richmond, and Lafayette fell back toward Fredericksburg. Cornwallis followed him.

On the 4th of June Lafayette crossed the Rapidan at Ely's Ford, and Cornwallis stopped the pursuit. Cornwallis probably profited by the lessons Greene had taught him in the Carolinas, and did not purpose letting himself be drawn too far away from his base again. But he sent Tarleton on a raid to Charlottesville, to break up the Virginia legislature in session there, and to capture, if possible, Thomas Jefferson, whose home, Monticello, was near by. Having failed to capture Jefferson, Tarleton started to Albemarle, in order to destroy some American stores collected there.

In the meantime Lafayette had been joined by 1,000 Pennsylvania regulars, under General Wayne, and other reinforcements; so that his little army now numbered about 4,000. With this force, Lafayette placed himself between Tarleton and Albemarle; and Tarleton started back eastward to rejoin Cornwallis.

Lafayette now felt strong enough to take the offensive,—at least to harass Cornwallis; so he moved toward him. Cornwallis turned southwest from the North Anna River, and was rejoined by Tarleton at the Point of Forks. Cornwallis continued his retreat through Richmond and down the Yorktown Peninsula to Williamsburg. Here an action occurred between parts of the hostile forces, and the Americans were repulsed.

The operations ended in the first week of August. Cornwallis put his army into Yorktown, so as to be close to sea communication; Lafayette occupied Malvern Hill, near the James, to watch him. Meantime Lafayette's army had been reinforced by Steuben with 1,000 men; so that Lafayette now had about 5,000 men. Cornwallis had about 7,000 at Yorktown.

(29) All these months, since the summer of 1778, Washington had held his army in the vicinity of New York City, keeping guard over Clinton, who clung to the city as a base. Washington had with him Count Rochambeau and four or five thousand French troops. In the West Indies Count de Grasse had a strong French fleet operating against the English in those islands. Washington had hoped, and planned, to wrest New York from Clinton, with the aid of Rochambeau's troops and the French fleet. But the successes of Greene and Lafayette in the Carolinas and Virginia drew his attention to that quarter.

Washington's actions were all to depend upon the French fleet. De Grasse had orders from France to coöperate with Washington, but had the choice of sailing either for the Hudson, or the Chesapeake. "On the 14th of August" of this year [1781], "a message came from de Grasse that he was just starting from the West Indies for Chesapeake Bay, with his whole fleet, and hoped that whatever the armies had to do, might be done quickly, as he should be obliged to return to the West Indies by the middle of October." Washington had just received word from Lafayette, "that Cornwallis had established himself at Yorktown, where he had deep water on three sides of him, and a narrow neck in front."*

Washington determined at once to transfer his army to Virginia. The distance was more than 400 miles. He maneuvered so as to make Clinton think he was going to attack the British in New York. As Clinton had got wind of the French fleet's movement toward the north, he was, of course, looking for it to appear in New York Harbor and coöperate with Washington against him. Clinton was completely fooled.

"On the 19th of August [1781], five days after receiving the dispatch from Grasse, Washington's army crossed the Hudson at King's Ferry, and began its march. Lord Stirling" [General William Alexander] "was left with a small force at Saratoga, and General Heath, with 4,000 men, remained at West Point. Washington took with him southward 2,000 Conti-

*Fiske.

mentals and 4,000 Frenchmen. . . . None save Washington and Rochambeau knew whither they were going. So precious was the secret," continues Fiske, "that even the general officers supposed, until New Brunswick was passed, that their destination was Staten Island. So rapid was the movement that however much the men might have begun to wonder, they had reached Philadelphia before the purpose of the expedition was distinctly understood."*

At Chester, Washington received word that de Grasse had arrived in Chesapeake Bay. By the 5th of September, the army had reached the head of Chesapeake Bay. Here it embarked and had arrived near Yorktown by the 18th.

The British West Indies fleet had followed the French fleet northward; but had lost sight of it, outsailed it, passed it without seeing it; then it scouted Chesapeake Bay, before the French fleet had got there, and finally sailed away for New York, expecting surely to find de Grasse there. This fleet brought Clinton and Admiral Graves, who commanded the British fleet at New York, the first news of what had really happened. So Graves started with his fleet, at once, for the Chesapeake. He arrived there on the 5th of September, the very day on which Washington's army was embarking at the head of the Bay.*

(30) "Graves found the French fleet blocking the entrance to the bay, and instantly attacked it." After a fight of two hours, in which about 700 men were killed and wounded in the two fleets, the British ships withdrew.* Three thousand French troops had landed from de Grasse's fleet and joined Lafayette. With his army thus increased to about 8,000, Lafayette felt strong enough to close in upon Cornwallis at Yorktown. (28) Accordingly he moved down to the narrow neck at Williamsburg, and, on the morning of the 8th of September, had Cornwallis sealed up in Yorktown,—the very morning that Greene, down in South Carolina, was fighting his last battle, at Eutaw Springs. On the 14th of September Washington reached Lafayette's headquarters, and assumed command; by the 26th the entire force of Continentals and French, 16,000 strong, was assembled at Williamsburg.

(31) Washington now laid siege in the regular way to Yorktown. On the night of the 15th of October the garrison made an unsuccessful sortie; on the 17th,—the fourth anni-

*Fiske.

versary of Burgoyne's surrender,—Cornwallis had a white flag raised. On the 19th he surrendered; and 7,247 Englishmen marched out to an old tune, "The World Turned Upside Down," and laid down their arms.* This practically ended the Revolutionary War, though the treaty of peace was not signed until 1783.

On the very day that Cornwallis surrendered, Sir Henry Clinton, having received naval reinforcement, sailed from New York, with thirty-five ships and 7,000 troops. Five days brought him to the mouth of the Chesapeake, where he learned that he was too late, as he had been four years before, when he went to relieve Burgoyne.*

COMMENTS.

General Greene's operations in the Carolinas were more brilliant, from a strategic point of view, than any other operations of Americans or British in this war. True, Washington's sudden and secret transfer of his army from New York to Yorktown resembled very much, on a small scale, Napoleon's march from the English Channel to Bavaria in the Ulm campaign of 1805. Neither movement could be repeated in America or Europe to-day, with the electric telegraph and enterprising newspaper reporters to contend with; though they might be achieved under a Japanese or Russian censorship. Both depended upon secrecy and swiftness for their success; which, after preparedness—the preparedness that can only be attained in time of peace—are the highest essentials of strategy.

If Greene had failed, when he divided his little army in front of Cornwallis, in the winter of 1780-'81, he would have been condemned by the critics for dividing his command in the presence of the enemy, and allowing the two parts of it to be defeated in detail. But General Greene was right, as results proved. There are two cases in which it is safe to divide one's force: first, when either part of the divided force is strong enough to defeat the enemy by itself; and second, when each part of the divided force is so small that it has no intention of fighting,—the smaller the detachment the faster it can get out of the way of the enemy. This was General Greene's case. If Cornwallis had kept his army together, it would never have caught either Greene's or Morgan's detachment. Yet by divi-

*Fiske.

ding his force, Cornwallis made conditions more nearly equal for the American commanders, and gave Morgan his chance at The Cowpens.

Cornwallis either did not understand and appreciate the policy of Sir Henry Clinton, or, in his eagerness to win victories and laurels for himself, he wilfully failed to carry out the wishes of his chief. A long and bitter controversy was afterward carried on between these two noblemen.

With France and Holland and Spain fighting her in Europe and the West Indies, and Hyder-Ali in India, and all the rest of Europe unfriendly and threatening, England could not furnish Clinton troops enough to enable him to conduct the war as he would have liked to conduct it. So Clinton knew he could not destroy the organized forces of the Americans, and, at the same time, so garrison the conquered territory as to keep down the rebellion. Hence his reason for adopting a "wearing-out" policy,—the policy by which he purposed holding New York as a principal base, and establishing one or two smaller bases, like Charleston, from which raids could go out, to make it uncomfortable for the people that were carrying on, or encouraging the rebellion. He did not intend that the raiding expeditions should go dangerously far from their landing places, or from the posts held in the interior, like Camden and Ninety-Six. As for example, the raiding forces sent to Connecticut seldom spent the night on shore; but they wrought a lot of destruction.

Cornwallis never should have followed Greene up into northern North Carolina; but Greene showed his strategic skill, in drawing his adversary farther and farther away from his base. General Greene put the "power of attraction" of his little army to its fullest use. Cornwallis defeated Greene in every fight, but gained nothing by his victories. It would have been better for the British cause, if Cornwallis had been defeated, and driven back to Charleston at the start; it would have saved him the mortification, and England the misfortune, of Yorktown.

A remarkable thing about Greene's operations is, that, although he was defeated tactically in every battle, his campaign was a strategic success from start to finish; and it resulted in expelling the British from every post in the Carolinas and Georgia, except Charleston. It was, also, a direct factor in the capture of Yorktown.

Cornwallis had no business to go to Virginia. When he re-

treated to Wilmington, he should have gone on back to his base, Charleston, by sea, and made a new start. His movement to Virginia disappointed and offended Sir Henry Clinton. No plausible reason can be assigned for it, except that Cornwallis thought a return to Charleston would be an acknowledgment of defeat. General Greene did right to desist from pursuing him, and to return to South Carolina, whether Cornwallis went to Charleston, as Greene expected him to do, or marched to Virginia, which was the last thing Greene thought he would do.

After all is said, it was the presence of de Grasse's fleet in the Chesapeake that compassed the surrender of Cornwallis's army. And if the British fleet had succeeded in gaining a decisive victory over the French fleet, when it attacked it at the entrance to the Bay, Washington's march to Virginia would have been in vain,—more than likely his army would have been sunk or captured by the British fleet in Chesapeake Bay, where it would have been caught in its transports without naval escort; the surrender of Cornwallis would not have taken place; Clinton's "wearing-out" policy would have gone on; the war might have lasted several years longer; and—who knows but we might still be British subjects to-day?

That was the darkest period of England's history; at war with America, France, Holland, Spain, and her subjects in India; without a friend in all Europe; and, worst of all, with a lot of men at home that were worse enemies than those in foreign lands. Fiske says, and seems to say it with pride rather than contempt, "There were many people in England, however, who looked upon the matter differently from Lord North. This crushing defeat was just what the Duke of Richmond, at the beginning of the war, had publicly declared he hoped for. Charles Fox always took especial delight in reading about defeats of invading armies, from Marathon and Salamis downward; and over the news of Cornwallis's surrender, he leaped from his chair and clapped his hands. In a debate in Parliament four months before, the youthful William Pitt had denounced the American War as most accursed, wicked, barbarous, cruel, unnatural, unjust, and diabolical." Precisely this kind of language has been used by men in America concerning our war in the Philippines; and all such men, whether Englishmen or Americans, deserve a place in the same pillory of universal scorn as that occupied by Benedict Arnold.

LECTURE IV.

THE WAR OF 1812.

(32) On the 18th of June, 1812, Congress declared war against Great Britain.

The grounds upon which the declaration was made were just and sufficient, but not more so than they had been for several years. Nor can it well be seen by a careful review of the case that there was much less cause for war with France than there was for war with England. These two states had been engaged in hostilities for several years. The British Ministry by their "Orders in Council" declared the coasts of France and her allies and colonies in a state of blockade. Napoleon replied with his famous Berlin and Milan Decrees declaring a blockade of British ports. Neither belligerent, of course, was able to maintain an actual blockade of such extensive coast lines; but each seized all vessels caught violating its "paper blockade." The result of it all was that within three or four years American commerce was practically driven from the seas.

A former Administration, Mr. Jefferson's, undertook to retaliate by issuing an embargo, prohibiting American vessels from going to sea. This was based on the supposition that Europe could not subsist without American products. It imposed a great hardship on our commerce, of course, had no effect on the belligerents, and was revoked after fourteen months. The same thing was again resorted to in the present Administration, Madison's, with the same result. Another grievance against Great Britain was based on her monstrous assumption of the right to search American ships for British subjects. In fact, this complaint was given first place in the President's message to Congress, recommending a declaration of war.

But all these outrages had gone on for five or six years, and would probably have been tolerated till the end, if President Madison could have had his way,—for he was as pacific and long-suffering as his Mentor, Mr. Jefferson. But a squad of younger men, led by Henry Clay and John C. Calhoun, had got control in Congress. They compelled the decision for war.

PLANS.

In the technical sense of the word, it cannot be said that either the British or the Americans had any plan of campaign. Sir George Prevost, the governor-general of Canada, had about 4,500 regular troops at his disposal, and the British army was too busy on the Continent of Europe to spare any more men for service in America. So all Prevost could hope to do was to defend Canada. He counted, also, upon assistance from the powerful Indian tribes along the outer edge of our western settlements. The famous chief Tecumthe [or Tecumseh] was keeping track with the quarrel going on between the British and Americans, and was ready to take advantage of it. He had gone from Michigan to Alabama, urging the tribes to unite against the Americans.

The standing army of the United States at this time "was only 6,744 strong, notwithstanding that Congress had six months before passed a bill increasing it to 35,000."* Still our statesmen had no thought of anything but an offensive campaign. Canada was to be invaded and conquered at once. Mr. Jefferson, who was a man of peace and detested a standing army, wrote from Monticello, his Virginia home: "The acquisition of Canada this year, as far as the neighborhood of Quebec, will be a mere matter of marching, and will give us experience for the attack of Halifax the next, and the final expulsion of England from the American Continent,"†—a prophecy that showed no less ignorance of the science of war than of the horoscope. We never acquired any part of Canada; and England has not yet been expelled from the American Continent. This, however, was the general opinion in the United States, and the plan of campaign adopted by the War Department proposed, "that a main army should advance by way of Lake Champlain upon Montreal, while three columns, composed chiefly of militia, should enter Canada from Detroit, Niagara and Sacketts Harbor." The details of the plan were not settled; nor was the time fixed for the combined movement.‡ After overrunning Upper Canada, the President expected these columns to unite on the St. Lawrence and advance to the capture of Montreal.§

*Upton's *Military Policy of the United States*.

†*History of the United States*, by Henry Adams.

‡Adams.

§*A History of the People of the United States*, by John Bach McMaster.

GEOGRAPHY.

At that time the American frontier was guarded by garrisons at the following widely separated points: Plattsburg, Sacketts Harbor, Fort Niagara, Detroit, Fort Dearborn [Chicago], and Fort Mackinac at the junction of Lakes Huron and Michigan.

On the Canadian side of the line were the garrisons of Montreal in Lower Canada; Kingston opposite Sacketts Harbor; Forts Erie and George opposite Buffalo and Fort Niagara; and Fort Malden at the mouth of the Detroit River. The British had possession of the lakes,—that is to say, they had small fleets on them,—which enabled them to concentrate troops promptly at different points; while the Americans must march overland, and, in some cases, cut their roads through the forests, and build them through the swamps.

OPERATIONS.

(33) Governor Hull of Michigan Territory, who had been an officer in the Revolutionary War, was to command the column that was to advance by way of Detroit. In April and May, 1812, he had assembled at Dayton,* Ohio, a force consisting of the 4th U. S. Infantry (300 effectives), three regiments of Ohio militia infantry, and one troop of Ohio dragoons,—about 1,600 men in all. Two regiments of Michigan militia were to join at Detroit.

Detroit was 200 miles to the north, and Hull's troops had to "cut a road through the forest, build bridges and construct causeways . . . but they made good progress."† The march was begun on the 1st of June [1812], and Detroit was reached on the 5th of July. On the way Hull received word of the declaration of war, which Congress had made on the 18th of June; but the British commander at Malden had also received the news. On reaching the Miami or Maumee River, General Hull forwarded his personal baggage, hospital stores, and a trunk containing his orders and muster-rolls, to Detroit by a schooner,—all of which fell into the hands of the British, who seized the schooner as it was passing Malden.

(34) On July 12 General Hull crossed the Detroit River.

*In Southwestern Ohio.

†Adams.

The British militia guarding the river retired behind the Canard River, twelve miles below, without firing a shot. Hull occupied Sandwich, was well received by the inhabitants, and issued a proclamation calling upon the people to give their allegiance to the United States. This proclamation had some effect for a time. The people seemed inclined toward the United States. Several hundred sought the protection of Hull's troops, and the Canadian militia deserted by scores. So General Hull conceived the notion that he was going to have a bloodless conquest of Canada. Besides his militia, however, the British commander at Fort Malden had 280 regulars and about 230 Indians, with whom to contest the conquest. The left flank of his position was covered and supported by a fleet. Hull called a council of war, which decided against storming Malden, and advised delay. A few days later Hull wrote Mr. Eustis, the Secretary of War: "It is in the power of this army to take Malden by storm, but it would be attended, in my opinion, with too great a sacrifice under the present circumstances." In the same letter he said, "If Malden was in our possession, I could march this army to Niagara or York [Toronto] in a very short time."*

But every day's delay lessened Hull's chances of success. The Ohio militiamen were clamoring for a fight. Nothing is so trying to raw troops as lying idle in camp. "Detachments scoured the country, meeting at first little resistance, one detachment even crossing the Canard River. But on the 19th and 24th of July, strong detachments were driven back with loss, and the outlook became suddenly threatening."*

Thenceforward every day brought Hull fatal news. His army lost respect for him in consequence of his failure to attack Malden; the British strengthened the defenses of Malden, and, on August 8, received sixty fresh men of the 41st Regiment, under Colonel Proctor from Niagara."* (32) But worse than all this, on the 3rd of August the garrison of Fort Mackinac arrived at Detroit as prisoners of war on parole, announcing that Mackinac had capitulated to a force of British and savages, and that a horde of Indians from the Northwest were on their way to fall upon Detroit.* A day or two later a party of Indians under Tecumthe crossed the river, and routed a detachment of the Ohio regiment on its way to pro-

*Adams.

tect a train of supplies coming up from Ohio. Hull decided at once to recross the river, which he succeeded in doing on the night of August the 8th without interference from the enemy.

(34) At this time Detroit contained about 800 inhabitants, within gunshot of the British shore. The fort was a square inclosure of about two acres, surrounded by an embankment, a dry ditch, and a double row of palisades. It did not command the river, but was capable of withstanding a siege as long as its supplies would hold out.* (33) It was 200 miles from any American station from which reinforcements or supplies could come; and its only road of communication lay for sixty miles along the shore of Lake Erie, where a British fleet on one side, and bands of savages on the other, could always make it impassable. The road was also within easy striking distance of the British garrison at Malden.

Hull appreciated the danger of his position at Fort Detroit, and wanted to retreat behind the Maumee without delay. But Colonel Cass informed him, "that, if this were done, every man of the Ohio militia would refuse to obey, and would desert their general. . . . Hull considered that this report obliged him to remain" at Detroit.†

He ordered out a body of 600 men, including the 4th U. S. Infantry, to restore his communication with Ohio and to fetch some supplies stopped at the Raisin River. Fourteen miles south of Detroit, the detachment encountered a force of about 200 British and twenty-five Indians, and routed it. But the detachment did not push on to the Raisin River after the supplies; the next day it marched back to Detroit.

"The next four days were thrown away by the Americans. August 13 the British began to establish a battery on the Canadian side of the river to bombard Detroit. Within the American lines the army was in secret mutiny. Hull's vacillations and evident alarm disorganized his force. The Ohio colonels were ready to remove him from his command, which they offered to Lieutenant-Colonel Miller of the 4th U. S. Infantry; but Colonel Miller declined this manner of promotion, and Hull retained control."†

On the 14th of August Hull sent the two Ohio colonels, McArthur and Cass, with their best men, about 350, to make another effort, by a long and circuitous route, to bring up the sup-

*Lecture by Lieutenant Chapman.

†Adams.

plies, which were still at the Raisin River, thirty-five miles south. (34) The next day [August 15, 1812], the British General Brock, who had arrived on the night of the 13th, with reinforcements, at Malden, and had taken command of the garrison, sent a summons to Hull to surrender. After some delay Hull declined, and then sent orders recalling McArthur's detachment.

As soon as Hull's reply reached the British lines, two British armed vessels moved up the river near Sandwich, while a battery opened fire on the town and fort from the Canadian shore. "The fire was returned, but no energetic measures were taken to prepare either for an assault or a siege."* During the night Tecumthe and 600 Indians crossed the river, some two miles below, and filled the woods, cutting the communication between McArthur's detachment and the fort.

A little before daylight of August 16, Brock himself, with 330 regulars and 400 militia, carrying with them five little cannon, crossed the river to storm the fort. General Hull had about 1,000 soldiers within the fort, and McArthur's detachment was only a few miles away. General Brock and his little detachment ought to have been killed or captured to a man. But they were not. As Brock came up the slope to reconnoiter the fort, he saw a white flag displayed. Within an hour Hull had surrendered, not only the fort and its garrison, but McArthur's detachment and the small force guarding the supplies at the River Raisin. Hull was afterward tried by court-martial for treason and cowardice, convicted of cowardice, sentenced to be shot, but pardoned by President Madison.

General Brock sent the American regulars that he captured, about 300 officers and men of the 4th Infantry, down Lake Erie to British prisons; but he showed his contempt for our militia, 2,000 prisoners, by giving them leave to return to their homes.

(33) The day before this, August 15, an overwhelming body of Indians massacred the little American garrison of Fort Dearborn; "and with it the last vestige of American authority on the western lakes disappeared. Thenceforward the line of the Wabash and the Maumee became the military boundary of the United States in the Northwest, and the country felt painful doubt whether even that line could be defended."*

*Adams.

OPERATIONS IN THE EAST.

(32) In the meantime what were the other columns of invasion proposed in the War Department's plan of campaign doing?

General Henry Dearborn, who had been called from the position of collector of the port at Boston to the highest commissioned office in the military service of the United States, was to have charge of the operations in the east. But so slow did the recruitment and mobilization proceed, through the incapacity and neglect of Congress and the War Department and General Dearborn, and the opposition of the governors of some of the New England States, that October had arrived before a single offensive movement had been made by Americans in that quarter. In fact, Dearborn had, in August, without any authority from Washington, concluded an armistice with Prevost, the governor-general of Canada, in spite of the fact that his orders "were plain, distinct and positive. He was to support Hull by a vigorous offensive movement on Canada at Niagara. He knew that Hull was in Canada. He knew that every available British soldier in Canada was hurrying toward Hull. He knew that time was precious." Yet he gladly agreed to a suspension of arms in his front.*

This long delay had enabled the British General Brock to transfer troops from the Niagara frontier to Detroit, and to achieve the overthrow of General Hull; then to bring them back to Niagara, in time to meet any offensive movement there. With less than 2,000 men, this active commander now guarded nearly forty miles of front along the Niagara River.

(35) On the opposite side, with his headquarters at Lewiston, Major-General Stephen Van Rensselaer of the New York militia, commanded the American forces, about 5,000 strong, including the 13th U. S. Infantry. Queenstown was held by two companies of British regulars and a few militia, about 300 in all.

On the night of October 10 General Van Rensselaer tried to cross the river to attack Queenstown, but "was prevented by some blunder with regard to the boats."† On the night of the 13th the effort was repeated, and a force of regulars and volunteers was landed on the Canadian shore. The Americans

*McMaster.

†Adams.

got possession of Queenstown Heights; but British reinforcements arrived from Fort George and Chippewa, and the Americans were finally driven off the Heights, and forced to surrender; while a large force of militia stood upon the opposite bank, overcome with fear, and refused to cross to the aid of their countrymen.* Among the British killed was General Brock, and among the American prisoners was Lieutenant-Colonel Winfield Scott of the 2nd U. S. Artillery. Ninety Americans were killed, and "not less than 900 surrendered, including skulkers and militiamen who never reached the Heights."†

General Van Rensselaer, disgusted at the behavior of his militia, sent in his resignation the next day, and was succeeded by General Alexander Smyth, an Irish brigadier-general of the regular army. Smyth announced his assumption of the command by issuing several bombastic orders, which make very amusing reading to-day.

(36) Smyth planned to cross the Niagara River at Black Rock, on the night of November 28, and issued the order accordingly to his army. Among the paragraphs of this order we find this amusing detail: "At twenty yards' distance, the soldiers will be ordered to trail arms, advance with shouts, fire at five paces' distance, and charge bayonets. The soldiers will be *silent* above all things."‡

A party of regulars and sailors crossed the river and spiked the enemy's guns. But the main force did not finish embarking before the afternoon; so the general ordered them to disembark and dine. The army was furious. Two days later, Smyth issued another order to embark. He would not cross with less than 3,000 men, and only enough of his militia volunteered, to raise his force to 1,500. The expedition was, therefore, again recalled. So enraged were the militia of Smyth's army now, that they threatened his life. The general had to pitch his tent in the midst of the camp of the regulars for protection. The militia went home, and Smyth took leave of absence. Three months later he was dropped from the rolls of the army.‡

(37) All this time General Dearborn, who was to command in person the main expedition against Montreal, which was to

*McMaster.

†Adams.

‡McMaster. Adams.

advance by way of Lake Champlain, had made no move. On the 19th of November he marched his army to the Canadian boundary,—twenty miles. There his militia refused to go any farther, and he marched his army back to Plattsburg.

(33) "Meantime the people of the United States demanded that the lost territory of Michigan should be regained. A force of Kentucky militia was assembled at Fort Harrison* with a view to crushing the strength of the Indian tribes and thus reopening the way to Detroit. General Hopkins was placed in command. Four days out from Fort Harrison, the command became frightened by a prairie fire, and, abandoning their general," retraced their steps and dispersed to their homes.†

Another army was organized under General William Henry Harrison to retake Detroit. It consisted of about 10,000 militia from Kentucky, Tennessee, Virginia, Ohio, and Pennsylvania. Harrison, who afterwards became President, had gained a national fame as a general by his victory over the Indians at the battle of Tippecanoe, in the autumn of 1811. His army was to march in three columns and concentrate at the rapids of the Miami River—one column from Newport, Kentucky; one from Urbana, Ohio; and the third from Erie, Pennsylvania. The Kentucky column mutinied when a few days out, and was kept in service only by the personal entreaties of General Harrison. The troops from Urbana had a slight skirmish with the Indians and then, in defiance of orders, returned to their homes. The third column never got started until the following year. It must be admitted that the mutinous conduct of the troops was occasioned chiefly by the hardships they had to suffer for lack of clothing, subsistence, and transport.* Thus ended the land operations of the year 1812.

TROOPS ENGAGED.

"The militia called into service during the year 1812 numbered 49,187, of whom 208 were from Massachusetts, and none from Connecticut. Adding 15,000 regulars, we find that the total strength of the troops that drew Government pay during the year 1812 was not less than 65,000." As the regulars were nearly all newly enlisted and without any training, they were little better than the militia.‡

The British regular force in Canada did not number 4,500;

*In Western Indiana.

†Upton.

‡McMaster.

but they were trained soldiers. The Canadian militia was no better than our own, and the Indian allies could not be counted upon.

OPERATIONS OF 1813.

During the winter of 1812-'13, Congress passed laws increasing the regular army to forty-four regiments of infantry, four regiments of artillery, two regiments of dragoons, one regiment of rifles, and the corps of engineers: Aggregate strength, 57,351. But the aggregate strength of the regular army for this year never actually rose above 19,036.*

In December, 1812, General Harrison had pushed forward a detachment of about 1,300 men, under General Winchester, to the Miami Rapids. The detachment was composed of the Kentucky militia regiments and the 17th U. S. Infantry. At Frenchtown, on the Raisin River, the enemy had a garrison of about fifty Canadian militia and 200 Indians. A part of Winchester's detachment captured the village, without much loss, and Winchester occupied it. No outposts were placed, although they were recommended to the commanding-general by his subordinate officers. The result was, that on the night of January 21 [1813], General Proctor, with about 500 British regulars and 600 Indians, from Brownstown and Malden, surprised the garrison, killed 397 of them, wounded twenty-seven, and captured General Winchester and 522 men.

Meantime General Harrison had moved to the Miami Rapids, with the rest of his force; and General Proctor, fearing Harrison would move against him, abandoned his wounded prisoners and hurried away to his intrenchments at Malden. Then Harrison, fearing that Proctor would return against him, burnt his post at Miami Rapids and hastened back to the Portage or Carrying River. A week later Harrison went back to the Rapids, where he spent several months having Fort Meigs built, and collecting troops and supplies.

Toward the end of April Proctor brought over a force of about 1,000 whites and 1,200 Indians, and laid siege to Fort Meigs. On the 5th of May Brigadier-General Green Clay arrived with 1,200 Kentucky militia to relieve the beleaguered garrison. He surprised the enemy, captured his guns, and almost won a victory. But the British and Indians soon made a counter-attack, and either captured or massacred nearly the

*Upton.

whole body "under the eyes of Harrison at Fort Meigs."* Proctor's Indians dispersed within the next day or two, and on the 9th of May Proctor abandoned the siege, and, unmolested by Harrison, withdrew to Malden.

In July Proctor returned with a much larger force of British and Indians to the siege of Fort Meigs, which had been left under command of General Clay. "Failing to coax the Kentucky commander out of the fort to fight, Proctor left his Indians to continue the siege, while he moved with his white troops against Fort Stephenson on the lower Sandusky. This post was garrisoned by 160 men of the 17th U. S. Infantry under young Major Croghan. On August 2 Proctor assaulted the post, but was severely repulsed."† Immediately afterwards Proctor raised the siege of Fort Meigs and fell back to Canada.

The Administration at last awakened to an appreciation of the impracticability of recovering the territory lost in the West, and of invading Canada from that quarter, without the possession of Lake Erie and the coöperation of an American fleet. So the Secretary of War, now General Armstrong, who had succeeded Mr. Eustis, had ordered General Harrison to maintain a strict defensive, guarding the line of the Maumee, until a fleet should be built on Lake Erie. This was accomplished, and possession of the Lake was achieved by Commodore Perry's victory on the 10th of September.

On September 12 Harrison, at Seneca, on the Sandusky River, received Perry's famous dispatch: "We have met the enemy and they are ours." This meant that it was now Harrison's turn to act. Harrison's army consisted of about 2,500 regulars, 3,000 Kentucky volunteer infantry, and Colonel Richard M. Johnson's mounted Kentucky regiment. While the mounted regiment marched to Detroit, Harrison transferred his infantry by water to a point about three miles below Malden.

Proctor, believing that he could not maintain himself at Malden with Lake Erie in possession of the American navy, fell back by the road up the Thames River. The Americans pursued, and on the 5th of October overtook the enemy near the Moravian Town, where the engagement known as the battle of the Thames was fought. Colonel Johnson's regiment alone

*Adams.

†Lecture by Lieutenant Chapman.

fought the battle on the American side; it was enough. Part of the regiment, mounted, charged the British lines in front, and broke through them; while the rest of the regiment, dismounted, turned the enemy's right, and completed the victory.* The British were routed, losing twelve killed, twenty-two wounded, and 600 captured. Tecumthe was among the slain, and, as a result of the battle, the Indians deserted the British cause.

The United States had regained the lost territory of Michigan, with the exception of Fort Mackinac, which remained in possession of the British till the restoration of peace. After this victory the militia and volunteers were discharged; regular garrisons were left at Detroit and other frontier posts; and Harrison, with about 1,300 regulars, moved by the Lake to Sacketts Harbor.

(32) The plan of campaign proposed by the War Department for the operations in the east this year [1813], contemplated, first, the capture of Kingston and Fort Prescott, which controlled the upper St. Lawrence River, and then the main expedition against Montreal. The possession of the St. Lawrence by the United States would sever Upper from Lower Canada; for it was the only line of communication between the two.

General Dearborn commanded the American forces about Lake Ontario, some 7,000 men, regulars and militia. The British forces on the opposite shore numbered about 1,800 regulars and 500 militia.

General Dearborn did not follow the exact plan as proposed by the Secretary of War. On the 27th of April he crossed the Lake with about 1,700 men, and captured York, now Toronto, driving away the small British garrison, and burning the Parliament House.† A month later, on May 27, his forces captured Fort George, after a sharp engagement, driving the British garrison toward Hamilton at the head of Lake Ontario.

Dearborn, who personally had remained on shipboard during the engagement, sent General Winder with about 1,000 men in pursuit. Winder halted and sent back for reinforcements, and General Chandler marched out with another thousand men, and himself took command of the united forces. He pushed on to

*McMaster.

†Francis A. Walker, *The Making of the Nation*.

Stony Creek, where he camped without outposts, within ten miles of the British position at Hamilton.

In the night, the British commander, Vincent, surprised his camp and attacked it with about 700 men. Great confusion ensued, with considerable loss on each side. Both American generals, Chandler and Winder, were captured; and the two hostile forces retreated in opposite directions, leaving their dead unburied. Two days afterwards, June 8, the Americans were back at Fort George.

On the morning of June 24, Colonel Boerstler, with some 540 men of the 14th U. S. Infantry and two field-pieces, marched from Fort George to Beaver Dam, about seventeen miles, to destroy a store-house. He found himself surrounded by Indians and tried to retreat; but a British lieutenant with a squad of soldiers barred his way. Becoming utterly demoralized, Colonel Boerstler surrendered his 540 men to the British lieutenant, who had only 260 Indians, militia, and regulars.

The withdrawal of troops for the expedition against York and Fort George left Sacketts Harbor with a very weak garrison. The possession of this place was of as much importance to the British as the capture of Kingston would have been to the Americans. So on the night of May 26, Sir George Prevost himself embarked about 800 regulars at Kingston for its capture. The expedition landed next morning, and was met on the beach by General Jacob Brown, with a line of American militia in front, backed up by a line of regulars. "The militia instantly fled. The regulars fell back to the barrack and the block-house, and there checked the British advance." Prevost then retreated to his vessels, leaving a third of his force killed, wounded or missing.*

Kingston and the St. Lawrence River were still in the possession of the British; so was Lake Ontario; and General Dearborn's operations had really accomplished very little. He was now replaced by General James Wilkinson; and Major-General Wade Hampton was placed in command of the forces at Lake Champlain, some 5,000 regulars. Hampton was under Wilkinson's command; but these two generals mutually despised each other, and Hampton ignored Wilkinson's orders and refused to serve under him. "The Secretary [of War] pacified Hampton as well as he could, consented that all orders and reports should go out from and be made to the Department of War,"

*McMaster.

and moved that department from Washington to Sacketts Harbor.* This enraged General Wilkinson.

After more than a month of ludicrous and unseemly wrangling between the Secretary and the General over a plan of operations, it was finally decided that Wilkinson with some 8,000 regulars should move down the St. Lawrence, form a junction with Hampton, and march the combined force against Montreal.

Embarking his men in bateaux, Wilkinson sailed down the St. Lawrence on the 17th of October. Twelve hundred men under General McComb were placed on the north bank to march as a flank-guard abreast of the flotilla. A brigade under General Brown, also on the north bank, marched as advance-guard. British gunboats and 800 troops from Kingston set out in pursuit. On November 11, at Christler's Farm, the troops attacked the American rear. General Boyd was landed, with three brigades, to drive back the enemy, but was defeated; 2,000 American regulars, commanded by regular officers, retired before 800 British. The next day Wilkinson took his command to the south bank, and fled with it to French Mills, where it went into winter quarters.

(37) Meantime General Hampton had, toward the end of September, moved his force to Chateaugay. He had about 4,000 effectives. On October 22 he started down the Chateaugay River and marched as far as Spears. Here he found himself opposed by the British, and, judging rightly from letters received from the Secretary of War and from General Wilkinson, that the combined movement against Montreal had been suspended for the winter, he marched his command back to Plattsburg.

(35) A garrison of 500 New York militia had been left at Fort George under General McClure. Learning that Colonel Vincent with a force of British was advancing against them, the militia refused to serve any longer; so McClure burned the town of Newark near the fort, set fire to Queenstown, and withdrew to the American side. Then the militia returned to their homes. (36) On the 18th of December a British detachment retaliated by burning Buffalo, Black Rock, and other towns, and destroying all public and private property along the frontier for thirty miles. Fort Niagara was captured by surprise, and held by the enemy until peace was restored.

*McMaster.

(38) In April of this year the British Rear-Admiral Cockburn, "with a few boats and one hundred and fifty men, terrorized the shores of the Upper Chesapeake." Cockburn was opposed by only a few militia; so he plundered farms and burned villages in real buccaneer fashion.* Admiral Warren, also, undertook to capture Norfolk in June by a land attack, but was repulsed.

TROOPS EMPLOYED IN 1813.

General Upton in his valuable book, *The Military Policy of the United States*, says: "The false economy of making, in time of peace, no preparation for war, was made increasingly apparent by our experience in the foregoing campaigns.

"Exclusive of volunteers and rangers, in reference to whom data for the campaign is wanting, the number of troops called out during the year [1813] numbered:

Regulars	19,036
Militia	130,112
<hr/>	
Total	149,148

"The only compensation was the destruction of Proctor's force of 800 regulars, a feat that would have been impossible, but for the victory of Commodore Perry on Lake Erie."†

CAMPAIGN OF 1814.

In the first months of 1814 Congress passed bills increasing the regular army to 62,733 men; but by the following September enlistments had brought its numbers up to only some 38,000. There was, however, a marked improvement in the quality of the troops. "The regular troops at Buffalo passed the winter and spring of 1814 in drilling and improving their discipline. . . . Brigade commanders, like Scott, personally taught their officers the elements of squad drill, so that they in turn might more thoroughly instruct their men."†

(32) In February, 1814, General Brown was ordered to Sacketts Harbor with 2,000 men, from French Mills, and Gen-

*Adams.

†Upton.

eral Wilkinson fell back to Plattsburg with the rest of his army. At this time there were some 8,000 British troops at Montreal and in posts along the River Richelieu [Sorel]. (37) Two hundred occupied an advanced post in a stone mill at La-colle Creek. On March 30 Wilkinson led 4,000 men with two field-guns against this mill. He was unable to batter down the walls with his cannon, and, after losing 200 of his men by the fire from the building, he gave up the attempt and returned to his station. This was General Wilkinson's last military exploit. On the 1st of May General Izard took command of the army at Lake Champlain.

(32) The war in Europe was at an end, and in July fourteen of the best regiments of Wellington's army sailed for Canada. The British still had possession of Lake Ontario, the American fleet being practically blockaded at Sacketts Harbor. So General Brown determined to cross the Niagara River and operate against the British in that quarter. Brown's army consisted of two small regular brigades under Winfield Scott, now a brigadier-general, and Ripley; a volunteer militia brigade, including some 600 Indians, under General Peter B. Porter; and a battalion of artillery under Major Hindman: in all about 3,500 men for duty. On their side of the river the British had some 4,000 effectives under General Riall.

(36) On the 3rd of July Brown crossed the river and captured Fort Erie. He then moved down the river toward the other British posts. (39) On the 5th of July Porter's brigade was in the lead, and met the British just beyond Street's Creek. The brigade, after a short fight, "broke and fell back in confusion"; but Scott came on with his brigade, and the "British line broke and crumbled away." Henry Adams says in his history: "The battle of Chippewa was the only occasion during the war when equal bodies of regular troops met face to face, in extended lines on an open plain in broad daylight, without advantage of position; and never again after that combat was an army of American regulars beaten by British troops."* Had the historian looked farther ahead in our annals, he might have added, "nor by any other troops." (35) Brown pursued the British beyond Queenstown, where he remained more than a fortnight; then, learning that British reinforcements were arriving, he fell back to Chippewa, July 24. Then Scott's brigade moved forward to reconnoiter, and

*Adams.

encountered the British at Lundy's Lane, at 5 p.m., July 25. (40) This brought on the battle of Lundy's Lane, which lasted till ten o'clock at night. (41) The British were driven back from their first position, but the Americans withdrew from the field at the end of the engagement. In this combat the British numbered 3,045 and the Americans, less than 2,000. The losses were 743 killed and wounded on the American side, and 643 on the British. Generals Brown and Scott were both badly wounded.*

(36) The army fell back to Fort Erie. The British did not pursue at once,—this battle and that of Chippewa had increased their respect for American soldiery. (42) At length, on the 15th of August, after elaborate preparation with siege artillery, the British assaulted the American position at Fort Erie, and were severely repulsed. On the 17th of September the Americans made a sortie, which was so far successful that the British fell back on the 21st toward Chippewa.

(32) Meantime a British fleet had ascended the Sorel River into Lake Champlain; and Sir George Prevost, with upwards of 11,000 of Wellington's veterans, advanced from Montreal against Plattsburg, held by a small, but well intrenched, garrison. (43) On September 11 the British attacked at Plattsburg by land and water. The American navy saved the army. Lieutenant Macdonough practically captured or destroyed the British fleet; and the next day Prevost retreated to Canada.

(44) From the beginning of the war, Washington City had been left to the protection of Providence. Not a thing had been done for its defense. Finally, in July of this year, 1814, Brigadier-General Winder, "to please the governor of Maryland," was charged with the command and defense of the city.*

On August 18 word reached Washington that a British fleet was at the mouth of the Patuxent River, and troops were landing at Benedict about forty miles from the Capital. Mr. Monroe, the Secretary of State, mounted a horse and rode off to reconnoiter the enemy. General Winder gathered together some 2,000 men, including about 300 regulars of different regiments, and marched them out to Woodyard, where he was joined by Mr. Monroe.

Meantime General Robert Ross was leisurely marching his

*Adams.

5,000 red-coats toward Washington. Winder's army at Wood-yard watched them go by, but did not molest them. Then Winder fell back to Old Fields, where he stayed till the British approached; then he retreated across the Navy Yard bridge. The President and all the cabinet had joined him; and when they found for sure that the British had taken the Bladensburg road, they all hurried with the army to that point. Mr. Monroe was in the lead.

(45) Other militia troops had assembled at Bladensburg, also; so there were nigh 7,000 Americans on the ground, on August 24. The head of the British column deployed, and advanced straight against the Americans, who stood their ground and received it with fire. But when the next British regiment crossed the little stream, and threatened to turn its left, the American line broke. Some of the Americans retired in order, "but the mass, struck by panic, streamed westward toward Georgetown and Rockville." The only redeeming feature of the whole affair was the conduct of Captain Joshua Barney and his four hundred sailors and marines. Barney had commanded a gunboat flotilla in the Chesapeake, and had been obliged to destroy it to save it from the British fleet. With his sailors he trailed along behind Winder's army without any orders, and took his place in the battle. And his men stood their ground till they were overwhelmed in front, and enveloped in flank. But this time the navy was not strong enough to save the army.

(44) General Winder and his army never stopped in their flight, until they had gone sixteen miles beyond Washington. The British marched into Washington, burned the Capitol, the White House, and other public buildings; "and," the historian states, "from the distant hills of Maryland and Virginia the flying President and Cabinet caught glimpses of the ruin their incompetence had caused."*

The British marched back to their ships and sailed for Baltimore. They landed near North Point, and the fleet pushed into Patapsco River to shell the city. Baltimore had made ready for a stouter defense than Washington's. A brigade of militia met the invaders and delayed them some time, killing General Ross; and two days later, September 14, the British withdrew to their transports without having assaulted the American intrenchments.

*Adams.

OPERATIONS AT NEW ORLEANS.

The British troops that captured Washington sailed for Jamaica, where they were reinforced by other veteran regiments. Sir Edward Pakenham, "the brother-in-law of Wellington, and the ablest of his lieutenants,"* then took command of the whole force and embarked it for the capture of New Orleans. (46) He entered Lake Borgne, an arm of the Gulf of Mexico, and landed his troops near the head of Bayou Mazant, about ten miles east of New Orleans.

General Andrew Jackson was in command at New Orleans, and had got together a force of about 5,000 men, mostly militia. (47) On the evening of December 24 Jackson with part of his force surprised the advanced troops of the enemy in their camp at the Villeré plantation, and, aided by the guns of the *Carolina*, in the Mississippi, attacked them. A confused combat took place in the fog and darkness, and the Americans were repulsed. Jackson then placed his command behind a strong field-work, stretching across a space about a thousand yards wide, between the river on one side and a cypress brake on the other. A canal flowed along the front of the work.

On the 1st of January, 1815, the British batteries opened fire upon the American position. Their fire was immediately returned, and by noon they had been silenced. Pakenham then waited for more of his troops to come up, and, on the 8th of January, assaulted the American line with more than 5,000 of the best British veterans. "Behind the line," says McMaster, "were gathered as motley an array of men as ever at any time fought under one banner. On the extreme right, just where the line joined the levee, were some regulars, a company of New Orleans Rifles, some dragoons grouped about a howitzer, some sailors from the *Carolina* who served a small battery, and a battalion of Louisiana Creoles resplendent in gay uniforms. In the midst of the battalion were Dominique You and Beluche, with the swarthy crews of their pirate ships serving two twenty-fours. Then came a battalion of free negroes, more sailors with a thirty-two pound gun, a battalion of San Dominicans, more regulars, some old French soldiers under one of Napoleon's gunners named Flaujeac tending a brass gun, a long line of Carroll's Tennesseans in brown homespun hunting shirts, some more sailors, some more regulars with a long brass

*McMaster.

culverin, then John Adair and his Kentuckians, and last of all, standing knee-deep in the water of the swamp, Coffee's Tennesseans."

Jackson had altogether about 5,700 men of whom "barely one-third fired a gun." The British were repulsed with a loss of about 2,000 men killed, wounded, and prisoners. General Pakenham was among the slain.* The American loss was seven killed and six wounded.† There was some fighting on the opposite side of the river in which the British were successful.

This was the last battle of the war, and it was fought after the treaty of peace had been signed at Ghent, December 24, 1814. This treaty merely ended hostilities. Not a question upon which the war had been based was settled. The question of blockade ceased with the war in Europe; and the impressment of American seamen, though not mentioned in the treaty, was discontinued, as it would have been without the war.

COMMENTS.

The achievements of our navy during the War of 1812 were such that they will always be a subject of just pride to us; but the management and behavior of our land-forces were in many cases so unhappy, so discreditable, so bad, so burlesque, that a contemplation of them arouses in us mingled feelings of disappointment, shame, disgust, and amusement.

The war was, nevertheless, full of lessons for the military student, but especially for the American citizen—the man that votes and makes the legislators that make the laws. He is the one primarily responsible; for all the failures of this war, like the failure to end the Civil War in a single month, fifty years later, were due to a lack of preparedness,—to bad legislation.

George Washington by sad practical experience had learned the hopelessness of trying to conduct war with men that had been taught nothing about the business of war. Raw militia were the burden of his complaint from the beginning to the end of the Revolutionary War; and in his very last message he admonished the people that "timely disbursements to prepare for danger, frequently prevent much greater disbursements to repel it." But Mr. Jefferson, who never saw a battle, and dur-

*Adams.

†Upton.

ing whose administration our regular army was reduced almost to zero, said, in his last message, while war with England was threatening: "For a people who are free and who mean to remain so, a well-organized and armed militia is their best security."*

The lesson that the War of 1812 held out above all others, was that our militia furnished no security at all, and that a reliance upon it only resulted in a vast expense to the Government and an immortal national shame. The men that went out with our militia regiments certainly had as much natural courage as any other Americans—all they lacked was military training and educated leaders. They were just as good in battle as regulars with no more training; as was shown by the equally bad behavior of newly-enlisted regulars, under newly-appointed officers, on several occasions.

As we all know, it is the discipline that is instilled into soldiers in garrison and camp and march, under qualified officers, which counts in campaign, far above mere excellence in the manual of arms and the movements of the drill-book. These latter are useful mainly as an aid to discipline. The value and importance of training is shown by a comparison of the conduct of Scott's and Ripley's brigades, at Chippewa and Lundy's Lane, with that of our troops in other battles of the War of 1812.

The disadvantage of short terms of enlistment, which resulted in the discharge of men, and the melting away of whole regiments, just about the time when they became fit for campaign, early became apparent; and the term was changed from one to five years for the regular troops.

The difficulty of recruiting the regular regiments in time of hostilities was shown in this as in all our later conflicts; and the importance of maintaining a standing army of a size proportionate to our needs and to the population of the country, to serve as a training school for officers, and as a nucleus and a first line, in case of war, was made very evident.

General Upton says, that with a standing "army of 15,000 men, so organized as to have been capable of expansion by the aid of voluntary enlistments and obligatory service to double or triple its numbers, there is little reason to doubt that Canada would have been ours, and the war brought to a close on a single campaign."

The Administration was, during the first two years, greatly

*Upton.

at a loss for higher commanders. The trade of a general has to be learned; and our army was so small in 1812 that it contained no officers that had had any experience in commanding considerable bodies of men. So the Administration was forced to select its generals from among the territorial governors and other civil officials, like Hull and Dearborn, some of whom had seen a little service in the Revolutionary War, more than thirty years before. Not until they had gone through two years of training in the actual school of war, the best of all military schools, were Jacob Brown and Andrew Jackson and Winfield Scott able to show that they knew how to command men in battle and campaign. The chief qualities of these generals, the qualities that achieved success, were their energy, activity, and readiness to fight.

In its prosecution of the war the Administration was greatly hampered by the opposition of the New England States. The governors of some of those States refused to let their militia leave the States, and took so little pains to enforce the laws of war, that the British army in Canada was fed and supplied by New Englanders, and paid with money furnished by New England banks. The British army also purchased supplies in New York.*

From the beginning to the end of the war, there were called out on the American side 56,032 regulars and 471,622 militia and volunteers; while "the largest force of British regulars opposed to us was 16,500";† and the British regulars were probably never at any one time aided by more than 800 Canadian militia and 2,500 Indians.

When we remember that the British government sent upwards of 450,000 troops to South Africa rather than submit to defeat there, we must congratulate ourselves that England had her hands full with her war on the Continent of Europe; that the American war was no more in favor in England than it was in America; that the British really had no cause to fight us, except to keep us out of Canada; and that the causes for which we were fighting ceased with the cessation of hostilities between Napoleon and the British government.

STRATEGY AND TACTICS.

Of strategy and tactics there was not an example worthy of

*Adams.

†Upton.

emulation shown by either Americans or British in any campaign of the entire war; unless it was in General Brock's operations. The campaigns are valuable as professional studies only on account of their blunders; and these are so apparent, it should seem that no officer that has passed the primer of his military education could be guilty of repeating them.

In 1812 we saw an invasion of Canada planned for three separate columns between which there could be no coöperation nor concert of action. Each moved, or tried to move, without any regard to the others. So the British met them, and repelled them one at a time, and with the same troops.

General Hull's invasion of Canada by way of Detroit, while Lake Erie was still controlled by a British fleet, was doomed to failure from the start. His only line of communication was by a road 200 miles long, exposed to attack from the British at Malden, exposed for many miles along the lake-shore to fire from the British fleet, and passing through more than a hundred miles of forest and swamp, filled with hostile Indians. The chances of keeping a wagon-train going and coming with supplies along such a route, were very slim.

General Wilkinson's line of communication, also, was in peril when he moved his army down the St. Lawrence with Kingston still in possession of the British in his rear. The Secretary of War saw the importance of the capture of Kingston, and urged it; but both General Dearborn and General Wilkinson, and later, also, General Brown, were dissuaded by Commodore Chauncey, who commanded the American fleet on Lake Ontario, from undertaking the capture. Then Chauncey, who was to guard the entrance to the St. Lawrence with his fleet, performed his duty so badly as to allow the British gunboats to slip by him and fall upon the rear of Wilkinson's flotilla.

The disasters at the Raisin River and Stony Creek were both due to the failure of the American commanders to secure their camps by outposts.

Even where our troops achieved victory, their success was not due to good tactics, but rather to valor, marksmanship, good discipline, or courageous leading. At Chippewa Scott "tempted destruction by quitting his secure position behind Street's Creek," and marching his little command across the bridge over the creek with the British twenty-four pounders playing on it. Again at Lundy's Lane Scott charged a British force about twice the strength of his own, when he was only out on a reconnaissance, and might better have fallen back, or

taken up a defensive position and waited for Ripley's brigade to come to his assistance. Still the fault of attacking superior numbers, and attacking vigorously, as General Scott always did, is one seldom to be censured in a leader. Scott, like all courageous, dashing leaders, had the quality of inspiring his men with something of his own spirit.

In the battle of New Orleans, one of the most remarkable in all history, General Jackson, although two-thirds of his troops had not fired a shot, failed to complete the destruction of the British by a counter-attack. This, however, was probably not practicable with raw, undisciplined, heterogeneous troops, such as his were.

In the first two years of the war the British government had no thought of taking the offensive. With its army engaged in Europe, it only undertook to defend Canada, and to blockade the American coast from New York to Georgia. To maintain the friendship of New England, the ports of that section were not subjected to the blockade. But in 1814, with its armies set free, Great Britain began a more vigorous campaign.

The expedition of Prevost against Plattsburg was undertaken for the purpose of cutting off the Eastern States from the rest of the Union, with the hope of regaining them for the British crown in the treaty of peace. The avowed objects of the expedition to New Orleans were two: "first, the command of the mouth of the Mississippi so as to deprive the back settlements of America of their communication with the sea; second, 'to occupy some important and valuable possession by the restoration of which we may improve the conditions of peace, or which may entitle us to exact its cession as the price of peace.'"^{*} The purpose of General Ross's expedition, as shown by his instructions, was "to effect a diversion on the coasts of the United States in favor of the army employed in the defense of Upper and Lower Canada" . . . and not "for any extended operation at a distance from the coast." This explains why Ross did not follow up General Winder's fleeing militia at Washington.*

The capture of Washington rather than Baltimore or some other city, had no strategic significance, and might not have been undertaken at all, had not its defenseless condition invited capture. Being the capital of the country, its capture was of some political importance, and was very humiliating to Ameri-

*Adams.

can pride. The excuse for the destruction of the public buildings, as well as for other burning and plundering done by the British, was, to quote from their instructions, to make the Americans "sensible of the impropriety as well as of the inhumanity of the system they have adopted." This referred to the destruction of villages and buildings by American militia in Canada.*

*Adams.

LECTURE V.

THE MEXICAN WAR.

TAYLOR'S CAMPAIGN.

(48) This war grew out of the annexation of Texas and our dispute with Mexico over the boundary line. Texas had achieved her independence of Mexico in 1836, and in less than a year her sovereignty was acknowledged by our Government. Soon afterwards Texas applied for annexation to the United States, and a bill to that effect, after much discussion in Congress, finally passed in March, 1845.

As had been anticipated, Mexico showed her resentment of this act, by recalling her minister at once from Washington, and terminating further diplomatic intercourse with the United States. On account of this attitude on the part of the Mexican government, and hostile demonstrations and rumors along the Rio Grande, Colonel Zachary Taylor, 6th Infantry, U. S. Army, acting under orders from the War Department, established a large camp of troops at Corpus Christi, at the mouth of the Nueces River, in the autumn of 1845. The first troops to arrive were eight companies of the 3rd Infantry, which General Taylor took with him by transport from New Orleans. By the end of October General Taylor's command consisted of the following regiments:

2nd Dragoons,

1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th Artillery,

3rd, 4th, 5th, 7th, 8th Infantry.

Aggregate, 3,554 officers and men.

This was the entire regular army of the United States, as it then existed, with the exception of one regiment of dragoons and three of infantry. The weakest of the regiments contained only 169 rank and file, and the strongest only 375.* The Mexican forces, including state troops and rural guards, were estimated at about 30,000; but a revolution led by General Paredes had just overthrown the government. The changes

*Upton.

among the higher officers, and the jealousies and confusion, occasioned by this event, greatly hindered the mobilization and hampered the operations of the Mexicans.

GEOGRAPHY.

The territory between the Nueces River and the Rio Grande, about 130 miles wide along the coast, was in dispute. Texas claimed the Rio Grande as her boundary, but as yet had exercised no jurisdiction south of Corpus Christi. For several hundred miles back from the coast this country was low and flat, covered with prairie grass, chaparral [thickets of mezquite], and cactus flats in irregular patches of greater or less area. There were also many marshes and lagoons, especially near the coast. There were trails and roads practicable for troops and artillery in almost any direction. Along the coast were several low islands; the principal one, Padre Island, stretching from the mouth of the Nueces to that of the Rio Grande, formed a perfect barrier separating the main coast from the Gulf of Mexico between these two points; and without the mouths of these two rivers there were sandbars over which only lighters and boats of light draft could pass. Similar craft could navigate Laguna de la Madre, the narrow passage between Padre Island and the mainland.

South of the Rio Grande the Gulf coast and the country are of similar character westward to the slopes of the Sierra Madre—a part of the great mountain-chain that forms the backbone of the continent,—the great divide between the Atlantic and Pacific slopes. But the country is more densely covered with trees and vegetation; and the climate is hotter, unhealthier, more unbearable. This is the Tierra Caliente. It generally contains plenty of water and grass, but in no other respect is it fit for the march of troops. The mountain-slopes lead up to the high interior table-land, which falls away gradually from a general elevation of about 7,500 feet at the City of Mexico, to about 4,000 feet above sea-level at El Paso.

The main road southward to this table-land broke into the mountains at Monterey; and at Saltillo, seventy miles farther southward, came out upon the high plateau. From Saltillo on to San Luis Potosí, some 300 miles, the country was so dry and barren as almost to be a desert. There was not a running stream between those points. From San Luis Potosí south-

ward the country was excellent in every way—fertile, cool, well-watered, thickly settled, and traversed by good roads. There were two roads from Camargo to Monterey, and another which, starting at San Antonio, Texas, crossed the Rio Grande at Laredo, and, passing through Monclova, joined the road through Monterey at Saltillo. From there the direct road to the City of Mexico led southward through San Luis Potosí.

PLANS.

General Taylor's instructions were, "to defend Texas from invasion . . . and should Mexico invade it . . . [to] employ all his forces to repulse the invaders, and drive all Mexican troops beyond the Rio Grande." Further instructions from the Secretary of War said, "The assembling of a large Mexican army on the borders of Texas, and crossing the Rio Grande with a considerable force, will be regarded by the Executive here as an invasion of the United States and the commencement of hostilities. An attempt to cross the river with such a force will also be considered in the same light. . . . In case of war . . . your main object will be the protection of Texas; but the pursuit of this object will not necessarily confine your action within the territory of Texas."* Taylor was also authorized to call on Texas and several other near States, for volunteers, if he should need them. He was not, however, to call for volunteers until invasion actually took place, hence was to have no opportunity to train them in his winter camp at Corpus Christi. He spent the time, however, in training and drilling his regulars. They had never been assembled in large bodies before, but "four-fifths of his officers had received the benefits of professional training at the Military Academy, or in the Florida war."*

Mexico's plan was to assemble as large a force as practicable at Matamoros, and drive all American troops beyond the Nueces.

OPERATIONS.

(49) Better to carry out his instructions, General Taylor marched his little army to the Rio Grande, and at the end of March, 1846, established a camp opposite Matamoros, and a depot of supplies at Point Isabel, nine miles to the northeast on

*Upton.

the coast. On his way he was met by a Mexican delegation sent to protest against his invasion of Mexican territory; and he himself issued a proclamation announcing the purpose of his occupation, and promising protection to the people.

Meantime a Mexican army estimated at 6,000 had assembled on the opposite side of the Rio Grande, at Matamoros, under General Ampudia. On the 12th of April Ampudia sent General Taylor an order to break up his camp within twenty-four hours and withdraw to the Nueces River, or accept war as the alternative. Ampudia was superseded in command within a few days by General Arista, who was as eager for action as Ampudia.

(50) On the 24th of April Arista ordered a considerable detachment under General Torrejon to cross the Rio Grande at La Palangana, six miles above Matamoros. The next day this detachment encountered a small reconnoitering party of the 2nd Dragoons, under Captain Thornton, and killed one officer and sixteen men, and captured the rest. The entire American loss, killed and captured, was four officers and fifty-nine dragoons.

This was the beginning of the war. General Taylor at once asked the governors of Texas and Louisiana each for four regiments of volunteers. The mouth of the Rio Grande was blockaded by an American revenue cutter and the brig *Lawrence*, to prevent supplies from entering by water for Arista's army.

On April 30 General Arista, leaving General Mejía in command at Matamoros, marched the bulk of his army to Longo-reño, about five miles below Matamoros, where he expected to cross the river, in order to cut off the communications of the American army with its base of supplies at Point Isabel. A scarcity of boats caused a delay of twenty-four hours in his passage.

General Taylor had caused his camp to be fortified and prepared for defense. Anxious about the safety of his base of supplies, he left Major Jacob Brown with the 7th Infantry and two batteries at this camp, and started himself with the rest of his force, on the afternoon of May 1, for Point Isabel, arriving there the next day at noon.

Arista's delay in crossing had prevented his capturing the depot at Point Isabel, or getting between Taylor's army and that place. But he was anxious for a battle with the little American army. So he marched to Palo Alto, on the road be-

tween Taylor's camp and Point Isabel; and to hasten General Taylor's return, he dispatched orders to General Mejía to open with artillery on the American camp, and sent General Ampudia with four cannon and a considerable force to attack it on the northern bank of the river. Ampudia opened fire upon the camp on the morning of May 5, and kept it up until midnight of the 7th, when he was recalled by Arista to aid him against Taylor, who had started back from Point Isabel to the relief of Major Brown's garrison.

(51) At about noon on May 8 Taylor found Arista's army in line of battle near Palo Alto. The right of the Mexican line rested on a sort of low ridge, about 3,000 yards to the east of Taylor's road; the left reached to the road, which passed along the edge of a swampy chaparral. The right of the line was covered by a squadron of cavalry, and the left by eight squadrons. The guns were in the intervals between the infantry regiments. The line faced nearly north and had a clear field of fire over a stretch of prairie with several swampy places in it. The left of the line rested on a marsh, and there were two large marshes immediately in rear of the line.

The left of the Mexican line was the weaker, and the chaparral on that flank offered some cover for the Americans. So General Taylor made his main attack against that flank. Captain May's squadron covered the left of Taylor's line, while Captain's Ker's squadron guarded the exposed right, and the rear where the train was parking. As with the Mexican line, the artillery was posted between the infantry regiments.

Taylor's line advanced in regimental columns until the Mexican artillery opened upon it. Thereupon it deployed. The Mexican cavalry under General Torrejon now moved through the chaparral to attack the right and rear of the American line; but it was repulsed by the 5th Infantry, which was on the right flank, and a section of artillery. The Mexican left was now drawn back. Taylor changed the direction of his line to conform to the new position of the enemy. There was now about an hour's cessation of the battle.

May's squadron was sent round against the Mexican left flank; but finding itself greatly outnumbered it did not charge, but withdrew to the rear.

Just before dark Arista massed his troops in his right wing and moved them against the American left flank and rear, sending Torrejon again with his cavalry against the American right. The main attack was repulsed by Duncan's battery,

supported by the 8th Infantry and Ker's squadron of cavalry. The cavalry attack was also repulsed. At this moment there was great confusion in the Mexican line, and, if the Americans had followed up their success by a vigorous counter-attack, the Mexicans would probably have been routed.* It was now dark and the Mexicans retired into the chaparral in rear of their position; the Americans bivouacked on the battle-field.

Although General Taylor took the offensive in this battle and advanced to the attack, he found himself outnumbered by Arista's army, especially in cavalry, and was immediately thrown upon the defensive. General Wilcox in his account says: "The action of May 8 on the plains of Palo Alto was, on the part of the United States forces, defensive and mainly of artillery against Mexican artillery and cavalry supported by infantry."†

One incident occurred in the combat that might happen, with like effects, even in our day of long-range magazine fire: the prairie grass was set on fire by bursting shells, and the smoke for a time concealed the movements of the hostile armies from each other.

At Palo Alto the Americans numbered 2,288, and the Mexicans were estimated at about 6,000. The Mexican account of the combat gives the number of the Mexicans as only 3,000.

At dawn the next morning the hostile armies were in sight of each other, but by sunrise the Mexicans had begun a retreat for Matamoras. The American army, with its front well covered by scouts, took up the pursuit. About three miles from the battle-field of the day before, Arista in his retreat came upon what he conceived to be a very strong position. Here he decided to halt his army. (52) He placed his line in a resaca, or narrow shallow swale, which crossed the road in the midst of a thick chaparral and ended in a pool of water at each end. Arista appears not to have believed that the Americans would seriously attack him in this position; he had his tent pitched and was busy writing, when General Taylor opened fire on his line, and began the battle of Resaca de la Palma. Some Mexican artillery in and near the road on both sides of the swale could not be driven back; so Captain May was ordered to charge it with his squadron. On account of the dense growth May could only move in the road, and had to charge in

**The Other Side*, a Mexican account of the war, translated and edited by Colonel Albert C. Ramsay, U. S. Army.

†*History of the Mexican War*, by General Cadmus M. Wilcox.

column of fours. He captured seven guns and a Mexican general. He was driven from the battery by Mexican infantry, but the guns were soon retaken by American infantry. The action in the chaparral lasted for some time, but the Mexicans were finally routed. (50) They dispersed and fled, never stopping till they had crossed the Rio Grande.

Ker's dragoons, Duncan's battery, and the 3rd Infantry followed in pursuit. The Mexican account states that if Taylor had pursued with his whole available force, and followed the fugitives across the river, "it is undoubted that he would have completely destroyed them and taken Matamoros without opposition."* But Taylor had no means of crossing the river. The Mexican batteries at Matamoros opened on the pursuers, and the American guns in Fort Brown (as the fort built opposite Matamoros was afterwards named in honor of Major Jacob Brown, who was killed there during the siege and attack by the Mexicans) "were directed upon the mass of fleeing Mexicans while crossing at the upper ferry."†

The losses of the Americans in the two engagements were 170 killed and wounded, and the estimated losses of the Mexicans, 1,000.‡ Arista's baggage and all sorts of plunder were abandoned to the Americans.

The next day, May 10, the American army was again assembled opposite Matamoros. Several days were spent by its commander in arranging with Commodore Connor, who commanded the American squadron at the mouth of the Rio Grande, for the proper defense of the American base at Point Isabel, and for the complete opening and holding of the river.

On his way back to Fort Brown from Point Isabel, Taylor received word that Mexican reinforcements were coming into Matamoros, and that Barita and other points near the mouth of the Rio Grande were being fortified; so he dispatched a detachment of 300 volunteers, several regiments of which had joined the army, to Brazos, there to be ferried across by the navy. The detachment seized Barita on the 17th of May. The same day Arista sent Taylor a written request for an armistice, until the two governments could arrange terms. The request was promptly declined. The next day, May 18, Taylor crossed his army in boats and launches to the Mexican

**The Other Side.*

†Wilcox.

‡Upton.

side, and took possession of Matamoros, without any resistance.

(49) Arista had withdrawn his army toward Linares, 150 miles southwest, whence it could march promptly to Monterey or Victoria, according to the direction the enemy should take.* Taylor started all of his cavalry, regular and volunteer, in pursuit on the 19th. It followed the enemy sixty or seventy miles, but was then forced to return by the lack of water for men and animals. After a march of great hardship, due to scarcity of food and water, Arista's dispirited army reached Linares on the 28th of May. Arista was relieved from command and ordered before a court-martial.

The victories of Palo Alto and Resaca de la Palma gave the Americans control of the Rio Grande; but for lack of troops, especially cavalry, and more so for lack of land and water transportation, Taylor was unable to follow up the Mexican army. He had made timely requisition for boats and wagons; yet for want of them, his army had to lie idle for three months. He reestablished his camp opposite Matamoros.

The Sierra Madre range was to be the new line of defense for the Mexicans, and Monterey was selected as General Taylor's first objective. Camargo was the natural place for his advanced or secondary base, because the road from that point to Monterey was shorter than that from any point farther down the Rio Grande; and, more important still, it lay in the valley of the San Juan River, where plenty of water and wood could be found. The depot at Camargo could be supplied by water transport from the base at Point Isabel, and the route all the way down the river was practicable for artillery and wagons on both banks.

THE BATTLE OF MONTEREY.

Toward the middle of August Taylor had his invading force gathered together at Camargo. For lack of transportation he had been obliged to leave some 6,000 volunteers at Fort Brown, but still had about 6,000 men with him. He organized them into two divisions of regulars under Generals Worth and Twiggs, and one of volunteers under General Butler. He established another depot at Cerralvo, connected with Camargo by two roads, each about seventy-five miles long.

**The Other Side.*

With its cavalry in advance, the American army began its march from Camargo on August 19, the rear division, the volunteers, not leaving till September 6. By the 13th of September the entire army was concentrated at Cerralvo. The march was resumed on the 18th. The Mexican cavalry, which had now shown itself, fell back before the American squadrons, and, on the night of the 19th of September, the American army bivouacked at Walnut Springs, three miles from Monterey. The Mexican army, now again commanded by General Ampudia, had anticipated the movement against Monterey, and had itself moved thither and prepared the town for defense.

(53) Monterey is inclosed on the west and south by high ridges of the Sierra Madre through which the San Juan River breaks. The river here flows eastward and then turns toward the northeast. The town lies in the bend thus formed. Through the northern edge of the town runs a smaller stream, branch of the San Juan, spanned by a fortified stone bridge. Beyond this stream to the northward the ground rises in gentler slopes than those south of the town. The defensive works consisted of the masonry citadel, 1,500 yards north of the main plaza and close to the Camargo road, and several small forts and buildings on other sides of the city. On the east were two small forts and a stone tannery prepared for defense. On the west, covering the roads entering from that side, three or four small forts occupied commanding points, and a stone building, the Bishop's Palace, stood upon a very prominent isolated hill. South of the town the gorge of the river was impassable, and no roads entered from that side. The stone wall of the cemetery in the western edge of the town, and the stone parapets around the flat roofs of the houses, also gave excellent protection for the defenders.

The line of communication of the Mexican garrison was the Saltillo road, leading from the western side of the town. General Taylor's attack had for its main purpose to get possession of this road. The "main attack" was therefore to be made by a turning movement of General Worth's division against the works on the west, while the "secondary attack" would be made against the north and east of the town, by Twiggs's regular and Butler's volunteer divisions.

Worth started out on his turning movement in the afternoon of the 20th September. The next morning he was received with a charge of cavalry west of the hill upon which the Bishop's Palace stood. Thus the battle of Monterey began. The

Mexican cavalry was repulsed. The battle lasted until the evening of the 23d. The Americans took one work after another, until they were in possession of all except the citadel; this stronghold held out to the last. At length, after much fighting in the streets and from the housetops, the Mexicans were driven in about the main plaza; and at 3 a.m., on the 24th of September, General Ampudia sent a note to Taylor proposing terms of surrender. The battle was, thereupon, suspended; and after some hours of conference, terms were agreed upon. "The terms were, briefly, the Mexican army to retire, the infantry and cavalry carrying their arms . . . the artillery to retain one battery not to exceed six pieces . . . the Mexican flag, when struck at the citadel, to be saluted by its own battery."*

(49) "In addition, it was agreed that the Mexican armed forces should retire within seven days beyond the line Rinconado-Linares-San Fernando, and that the forces of the United States were not to advance beyond this same line before the expiration of eight weeks, or until the orders of the respective governments be received."

In this battle the aggregate strength of the American army was 6,650; that of the Mexicans about 10,000.* The American losses were 488 killed and wounded. The loss of the Mexicans is not accurately known.

(48) The Mexican army retreated to San Luis Potosí, where General Santa Anna took command of it, and set about reorganizing it. Santa Anna with the connivance of the American authorities, had lately returned from exile. He was immediately elected President of the Republic, and he personally conducted all the subsequent operations against the invaders of his country.

The Administration at Washington disapproved the armistice granted at the surrender of Monterey, and ordered Taylor to resume hostilities at once; but the order reached Taylor in time to shorten the armistice by only about a week. Accordingly General Worth's division was started forward on the 13th of November to take and hold Saltillo. The place was occupied without opposition.

Saltillo was strategically an important point. As we have seen, it was where the road to the capital passed from the mountains into the high central table-land; there, also, a road

*Wilcox.

came in from Parras, a town a hundred miles farther west, where there was another American column, under General Wool. Parras was situated in a very fertile region, from which General Taylor could draw provisions for his troops. Furthermore, Saltillo was the capital of Coahuila, which gave it a political importance. General Taylor did not contemplate any farther advance toward the City of Mexico along this line.

General Wool's column, about 2,000 strong, had marched independently from San Antonio, Texas, by way of Monclova. It had met no opposition and had now, at Parras, come under Taylor's command.

The Administration at Washington was desirous of having the state of Tamaulipas occupied as a means of making the Mexican government and people want peace. Accordingly the important port of Tampico, from which Santa Anna had withdrawn its garrison, was taken by Commodore Perry about the middle of November; and General Taylor marched an expedition from Monterey to Victoria, the capital of the state. A detachment under General Shields was sent down from the Rio Grande to garrison Tampico, and the port was afterwards used as a base for the fleet and army in the operations against Vera Cruz.

In December Santa Anna, taking advantage of Taylor's movement against Victoria, threatened to advance against Worth at Saltillo. General Wool, therefore, moved his command from Parras and joined Worth. Santa Anna remained at Potosí.

On the 4th of January, 1847, General Taylor was at Victoria with Twiggs's division of regulars from Monterey and Patterson's division of volunteers, which had marched down from Camargo. A few days later Taylor received orders detaching from his command to General Scott's expedition against Mexico City, all of his regulars, except four batteries of artillery and two squadrons of dragoons, and all of his volunteers, except some 4,000 at the front, and a few thousands guarding his line of communications. With so small a force Taylor could hope to do no more than hold the advanced position of Saltillo or Monterey. General Worth had been taken from him, but Wool was left in command at Saltillo. General Taylor arrived at Saltillo, and resumed command there February 2.

Several small detachments sent forward by Wool to reconnoiter had been attacked, and some of them captured. (54)

"To restore confidence among the volunteers, shaken by the late captures," Taylor moved the bulk of his little force, February 5, eighteen miles farther south to Agua Nueva.

Santa Anna got possession of General Scott's dispatch to Taylor detailing all the plans for the expedition against Vera Cruz, including the reduction of Taylor's forces; so Santa Anna resolved to march his army from San Luis Potosí to destroy Taylor's weak force. Egged on by the press of the capital city, he started on his march of 300 miles before he had provided adequate subsistence and clothing for his army. The march was begun on the 28th of January, and the troops suffered almost every hardship incident to campaigning—heat, cold, rain, snow, hunger, thirst, rags, bare feet, sickness. Before the end of the journey, the army had lost a fifth of its numbers by death, sickness, straggling, and desertion. On the morning of February 21, May brought in the news that Santa Anna's army was advancing rapidly.

THE BATTLE OF BUENA VISTA.

Back on the road some thirteen miles, near the hacienda of Buena Vista, was an excellent defensive position at the northern end of a narrow defile, or angostura. Here Taylor resolved to stand for battle with the enemy. Leaving his volunteer cavalry as a rear-guard to forward the stores and burn such as it should not have time to move, Taylor withdrew at once to Buena Vista. As soon as Santa Anna learned of the withdrawal and the burning of stores, he was convinced that the Americans had begun a precipitate retreat. His chief concern was to overtake them and bring them to battle.

(55) The road back to Buena Vista and Saltillo passed through the angostura. Along the western side of the road was a small stream flowing between banks twenty feet high and almost vertical. It could be crossed at a few points only. High mountain ridges rose on each side of the defile. On the western side the space between the foot of the mountain-slope and the stream was so cut up by deep gulches as to be impassable for any troops. On the eastern side, between the stream and the foot of the mountain, was a flat plateau forty or fifty feet above the roadway, cut into narrow tables by ravines running from the foot of the mountain-slope down to the valley of the stream. Most of the ravines could be crossed by infantry, but with difficulty.

It was on these narrow tables, and around the heads of the ravines, that the main part of the fighting at Buena Vista was done. One of the tables was from one to three thousand feet wide, and the point in which it terminated came down so close to the bank of the stream as barely to leave space wide enough for a wagon to pass. At this narrow point of the road five guns of Captain Washington's battery were placed behind an embankment. They were supported by the 3rd Indiana regiment posted on a hill between the two branches of the road back of the defile. From there the American line of battle extended up the middle of this table some 3,000 yards. Lieutenant O'Brien had the other three guns of Washington's battery at the left of the infantry line, and still farther to the left the volunteer cavalry and riflemen were guarding the flanks on the mountain-slopes. Bragg's battery with a regiment of infantry took position on a table to the right [west] of the angostura.

Santa Anna's army came up the next day, February 22, and finding the Americans in position for battle made its dispositions for attack. General Ampudia, with a brigade of light troops, pushed out to the right of the Mexicans, and driving back the dismounted American cavalry and riflemen in that quarter, took up a position on the mountainside. Two divisions, Lombardini's and Pacheco's, were formed abreast of each other to the right [east] of the road, with Ortega's to their right and rear in reserve. Mejía's brigade got across the stream and took position to the left [west] of the road. Blanco's column formed in the road.

The Mexican army was strong in cavalry. So General Miñon's cavalry division had been detached to make a swift turning movement by the mountain roads to the east, in order to cut off the retreat of Taylor's army. The rest of the cavalry was in three bodies, one supporting each flank, and the reserve under Andrade behind the center of the line. The artillery was posted in two strong bodies behind the wings of the army. These were about the positions of the two hostile forces, when the battle opened in earnest, at dawn on the morning of February 23.

Fearful of the capture of his supplies by Miñon's cavalry, Taylor, taking Jefferson Davis's regiment of Mississippi Rifles and May's squadron of dragoons, went back to Saltillo, six miles away, on the evening of the 22nd, and was there when the battle began at dawn on the 23rd.

Ampudia opened the fight on the extreme left of the American position; his purpose was to turn that flank. Soon the divisions of Lombardini and Pacheco advanced against the American left flank, and Blanco's moved by the road against the right. This division soon came under such destructive fire from the batteries of Washington and Bragg, and their supports, that it was ordered by Santa Anna to halt under shelter of the ground. Mejía's brigade crossed to the east of the road. Pacheco's division, composed of recruits, almost immediately broke and fled from the field; but the rest of the Mexican forces pushed forward.

An Indiana regiment supporting O'Brien's guns was the first part of the American line to break; and soon the whole line was forced back. Finally the American left was turned and the Mexican cavalry was in pursuit of the fleeing regiments. At this crisis Taylor returned from Saltillo with May's cavalry and all but two companies of Davis's Rifles. This regiment was deployed to the left of Buena Vista, and with reinforcements that were hastened to it, it succeeded in checking the enveloping Mexicans. But the battle kept up till dark.

The Americans were so greatly outnumbered by the Mexicans, and they had to defend a position so much too extensive for their strength, that their regiments, batteries, and squadrons were kept shifting their positions all day long. They would be driven back from one point, only to reform and take up a new position. Bragg's battery was posted first on the right flank, then it had to be withdrawn, and sent to the hacienda. Later on it went into position in support of Davis's Rifles, and wherever else it could do the most good. And so with the other batteries.

Finally, the Mexican reserve, Ortega's division, advanced upon the broad plateau, along which the main position of the Americans had rested in the morning. American troops were hurried to this quarter from other parts of the field as quickly as possible. At last Bragg's battery, General Taylor states in his report, "without infantry to support it, and at the imminent risk of losing its guns, came rapidly into action, the Mexican line being but a few yards from the muzzles of the pieces. The first discharge of cannister caused the enemy to hesitate, the second and third drove him back in disorder and saved the day."*

*Wilcox.

This ended the battle. The Mexicans withdrew from the field and fell back to Agua Nueva. Meanwhile, Miñón's cavalry had attacked at Saltillo, but had been driven off by the guard of mixed troops at that point.

In the Battle of Buena Vista the strength of General Taylor's army was 4,757 men and sixteen guns. All the troops were volunteers, except the artillery and two squadrons of dragoons. The American loss in the two days' engagement was 756, of which number 267 were killed, 456 wounded, and 23 missing.*

Santa Anna started from San Luis Potosí with some 18,000 rank and file, but the hardships of his long march had been such that it is probable he had no more than 14,000 to put into the battle. His loss was between 1,500 and 2,000 men, 294 of whom were prisoners.

General Taylor was in no condition, of course, to pursue Santa Anna's army. "He fell back to Monterey," says Wilcox, "where he remained for some months keeping open communications with the Rio Grande, superintending the forwarding of troops to reinforce Scott, and gaining the encomiums of the Mexican authorities by his wise and conciliatory civil administration."*

In all the annals of American warfare, no other such victory as that of Buena Vista can be pointed out. Upon ground unprepared for defense, with its left flank practically in the air,—the space was so much too wide for the force defending it that the heights on the left could not be properly guarded,—this little body of well-trained volunteers successfully resisted from daylight till dark the assaults of an enemy of three times its own strength; and at last repulsed him and kept the field.

COMMENTS.

With the question of the right or wrong of this war, from a political or a moral point of view, we are not concerned—we leave that to "Hosea Biglow" and Mr. Polk's Cabinet. Only as a military study furnished by the history of our own country does the war concern us here.

In the strategy of General Taylor's campaign and the tactics of his battles, there is little fault to find. In the first opera-

*Wilcox.

tions, those north of the Rio Grande, the student cannot help feeling, however, that the general was not quite as bold and aggressive as he ought to have been; that he was more taken up with defending his own base of supplies, and holding his intrenched camp opposite Matamoros, than with destroying the forces of the enemy that had crossed the Rio Grande.

It would appear that when Taylor learned on May 1 that the Mexican army was crossing the river at Longoreño, five miles below his camp, he should have marched all of his available force promptly against it, instead of withdrawing to his base. His surest way to protect his base was to destroy the enemy; and this he would undoubtedly have done, if he had attacked vigorously while the enemy was in the act of crossing, or immediately afterwards. The Mexican army had only two boats, and made its passage very slowly. Taylor's dragoons ought to have kept him perfectly informed as to the progress of the passage—the point of passage was less than a half-hour's gallop from the American camp.

In the combat of Palo Alto, also, there was the appearance of over-caution on the part of the American commander—it is evident that he believed himself greatly outnumbered. The Mexican account gives Arista only 3,000 men in the engagement; this number is probably nearly right. Taylor had 2,288. If our troops had not been content with repulsing the enemy and holding their ground, but had made a counter-attack at the right moment, they would have routed the enemy. After defeating the Mexicans at Resaca de la Palma all available troops ought to have taken part in the pursuit. But only a regiment of infantry, a squadron, and a battery followed the fugitives; the rest of the American army bivouacked on the battle-field. Judged by the sum of their success, however, General Taylor's operations in those few days were well-nigh faultless. They could hardly have achieved more.

Strategically, the campaign on the part of the Americans was a defensive-offensive campaign. General Taylor was told by the Administration that he was to defend Texas, in case of war, and was not to begin the hostilities. But in case the Mexicans resorted to hostile acts, then he was not necessarily to confine his action within the territory of Texas. And we have seen how Taylor waited till the Mexicans crossed the Rio Grande, then, after the first two engagements, pushed the campaign as hard and as fast and as far as the means at his command would permit.

There was delay, weeks and months of it, of which an army better prepared than that of Mexico would have taken advantage; but from beginning to end there was never a day of delay for which General Taylor or his subordinates were responsible. The system of supply in our service was centralized in Washington, and there was no electric telegraph and no railway mail. Every requisition for a wagon or a steamboat had to go back by the slow postal means of the time, and the army at the front had to sit and wait.

When an army is equipped in all of its details beforehand; when the system is such that supplies and means of transportation can be quickly obtained; when, in other words, the fighting machine is ready for work, before it takes the field, like the Japanese army in its war with Russia, the question of logistics is subordinate to the question of successful strategy and tactics. In such cases the general has merely to decide at the outset of his campaign what is to be his objective; and with each change in his operations, where is the best place to put his army in his next move, just as in a game of chess; and whether the route is practicable, and how long it will take to march his troops thither; and whether he can whip the enemy when he gets there. He must, of course, in every case, leave adequate forces to guard his depots and line of communication; but the mere means of transportation, the wagon-trains, and boats, and pack-trains, he does not need to worry about—he knows that they will be looked after by the proper staff department. The plan of his campaign must not be arranged to fit his means of transportation; they will be arranged to fit his plan of campaign.

With General Taylor's campaign it was just the reverse of all this; every movement was at the mercy of boats, or wagons and mules. (48) After the rout of Arista's army at Resaca de la Palma, for lack of a pontoon-train Taylor had to sit on the left bank of the Rio Grande, and watch the scattered Mexican force gather itself together again, and, unmolested, march out of Matamoros in a quiet and orderly manner, taking all of its stores and property with it. Yet General Taylor had foreseen his need of pontoons, and had made timely requisition for them.

He had to wait three months in his camp opposite Matamoros, and then leave 6,000 troops, half of his army, behind, for want of transportation to keep them supplied with food. And again at Monterey, his main reason for granting Ampudia

an armistice of eight weeks, was simply that he did not have enough wagons and pack-mules to carry food for his army, if he stretched his line of communications with his base at Camargo any farther at that time.

From every consideration, Monterey was General Taylor's first proper objective, after he got possession of the line of the Rio Grande to serve as his base of operations. Monterey is the capital of the province of Nuevo Leon, and it was the largest, most important city in the northern part of Mexico. It was on the main road from the Rio Grande to the City of Mexico—the road that passed through the important capital towns, Saltillo and San Luis Potosí. It was the northern gateway of this route through the Sierra Madre Mountains. These mountains formed a barrier between the lowlands of the northeast and the table-lands of the central region, impassable except at a few places. Monterey was also in a healthful region, whereas all the towns in the lowlands toward the coast were subject to yellow-fever and other diseases. When one considers that the losses in an army are always greater from disease than from battle, the importance of selecting, if possible, a healthful region and season for a campaign is apparent.

And after the choice of Monterey for an objective, Camargo was the best place for the base. It was 180 miles from the main base, Point Isabel, at the mouth of the Rio Grande; but a navigable river or other body of water is always the best and easiest line of communication, and a few leagues more or less make little difference. Camargo was not only nearer to Monterey than any other point of the river, but there were two roads, both good enough, connecting the two points; and both roads lay in the valleys of streams, and were therefore well supplied with water and wood, two items of chief consideration when campaigning in Mexico.

While an advance on Monterey threatened the interior of Mexico, and even the City of Mexico, General Taylor never designed to go beyond Saltillo. "To seize the Rio Grande, to conquer the northern states of Mexico, and to hold them tenaciously, at least as far as the Sierra Madre Mountains, was General Taylor's real work."* It was hoped that this might make Mexico willing to agree to peace upon our terms.

After Taylor reached Saltillo, the Administration wanted him to push on to San Luis Potosí; but General Taylor knew what a perilous task it would be to march an army across the 300

**General Taylor*, by General O. O. Howard.

miles of desert between Saltillo and that town. Without fighting a battle Santa Anna lost 4,000 men out of 18,000 in his march from San Luis to Saltillo. So Taylor advised the Administration that, if it were necessary to capture the Mexican capital in order to conquer peace, it should be done by the way of Vera Cruz—the very campaign that General Scott had already proposed.

The topographical difficulties of a land campaign from the Rio Grande to the City of Mexico would be somewhat less to-day, by reason of the railways leading southward from the Rio Grande; but a railway can never serve as a "line of operations"—it can never take the place of a wagon road, with water at camping places, for an army to advance by. It can only be used as a "line of communication," by which an army at the front will draw its supplies and reinforcements from its base, and send back its prisoners and sick and wounded. Even for these purposes, a long line of railway, like that from the Rio Grande to the City of Mexico, passing through the enemy's country, requires so many troops to defend it, that it is probable that even to-day, if we undertook to capture the Mexican capital, we should follow the same route that General Scott followed, and that Cortez had followed before him. We shall see in our study of the South African War that Lord Roberts, with more than 200,000 soldiers in the field, could only muster a force of 30,000 to lead against Pretoria. The rest were mostly guarding his railway communications, a thousand miles long.

Mexico's lack of an adequate navy simplified Taylor's campaign, as well as the later one under General Scott. In fact, if Mexico had possessed a navy strong enough to hold control of the Gulf of Mexico, and to prevent Taylor from landing supplies at Corpus Christi, and afterwards at Point Isabel, it is not seen how Taylor could have supplied his army, or made his invasion of Mexico. To-day, however, there would be no difficulty in transporting stores to the Rio Grande by railways.

So in this, as in many other American campaigns, the army was dependent upon the coöperation of the navy. Not only did the navy guard the army's transports; it blocked the mouth of the Rio Grande, and cut off the supplies of the Mexican army at Matamoras, and it captured the City of Tampico.

When he had to take away so many of Taylor's veteran troops for his own campaign, General Scott advised Taylor to fall back to Monterey; in the light of history it is not certain, but this was the best thing Taylor could have done. He had to

fall back anyway a little later. Taylor's reasons for holding Saltillo have already been stated—its strategic position at the junction of the roads from Monclova, Monterey, Linares, Parras and San Luis Potosí; the fertile country to the west of it, from which the Americans might have got supplies and the Mexicans would have got them, via Saltillo; the disheartening effect of a retrograde movement upon his army, etc. But, in looking back at it, the chief objection we can find to such a movement is, that it would have robbed our history of Buena Vista, a victory of which we have as just cause to be proud as of any other in our history.

President Polk disapproved the liberal terms granted by Taylor to Ampudia at the surrender of Monterey. General Taylor gives the following reasons for granting the terms: first, his army was too small to invest the town and prevent Ampudia's troops from escaping with their arms by some of the mountain trails, and reasons of humanity urged a suspension of the assaults; second, as to the eight weeks' armistice, Taylor, as stated before, was unable to go farther for lack of transportation. General Taylor gave other reasons. The military student will prefer to accept the judgment of General Taylor and his officers on the ground, rather than that of President Polk and his advisers two thousand miles away at Washington.

At Palo Alto Taylor's line of battle was formed nearly parallel to the road he was marching on—his line of communication with his base at Point Isabel. Could the Mexicans have driven him back, or turned his left flank, they might have captured his wagon-train and cut him off from his base. Of course, with so small a force, this was not as serious a consideration as it would be with a great army. Taylor undoubtedly fought the battle in that way, because the chaparral west of the road gave him some cover through which to approach the Mexican left flank. An attack directly from the front, or against the Mexican right, would have had to be made over the open prairie without any sort of cover. Had Taylor been defeated in this combat, he would probably have lost his depot at Point Isabel, and his field-work and garrison at Fort Brown.

The effect of this victory and that of Resaca de la Palma was very important. By these triumphs Mexican authority was wholly and forever expelled from the soil of Texas; and the American troops gained a morale and prestige that they never

have lost to this day. Up to that time American troops had seldom known what it was to go after an enemy and defeat him. All their offensive campaigns—unless we except Yorktown, where they had the moral and physical support of the French—had been failures. All their strategic successes had been achieved in retreats, and nearly all their tactical victories had been gained by standing on the defensive.

At Resaca de la Palma Arista's army fought with the Rio Grande at its back; under like conditions a large army would have been captured. This little force, with no impedimenta, was able to scatter and cross wherever the men could find boats. Many were drowned. We have seen that Taylor could not cross the river and complete the rout and dispersion of his enemy for lack of a pontoon-train.

Arista did well to abandon Matamoros and retreat. Had he kept his army shut up in that town, he would surely have lost it soon or late, as every general does that allows his army to be invested in a town; as Ampudia did with this same army a few months later at Monterey.

General Taylor risked a great deal at the battle of Buena Vista. The chances of victory appeared very slender, and the consequences of defeat would have been very serious for the United States. General Wilcox says in his history of the Mexican War: "Had Santa Anna been successful at Buena Vista there is hardly a doubt, under the excitement that would have prevailed in Washington, that a garrison would have been left at Vera Cruz to run the gantlet of the vomito [yellow-fever], General Scott with his remaining forces ordered to the Rio Grande, and the war prolonged another year." While we do not believe Santa Anna would have "taken and sacked New Orleans," as he boasted he would, or even that he would ever have got across the Rio Grande, he might have thrown the Americans back to that line, and set the war back where it was nearly a year before, with the best general the Mexicans had and the prestige of victory on the Mexican side.

If Taylor's army had fallen back to Monterey, or farther, without making a decisive stand, it is hard to say what might have been the outcome. If in such case Santa Anna had continued to pursue, and could have been long enough detained in the north, it would have made General Scott's advance against the capital easier.

On the part of Santa Anna, Buena Vista was a mistake strategically and tactically. He was cognizant of General

Scott's plan for a campaign against Vera Cruz and the City of Mexico; he should have moved his army southward to oppose Scott's landing, and the taking of Vera Cruz. But he had organized an army of some 20,000 officers and men, all eager to meet the invaders of their country; he was urged forward by an ignorant and nagging press at the capital; and he could not resist the temptation to throw his overwhelming numbers against the handful of Americans left with Taylor; he and every officer and man of his army felt sure of destroying Taylor's little army, or of driving it in flight beyond the Rio Grande and reconquering their lost territory.

But he ought to have appreciated the difficulties and perils of the long march before him. In his journey from San Luis Potosí to the field of Buena Vista and return, he lost four times as many men as he lost in the battle; he brought back to San Luis a ragged and demoralized remnant, less than half the men he had led away,* and he left the way clear for Scott to land his army and march it to the capital practically unopposed. Of this opportunity, however, General Scott was unaware. Nothing short of the direst necessity, or the sure prospect of decisive results, should ever tempt a commander to lead his army across such a dry and barren waste as the 300 miles from San Luis Potosí to Saltillo.

The main tactical mistake of the battle of Buena Vista consisted in a lack of order and concert in the attack. After the American line was driven back and turned, it seems almost certain that, if the entire Mexican force had closed in together on the defenders, it could not have failed to defeat and capture them. But by Santa Anna's bringing into the battle first one column and then another against different points of the position, Taylor was enabled to shift regiments and batteries so as always to check the attacks.

Never has the advantage of drill and training and discipline under educated officers been better exemplified than in the battles of this campaign. In the battles of Palo Alto and Resaca de la Palma, the American soldiers were all trained regulars. In the battle of Buena Vista, they were all volunteers except the artillery and two squadrons of dragoons. It is true that this victory could not have been won without the regular batteries which did such fine work; but with the exception of one or two regiments, no troops ever fought better than those vol-

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unteers. But they had all been in camp at Fort Brown and Camargo drilling, and in campaign serving with regular troops, for nearly a year; and in this battle, the regiments that acquitted themselves the best were under officers, like Colonel Jefferson Davis and Henry Clay, Jr., who had received a military training in the regular army. Without question the best purpose of our small standing army in time of peace, is to educate officers against a time of war; and it is to be regretted, as has been pointed out by an American general in a magazine article,* that more of the wealthy young men of the country do not seek commissions in the army, and serve with it a term of years, merely to fit themselves to command troops in case of war.

There is no difference between American volunteers and American regulars—they are both volunteers; but there is a difference between trained soldiers and untrained soldiers; between discipline and indiscipline; between a knowledge of how to take care of one's self in campaign and a lack of such knowledge; between soldiers rightly trained and soldiers wrongly trained.

In this campaign there was the same deplorable mixing of personal and party politics with field operations that we have had in all our wars, and that we shall doubtless have in every future war. The Administration actually made arrangements to send General Patterson (a politician without any military experience) in command of an expedition against Vera Cruz, with two other politicians, Generals Pillow and Shields, as his division commanders, while General Scott and other professional soldiers, who had given their lives to the study of arms, were to sit still and look on! And after Scott had finally been given command of the expedition against Mexico City, and while Taylor was still in command of the army in the north, the Administration introduced a bill in Congress to create the office of lieutenant-general, in order to place Senator Benton, of the right party, but of no military experience whatever, in command of both of these veteran major-generals, who were of the wrong political party. Fortunately, Congress refused to perpetrate such an outrage upon the country and the honorable profession of arms; and left the pages of our history free from that blot.

In this war, also, as in the War of 1812, and in every other

*General W. H. Carter.

war that we have entered into, a large part of the people were opposed to it, and from the beginning to the end talked, and wrote, and worked against it and against the interests of the Government. This is deplorable; but so long as we are human, and so long as the country is vast in area and interests, we must expect it.

LECTURE VI.

THE MEXICAN WAR.

SCOTT'S CAMPAIGN.

(48) From the opening of hostilities with Mexico in the spring of 1846, Major-General Winfield Scott, Commanding General of the United States Army, had asked to be allowed to command the forces in the field in Mexico. But not until November, 1846, after the news had reached Washington that Ampudia had surrendered to General Taylor at Monterey, did President Polk, after much vacillation and with much reluctance, give his consent for General Scott to go to Mexico to conduct a campaign in person.

PLAN.

General Scott's plan was to capture Vera Cruz, and, with this port as his base, to march his army to the City of Mexico. Fifteen thousand troops he estimated to be the smallest number with which he could hope for success in such a campaign, 5,000 of which must be regulars. To make up his army, he took from General Taylor 4,000 regular and 4,000 volunteer infantry, two light batteries, 500 regular and 500 volunteer cavalry. This left Taylor with a command of only some 7,000 men, with which he was expected to act strictly on the defensive. The rest of the complement of 15,000 troops that General Scott counted upon, were to be volunteers raised immediately in the States. Congress, however, failed to authorize these volunteers until the end of February, 1847.

Owing to the recurrence of yellow-fever on the coast of Mexico, Scott felt that he must be at Vera Cruz with his army by the 1st of February; and he made all of his plans accordingly. He arranged with Commodore Connor, who commanded the American fleet in Mexican waters, for his coöperation; he submitted, in full time, requisitions for transports, lighters, land transportation, siege trains, and everything that he should need; he selected the Island of Lobos as the place where he should assemble his army.

There were all sorts of delays, for which Scott was noway to blame; and the end of February was at hand. Only 13,000 troops were present, and there was shortage of transports, lighters and all matériel. But the expedition could not wait; if it were delayed any longer, it would have to be put off till the next fall or winter.

OPERATIONS.

So on the 2nd of March, the order was given to weigh anchor at Lobos; and by the 7th, the fleet had cast anchor again at Anton Lizardo, eighteen miles southeast of Vera Cruz. "Scott was at this time ignorant of the movement of General Santa Anna toward Monterey, and expected on landing or attempting to land, to be met by a formidable force of the enemy"; so every precaution was taken.* (56) Having selected the place for landing, well without the range of guns in the city and the castle of San Juan de Ulloa, he had the fleet moved up on the 9th March, and anchored in front of it. The naval guns shelled the beach, and the sand hills beyond, and the sailors landed the troops with surf-boats. No Mexican troops appeared, and by 10 p.m. the entire force had landed without an accident.

Scott's army, at this time, was organized in two regular divisions, under Generals Worth and Twiggs, respectively, and a volunteer division under General Patterson. The cavalry and artillery, and the company of engineers, were not attached to the divisions, but remained under the direct orders of the commanding-general.

A complete line of investment was immediately established, extending from shore to shore on either side of Vera Cruz; and batteries were set up to shell the city. Owing to delay in getting the siege matériel ashore, the batteries were not ready to begin work until the afternoon of the 22nd [March]. General Scott then called upon the Mexican commander to surrender the town and the fort [San Juan de Ulloa]. The Mexican commander declined to surrender, and the batteries opened fire. The guns of the town and fort returned the fire. The bombardment was kept up until the 26th, when Scott received a proposal of surrender from the Mexican commander; terms were agreed upon the next day. The city and fort, 5,000 pris-

*General Scott, by General Marcus J. Wright.

oners, and 400 guns were turned over to the Americans. General Scott's loss was sixty-seven killed and wounded.

In this investment the navy not only bombarded the enemy's works from the sea, but also set up a battery in line on land, which did effective work. During the siege the only interference with the Americans from the outside, was occasioned by a considerable cavalry force, which hovered around, and had to be chased away two or three times.

GEOGRAPHY.

(57) From Vera Cruz two roads led westward across the Tierra Caliente, up through the mountains, to the Plateau of Anahuac, as the great interior table-land is called, and on, to the Valley of Mexico, and the capital city at the lowest point of this bowl-shaped valley. The two roads, however, came together at El Pinal, east of Puebla. The northernmost of these roads passed through the towns of Jalapa, Perote, and Puebla, and was almost the identical route that Cortez took in 1519. This road was, in 1847, the main post-road, the better of the two, and, therefore, the one selected by General Scott. The other road passed through Orizaba. The French followed this road in their invasion of Mexico in 1863.

The road chosen crossed the Tierra Caliente to the foot-hills at Plan del Rio, about thirty miles from Vera Cruz. There it began the ascent of the mountains to the great Plateau; thence it led on to the City of Mexico, more than 200 miles from Vera Cruz. Many strong defensive positions there were between the Plan del Rio and the Valley of Mexico.

As far as Jalapa the road lay in the Tierra Caliente; but from there on, to the capital, the country crossed possessed as fine a climate for campaigning as any in the world; but there was a scarcity of water from Jalapa to the Valley of Mexico. Toward the Valley of Mexico, the country became more fertile and thickly settled, and subsistence supplies in abundance could be obtained for an army.

The topography was of such character much of the way from Vera Cruz to the capital that troops could march only on the roads. In the Tierra Caliente there was high grass and dense vegetation; over the mountains the road was shut in the passes; in the Valley of Mexico all roads rested upon causeways.

There were five lakes in the Valley of Mexico, the remains of a single large ancient lake which had been gradually drying up

for ages. Lake Chalco, which existed at the time of Scott's campaign, is dry to-day. There were no impassable rivers between Vera Cruz and Mexico, behind which an army could take a defensive position. The chief natural obstacles in Scott's way were the mountains with their impassable heights and gorges, and the lakes and marshes around the capital city.

OPERATIONS AFTER VERA CRUZ.

After the fall of Vera Cruz the army was still short of transportation. Several expeditions were, therefore, sent out into the interior for the purpose of finding markets in which to purchase horses and mules. By this means General Scott eked out his transportation enough to enable him to start his army on the road to the interior before the return of yellow-fever. Twigg's division started for Jalapa on the 8th of April, and was followed on the 9th by part of Patterson's volunteer division. Two batteries were attached to Twigg's division, and one to Patterson's. Worth's division, and part of Patterson's, had to remain for the present at Vera Cruz, for want of transportation.

(48) After his defeat at Buena Vista (February 22-23), Santa Anna fell back with his army to San Luis Potosí, where he arrived after a march of great hardship with less than 10,000 effectives.* After resting here four days, he resumed the march to the capital with two brigades.

A new revolution had, meantime, broken out in the City of Mexico, and, when Santa Anna arrived there, he found armed partisans confronting each other in the streets. (57) He managed to compose the dissensions, and on the 2nd of April set out for Cerro Gordo, a strong position on the road to Vera Cruz, where he purposed stopping the progress of Scott's army. A part of the troops he had commanded at Buena Vista, some 5,600, had already turned toward the same point; the rest remained for the present at San Luis Potosí. From the capital Santa Anna took the National Guards of that city.† Cerro Gordo [Big or Fat Hill] is on the Jalapa-Vera Cruz road, some twenty or twenty-five miles east of Jalapa, at the foot of the Sierra Madre—the last step from the great Plateau of Anahuac to the Tierra Caliente.

(58) Here the road from Vera Cruz crosses a small river

*Wilcox.

†*The Other Side.*

and a narrow stretch of level ground, the Plan del Rio; then it zigzags upwards and to the west, following the easiest grade from one bench to the next. To the right of the road, as one goes west, are first rugged cliffs and then an impassable ravine. Between the ravine and the road are two prominent wooded knolls, Atalaya and Telégrafo, a few hundred yards beyond which the road passes the Cerro Gordo Ranch. From the Plan del Rio to this ranch, and probably farther westward, the stream flows in an impassable gorge; and about midway of the distance is a commanding table. On this table the right of the Mexican line rested. The left was on Telégrafo, and the reserve was at the ranch.

The position as occupied was strengthened with parapets, trenches, palisades, and abatis; and the trees were cleared away from the field of fire in front. Artillery was so placed as to command the road and sweep all the approaches to the position.

(57) Owing to the ferocious heat and deep sand, the march of Scott's army across the Tierra Caliente, from Vera Cruz to Plan del Rio, was very hard and trying. Twiggs's division, which started on the 8th of April, did not reach Plan del Rio until the evening of the 11th. Twiggs had been informed on the way that Santa Anna was at Jalapa with troops, and he expected to meet him at Cerro Gordo.

As soon as General Scott received report that the divisions of Twiggs and Patterson had found the enemy in force at Cerro Gordo, he hastened forward from Vera Cruz himself, and joined the troops at the front on April 14. Having gotten more transportation, General Worth, also, marched his division forward, and had reached the camp of the other divisions at Plan del Rio, by the evening of April 17.

(58) Meantime the American engineer officers had been reconnoitering the Mexican position. They reported that the position, though fortified and very strong in front, could be turned by its left and struck in rear; and that the intrenchments on Telégrafo could be carried by assault. Telégrafo was the key to the position.

On the 17th Twiggs's division followed the route picked out by the engineers; and, after an action in which it lost ninety-seven officers and men, it got possession of Atalaya. General Scott thereupon issued an order for a general attack, for the morning of the 18th. Worth's division of regulars with Shields's brigade of volunteers, was to follow up and support the "main attack" against the Mexican left and rear; and Pil-

low's brigade of volunteers was to make the "secondary attack" against the front. The main attack carried Telégrafo, put the left of the Mexican line to flight, and got possession of the Jalapa road. Seeing escape impossible, the entire right of the Mexican line then surrendered. The American cavalry pursued the routed Mexicans, but was not fleet enough to do them much damage.

General Scott reported his strength at this battle as 8,500, and his killed and wounded, thirty-three officers and 398 enlisted men. He estimated the Mexican strength at 12,000, and the losses 1,000 to 1,200 killed and wounded, and 3,000 captured. The prisoners, like those taken at Vera Cruz, were, for lack of means to care for them, paroled.

(57) Without escort, almost without companions, Santa Anna escaped by difficult mountain trails to Orizaba. The Mexican cavalry was the only part of the defeated troops that quitted the field in a body; the infantry dispersed and fled without organization or command. The cavalry went to San Andres. Many of the other troops found their way to Orizaba, and after some days Santa Anna succeeded in organizing a force of 4,000 men. Then he moved this force and the cavalry to Puebla.*

Without delay the American army moved to Jalapa. Here, on April 27. Scott received word that the reinforcements intended for him had been diverted to Taylor, on the Rio Grande frontier, by order of the War Department. The term of the one-year volunteers had nearly expired; they were clamoring to be discharged in order to be able to pass through the Tierra Caliente before the return of yellow-fever. As General Scott knew that he could not complete his campaign before their term would expire, he had nothing to do but to wait for reinforcements; so he discharged the one-year volunteers at Jalapa on the 4th of May and let them go home.

With the remainder of his army, Scott resumed the march to Puebla. Santa Anna sent his cavalry forward for the purpose of surprising or ambushing the American advance; but the Mexican cavalry was itself taken by surprise, and was glad to make its escape. Without making further resistance, Santa Anna evacuated Puebla and retreated to the City of Mexico. Worth's division took possession of Puebla on the 15th of May.*

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The American army remained at this place three months, awaiting reinforcements. Its numbers fell as low as 5,820 effectives. At last reinforcements were received sufficient to raise the aggregate to 12,776 men, of whom more than 3,000 were sick. The army was now organized into two regular divisions under Worth and Twiggs, and two volunteer divisions under Pillow and Quitman.

It was known that another Mexican army had in the meantime been organized to defend the capital city. This army was believed to be 30,000 strong; it actually numbered not more than 20,000.* Scott's army was now 150 or more miles from Vera Cruz, and the road was beset by guerrillas. With so small a force Scott could not proceed farther and, at the same time, guard so long a line of communication. Abandoning his communications, therefore,—cutting loose from his base,—and leaving his sick and convalescent at Puebla, he resumed the march for the City of Mexico on the 7th of August; by the 12th his leading division, without encountering any serious resistance, had arrived at Ayotla in the Valley of Mexico.

(59) After the authorities at the Mexican capital became convinced that General Scott was going to continue his advance on that city, and that there was no longer any hope of checking him on the way, they displayed great energy in preparing for the defense of the city. The foundries and powder-mills were worked to their utmost capacity in the manufacture of arms and powder; the part of the Army of the North which had remained at San Luis Potosí to watch for the Americans in that direction, was now ordered to Guadalupe; the various states were asked for troops, but only a few responded; the best men of all ages and classes of the capital enrolled themselves in the ranks of the National Guard; and field-works were built covering all the approaches to the southern side of the city. It was rightly supposed that the invaders would not advance by the northern shore of Lake Texcoco. The following points were fortified: El Peñon, Mexicalcingo, San Antonio, and the convent and bridge of Churubusco; while on the southwest the fortress of Chapultepec stood at the junction of two of the main causeways leading into the city, and from its high position commanded with its artillery all space within range. All of the garitas (points at which the causeways entered the city) were fortified.

It was confidently believed that the Americans would try to

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force an entrance into the city by way of El Peñon; so the National Guard was posted at that strong position to block their way; while the Army of the North, now under General Valencia, took station at Texcuco for the purpose of falling upon their flank and rear and completing their destruction.*

The Valley of Mexico, surrounded by mountains, is more than 7,500 feet above sea-level, and is about eighteen Spanish leagues long from north to south, by twelve wide. It is very fertile, and, besides the capital city, contains numerous smaller towns. The valley is nearly level, the City of Mexico being near its lowest point. The lakes overflow, and submerge the valley more or less every year; all the roads within the valley are built upon causeways protected by ditches on either side. The country, so far as the roads are concerned, is probably very like that with which we are so well acquainted in the rice fields of the Philippines. At the time of the American invasion it was not practicable for troops to march across country in any direction.

(60) The main road from Ayotla lay between the foot of the strongly fortified hill, El Peñon, and Lake Texcuco. The roads around Lake Texcuco, which enter the city from the north, were not reconnoitered, probably not considered, on account of their length and roundabout direction. The way around the south side of Lakes Chalco and Xochimilco was, at first, supposed to be impracticable; but by reconnaissance it was later found to be practicable. This route had the advantage of passing through ground firm enough for troops to maneuver upon, but, at the same time, very rocky and rugged.

Reversing the order of march, therefore, Worth's division, which had been in rear, was started, on the 15th of August, by this southern road for San Augustin. Twiggs's division, which had been in the lead, and was camped at Ayotla, was held there for a time, in order to keep up the appearance of an advance by way of El Peñon. The Mexicans, however, gained a knowledge of the movement on the 16th [August]; and on the 17th the bulk of the National Guards at El Peñon, and Valencia's Army of the North at Texcuco, were withdrawn. The National Guards were placed at Churubusco; on the 19th two of their battalions advanced to San Antonio. Valencia marched first to San Angel, and then, contrary to Santa Anna's orders, put his command into an isolated position upon an open

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ridge just north of Contreras and west of the southern end of the Pedregal, a large space covered with volcanic rocks. He placed a part of his troops, also, several hundred yards in front of his main position, at the ranch of Padierna. Valencia was planning to fall upon the flank and rear of the Americans, as they moved on the capital by way of San Antonio.

The American army reached San Augustin on the 17th August, and occupied it without serious opposition. This place then became the base of operations. The engineers discovered the position of Valencia's army; they also ascertained by reconnaissance that a road could be made over the Pedregal, by which Valencia's position could be turned, his rear attacked, and his line of retreat to the main army and the capital cut off.

On the 18th of August Worth's division moved forward to San Antonio, and on the 19th masked that place. (61) On this day the divisions of Twiggs and Pillow advanced against Valencia's position. While part of this force attacked and captured the advanced post at Padierna, driving back the enemy from there, three brigades, under General Persifor F. Smith, made their way across the Pedregal to the wood around San Gerónimo, less than 2,000 yards to the left and rear of Valencia's main position. Here Smith's detachment was wholly separated from the rest of the American army, and his rear was exposed to attack from the direction of San Angel. Santa Anna, in fact, hurried forward a brigade, which appeared on the Hill of Toro, 1,500 yards north of Gerónimo, at 5 p.m.; but before it made any movement of attack, it received orders from Santa Anna to retire to San Angel, where he himself spent the night with other troops. The only assault upon Smith at San Gerónimo was made by Valencia's cavalry, which was easily repulsed.

That evening the Americans vacated the ranch of Padierna, which was reoccupied by the Mexicans. During the night General Scott sent Shields's brigade to reinforce Smith. Santa Anna sent an order to Valencia directing him to withdraw to Coyoacan. (60) Valencia refused to obey the order, and held his position.

(61) Leaving Shields to hold Gerónimo, protect his rear, and cut off the enemy's retreat, Smith moved forward the rest of his detachment before daybreak on the 20th, and fell upon the rear of Valencia's position. Scott had ordered Worth and Quitman to support this attack by assaulting the front of the position. This "secondary attack" was quite unnecessary, for

Smith's assault took the enemy by surprise and put him to flight. The victory was complete.

While the Americans were thus routing Valencia's command, Santa Anna was at San Angel, less than three miles distant from the battle-field, with three brigades. He started forward with part of his force, but was almost immediately met by Valencia's flying troops. Thereupon he turned about and hastened toward the city, sending orders for all the Mexican troops to concentrate upon the inner line of defense at the garitas of the capital.*

In this engagement, which Americans call the battle of Contreras, and the Mexicans call the battle of Padierna, the Americans engaged numbered 4,500; the Mexicans, 4,000. The Americans lost fewer than 100 men; the Mexicans lost 700 killed, 813 prisoners.†

(60) The Americans pursued to Coyoacan and Churubusco. Pillow's division from Coyoacan turned toward San Antonio, to attack the rear of the Mexicans at that point, while Worth's division attacked them from the direction of San Augustin.

(62) One of Worth's brigades [Clarke] also made a turning movement to the left, through the edge of the Pedregal. Pursuant to Santa Anna's orders the two Mexican battalions at San Antonio fell back toward Churubusco without making any serious resistance. In their retreat they were attacked in flank by Clarke's brigade, and scattered through the marshes in every direction. The divisions of Worth and Pillow pushed on by the San Antonio causeway to Churubusco. In passing, Santa Anna had given orders that this point must be held at all risk.*

Meantime Twiggs's division, with part of Quitman's, had continued the pursuit from Contreras through Coyoacan to Churubusco. Here they had engaged a Mexican force strongly posted in and about the Convent of San Pablo, on the west side of the town. Worth and Pillow, without stopping to reconnoiter, attacked the Mexicans at the bridge-head at the Churubusco River. The brigades of Shields and Pierce were sent across fields to the left, and north of the Churubusco River, to get in rear of the Mexicans; and Major Sumner was

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†Wright. Wilcox. *The Other Side. La Batalla de Padierna*, by Teniente-Coronel Miguel Ruelas, in *Revista del Ejercito y Marina*, Tomo IV., Num. 21.

sent with a detachment of mounted rifles and dragoons to their support.

(60) At last the Mexicans gave way and fled in great confusion down the causeway to the San Antonio garita. The Americans pursued until Worth gave the command to halt; Colonel Harney, not receiving the command, did not stop his dragoons until they had ridden up to the muzzles of the Mexican cannon at the fortified garita.

The garrison in the convent of San Pablo held out for three hours. It made a stout and gallant defense, but was at last forced to surrender. Among the prisoners, none had fought more desperately than the San Patricio companies—deserters, mostly Irishmen, from the American army.

Referring to the work of this 20th of August, General Scott says in his report: "After so many victories, we might with but little additional loss have occupied the capital the same evening." But he thought the attainment of peace would be favored by his remaining outside of the capital for the present, and granting an armistice until terms of peace could be considered by Mr. Trist, American peace commissioner accompanying his army, and representatives of the Mexican government.* The Mexican account confirms General Scott's opinion of the American successes, in the following words: "The unfortunate day of the 20th of August had terminated; the loud sound of cannon even yet rang in the ears of the Mexicans; the sanguinary battles of Padierna and Churubusco had passed; and the invading army triumphed at the gates of the city. The spirits were worn out; the remnant of our troops demoralized and lost; confusion and disorder had overcome all classes of society."†

On the 23rd of August an armistice was agreed to, which "was to continue as long as the commissioners of the two governments" should "be engaged in negotiations; or until the commander of either army" should "give formal notice to the other of its cessation," and forty-eight hours thereafter.*

General Scott established his headquarters, with Worth's division, at Tacubaya; Quitman's division remained at San Augustin, Twiggs's at San Angel, and Pillow's at Mixcoac. The head and tail of the army were within eight miles of each other.

*Wilcox.

†*The Other Side.*

The peace commissioners came to no agreement, and the Mexican army had violated several of the terms of the armistice. So, on September 6, Scott notified the Mexican commander that the armistice would cease. On the 8th September the army closed up. Quitman moved up to Coyoacan from San Augustin; one of Twiggs's brigades took post on the Niño Perdido causeway, to threaten the city in that direction; one of Pillow's brigades occupied the San Borja hacienda, the other joined Worth at Tacubaya, and took part in the battle of Molino del Rey, fought that day. Mixcoac was to be the general depot.*

All the southern and western garitas of the city were strongly fortified, and defended by artillery; and outside of the city there were strong garrisons and defensive works at the Castle of Chapultepec, Molino del Rey, and the Casa de Mata. Santa Anna's cavalry, 4,000 strong, was at the hacienda of Morales, two miles west of Chapultepec.

(63) The Molino del Rey consisted of a huge pile of stone buildings, 200 yards long, in a part of which cannon and powder had formerly been made. Some three hundred yards west of it was a four-sided bastioned fort, inside of which was the Casa de Mata, a large building used for the storage of powder. Southward the ground rose in a gentle slope to Tacubaya, and a short distance west there was a deep ravine. "The Well-fortified castle of Chapultepec," the national military academy, "on a height in rear, commanded these buildings and the ground beyond, toward Tacubaya."*

"General Scott had received a credible report that there was a cannon foundry in the Molino del Rey, and a large quantity of powder in the Casa Mata."* He determined, therefore, to attack and destroy the buildings, and assigned the task to General Worth with his own division, one of Pillow's brigades, 270 horsemen under Major Sumner, and five guns. The assault was set for the morning of September 8.

Santa Anna got possession of General Scott's order for this attack, and spent the 7th in arranging to meet it. He placed five brigades of infantry with artillery in and about the buildings to receive the assault, and stationed his cavalry, 4,000 horsemen, under General Alvarez, in position to charge the flank and rear of the assaulting columns and destroy them.†

*Wilcox.

†*The Other Side.*

At the first light of day the American guns opened on the buildings, and the assaulting columns soon moved out. The battle lasted two hours, at the end of which the Americans stood in possession of the buildings. The defenders that escaped death and capture took refuge under the guns of Chapultepec.* Eight hundred were taken prisoners. Worth had only 3,100 men; he lost 116 killed and 671 wounded. There must have been 14,000 Mexican troops in the engagement, or within supporting distance, but they lacked a single directing head; Santa Anna was in the city, and there was no single commander directing the defense. It was one of the most remarkable victories ever gained by American troops, but the percentage of their loss was frightful. Santa Anna published a proclamation, and sent it abroad in the land, announcing that the Mexicans had gained the victory, and that he had led them in person.†

During the engagement General Alvarez and his cavalry sat idle in their saddles. He claimed to be unable to cross the ravine between him and Worth's assaulting columns. Sumner led his little band of American horsemen across the same ravine to the side of Alvarez; they were not charged by the Mexican cavalry.† Alvarez was probably kept at bay by the American artillery.

(64) Chapultepec was the next stronghold to be attacked. This stone castle stands on "an isolated mound rising 150 feet above the valley; nearly precipitous on the northern, eastern, and part of the southern side, it declines gradually on the west to a cypress grove separating it from Molino del Rey." The grounds were inclosed by a high wall on the southern side, and on the northern side by the San Cosme Aqueduct. The castle commanded two of the causeways leading into the City of Mexico about two miles east of it. The position was defended with cannon.*

To mislead the Mexicans as to the objective of the attack, a feint was made against the southern garitas. On the 9th September a battery and a brigade took position at the Hermitage on the Niño Perdido causeway; and on the afternoon of the 11th Quitman and Pillow marched their divisions to Piedad. After dark these divisions were withdrawn to Tacubaya; for

*Wilcox.†*The Other Side.*

they were designated to make the assault on Chapultepec. Twiggs's division remained on the causeways south of the city to keep up the demonstration; and the battery at the Hermitage shelled the Candelaria and San Antonio garitas.

(65) Batteries were placed, and they shelled the fortress of Chapultepec all day of the 12th September. The bombardment was resumed on the morning of the 13th, followed by "two columns of attack, one led by Quitman against the southern face of the castle, advancing along the road leading from Tacubaya; the other under General Pillow" from Molino del Rey through the cypress grove, against the western side. Each division was accompanied by a storming party some 250 strong, with ladders and pick-axes and crow-bars. The assault was successful, and the commander of the stronghold surrendered after a gallant defense, in which the young cadets of the Mexican National Military Academy bore a conspicuous part.

About 7,500 Americans took part in the attack of Chapultepec. The Mexicans claim they had only 800 muskets in the grounds; but from the outside they had some 4,000 infantry aiding the defense, and the same number of cavalry. This infantry, however, did very little, and the cavalry nothing whatever.

(66) "The pursuit, with a short pause at Chapultepec, was pressed vigorously on the two causeways leading into the city. The more direct of these, the one followed by Quitman, led to the Garita de Belen, about two miles distant. Worth" (who had supported Pillow) "advanced over the other and longer, which entered the city through the San Cosme Garita. These roads were broad, level avenues. In the center of each was an aqueduct consisting of an open stone trough, resting upon arches springing from stone piers, and right and left of the causeways were ditches filled with water."*

The columns on both roads met with stout resistance; but neither was stopped till it had entered the capital. Quitman's column passed the Belen Garita at 1.20 p.m., and pushed a short way into the city; but the fire from the houses and streets was so severe, the column was driven back to the gate, and remained there during the night. Worth passed the San Cosme Garita and halted in front of the convent of San Fernando for the night.

*Wilcox.

(60) During the night the city was evacuated by Mexican troops. Santa Anna went to Guadalupe. (66) "At dawn of the 14th September a white flag was sent from the Citadel to the Belen Gate, the bearers of which requested General Quitman to take possession."* Thereupon Quitman marched his command to the Grand Plaza. About 8 a.m. General Scott, accompanied by his staff and an escort of cavalry, rode into the Plaza. He appointed General Quitman military governor of the City of Mexico.

Soon after General Scott's arrival on the morning of the 14th, shots were fired at the American troops from the houses and the streets, by inhabitants and straggling soldiers. It was necessary to clear the streets with artillery and musketry, many houses had to be entered, and armed bands were killed or captured. This disturbance kept up much of that and the next day, and quiet was not wholly restored until the 16th.

(57) On the night of September 16, at Guadalupe, Santa Anna resigned the Presidency of Mexico and the chief command of the army, and, with 1,500 volunteer cavalry and three or four pieces of artillery, set out for Puebla to capture the American garrison there. He laid siege to the garrison's little stronghold, Cuartel de San José, and summoned the commander to surrender. This was refused, and, a few days later, Santa Anna raised the siege, and marched away to El Pinal, where he expected to capture an American train. He encountered an American force under General Joe Lane, and was defeated. The next day he received an order directing him to turn over his command and await a trial by court-martial. After various ups and downs Santa Anna died in the City of Mexico, in 1876, poor and neglected.

"A provisional government was established" by General Scott and "expeditions were sent against numerous guerrilla bands which still carried on their operations in rear of the army. . . . In all these expeditions, the Americans were successful; but in many severe losses were incurred."†

(60) Scott's campaign was over; but it was not until February 2, 1848, that the treaty of peace was concluded at Guadalupe Hidalgo. (48) Ratifications were exchanged at Querétaro, May 30, 1848; peace was proclaimed July 4, 1848; and on August 1 the last American soldier quitted Vera Cruz.

*Wilcox.

†Lecture of Lieutenant Haight, 4th U. S. Cavalry.

THE NAVY.

The coöperation of the American navy throughout the Mexican War was most effective. Not only did it escort the transports of the armies of both Taylor and Scott, guard their bases from the side of the sea, put Scott's army ashore at Vera Cruz, and join in the siege of that city; but it also maintained an effectual blockade of the Mexican coasts on the Gulf and on the Pacific sides, and, besides Tampico, captured several other important coast towns.

COMMENTS.

General Patterson and others were provoked at General Scott because he would not capture Vera Cruz by storm. But Scott preferred the more sensible, certain, humane, and scientific, if less spectacular, method of siege, which succeeded with the loss of sixty-seven men killed and wounded. After reconnaissance had been made, General Scott said to his chief engineer: "Vera Cruz must be taken with a loss of not to exceed 100 men; for every one over that number I shall regard myself as his murderer." His chief concern was to get on into the highlands in the interior before the yellow-fever appeared. If the place could not have been taken by siege in time for this, Scott would have carried it by storm. "The capture of Vera Cruz was an affair, in the main, of the staff and the artillery. The engineers located and constructed the batteries with such good judgment and care, that there were few casualties."*

If General Scott had had the transports and siege material at hand that he had asked for, and had a right to expect, he could have begun the bombardment of Vera Cruz at least a week earlier; that is, on the 15th instead of the 22nd March. By the 20th the city would have fallen, and by the 22nd, if he had, also, had the necessary land transportation, he could have been on his way to the City of Mexico—before Santa Anna would have had time to return from his defeat at Buena Vista [February 23] and to organize an army with which to meet him at Cerro Gordo. With all his energy and exertion, Santa Anna did not have all his army at Cerro Gordo until the 12th of April; but Scott was not ready to attack him before the 17th.

Lieutenant-Colonel Robles, the Mexican engineer that forti-

*Wilcox.

fied Cerro Gordo, gave it as his opinion, that the position was only suitable for "harassing an invading army,"—that is, for fighting a delaying action, a rear-guard action,—and not for fighting a defensive battle with the hope of winning a decisive victory. He reported that the position could be turned precisely as it was afterwards turned by the Americans. He "advised that the main defense be made at Corral Falso, six or eight miles in rear." But Santa Anna insisted upon fortifying Cerro Gordo. It was here that the patriots had made a famous stand against the Spanish in the War for Independence.* Nor did Santa Anna make any provision against the turning movement. Even after the Americans had got possession of the hill, Atalaya, on the first day of the battle, he persisted in believing that the main attack would be made against his right and front, and he made his dispositions accordingly.

"All of Santa Anna's army, except one brigade of National Guards, had reached Cerro Gordo by April 12, while one-half of the American regular force did not leave Vera Cruz until the 13th, and Quitman's brigade of volunteers not until the 15th. It cannot be supposed that the Mexican commander was ignorant of the condition of the hostile army in his immediate front. He should therefore have attacked it within a day or two after he reached Cerro Gordo; his failure to do so can be explained only upon one of two suppositions: first [he believed] the position held by him could not be forced, and his enemy with inferior numbers must fight in order to escape from the Tierra Caliente; second, if the enemy delayed his advance awaiting reinforcements, he would certainly be scourged by yellow-fever, and, with his thinned ranks, be easily captured or dispersed.

"A want of adequate transportation, and a desire to get his army away from the seacoast before the fever appeared, compelled General Scott to march with his various detachments on separate days, at the risk of being attacked in detail."*

By the victory of Cerro Gordo the road to the Mexican capital was opened to the American army, and Santa Anna's army was so badly routed, demoralized, and dispersed that, "had General Scott been provided with the requisite force and transportation," he might have pushed on to the capital and speedily terminated the war. But with the discharge of seven regiments (the one-year men) at Jalapa, and with no reinforcements, Scott was forced to wait with his army three months at

*Wilcox.

Puebla. He wrote to the War Department: "With the addition of ten or twelve thousand new levies in April and May, asked for, and until very recently expected, or even with the addition of two or three thousand new troops, destined for this army, but suddenly, by order of the War Department, directed to the Rio Grande frontier, I might, notwithstanding the unavoidable discharge of the volunteers—seven regiments and two independent companies—advance with confidence upon the enemy's capital."*

For General Scott to cut loose from his base,—abandon his line of communication with Vera Cruz,—and set out with an army of 10,000 soldiers from Puebla to try to overcome an army of 30,000 and capture the capital, seems like a very hazardous undertaking. When the news of it reached Europe, Wellington said: "Scott is lost. He has been carried away by success. He can't take the city, and he can't fall back upon his base."† It is seldom that a commander is justified in taking such a risk, and if General Scott had failed, military critics would have condemned him for rashness. General Wilcox says in his history of the war: ("The defeat of Santa Anna and the capture of the Mexican capital were due to Scott's skill and good judgment, aided by an able, educated, and scientific staff, and by an infantry, artillery and cavalry force whose fighting qualities" are rarely equalled.)

A distinctive feature of this campaign was the work of the younger engineer officers, Lee, Beauregard, Tower, Mason, McClellan, and others, in reconnoitering routes and positions, selecting the places for lines and guns, constructing batteries, guiding columns of troops, watching for vulnerable points in the enemy's line. General Scott placed great reliance upon these officers. Not a route was taken, nor an attack ordered, until they had made their reconnaissance and report. The only attack made in the campaign without reconnaissance beforehand by the engineer officers, was Worth's impetuous assault of the bridge-head at Churubusco. Truly did the Military Academy repay its cost to the Nation with the work of these young graduates in this single campaign.

(60) It does not appear that Santa Anna considered the probability of Scott's advancing on the capital by the road south of Lakes Xochimilco and Chalco. No doubt he was fooled by the appearance of the army at Ayotla, and by the ap-

*Wilcox.

†Wright.

pearance of reconnoitering parties on the road by El Peñon, and, also, on the road from Los Reyes to Mexicalcingo, which was fortified. But on the road actually taken by the Americans, no real resistance was offered, and no preparation for defense had been made south and east of San Antonio. The road from San Augustin to the southern end of Lake Chalco presents every advantage for defense, and ought to have been fortified and defended by the Mexicans. The instant, however, that Scott reversed his army and started it southward round Lake Chalco, Santa Anna saw through the movement, and accordingly issued orders this same day, August 15, for his army to concentrate on the causeways south of the capital, from Mexicalcingo to San Angel.

General Valencia's division was ordered to hold San Angel; but this general moved forward and occupied the advanced position at Contreras. This position was from every point of view untenable. Not only could it be turned easily, and attacked in rear (as was done), but Valencia would have been just as bad off, if Scott had only left a containing force to occupy his attention in front, while he forced a way forward over the San Antonio causeway, and from there crossed over to the San Angel road. This would have cut Valencia off from his communications. Taking position, then, at Contreras was Valencia's strategic mistake. He made an equally bad tactical blunder, in putting a part of his force in front at Padierna—an advanced post beyond the support of his main position.

General Grant says in his *Memoirs*: "Both the strategy and tactics displayed by General Scott in the various engagements of August 20, 1847, were faultless, as I look upon them now after the lapse of so many years"—Contreras, San Antonio, and Churubusco. Strategically, Molino del Rey and Chapultepec may have been mistakes; they clear the way for an entry into the city, but they were very costly victories. Possibly Scott could have forced the San Antonio Garita at less cost than storming Chapultepec. This was the opinion of all his generals except Pillow, and of all his engineer officers except Beauregard.

General Scott was greatly handicapped in the carrying-out of his campaign, by a lack of funds and supplies, as well as by the delay and scarcity of his reinforcements. During his long, enforced wait at Puebla, no funds nor supplies had been received. Four months' pay was due the troops. Mexicans

were employed to make shoes and clothing for the army, and food and forage had to be got from the country; and the subsistence and quartermaster's departments had to make all purchases on credit.

This campaign, like Taylor's, exemplified the benefits and importance of drill, discipline, and training. Advantage was taken of the long stay at Puebla, and wherever opportunity offered, for instruction in these matters.

Possibly the best incident of the Mexican War, from the military point of view of the Nation, was the absence of the militia—George Washington's abomination and Thomas Jefferson's bulwark of freedom. No attempt was made to test the constitutional rights of the militia by ordering them beyond the Rio Grande. Trained volunteers were employed in their stead, and a larger proportion of regulars; and we have seen a different sort of fighting from that of the shame of 1812. Of a truth, for courageous, hard, sustained fighting, as shown by the percentage of loss, and the victories gained over superior numbers in strong position, there is no page of our history so notable, and none so inspiring, as that which tells of the battles around the City of Mexico. If a single American regiment or company ran away from any engagement in Scott's campaign, the historians have failed to record it.

The invasion and conquest of Mexico by an army so small as General Scott's, and so hampered by lack of support from its own government, was made possible only by the circumstances existing in Mexico. The foremost of these circumstances were the weakness of the central national government and the political dissensions within the republic. A state torn by internal dissensions is in the worst condition to repel invasion.

It is almost impossible for an American student of to-day to get a clear apprehension of the Mexican political potpourri of that day. And it is not worth while. Out of the muddle of Moderados, Puros, Polkos, Clericals, and the rest, about the only notion that we can gather, is that there was a political party for every man strong enough to have a temporary following. The consequences of it all were revolutions; and more revolutions. There were two or three during the war with the United States. The Republic of Mexico was a union of states, like the United States; but the central government was so unstable and weak as to have no real authority, and very little real influence, over the state governments. Govern-

ors of states were asked for troops to defend the national capital when the invaders were at its gates; almost none of them responded. That the Republic out of all its thousands of population could muster an army of only 20,000 men to defend its ancient and beautiful capital, seems as pitiable, and as absurd, as our own failure to defend Washington City against a handful of British in the War of 1812.

The Mexican army suffered not so much from a lack of commanders as from the lack of a commander. All things considered, Santa Anna appears to have been its best; yet his operations all show the want of an understanding of strategy and tactics. He even seems to have lacked the common quality of personal courage. Attention has already been pointed to the strategical mistake he made in taking his army to Buena Vista rather than to Vera Cruz; of a piece with it, was his withdrawal of the garrison from Tampico. This virtually gave that important port to the American navy; and it became the base of operations against Vera Cruz.

This was a conflict in which nothing but the taking of the national capital would have made the weaker nation accept the terms of peace proposed by the stronger. It was not enough to destroy the organized armed bodies; it was not enough to blockade the coast, capture important seaports, and occupy a large part of the territory. From prehistoric times Mexico City had been the capital of Mexico; it was the metropolis as well as the political capital. The pride of the nation was centered in that city, and the leaders of the people, the men who were able to make a treaty of peace that would be binding on the nation, were there.

The capture of Vera Cruz was the first step toward the capture of the City of Mexico. Its defense should, therefore, have been the first consideration of the government and the commander-in-chief. But it was neglected by both. No adequate preparation had been made for its defense; there was no army at hand to guard it from without; and it was not provided with forts, or garrison, or armament, or supplies, to withstand a siege.

One of the most serious strategic mistakes made by Santa Anna, was his withdrawal from Orizaba to the capital, after reorganizing his beaten army at Orizaba. This town stood upon the flank of General Scott's line of operations, and within easy striking distance of it. Scott could not have dared to push on to the capital, or even as far as Puebla, so long as

Santa Anna remained at Orizaba. As the American commander had not troops enough to spare a force to mask or "contain" Santa Anna's army in its flank position, he would have been obliged to move his whole force against it to dislodge it, before he could have gone on toward the Valley of Mexico. At Orizaba Santa Anna would have had the same advantage over the Americans that Washington had over the British in his flank position at Morristown.

In conclusion I cannot refrain from quoting the remarks made by Daniel Webster in the Senate of the United States about General Scott: "A man," said he, "who has performed the most brilliant campaign on recent military record; a man who has warred against the enemy, warred against the climate, warred against a thousand unpropitious circumstances; and has carried the flag of his country to the capital of the enemy—honorably, proudly, humanely—to his own permanent honor and the great military credit of his country. And where is he? At Pueblo—at Pueblo undergoing an inquiry before his inferiors in rank, and other persons without military rank, while the high powers he has exercised and executed with so much distinction are transferred to another."

Yes, such was General Scott's reward—an order from President Polk relieving him from command of his army, and sending him before a court of inquiry. The occasion of this indignity was the insubordination of one of Scott's regular generals and the vainglory of one of his volunteer generals. Mexican history gloatingly says: "The conqueror of Mexico found himself brought like a criminal before a military tribunal. . . . We believe this step was a measure of profound policy on the part of the Cabinet of the United States. When General Taylor had at one time acquired sufficient popularity by his campaigns in the north, General Scott was put forward as his rival; and when Scott had caused the renown of old General Taylor to be forgotten, the Executive wished the people of the United States to forget both these leaders, in order that the military spirit should never prevail, which is so prejudicial to countries governed by the federal system."* But the Mexican historians saw only half-way through the motives of Mr. Polk's Cabinet.

**The Other Side.*

LECTURE VII.

THE FIRST BATTLE OF BULL RUN.

(67) It is not our purpose to attempt to trace the causes of our Great Civil War—they are even yet more matters of controversy than of exact history. We are concerned merely with its military history. We want to learn the lessons of our trade from its campaigns, and to do so to the best advantage we must forget the sectional prejudice we may have imbibed in our childhood; indeed we must forget, if we have not already done so, much of the fiction we were taught, under the guise of history, in the school-rooms of our youth. We must strive to get at the exact truth of events, and then study coldly, critically, comparatively, not only the faults and mistakes of opposing commanders and troops, but also their examples of skill and excellence. We want to appreciate, if we can, the causes of success on the one hand, and of failure on the other, in every case.

As students of American history we may have a personal leaning towards the soldiers of one side or the other, towards the famous leaders of one side or the other; better still, we may have a national pride in the great deeds and qualities of the actors on both sides, or we may deplore their shortcomings; but as students of military history, a branch of our professional education, a chief means of learning the business of war, we must study the work of Grant and Lee, of Jackson and Sheridan, of Sherman and Johnston, and of the rest, merely as the work of characters in history; just as we shall study the work of von Moltke and Benedek, of Roberts and Cronje, of Oyama and Kuropatkin.

To arrive at a right estimate or appreciation of this conflict, one thing must be kept always in mind; namely, that while politically it was a civil war, from a purely military point of view it was as much a war between two hostile nations as was the war between Mexico and the United States, or the war between France and Germany in 1870-'71. In other civil wars the people of a nation have been divided among themselves, and not by geographic lines. The cleavage has usually been be-

tween social classes, political factions, or religious sects; but in this war the inhabitants of two geographic sections were opposed to each other almost to a unit,—as solidly as any two distinct hostile nations speaking different languages. However otherwise the matter may have been viewed by the people of the North, the people of the South, almost as a whole, believed themselves to be defending their soil against an invader, rather than struggling merely to defend, or to achieve, rights from governmental oppression.

South Carolina, whose statesmen had for long been threatening separation from the United States, was the first State to pass an ordinance of secession. This happened on the 20th of December, 1860, and, unfortunately, Mr. Buchanan, and not Andrew Jackson, was President of the United States. Buchanan did not believe that a State had the right to secede; nor yet did he believe that the Government had the right to coerce a State. So South Carolina was not opposed.

By the 1st of February, 1861, Georgia and the five States bordering on the Gulf of Mexico had also withdrawn from the Union without opposition. The seceding States took possession of the public property within their borders, such as mints, arsenals, and forts, with the exception of three or four forts along the seacoast. General Twiggs, who was in command of the Department of Texas, to his immortal shame surrendered all the posts in Texas, with their garrisons and equipment, to a regiment of Texas militia. Among the forts not given up to the seceding States was Fort Sumter in the harbor of Charleston, South Carolina.

In February, 1861, representatives of the seceding States met at Montgomery, Alabama, and organized a provisional government. Jefferson Davis was chosen provisional President of the Confederate States of America. On the 4th of March, 1861, Abraham Lincoln succeeded Buchanan as President of the United States. The new Administration took no immediate steps to reduce the seceded States; and for a time matters went on in about the same way as under Buchanan's Administration. In fact, the Government had no means at hand with which to coerce the recalcitrant States. The United States marshals and other civil officers refused, and were powerless to act; the army was only about 16,000 strong, and was, for the most part, in the far West. "The navy consisted of six screw-frigates, only one of which was in commission, of five steam

sloops, some twenty sailing vessels, and a few gunboats.”* In the States remaining in the Union public opinion concerning the right of States to secede, and the right of the Government to coerce a seceding State, had not as yet crystalized into such shape as to warrant the President in taking the extreme step of calling out the militia.

Meantime, Major Anderson with his little garrison at Fort Sumter was besieged by an armed Confederate force under General Beauregard, and his provisions were running low. In January reinforcements and supplies had been dispatched to him in a steamer called *Star of the West*; but the vessel had been fired upon and stopped by Confederate guns at Fort Moultrie. Confederate commissioners spent several weeks at Washington negotiating for the delivery of the fort; about the 1st of April they obtained from the President an agreement “that he would not change the military status at Charleston without giving notice.”† Just a week later a messenger from Mr. Lincoln notified the Confederate authorities at Charleston that an attempt would be made to “supply Fort Sumter with provisions only.” Thereupon “Beauregard was instructed to demand the evacuation of Sumter, and, in case of refusal, to reduce it.”†

The demand was made on the afternoon of the 11th of April and promptly refused. At half-past four o’clock on the morning of the 12th the first shot was fired at Fort Sumter. It was the first shot of the war. At noon on Sunday, the 14th, the Stars and Stripes were hauled down, and the fort was evacuated.

The next day, the 15th of April, President Lincoln issued a proclamation calling forth 75,000 militia, and stating that their “first service” would “probably be to repossess the forts, places, and property which have been seized from the Union.” The term of service of this levy was for three months only.

All of the Free States responded enthusiastically to the President’s call; the governors of the Slave States that still adhered to the Union refused. These States immediately took up the question of secession, with the result that Virginia, North Carolina, Tennessee, and Arkansas joined the Confederacy. In the other border States a desperate struggle took place between Secession and Union. Kentucky undertook to

*Henderson’s *Life of Stonewall Jackson*.

†Scribner’s *Campaigns of the Civil War*,—Nicolay.

remain neutral, but soon found her neutrality violated by both the Confederacy and the United States. Missouri was held in the Union mainly by means of the activity and judgment of General Lyon, then a captain in the 2nd U. S. Infantry. A good deal of fighting took place in that State in May and June, 1861. The Union victory at Boonville, on the 17th of June, "decided the fate of the State in favor of the Union." In Maryland there was a very strong sentiment in favor of Secession. It exhibited itself in an assault made by a mob in Baltimore upon a Massachusetts regiment passing through that city, on the 19th of April. The State was kept in the Union. In the mountainous counties of western Virginia the people were almost solidly for the Union. They repudiated the secession of Virginia and set up the loyal State of West Virginia. The Governor of Virginia dispatched troops thither to overawe them; but the troops were defeated and put to rout by Union forces under General McClellan in a "brief and brilliant campaign." The actions at Rich Mountain and Carrick's Ford, on the 11th and 13th of July, "settled forever the fate of West Virginia."

While these hostilities were going on in Missouri and West Virginia, and Kentucky was trying to stand neutral, it was evident from the start that the main campaign would be carried on in Virginia or Maryland. This was determined primarily by the position of Washington, the capital of the United States, and secondarily by the position of Richmond, the capital of the Confederacy. Whether the battle-ground would be in Virginia or in Maryland depended upon whether the Federal forces or the Confederate should take the offensive.

The safety of Washington was the first consideration of the Federal Government; to this end the new troops and some regulars were hurried to that point. The South hastened its raw levies to Virginia, and established its main camp at Manassas Junction, under General Beauregard.

On the 24th of May, the day after the people of Virginia by their votes ratified the ordinance of secession, columns of Federal troops crossed the Potomac and, without opposition, seized Alexandria and Arlington Heights. They established a camp on the south side of the river, and intrenched the line from the Chain Bridge, above Washington, to Alexandria, below it. General Scott, then in command of the army of the United States, hero of two wars, and the only man in America that had ever actually commanded as many as 5,000 soldiers, was too old

actively to take command. So Brevet-Major McDowell, an officer of the Adjutant General's Department, on duty at the War Department, whose highest rank of command had been lieutenant of artillery, was made a brigadier-general, and given command of the forces on the south bank of the Potomac. McDowell and Beauregard had been classmates at West Point; Beauregard had been an officer of the U. S. Engineers.

Washington being now prepared for defense against direct attack, the Northern newspapers and public began to cry out for a movement against the Confederate force at Manassas. General Scott did not believe the three-month levies could be counted upon for an offensive campaign. On the 3rd of May President Lincoln had made a second call for troops, 42,034 three-year volunteers, 22,714 men for the regular army, and 18,000 for the navy. General Scott wanted to wait until the men of this second levy could be trained and made ready for the field. "But the Northern public, as the violent language of the newspapers clearly showed, was determined not to lose the services of the three-months men before proving how much they could do; and . . . the Administration was finally induced to overrule the judgment of the lieutenant-general, and to order him to make the necessary arrangements for an advance."*

Besides the armies under McDowell and Beauregard there were several other hostile forces in this theater. Near Winchester, in the lower Shenandoah Valley, a Confederate force, about 12,000 strong, under General Joseph E. Johnston, confronted a Union force, about 18,000 strong, under General Patterson. This was the same General Patterson that we met in the Mexican War. He was now nearly seventy years old, and had lately been appointed a major-general of volunteers from civil life, and given this important command. At Aquia Creek, about thirty miles southeast of Manassas, there was a Confederate force of some 3,000 men and six guns, under General Holmes. Threatening Richmond from the southeast, a Federal force under General Benjamin F. Butler, at Fort Monroe, was opposed by Confederates under Generals Huger and Magruder. In the mountains of western Virginia five or six thousand Confederates were guarding the passes against the advance of the victorious Federals from West Virginia. There were also Confederate troops at Richmond, and Beauregard

**The Story of the Civil War.*—Ropes.

had a detachment near Leesburg, thirty miles away, watching the crossings of the Potomac.

None of the Union forces, except his immediate command, were under McDowell's control; and none of the Confederates, except those at Leesburg and Manassas, were under Beauregard's command. President Davis, with General Lee as his military adviser, undertook personally to command all the Confederate detachments from Richmond; while General Scott, under President Lincoln, directed the Federal forces from Washington.

The strategic importance of Manassas was due to the roads and railways converging and passing near there. An advance against Richmond by way of the Chesapeake Bay was not, as yet, seriously feared, as it would require stronger naval co-operation than the little navy of the United States was then equal to. Any advance of Union forces was expected to be made overland from Washington; and Manassas lay directly between the two main roads leading from that city to Richmond—one by way of Alexandria and Fredericksburg; the other by way of Warrenton, and thence through Culpeper [Fairfax] or Fredericksburg. The main line of railway from Washington to the Southern States, and also to Richmond, was joined at Manassas by a shorter line from the lower Shenandoah Valley. This branch line, it was foreseen, could be used quickly to unite the armies of Beauregard and Johnston, in the direction either of Manassas or Winchester, as circumstances required. It was also the line by which Johnston's army communicated with the Confederate base at Richmond. Beauregard's position at Manassas guarded this line.

Occoquan Creek covered the right flank of the Confederate position at Manassas, and Bull Run ran in front of it. (70) This stream, although it had many regular crossings, and could probably have been forded at many other points during the summer, was, nevertheless, a "formidable obstacle" to cross in the face of a hostile army. Its banks were generally high and wooded. It was more difficult below the Stone Bridge (on Warrenton Pike) than it was above that point. (67) There was little danger of an overland movement against Richmond to the east of the Alexandria-Fredericksburg road, on account of the difficult streams that would have to be crossed; still Holmes's command at Aquia had an eye on that region. Nor did the Shenandoah Valley offer a good route. The roads up that valley from the Potomac led rather away from the direc-

tion of Richmond, and the valley was closed on the east by the Blue Ridge Mountains, which could be crossed only at a few passes, or "gaps" as they are called there. These gaps could easily be guarded by the Confederates, and could be used by them to fall upon the flank or rear of any hostile column that might pass up the Valley. The Shenandoah Valley offered a better route for a Confederate invasion of Maryland and Pennsylvania, and, as we shall see, was later made use of by General Lee for that purpose. The position of Johnston's army, besides menacing the Baltimore and Ohio Railway, the main line of communication between Washington and the West, threatened such an invasion, and also guarded the Valley against a hostile advance. In fact the main purpose of Johnston's force and Patterson's, at that time, appears to have been to keep each other from doing anything. We shall see hereafter which force succeeded.

In reluctant response to the cry of the people and the press for a forward movement, General Scott called upon McDowell to submit a plan of operations. This McDowell did on the 24th of June. The plan proposed "to turn the enemy's position and force him out of it by seizing or threatening his communications."* The plan counted upon Patterson and Butler to "contain" the Confederates in their fronts, and estimated that Beauregard would still receive reinforcements enough to raise his army to about 35,000. So McDowell reckoned that he must have "a force of 30,000 of all arms, with a reserve of 10,000."

His plan was approved, and he was ordered "to carry it into effect July the 8th." Owing, however, to delays, it was not until the 16th July that his army was raised to the strength agreed upon. Not until about this time was his army organized into brigades. As finally organized, it consisted of five infantry divisions. The First Division, under Tyler, contained four brigades under Keyes, Schenck, W. T. Sherman, and Richardson; the Second Division, under Hunter, contained two brigades under Andrew Porter and Burnside; the Third Division, under Heintzelman, contained three brigades under Franklin, Willcox and Howard; the Fourth Division, under Runyon, contained nine regiments not brigaded; and the Fifth Division, under Dixon S. Miles, contained two brigades under Blenker and Davies. There were forty-nine guns and seven troops of regular cavalry. Eight companies of infantry, under

**Battles and Leaders*—Fry.

Major Sykes, and seven of the batteries were also of the regular army; and there was one small battalion of marines. The army aggregated about 35,000 men. Runyon's division was held back to guard the road in rear of the army, and took no part in the battle of Bull Run.

General Fry in his account of the battle says: "Northern enthusiasm was unbounded. 'On to Richmond' was the war-cry. Public sentiment was irresistible, and in response to it the army advanced. It was a glorious spectacle. The various regiments were brilliantly uniformed according to the æsthetic taste of peace, and the silken banners they flung to the breeze were unsoiled and unturned."*

Through his spies in Washington Beauregard was informed of the contemplated advance; he reported it to Richmond. On the 17th of July he wired that McDowell's army had started. By telegraph President Davis immediately ordered Johnston and Holmes to reinforce Beauregard with their effective forces; and he sent him troops from Richmond.

Johnston had taken command of the Confederate force in the Shenandoah Valley at Harper's Ferry; but he soon had seen that this place was in a pocket, surrounded by hills and commanded by Maryland Heights on the north bank of the Potomac, and that it was untenable. He, therefore, withdrew his command to Winchester. Then Patterson crossed the Potomac, and, after a good deal of indecisive moving about, and the receipt of many telegrams from General Scott urging the necessity of his preventing Johnston from quitting the Valley and going to Beauregard's aid, he advanced as far as Bunker Hill, within nine miles of Winchester. He was deceived in the size of Johnston's force, and believed it to be 35,000 strong;† it was, in truth, not more than two-thirds the strength of his own.

(68) On the 17th of July Patterson withdrew to Charlestown; the next day Johnston started his army, about 9,000 effectives, by way of Ashby's Gap to Piedmont. Here he placed his infantry in railway cars; and by the afternoon of the 20th had joined Beauregard with the bulk of his army. The movement had been so completely masked by Stuart with his little command of cavalry that it was not suspected by Patterson until July the 20th.‡

**B. & L.*

†Patterson's telegram to General Scott, July 18.

‡Imboden in *B. & L.* Nicolay in *Scribner's Series.*

Beauregard had withdrawn his detachment from Leesburg. His army, called the Army of the Potomac, consisted of six and a half brigades, and he had thus disposed them behind Bull Run: (69) At Union Mills Ford, about six miles in a straight line from the Stone Bridge, Ewell's brigade; at McLean's Ford, D. R. Jones's brigade; at Blackburn's Ford, Longstreet's brigade; at Mitchell's Ford, Bonham's brigade. Evans's half-brigade held the Stone Bridge on Warrenton Pike; and Cocke's brigade covered the fords between the Stone Bridge and Bonham's left. Early's brigade was placed as a support in rear; as were, also, Holmes's, when it came up, and the brigades of Jackson, Bee, and Bartow, of Johnston's Army of the Shenandoah.* It is evident from these dispositions that Beauregard expected McDowell to try to cross the creek by the fords to the east of the Stone Bridge; this was McDowell's original purpose, but he decided later that the creek and the close country in that quarter were too difficult. General Johnston ranked Beauregard, and upon his arrival on the ground fell into command of the Confederate forces. He, however, approved all of Beauregard's arrangements, and virtually waived his right of command.

(68) Meantime the Union army was on its way from Alexandria. It had started on the afternoon of July the 16th. On the morning of the 18th it was concentrated at Centreville, about twenty miles from the Potomac and four miles east of the Stone Bridge. The Confederate outposts and advance detachments had fallen back before it.

(69) From Centreville the Warrenton Turnpike leads almost west; and there were earthen roads leading to all the fords of Bull Run held by the Confederates, as well as to other crossings farther to the east. The distance from Centreville to Union Mills Ford, the right of Beauregard's line, was about six miles. Centreville is on an elevation from which the ground slopes in all directions. Between the town and Bull Run the country is cut up by small streams, and covered with farms and thick woods. The woods furnished good cover for troops. McDowell had to wait at Centreville for his trains to come up. On the morning of the 18th he ordered Tyler, whose division was in the lead, to "observe well the roads to Bull Run and to Warrenton. Do not," his order read, "bring on an engagement, but keep up the impression that we are moving on Manassas."

*Beauregard in *B. & L.*

(70) Tyler moved out on the road to Mitchell's and Blackburn's Fords. At the stream he encountered Bonham's and Longstreet's brigades reinforced by Early's. He opened fire on the Confederates with artillery, and sent forward two regiments of infantry, a squadron of cavalry, and two field-pieces into the thick woods along the creek. The Confederates on the other bank returned the fire of these troops at short range, and drove them back in disorder. This first affair, small as it was, greatly encouraged the Confederates, and had a depressing effect upon McDowell's army. "The regiment which suffered most was completely demoralized."*

(69) Tyler's experience on the 18th confirmed McDowell in his opinion, that with his raw troops—their average length of service was sixty days—he could not force a crossing of Bull Run in front of Beauregard's army. The 19th and 20th he spent at Centreville completing the concentration of his "loosely organized force,"† while his engineers examined the position of the enemy, and the stream and adjacent country. The reports of the engineers decided him to turn Beauregard's left, and then, "if possible, destroy the railway connecting him with Johnston in the Valley." He was not then aware that Johnston had already joined Beauregard.

Miles's division, with Richardson's brigade of Tyler's division and a strong force of artillery, was to remain in reserve at Centreville, and to threaten Blackburn's Ford. The rest of Tyler's division, which was in advance on the turnpike, was to march at 2.30 a.m., on the 21st of July, and make the "secondary attack" at daybreak, by way of the Stone Bridge. It was to be accompanied by four batteries of artillery of the regular army. Hunter's division, followed by Heintzelman's, was to march on the pike to a point two miles west of Centreville, there to take a road through the woods to the right, cross Bull Run at Sudley Springs, and move down upon the flank and rear of the enemy. Five batteries, twenty-four guns in all, were to go with this column, the whole under General McDowell's personal command. This "main attack," together with Tyler's, was expected to force the left of Beauregard's army away from the Stone Bridge. Then Tyler was to cross and join in the main attack.

No resistance was anticipated at Sudley Springs, and none

*Fry in *B. & L.*

†Ropes.

was encountered. But this ford was not reached until after nine o'clock, instead of at seven as was calculated. The turning column had been blocked on the pike for two or three hours by Tyler's division, which was slow in getting started.

(71) Tyler's first gun was fired about half after five o'clock; but his attack was pushed with so little vigor, and the turning movement was so long delayed, that Evans, who commanded the Confederates at the Stone Bridge, suspected that Tyler's was not the main attack. His suspicions were confirmed by a courier from a picket at Sudley Springs, and by a "wig-wag" message from Beauregard's signal-officer, Captain E. P. Alexander.* (69) Leaving four of his companies and two pieces of artillery to defend the bridge, and sending word to Cocke, the nearest brigade commander on his right, Evans marched the rest of his command—eleven companies and two guns*—to the left and rear, and took up a position on high ground about three-quarters of a mile north of Warrenton Pike. (71) His left rested on the Manassas-Sudley road. Here Evans's command was met by Burnside's brigade at the head of Hunter's division about ten o'clock.

(69) When Beauregard learned through his scouts, before daybreak, that the Federals were advancing on Warrenton Pike, not suspecting that they purposed turning his flank by way of Sudley Springs, but supposing they meant to attack him by way of the Stone Bridge, he issued orders, at half after five o'clock, for the left of his line, Evans and Cocke, to hold the bridge, and for his center and right to "advance and vigorously attack the Federal left and rear at Centreville."† About seven o'clock he ordered Jackson's brigade, with Imboden's and Walton's batteries, to the left to support Cocke; he also started Bee's and Bartow's brigades, under Bee's command, to support the left.

The order to Ewell somehow miscarried; and, as his brigade was to lead in the movement on Centreville, none of the others advanced. By half-past ten Beauregard received word that his center and right had not advanced. By that time "the firing on the left began to increase so intensely as to indicate a severe attack" in that quarter. Beauregard appears not yet to have suspected that the enemy had actually turned his left;

**Memoirs of a Confederate*—E. P. Alexander.

†Beauregard in *B. & L.*

but judging "that they were making too much progress against his left at the Stone Bridge, for his movement against Centre-ville to succeed," he ordered "Ewell, Jones, and Longstreet to make a strong demonstration all along their front on the other side of the Run." He ordered the brigades of Holmes and Early, and two of Bonham's regiments, and six pieces of artillery, "to move swiftly to the left." He and General Johnston "set out at full speed for the point of conflict."*

(71) Upon finding Evans blocking his path, Burnside had promptly formed a regiment in line of battle and attacked.† Evans repulsed this attack and pursued his assailants. Other regiments came forward one after another and were repulsed.‡ Then Porter's brigade came up to support Burnside. But Evans maintained his position alone for more than an hour. Then Bee, with his own and Bartow's brigades, came forward and formed on his line; and Imboden's battery from Henry House Hill lent its aid.

The leading regiments of Heintzelman's division had come up and prolonged the Federal line to the right. Part of both hostile lines was in the wood and part in the open fields. At some points the lines were within a hundred yards of each other. For another hour or more the Confederates held their ground. Meantime Sherman's brigade of Tyler's division had crossed the Run by a ford a mile or more above the Stone Bridge, and formed on the left of the Union line. Thus enveloped on their right, and having suffered severely, the Confederates at last gave way, and fled in confusion across Young's Branch.

(72) In the angle south of the turnpike is the end of a commanding ridge called the Henry House Hill, generally level on top, and some 200 yards across. The direction of the plateau is oblique to both the turnpike and the road which intersect here at right-angles. Gentle slopes led down from it to the valley of Young's Branch; but they were cut up by little ravines, and partly covered with patches of young pines. Upon the northwestern brow of the plateau stood the Henry House; and 600 yards northeast of it, on a projecting spur, was the Robinson House surrounded by dense trees and shrubbery. Neither of these houses had any defensive strength. Around the eastern and southeastern borders of the plateau was a thick

*Beauregard in *B. & L.*

†Fry in *B. & L.*

‡Alexander.

fringe of young pines,* which merged into a dense oak wood. This wood was considerable in extent, and lay on both sides of the Manassas-Sudley road.

In the edge of the pines along the eastern brow of the plateau Jackson, who had marched to the sound of the firing, had formed his brigade just in time to support Imboden's battery, which, badly cut to pieces, was withdrawing from the fight. The routed infantry of Bee and Bartow and Evans also rallied on Jackson's line. It was at this juncture that Bee reanimated his own men by pointing to Jackson's brigade, "standing," as he said, "like a stone wall." Bee died that day, but his words will live for ever.

Beauregard and Johnston were now on the ground. Beauregard took personal charge of the troops, and Johnston rode back to headquarters at the Lewis house for the purpose of hastening forward such reinforcements as he thought it safe to withdraw from the fords.

It was now about two o'clock. General McDowell was present in direct command of the Federal lines. He determined to follow up the routed Confederates and assault them on the Henry House Hill. He had allowed Burnside to withdraw his brigade on the plea of fatigue; but he still had available for the attack the brigades of Porter, Franklin, Willcox, and Sherman, a squadron of regular cavalry, and four batteries of artillery. Tyler, with Keyes's brigade of his division, had crossed at the ford taken by Sherman; but, after a feeble advance up the slope towards the Robinson house, he "marched down Young's Branch, out of sight of the enemy, and took no further part in the engagement."† Schenck's brigade and Tyler's artillery were still on the other side of Bull Run. Howard's brigade, which had been left back on the road to guard the rear of the turning column, had not come up.‡ McDowell had 10,000 or 11,000 men with whom to assault the hill; Beauregard had 6,500 infantry on the spot, thirteen pieces of artillery, and Stuart's squadron of cavalry, with which to defend it.

The Federals advanced across the valley of Young's Branch, and up the northern and western slopes of the hill. There they encountered the fire of the Confederates. They pushed out beyond the Henry House, and the fighting on the plateau became fierce. The Union batteries of Ricketts and Griffin, with the

*Beauregard in *B. & L.*

†Fry in *B. & L.*

‡Alexander.

Fire Zouaves for support, were sent forward and planted near the Henry House, within musket-shot of the woods to the south. Stuart with his squadron was guarding the Confederate left. Filing through the fences on Bald Hill he charged the Zouaves.* At about the same time the 33rd Virginia infantry charged from the woods at the south. This regiment was taken for Union troops by the artillery commander; before it was recognized it had opened fire at close range, shooting down two officers, about forty men, and seventy-five horses, and hastening the flight of the Zouaves. Only three guns of the batteries escaped. But Federal regiments kept on coming forward one after another, renewing their line and extending it to the right, up and beyond the Manassas-Sudley road. The 33rd Virginia was driven back, and the captured batteries were recovered.

The battle surged backward and forward across the plateau; the two batteries were taken and retaken again and again. The Confederates would advance into the open, only to be driven back to the cover of the pines, but there the Union line would be stopped again. Howard's brigade joined in the contest about 3 p.m., but without materially changing the situation. The struggle on the plateau kept up without a decision till near four o'clock; then the Confederates received reinforcements, which turned the day to their account. Early's brigade, which had come up from the lower fords, and Kirby Smith's brigade of Johnston's army, had arrived on the field. Kirby Smith's had reached Manassas by the cars, and marched at once to the battle. These fresh troops, and with them a battery, came into the engagement far out on the left of the Confederate line, thus enveloping the right flank of the Federals. Beauregard pressed his enemy in front. The effect was decisive. The Federal soldiers, without any show of panic, simply broke ranks and started home in spite of all the efforts of their officers to stop them. The troops, for the most part, retired by the roads over which they had come. Sykes's battalion of infantry and Palmer's squadron of cavalry, both of the regular army, stanchly covered the rear.

By six o'clock there was not a Union soldier, but the dead, the wounded, and the captives, on the south side of Bull Run. "There was no panic, in the ordinary meaning of the word, until the retiring soldiers, guns, wagons, congressmen, and

*Ropes. Henderson. Beauregard in *B. & L.*

carriages were fired upon on the road east of Bull Run. Then the panic began." (69) A Confederate battery had got a position commanding the bridge over Cub Run on the turn-pike. A wagon was upset on this bridge, blocking the way for other vehicles; this caused utter confusion.*

Stuart pursued with his squadron by the Sudley Springs road; Radford's squadron crossed at Ball's Ford and struck the fleeing masses on Warrenton Pike. But neither of these cavalry forces was strong enough to do decisive harm. In fact, no effective pursuit was made by the Confederates. The brigades of Holmes and Ewell had reached the scene, and might have been sent in pursuit; but just then Beauregard received a false report that a large Union force was moving against his depot at Manassas. So he sent these two brigades in that direction.† On the Confederate right Longstreet had four regiments, and Bonham had three, which had not fired a shot. About half after five these generals received orders to advance upon Centreville and cut off the Union retreat by way of the Stone Bridge. Through Longstreet's "superfluous caution," and Bonham's whimsical stickling for the right of seniority, and then his hesitancy in assuming its responsibilities, this order was practically "ignored and disobeyed"; and the Union army got away. "Never did an enemy make a cleaner escape, out of such an exposed position, after such an utter rout," says General Alexander.‡

Miles's Federal division in reserve at Centreville, and Richardson's brigade near the lower fords, behaved well; and they formed a "steady and trustworthy rear-guard to the army after it had passed Centreville" in its retreat.§

"When McDowell left the battle-field his intention and orders were to rally at Centreville."¶ He reached that place by sunset, but he knew before then that "the mass of the army was completely demoralized."* "The battalion of regular infantry under Major Sykes," says Ropes, "was wholly unaffected by the general demoralization."§ Rhodes says "The battalion of regular infantry alone obeyed commands. It covered the vol-

*Fry in *B. & L.*

†Beauregard in *B. & L.*

‡Alexander.

§Ropes.

¶Nicolay.

unteers' retreat, which became a rout and then a panic."* The beaten troops never stopped until they reached the Potomac that night. The soldiers of Hunter's and Heintzelman's divisions, undisciplined and unseasoned, had fought a battle and marched forty-five miles in less than thirty-six hours†

The Federal loss in the battle of Bull Run, or, as it is called at the South, the battle of Manassas, was as follows: killed, 460; wounded, 1,124; captured or missing, 1,312; total, 2,896. The Confederate loss was as follows: killed, 387; wounded, 1,582; captured or missing, 13; total, 1,982. Among the casualties on the Federal side Hunter, Heintzelman and Willcox were wounded; on the Confederate side Bee and Bartow were killed; Jackson and Kirby Smith wounded.

The Confederates, now under command of Johnston, set up their camps and intrenched them on the heights at Centreville. Soon they pushed their outposts almost to the bank of the Potomac, "flaunting their flag within view of the capital of the Nation."‡

COMMENTS.

As an example of political strategy, seldom has a greater mistake been made in history than that made by the Confederate government when it ordered the bombardment of Fort Sumter. Up to that time the opinion and the sentiment of the Northern States were divided along party lines upon the question of a State's right to secede, and the Government's right to coerce a seceded State.

Four months had passed since the first State had withdrawn from the Union, more than a month of which was under Mr. Lincoln's Administration; yet no active step had been taken by the Government to reduce the seceding States. The longer secession were allowed to stand unpunished the sooner it would come to be recognized as an accomplished fact. If the United States were not going to do anything to suppress the rebellion foreign governments would not long withhold their recognition. The right policy of the seceded States was certainly to keep at peace with the Union as long as possible. Sooner or later even the people of the other States would have

**History of the U. S.*—J. F. Rhodes.

†Fry in *B. & L.*

‡Swinton.

become used to a Southern Confederacy. There is strength in the *status quo*.

But everything changed in an instant with the firing on Fort Sumter. That the flag of the country and a helpless little garrison within a fort belonging to the Nation should be fired upon, and the commander made to surrender simply because the Government was going to send him food for his men, was regarded as such a National insult and outrage that it completely overshadowed every other sentiment and feeling in the Northern States. It welded the people into a solid mass against the Confederacy and aroused among them an enthusiasm that expressed itself in the alacrity with which the President's call for volunteers was answered.

That was the hour of all others in the history of the Nation when all loyal persons must have wished that Washington's injunction, to prepare for war in time of peace, had been heeded. About 30,000 disciplined soldiers within call, and a navy strong enough effectually to close the Southern ports, would have done in a few months, at small cost of life and treasure, what it took four years, thousands of lives, and uncounted billions of dollars to do. It may be asked if some of the soldiers and ships might not have gone over to the seceding States; the answer is, no. Enlisted men could not resign, and virtually none deserted to "go South." In the navy comparatively few officers resigned.

In the hasty mobilization and organization of its raw troops the Confederate government exhibited a better military system than the Government at Washington did. This was to be expected, for Mr. Davis was himself an educated soldier. A graduate of the Military Academy, he had served seven years in the regular army, first in the infantry and then in the dragoons; he had commanded a volunteer regiment in Taylor's campaign in Mexico; and had then served as Secretary of War; while Mr. Lincoln had practically had no experience of military affairs. Davis was officially, probably personally, acquainted with most of the higher officers of the "Old Army"; he was, accordingly, able to make good selections for command at the start, from those that resigned to "go South." Hence we find that there were more Confederate than Union officers in the first battle who afterwards became distinguished.*

Mr. Davis had the trained soldier's horror of committing the

*Lecture by Major Swift.

lives of men, and the fortunes of the army and the country, in war, to the charge of men that knew nothing whatever of soldiering and the business of war. Hence he intrusted no important commands to such men as Butler and Banks; able politicians, no doubt, but perfectly incompetent as commanders of troops. No citizen soldier, without previous military education or training, was given a higher command than a brigade in the Southern army until he had learned to command by actual practice and had proved his fitness.

McDowell's army of 35,000 was the largest field army that had ever been assembled on the Continent; yet it was not organized into higher units than a regiment, until just before it started on its forward movement. It was then organized into five divisions, thirteen brigades; but only three of the divisions, and none of the brigades, were commanded by general-officers. The rest were commanded by field-officers. The staffs were all incomplete. The Confederate army, on the other hand, was composed of eleven brigades, seven of which were commanded by general-officers. The brigade-commanders had fairly complete staffs.*

Serious or prolonged hostilities were not anticipated by either of the governments. Mr. Davis ordered 10,000 small-arms, only, in Europe at the start; while Mr. Lincoln's first call for volunteers was for three months' service. Such a short term proved disastrous. We have seen that it was the main reason for hurrying McDowell forward, before his army was fit to take the field. One of the regiments and a battery claimed their discharge on the very day of the battle, and "marched to the rear to the sound of the enemy's cannon."

(67) The critics are not wholly agreed as to where to place the blame for Patterson's mismanagement in the Shenandoah Valley. General Scott plainly made known to Patterson that his duty was to detain Johnston in the Valley while McDowell moved against Beauregard. He also indicated his belief that Patterson outnumbered Johnston and should attack him. He, however, left Patterson to choose his own way. If Patterson had understood the business of command he would have needed no further instructions. The mistake General Scott made, was in not withdrawing Patterson's force and joining it to McDowell's before letting the advance against Beauregard begin. The military mistake the President made,

*Lecture by Major Swift.

however necessary it may have been politically, was in not relieving Patterson. Reinforced by Patterson's 12,000 or 15,000 effectives, McDowell would almost surely have won the day at Bull Run.

(69) McDowell's staying at Centreville, the 19th and 20th of July, was fatal. Had he made his attack on the 19th, he would have caught Beauregard's army before the arrival of Holmes, or Johnston, or the troops from Richmond. The brigades of Jackson, Bee, and Bartow, of Johnston's army, composed the bulk of the Confederate force on Henry House Hill, and did the bulk of the fighting; and Kirby Smith's brigade arrived in time to decide the fate of the day. Stuart's cavalry and Imboden's battery, which played a decisive part on the Confederate side, also belonged to Johnston's Army of the Shenandoah.

We have seen that McDowell's plan of attack was based upon two false premises; namely, that McDowell would have Beauregard's army alone to deal with; and that, by getting possession of the Manassas Gap railway in Beauregard's rear, he would place his army between those of Beauregard and Johnston.

Believing, as he did, that Bull Run could be crossed only at the Stone Bridge and a few fords, all but one of which were held by the enemy, McDowell's plan involved the risk of having his army split in two by a formidable obstacle. The success of his project depended upon his rolling up the left flank of the enemy and clearing the way for his own wings to unite by way of the Stone Bridge. Suppose that he had succeeded in this; his plan further involved the hazard of forming his line of battle parallel to Warrenton Pike, his line of retreat; or with its back to the stream; or with its face to the rear. But a general must always take some risk. As the battle was actually fought the Union line faced approximately to the rear.

(71) Evans's action in quitting the Stone Bridge with the larger part of his command, and placing it across the path of the Union turning column, showed quick decision and soldierly qualities. He would have shown better judgment, however, if he had placed his troops on the Henry House Hill at first, instead of waiting to be driven back to it.

As has so often happened in combined movements the attacks of the different Union columns were not well timed. Tyler's "secondary attack" at the bridge began before six o'clock; while the turning column did not reach Sudley Springs

Ford till nine. It was expected to be there about seven. This discrepancy gave Beauregard time to dispatch the brigades of Jackson, Bee, and Bartow to the left of his line, and caused the battle to be fought on the Henry House Hill. Otherwise Evans's unaided troops would quickly have been driven off, and the way would have been cleared for Tyler's division to cross the bridge; and the battle might have taken place farther south on the Manassas-Sudley road; possibly on the timbered hills near New Market.

(69) The tardiness of the turning column was due to two causes. First, the arrangements for starting from Centreville were not properly made. Tyler's division, which was to have the right of way, was not camped all together. Two brigades were west of the village, and one was two miles back on the road, east of the village. It was this rear brigade that blocked the way and caused the delay. It ought to have bivouacked with the rest of the division, west of the village. Second, the road round by Sudley Springs was found to be much longer than had been expected.

(71) In the attack Heintzelman's division deployed on the right of Hunter's, and prolonged the Federal line down and west of the Masasses-Sudley road. The effect of this was to carry the line farther and farther from the Stone Bridge, by which Tyler's division was expected to join. Two of Tyler's brigades actually came into the field by a ford; but his other brigade, and his batteries, did not cross at all. The extension to the right also threw the right flank "in the air"; and faced the line almost to the original rear, with its back towards the railway by which it was known that Johnston's army might approach. McDowell ought to have put in Heintzelman's division on the left of Hunter's, and developed his line towards Bull Run.*

The attack was badly made from every tactical point of view. Instead of setting up his headquarters somewhere in rear, and directing his army as a whole, McDowell was at the very front, in the thick of the battle, scarcely exercising any influence on the action beyond the sound of his voice. Instead of commanding the army he simply led the few regiments close at hand. Brigades and regiments followed one after another into the fight without any sort of order or concert of action. The continued extension to the right was made not with any

*Major Swift's Lecture.

well-formed purpose of enveloping the Confederate left; apparently the line deployed in that direction simply because, topographically, it was the line of least resistance. The assaults were all straight to the front; there was no real effort to make a flank attack. (69) McDowell did not summon his reserves from Centreville only four miles distant—nearer to the Henry House Hill than any of Beauregard's brigades, except Cocke's, were, at the beginning of the day. He did not call Schenck's brigade and the batteries with it across the Run, though the way over the Stone Bridge was open. He never ordered back into the line Burnside's brigade which had withdrawn before noon to rest. He did not put Howard's brigade into the line until after three o'clock. (72) He lost all touch with Tyler, and let him keep Keyes's brigade idle under cover of Young's Branch throughout the engagement. Beauregard was constantly in fear of attack on his right flank by Tyler; that is what ought to have taken place.*

Beauregard, too, played the rôle more of a leader of troops than of an army commander; but, fortunately for his side, he had an able assistant in General Johnston, who directed his reinforcements from the rear.

Out of McDowell's army of 35,000 men only 18,500 crossed Bull Run; of these the brigades of Burnside and Keyes took no part at the critical time. Beauregard had nearly 32,000 effectives available, but put only 18,000 into the battle. This was bad management on the part of both of these generals.† In fact a careful study of the battle of Bull Run points the student to only two general-officers who displayed a knowledge of the tactical handling of their commands, or of the tactical employment of the ground. Those two were Sherman on the Union side, and Stonewall Jackson on the Confederate side. Sherman found a ford and led his brigade across it, and against the *flank* of Bee's line; Jackson instead of putting his line on the edge of Henry House Hill *towards* the enemy, put it in the fringe of pines on the edge of the open plateau *farthest* from the enemy. The choice of this strong position, and McDowell's failure to take it in flank, enabled the Confederates to hold out against greatly superior numbers for nearly four hours, and made their victory possible. But the student must not wonder that only two of the generals knew their business; he should rather wonder that there were as many as two. A

*Major Swift's Lecture.

†B. & L.

man can learn how to command bodies of men only by commanding them. He must study the theory—learn how others have commanded—then himself have practice. Until that 21st of July not a general upon the field had ever commanded as many as 500 men in battle or in peace maneuver.

Only Stonewall Jackson, too, of all the Confederate generals, appears fully to have appreciated the importance of pursuing and destroying the beaten enemy. "Give me 5,000 fresh men, and I will be in Washington City to-morrow morning," he cried to President Davis. But Mr. Davis and Generals Johnston and Beauregard were content to spend the three hours of daylight after the battle riding about the battle-field, strewn with its dead and wounded, instead of bending every effort to organize a prompt and vigorous pursuit with every available man.*

The army of McDowell ought to have contained a brigade of cavalry; it had only seven little troops, and they were mostly split up into small details. The Confederates had 1,800 horsemen, but they, also, were frittered away upon orderly duty, at the rate of at least two troops to each brigade of infantry. With the exception of Stuart's charge on the Fire Zouaves, and Radford's on the fugitives at Cub Run, the performance of the cavalry in this battle was insignificant. If Beauregard's cavalry had been doing its proper duty before the battle, reconnoitering, and covering the flanks and front of his army, it would have given him timely warning of the Federal turning movement. Indeed it might have delayed that movement several hours north of Sudley Springs. If, at the same time, the Federal column had been preceded by a mounted force, as it should have been, a cavalry combat would have taken place before the column reached the ford. Instead of being out on one of the flanks of Beauregard's army, Stuart's squadron, before the battle, was guarding a piece of the creek between two infantry brigades, opposite a dense wood, where there does not appear to have been a ford.

This was the first military campaign in which railways played a conspicuous part. Not only were they used by both sides in concentrating their forces before the battle; but the Manassas Gap Railway also brought Confederate troops to the field during the battle; and this circumstance gave victory to the Southern arms.

*Alexander.

In his critical and informing *Memoirs* General Alexander directs attention to two examples of the wrong method of issuing orders, in connection with this campaign, and their serious consequences, which serve as lessons to the student of the military art. The first was President Davis's telegram to Johnston directing him to take his army to aid Beauregard at Manassas. Johnston did the right thing; but the two words, "if practicable," in the telegram—a phrase which should never appear in any military order—were the subject of a controversy that never ceased until both Mr. Davis and General Johnston were dead. The other was the order directing the brigades of the Confederate right wing to advance on Centreville. This order was not understood alike by the commanders that received it, and was not received at all by the commander that was to begin the movement. So the movement was not made. The dunce that General Sedgwick kept to read his orders, before he issued them, for the purpose of seeing whether they were understandable, was an important member of his staff.

LECTURE VIII.

FORTS HENRY AND DONELSON.

(73) When the Southern States seceded and organized the Confederacy, Kentucky, as stated in the last lecture, wavered between Union and Secession. The governor was for Secession, but the legislature was for the Union. So the State, which had been brought up in the school of compromise by her greatest statesman, Henry Clay, compromised in this instance by undertaking to remain neutral.

For a time the United States and the Confederacy appeared tacitly to recognize the neutrality of her soil, while both recruited regiments among her people. The first violation of her neutrality was done by General Leonidas Polk, who, with a Confederate force, occupied Columbus on the 3rd of September, 1861. Thereupon General Grant, with a National force, occupied Paducah on the 5th September.* Henceforth Kentucky's neutrality was not regarded.

As it was well known that a large part of the population of Kentucky was in favor of Secession, the Confederate authorities were very loath to let go any part of the State; so General Albert Sidney Johnston was, in September, 1861, placed in command of the Confederate forces in the West, whose task was to hold Kentucky and Tennessee, and the Mississippi River. He made Bowling Green his headquarters, and issued a proclamation saying in effect that he would respect Kentucky's neutrality and withdraw his army from her soil as soon as he should be assured that the Union commanders would do likewise.* His line stretched from Columbus to Cumberland Gap. At Columbus, which was fortified, General Polk had, in January, 1862, 12,000 effectives;† and in the intrenched camp at Bowling Green there were about 22,000 effectives.* General Tilghman garrisoned Forts Henry and Donelson with 5,000 or 6,000 men. At Cumberland Gap there was a fortified Confederate camp. Below Columbus the Mississippi was guarded by two or three garrisoned forts.

Opposed to Johnston's Confederate forces General Buell had

**Life of General A. S. Johnston*—W. Preston Johnston.

†Letter from Polk to Johnston, dated January 11, 1862.

a Union army of some 45,000, with headquarters at Louisville. General Halleck was in chief command in Missouri; his headquarters were at St. Louis. and his territorial department included that part of Kentucky west of the Cumberland River. The commands of these two generals were independent of each other. At Cairo there was, also, a strong Union fleet of iron-clad gunboats, under Commodore Foote.

GEOGRAPHY.

The geographical features of most importance from a strategical point of view in all this region were: first, the Tennessee and Cumberland Rivers. The Tennessee was navigable from its mouth, through western Kentucky and Tennessee, and into the northern part of Alabama as far as the Muscle Shoals. The Cumberland was navigable as far up as beyond Nashville.

In the east were the Cumberland Mountains, which could be crossed only at certain passes, the most important of which was Cumberland Gap. The East Tennessee and Georgia Railway ran up through the valley of these mountains into Virginia; it was one of the main lines of communication between the Confederate army operating in that State and the Gulf States. At Chattanooga it connected with the Georgia Central Railway, which led into the heart of Georgia; and with the Memphis and Charleston, which passed through Northern Alabama and Mississippi to Memphis. From Louisville the Louisville and Nashville line went southward through Bowling Green, 100 miles, to Nashville, seventy miles farther. From Bowling Green the Memphis and Ohio passed through Clarksville, sixty miles, and Paris and Humboldt, to Memphis, 250 miles. From Paris there was a branch to Columbus, making Columbus, the left of Johnston's line, about 170 miles by rail from Bowling Green, which was, in fact, the right of the line. There was a double line directly from Humboldt into Mississippi. From Nashville the Nashville and Decatur line led into Alabama; and the Nashville and Chattanooga connected Nashville with the railway center at Chattanooga.

So long as Johnston could hold his line from Bowling Green to Columbus he not only blocked the Cumberland, the Tennessee, and the Mississippi Rivers against the advance of Union forces, but he also guarded this entire system of railways.

There were some metaled pikes in Kentucky and Tennessee;

but the highways were mainly the ordinary country earthen roads, good enough in summer, but well-nigh impassable with mud in winter and spring.

Fort Henry on the east bank of the Tennessee, and Fort Donelson on the west bank of the Cumberland, stood at points where these rivers were not more than eleven miles apart. Better positions could have been chosen for forts to guard the passage of these streams, lower down, probably at the point where the rivers come nearest together; but the forts were built, or begun, at the time when Kentucky's neutrality held good; so they had to be kept within the limits of Tennessee.*

PLANS.

We have seen that Buell and Halleck were entirely independent in their commands, each of the other. Each reported directly to General McClellan, who was now Commander-in-Chief of all the land forces of the United States, with his headquarters on the Potomac, 500 miles, as the crow flies, from Louisville.

The plan proposed by Buell for the opening campaign of 1862, in this theater, was that Halleck should move up the Cumberland and Tennessee Rivers with 20,000 men supported by the ironclad fleet; while he, at the same time, moved southward along the railway on Bowling Green and Nashville. He contended that this combined movement would compel Johnston to fall back. Halleck did not favor this plan, but wanted Buell's army placed under his command, so that he might leave merely a containing force from Buell's army in front of Bowling Green, and combine the bulk of Buell's troops with his own and form an army of 60,000, for a movement up the Cumberland River. McClellan would not give his approval to either of these plans, but kept urging Buell to lead his army into East Tennessee, in order to get possession of the East Tennessee and Georgia Railway, and to encourage and support the inhabitants of that mountain region, who were strongly loyal in sentiment.

The President had still another and different plan, which he outlined to General Buell in a letter dated Executive Mansion, January 13, 1862. The following is an extract from the President's letter: "I state my general idea of this war to be that we have the greater numbers, and the enemy

*W. Preston Johnston.

has the greater facility of concentrating forces upon points of collision; that we must fail unless we can find some way of making our advantage an overmatch for his; and that this can only be done by menacing him with superior forces at different points at the same time, so that we can safely attack one or both, if he makes no changes; and if he weakens one to strengthen the other, forbear to attack the strengthened one, but seize and hold the weakened one, gaining so much. To illustrate: Suppose last summer, when Winchester ran away to reinforce Manassas, we had forbore to attack Manassas, but had seized and held Winchester." And the President thought so well of this plan that, while he forbore to order it, he had a copy of this letter sent to General Halleck. The student may guess how long it would have taken Napoleon or Stonewall Jackson to destroy Buell's detachments in detail, if either of those masters of the art of war had been in Johnston's place, and Buell had adopted the President's project.

Johnston had a difficult problem. He had only about 43,000 available troops, and they were badly armed. Many carried flint-locks, fowling-pieces, or squirrel-rifles.* Johnston "had, at any rate, so long as his communications remained unbroken, the advantage of interior lines; he could rapidly concentrate his forces. . . . He knew that the Federal iron-clad fleet was superior to any force that the Confederates could muster on the three rivers. He knew, in fact, that he could not maintain himself against well directed attacks, and that his only chance lay in the possibility that his adversaries would make mistakes, of which he could take advantage. His attitude was strictly defensive. He did not at this time [January and February, 1862] fear any sudden movement of the enemy by land, for the roads were in very bad condition; although, as he well knew, he could be flanked out of his camp at Bowling Green." What he feared, however, at any minute, was that the Federal fleet might ascend the Cumberland and the Tennessee Rivers, or one of them, and attack his forts. He expected them to ascend the Cumberland first.†

OPERATIONS.

There were some skirmishes and minor affairs in Kentucky

*W. Preston Johnston. *B. & L.*—Captain Jesse Taylor.

†Ropes.

in December and January, the most important of which was the battle of Mill Springs. Here General Thomas, with a division of Buell's army, defeated a force of Confederates under Generals Crittenden and Zollicoffer, and drove it back into the mountains at Cumberland Gap, on the 19th of January. No important movement was made, however, until February.

On January 29 Halleck received a telegram from McClellan, telling him that a deserter had reported that Beauregard was under orders to leave Manassas for the line of Columbus and Bowling Green with fifteen regiments. On the 1st of February, without awaiting further instructions from Washington, or arranging for any coöperation on Buell's part, Halleck ordered General Grant, with 17,000 men and Commodore Foote's iron-clads, to ascend the Tennessee, and attack Fort Henry; in order, as he explained, to "anticipate the arrival of Beauregard's forces."* The expedition started February 2. There were not boats enough to carry the whole force at once, so General McClernand's division, escorted by the iron-clads, went up the river first, and landed about nine miles below Fort Henry. General Grant followed with the rest of the troops. (74) On the 5th of February Grant moved his army by boats up to a point about four miles below Fort Henry.

Fort Henry was a regular bastioned work, armed with seventeen cannon, and enclosing a space of about ten acres. It was in a bend of the river, so that twelve of its guns had a perfect sweep of the water. But this was its only advantage. It was so low that, at this time, the base of its flagstaff stood in two feet of water. Its guns were at the water-level, which not only deprived them of the advantage of a plunging fire, but made them an easy target for the Union gunboats. The fort was not only surrounded by higher ground on its own side of the river, but was perfectly commanded by the high ground on the opposite bank. To offset this disadvantage the Confederates had built Fort Heiman on the high ground across the river.

There were two roads leading across to the town of Dover and Fort Donelson, eleven miles east on the Cumberland. The intervening country was cut up by creeks and marshes, hills and ravines; and was thickly wooded. It had been raining for some time, and all the waters were high; the creeks, insignificant in dry weather, were now impassable near their mouths.

*Ropes.

General Tilghman had at this time about 2,500 men in the two forts on the Tennessee; but, as soon as the Union army and fleet made their appearance, he knew that he could not hold out against them; so he withdrew the garrison from Fort Heiman, and, on the night of the 5th of February, made ready to withdraw his whole force to Fort Donelson. The next morning he started all the garrison for that fort, except seventy men. These he kept at Fort Henry under his own command, to serve the guns, and hold the fort, until the infantry should be safe on the way.*

General Grant did not expect to assault Fort Henry with his troops; he expected the fleet to reduce it. But he hoped to put his troops on the roads in rear of the fort to cut off the retreat of the garrison. The fleet consisted of four iron-clads and three wooden gunboats. At 11 a.m., on the 6th of February, the fleet and the land force moved out. The fleet opened fire on the fort when within a mile of it; two hours afterwards Tilghman, who had remained in it, had his colors lowered, and a white flag run up. The Union army, however, was so much delayed by the high water in the creeks, and the mud in the roads, that it was not in time to cut off the main garrison, which made good its retreat to Donelson. Not knowing that Fort Heiman had been abandoned, General Grant had sent one brigade up the west side of the river.

(73) "Immediately after the fall of Fort Henry two of the gunboats proceeded up the river and destroyed the bridge of the Memphis and Ohio Railway. Then they continued on up the river, as far as the Muscle Shoals, destroying large quantities of supplies on the way, and several Confederate transport-steamers; and spreading alarm throughout the whole region."†

As soon as General Johnston learned of the fall of Fort Henry he was convinced that Fort Donelson must also yield to the National river-fleet; this would open the Cumberland River as far up as Nashville and cut his communications in rear of him. (75) He made haste, therefore, to evacuate Bowling Green. He sent 12,000 men under General Floyd to Fort Donelson, which, with some reinforcements from Columbus, raised the garrison of that fort to about 15,000. With the rest of his army, some 14,000, Johnston retreated to the south bank of the Cumberland. He reached Nashville on the

*B. & L.—Captain Jesse Taylor.

†Ropes.

16th of February. The reinforcements began arriving for the garrison of Fort Donelson on the 9th of February; by the 13th all had arrived.

We have seen that Fort Henry surrendered on the 6th of February. General Grant appreciated the importance of moving promptly against Fort Donelson before it could be reinforced; he would have liked to move at once. But it continued to rain, and the roads were so bad that his artillery and wagons could not move. Moreover, he did not "feel justified" in attacking the place without the coöperation of the fleet which, besides having to go back down the Tennessee, and up the Cumberland, had to stop to have some damages repaired. So it was not until February 12 that Grant's army moved. "On that day he started with the divisions of McClernand and C. F. Smith. Another division, which had just arrived under Lew Wallace, which included one brigade sent by Buell, went around by water. Before night the neighborhood of the fort was reached by McClernand and Smith, and the troops had taken up a position surrounding the work."*

(76) Fort Donelson was a larger and more elaborate work than Fort Henry. The main fort was an irregular, bastioned parapet, inclosing a space of about 100 acres, nearly 500 yards long in its greatest length. It stood 100 feet above the river, at the eastern end of a ridge which narrowed down to a mere neck just west of the work. Except right at this neck the ground sloped from the site on all sides—to Hickman Creek and its branch on the north; to the river on the east; and to Indian Creek and its branch on the south. Hickman Creek was unfordable, and formed a perfect barrier on that side. On the river side there were two water batteries fifty or sixty feet above water-level, and perfectly commanding the river downstream. Six or seven hundred yards westward from the main work was another ridge, cut through in two or three places by forks of Indian Creek, and curving from Hickman Creek around to an unfordable creek south of Dover. On the irregular crest of this ridge a line of intrenchments had been made, and strengthened with abatis. These intrenchments were manned by infantry, and several batteries occupied commanding points within them. Floyd was the senior Confederate officer present; the next in rank, General Pillow,—the same that we met in the Mexican war,—commanded the left of the Confederate line; and General Buckner commanded the right.

*Ropes.

Six or seven hundred yards beyond the ridge occupied by the Confederate line, and approximately parallel to it, was another ridge. Upon this ridge Grant's army took position on the evening of the 12th of April—McClermand's division on the right and Smith's on the left. Grant had given his division-commanders orders not to bring on an engagement. He expected the gunboats to reduce the fort. Notwithstanding this McClermand ordered one of his brigades, on the 13th, to attack the batteries near the center of the Confederate line, which had been annoying him.* The brigade charged up to the abatis two or three times, but was repulsed with heavy loss. During the day of the 13th Lew Wallace's division arrived and took position in line between McClermand's and Smith's. The divisions were all closed up and the line was extended farther round to the right. General Grant now had some 25,000 troops in line.

There was no fighting on the land side upon the 14th February; but Commodore Foote's fleet attacked the fort from the river. The gunboats found no such easy task as the reduction of Fort Henry. The Confederate guns were better placed, and they were served more skilfully and more effectively. "Two of the iron-clads, the *St. Louis*, which carried the Commodore, and the *Louisville*, had their steerage apparatus shot away and helplessly drifted down the river, out of action. The other two were so greatly damaged between wind and water as to be compelled to withdraw. The two wooden vessels necessarily followed suit. The whole fleet was rendered unserviceable, and Foote himself was badly wounded. It was necessary to send the disabled gunboats to Cairo to be repaired, and further operations by water were accordingly indefinitely postponed."† The Confederate "batteries were uninjured and not a man in them killed"‡ during the bombardment by the gunboats.

General Grant had "expected that the fleet would reduce the fort, and that in this case the garrison and supporting troops would soon be compelled to surrender to the United States forces which surrounded them. But after he had witnessed the repulse of the fleet he felt that a speedy victory was not to be expected. He looked forward to a protracted siege. The enemy's works appeared to him too strong to be assaulted suc-

*Grant's *Memoirs*.

†Ropes.

‡Major Gilmer's report.

cessfully by the raw troops at his disposal. It seemed not unlikely that siege-operations might be required. Moreover, 'the weather had turned intensely cold; the men were without tents, and could not keep up fires where most of them had to stay,' in full range of the enemy's guns. 'The sun went down,' says General Grant in his *Memoirs*, 'on the night of the 14th of February, 1862, leaving the army confronting Fort Donelson anything but comforted over its prospects.'**

But the Confederate generals inside of the intrenchments had much graver cause for worry than General Grant had on the outside. They saw themselves entirely cut off and surrounded on the land side by an army which they supposed was even far greater than it really was and hourly increasing; while in the river was a powerful fleet of iron-clads which they expected to see return any minute and resume the bombardment. That night, the 14th of February, these generals held a council of war, and decided that their only chance lay in making a sortie on the south side and getting possession of the road via Charlotte to Nashville. Accordingly, it was arranged that Pillow's troops, which occupied the left of the line, should make the "main attack" against the Federal right. Buckner was to withdraw all of his troops from the intrenchments on the right, and to support Pillow. A single regiment, 450 men, enough only to keep up a show of resistance, was assigned to the right of the line. After Pillow, assisted by Buckner, had broken through the Union line, and forced it back off the Charlotte Road, Buckner was to throw his command across the Wynn's Ferry Road, and act as rear-guard, while the rest of the garrison made its escape.

It was midnight when the council of war had reached its decision. The commanders began at once moving their troops into position; and during the rest of the night there was marching of regiments and rumbling of wagons and cannon in the Confederate camp; but the Union troops paid no attention to the noises. It was a dark, bitterly cold night, and every person in both camps was shivering and miserable—this may account for the apparent disregard of the noise in the Confederate camp.

(77) At daybreak Pillow's division, supported on its left by Forrest's regiment of horsemen, moved to the assault. A little later Buckner came up on Pillow's right. The battle

*Ropes.

lasted all morning. Finally Pillow's infantry, supported by two batteries, broke McClernand's line, and, at the same time Forrest, who had worked round through the underbrush, charged it in flank and rear. The Federal right was thus forced off the Charlotte Road, and back through the woods along the Wynn's Ferry Road, in confusion.* Before noon the way to Nashville was open for the Confederates; Pillow had possession of the whole of the ground occupied at dawn by McClernand's troops, and with it a Union battery, 300 prisoners and 5,000 small arms;† and he had sent off a dispatch to General Johnston, announcing that he had won a great victory.

Buckner was in position to cover the withdrawal. "Ten fresh Confederate regiments, over 3,000 men, had not fired a musket."‡ It was the crisis of the battle; perhaps the crisis of the Southern Confederacy. At that moment the Confederate troops at Donelson needed what they did not have, a man in command of them that knew something about the business of war. In truth, they had no commander. General Floyd's seniority had forced the mockery of command upon him; but he did not command in fact. He listened first to Buckner's timid counsel and then to Pillow's rash advice, and ended by doing nothing that was right. At this crisis either one of two things would have been right: to have gone ahead with the plan agreed upon, and marched to Nashville by the road that was open; or to have thrown every man into the line and completed the victory so well begun. Floyd did neither. Pillow had just noticed a movement of the enemy toward the breastworks on the right, Buckner's old place, now held by a single regiment. He ordered Buckner to return to the works and defend them. Buckner refused and went to Floyd. Floyd sustained him and went to Pillow. Then Floyd changed his mind and agreed with Pillow. He ended by ordering his whole victorious left wing to return to the trenches.

About this time General Grant arrived on the scene. He had been absent during the morning, conferring with Commodore Foote on his gunboat. Foote, it will be remembered, had been wounded; he was unable to go ashore to see Grant. Grant immediately gave orders that the ground lost on the

*Wyeth's *Life of Forrest*. B. & L.—W. Preston Johnston.

†B. & L.—Lew Wallace. W. Preston Johnston.

‡W. Preston Johnston.

right of the Union line must be regained. Then he dispatched the following note to Commodore Foote: "If all the gunboats that can, will immediately make their appearance to the enemy, it *may* secure us a victory. *Otherwise, all may be defeated.* A terrible conflict ensued in my absence, which has demoralized a portion of my command, and I think the enemy is much more so. If the gunboats do not show themselves it will reassure the enemy and still further demoralize our troops. I *must order a charge to save appearances.* I do not expect the gunboats to go into action, but to make appearance, and to throw a few shells at long range."*

This note shows how uneasy General Grant was; it shows how serious the situation appeared to him. But he was too cool and self-possessed a soldier to display his anxiety to his subordinates. He gave his orders in his usual quiet tone. He rode over to General Smith, who had held his division out of the engagement, awaiting orders. Grant ordered him to charge the works in front of him. It was the movement in Smith's division that Pillow had seen. Buckner's division was now on its way to resume its place in those trenches, but it did not arrive in time. Smith's division had broken through the abatis and was in possession of the works. Buckner was in time, however, to help check Smith's further advance, and to force him back to the trenches he had captured.

(78) Meantime McClelland's division, reinforced by part of Lew Wallace's, had followed up the retreating Confederates. All of the ground previously held by McClelland's division was not, however, reoccupied; one of the roads from Dover to Nashville, the one nearest the river, was still left open.† General Floyd did not take advantage of this road to save his army. That night he held another council of war; its decision was to surrender. Floyd had been Secretary of War of the United States, and was at this time under indictment at Washington. So he declared that, personally, he did not dare surrender. Pillow, the next in command, said "there were no two persons in the Confederacy whom the Yankees would rather capture than himself and General Floyd."‡ So he, also, must escape. Thus these two political generals both abandoned the troops intrusted to their charge, and made good

*Ropes.

†Wyeth.

‡B. & L.

their escape in boats up the Cumberland, leaving General Buckner to surrender the army and fort to General Grant.*

One other commander made his escape, but he took his whole command with him. That was Forrest, than whom the world has seen no more daring leader of cavalry. He marched his regiment out by way of the muddy river-road, fording a creek up to his saddle-skirts. There were some infantrymen, also, bold enough to accompany him; and not a man was lost.

"About 11,500 men and forty guns were the fruits of this great victory."† Let us now see what were its strategical consequences. (75) As soon as Buell learned that Fort Henry had been captured, and that Johnston had evacuated Bowling Green, he dispatched Nelson's division to reinforce Grant, and made ready to follow Johnston with the rest of his army. On February 16, the very day on which Donelson was surrendered, and the day on which Johnston, with the part of his army retained by himself, reached Nashville, the advance of Buell's army reached Bowling Green.

(79) From Nashville Johnston fell back to Murfreesboro. Buell advanced to Nashville, where he arrived on the 24th of February. He found the town already occupied by the division [Nelson's] that he had sent round by boat to reinforce Grant; it had come up the Cumberland River from Donelson, where it was no longer needed. Buell now had some 50,000 troops, and Grant, who had been further reinforced, had, back at Donelson, about 40,000; while Johnston at Murfreesboro could not muster more than 20,000. Buell thought Johnston's army had been reinforced to a much larger number.

McClellan ordered Halleck to move against Nashville, and Grant was anxious to advance; but General Halleck was afraid that Beauregard, at Columbus, had a great army, and that he was about to move into Illinois or Missouri with it. So Halleck recalled Foote's fleet to the Ohio, and held Grant's army at Donelson doing nothing for ten days. The Confederates had no thought, however, of making any offensive movement up the Mississippi; they had neither the troops nor the morale, at this time, in this quarter, for offensive operations. On the contrary, they abandoned Columbus on the 2nd of March.

*Floyd took with him the Virginia troops of his own brigade.

†Ropes.

COMMENTS.

(73) On the National side this campaign was an example of what the text-books on strategy call "strategic penetration." The two wings of the Confederate army were at Bowling Green and Columbus, 170 miles apart, or less than one day, in point of time, by rail. The capture of Henry and Donelson, and the destruction of the railway bridge over the Tennessee, and the occupation of Clarksville by the Union forces, effectually broke the line of communication between the two wings of Johnston's army, and left Grant's army the choice of turning against either wing separately.

Grant's proper course, as we see it now, plainly was to move up the Cumberland River, and, uniting with Buell's force, follow Johnston to Murfreesboro, and destroy him there, if he stood to fight; or to pursue him to his destruction, if he continued to retreat. Grant wanted to move his army, now reinforced to 40,000, up the Cumberland; but we have seen that Halleck held him fast at Donelson. Halleck's alleged reason was the fear that Beauregard was about to make an offensive move into his territory, against Cairo and Paducah.

The incident illustrates the mistake of having two armies with independent commanders in the same theater of operations; but this was evident from the very beginning of the campaign. If there had been a single head—a single commander on the ground—directing the operations of Buell's and Halleck's forces, compelling them to coöperate constantly against a single objective, Johnston's army, it can hardly be seen how that army could have escaped destruction. In this regard, only, the Confederates had greatly the advantage; their forces in this theater of operations were all under the command of one man, and he was not hampered by any dictation or even suggestions from his President or war department hundreds of miles away from the spot.

Johnston's chief trouble was a lack of men and arms; his only chance lay in the errors that his opponents might commit. Yet, when his opponents did commit an error and give him the chance, he failed to take the proper advantage of it. It looks as if Grant's movement against Henry and Donelson, with only 15,000 troops, was an error—an unnecessary hazard for him to take without the prearranged coöperation of Buell's forces. And there was no such prearranged coöperation. Halleck sent forward Grant and Foote without consent from

Washington or arrangement with Buell. Although he had corresponded with McClellan and Buell about such an operation, no agreement or arrangement of plan had been made. Halleck seems simply to have taken for granted that when Grant's forces became committed to the movement, reinforcements would be dispatched to him by Buell.

This movement gave Johnston his only chance. To reinforce Grant Buell had to send troops round by the Ohio River; while Johnson had the short line of the railway and also the wagon roads. Johnston ought to have left the smallest containing force in front of Buell that could hold him, or delay him for a few days or hours, and himself marched all the rest of his army against Grant. And he ought not, of course, to have shut himself up at Donelson, but attacked Grant's army from the outside. Instead of doing this he sent an incompetent general, Floyd, with 12,000 men to Donelson, and fell back himself with 14,000 to Nashville.

General Grant had no thought of assaulting Fort Donelson. He at first thought Commodore Foote's guns would be able to reduce it; but after they failed he made up his mind to a regular siege. This is undoubtedly the agreement that he and Foote came to at their conference on Foote's boat, on the 14th of February. But at that very time the Confederates themselves were bringing the matter to a crisis by making a sortie against the right of Grant's line.

In all of the operations of the Civil War it would be hard to find another example of such crass incapacity as was displayed by the Confederate commanders at Fort Donelson. It was so bad as almost to persuade an unbeliever that it was one of the means of Providence to preserve the Union. Not one, but several opportunities, offered, from the time when General Grant landed his first troops below Fort Henry, to the time when General Buckner surrendered at Fort Donelson, which, if made use of by a bold and skilful general, might have resulted in a Confederate success.

After all the labor spent upon Forts Henry and Heiman General Tilghman abandoned them, virtually without an effort to save them, at the first appearance of the enemy. This was wise; it saved his garrisons from capture, and only proved the un wisdom of placing those forts where they were. Tilghman was quick and shrewd enough to send his little command away from Fort Henry before General Grant's forces had cut off its retreat. This was the most sensible thing that appears to have

been done by any of three generals that successively fell into the chief command of the Confederate troops in these operations.

After Tilghman's surrender Pillow succeeded to the command at Fort Donelson. He allowed the Federal troops to march from Fort Henry to Fort Donelson on the 12th of February, practically without offering them any resistance. Forrest's cavalry alone met them on the way, while the rest of Pillow's command stayed within the field-works. A skilful and aggressive leader like A. P. Hill, or Sheridan, or Stonewall Jackson, would surely have taken advantage of the thick woods to strike the Federal columns in flank on their way across country.

Early on the 13th Floyd arrived with reinforcements and took command by virtue of his rank. Lew Wallace's Union division had not yet landed. Floyd's command was then about equal in number to the Federals in line, and he had every advantage in position. If he had attacked the Union line boldly that day he would have had an excellent chance of winning a victory. We have already seen how he wavered in his decisions on the 15th, and thus gained nothing by the victory Pillow had won from McClelland's division; and how he neglected to lead his forces out that night by the road that Forrest took.

Pillow, at the council on the night of February 15, wanted to continue the fight within the works; Buckner advised a capitulation. We know the outcome. General Grant reported that large quantities of provisions were found within the fort; and one of the boats by which Floyd and Pillow escaped had brought a large supply of ammunition for the beleaguered army. With plenty of food and ammunition there does not appear to have been any adequate excuse for surrendering at that time. Under some governments Floyd, Pillow, and Buckner would have been tried for their lives by military court. With the Union gunboats away for repairs, and with two steamers in their possession, the Confederate commanders, by good management, ought to have been able to withdraw the bulk of their garrison and *matériel* to safety on the other side of the river.

While at the outset of the operations Johnston had the advantage of interior lines, and could have concentrated his army at any point near the railway from Bowling Green to Columbus more quickly than Halleck and Buell could have united

theirs at any point, as soon as Grant penetrated his front at Forts Henry and Donelson, and got possession of this railway, the case was exactly reversed. From that moment Grant and Buell could have united their forces at any point in the theater of operations more quickly than Johnston could have assembled his divided army at the same point. After that the strategical advantages were wholly on the side of the National forces, if their commanders had chosen to make use of them.

Manifestly Johnston could not remain at Bowling Green after the Union forces got possession of the Cumberland River in his rear; for with the Cumberland in their possession these forces would only have had to move up to Nashville to cut Johnston's communications. It was the fear of such a predicament that made Johnston quit Bowling Green and fall back to Nashville as soon as Foote's fleet had reduced Fort Henry. Johnston, like Grant, believed Foote's gunboats would also be able to reduce Donelson. The query suggests itself, then, Why did Johnston order Floyd to take his detachment to Fort Donelson? The answer is, Johnston did not expect Floyd to shut his army up within field-works, to be besieged. Fort Donelson was only a little bastioned work, less than 500 yards in its longest dimension. It was this work that Johnston expected Foote's gunboats to knock down. The troops ordered thither were expected to oppose General Grant's army outside of the fort. General Johnston never supposed that they would place their backs to the river and build a trap of breastworks around themselves. "He wished Donelson defended if possible, but he did not wish the army to be sacrificed in the attempt." One of his last telegrams to Floyd said: "If you lose the fort bring your troops to Nashville if possible."* It is almost certain that a general of ordinary ability would have found it "possible." The defense of Fort Donelson proper ought to have been left to its own little garrison. The army assembled there ought to have maneuvered to draw Grant's army away from the fort. If it made breastworks it ought to have placed them so as to cover its line of retreat, the Wynn's Ferry-Charlotte road. General Pillow was responsible for the position of the Confederate field-works; they were built while he was in command—after the fall of Fort Henry. The mistake General Johnston made was in not going to Donelson

*W. Preston Johnston.

himself; not Floyd, nor Pillow, nor Buckner was equal to the emergency.

The terrible state of the roads in the theater had an important bearing upon the operations; it rendered the sudden and swift movement of troops next to impossible; it had much to do with keeping Buell's army from attempting any aggressive movement against Johnston while Johnston was still at Bowling Green.

A thing which had a deterrent influence upon the commanders in the campaign,—which always has such an influence if an adequate system for securing information is not employed,—was their ignorance with regard to the strength and condition of the opposing forces. Halleck would not let Grant advance on Nashville, after the capture of Donelson, because he feared that Beauregard was moving into his territory with a great force—which was not the case; and after Buell reached Nashville with his first division, he was so afraid Johnston would return with an overwhelming army and crush him that he called on General Smith, of Grant's army, to move his division up from Clarksville to reinforce him at Nashville; while Johnston with a paltry 20,000 was glad enough to be left alone at Murfreesboro. Previous to this Buell had telegraphed to McClellan that Johnston had "50,000 if not 60,000 men"; when in fact he had no more than 40,000. And about the 13th of February Halleck wrote Buell that it was reported that 40,000 Confederates were at Dover and Clarksville; while in reality Floyd and Pillow had only 15,000 to 18,000. And after the fall of Donelson Halleck was afraid that Grant was going to be attacked by a large force from Nashville; whereas there was no Confederate force at Nashville, except Johnston's 14,000, which arrived that day [16th February] in full retreat from Bowling Green. General Halleck throughout the campaign exemplified a remark made by General Sherman in a marginal note in an old copy of Soady's *Lessons of War*; viz., "Generals in chief command generally worry more about things which never happen than about real catastrophes."

Except the work of Forrest's regiment at Fort Donelson, the rôle played by cavalry in this campaign was insignificant. Yet Halleck and Buell and Johnston all had cavalry; but it was volunteers, lately raised, and neither officers nor men had yet learned the strategic duty of "security and information," certainly one of the most important functions of modern cavalry. Even Forrest, up to this time, had done on more than forage

and fight. Terry's Texas Rangers and John Morgan, who soon became famous, were also with Johnston's army. An efficient cavalry in front of Buell's army, and in touch with Johnston's, would have relieved General Buell of his unnecessary apprehensions. General Grant had cavalry with his forces at Forts Henry and Donelson, but it did practically nothing.* How the Union cavalry reached the forts does not appear,—whether it marched, or was carried by the transports. If a regiment of independent cavalry had been pushed forward from Paducah, and another one from Smithland, to cover the flanks of Grant's army, in its passage up the rivers, and to gain touch with Johnston's, they would have saved General Halleck a great deal of worry over imaginary Confederate columns.

This was the first instance in the Civil War, and the only successful instance in any modern campaign, in which a river, independently of roads, was used as a line of operations. While navigable rivers make the best kind of lines of communication the ease with which transports can be harassed by the enemy on shore renders their employment as lines of operation very exceptional.

It is as much the province of strategy to dishearten the hostile people,—to make them appreciate the hopelessness of continuing the war—to make them crave peace—as it is to defeat and destroy their armies; indeed, this is the only reason for defeating their armies. It is probable that no other single victory, except Gettysburg, had as disheartening an effect upon the people of the South as the capture of Forts Henry and Donelson. Ropes, who is the best critic that has reviewed the campaigns of the Civil War, says: "The effect of the capture of Fort Henry on the people of the whole country, North and South, was electrical. It was the first great success won by the Union arms within the limits of the Confederacy." And of Donelson: "The capture of Fort Donelson was not a great affair judged by the number of the slain; but judged by its moral and strategical results it was one of the turning points of the war. Following so soon as it did after the loss of Fort Henry, the news of the surrender of Fort Donelson threw the Southwest into a state of excitement, not to say of panic, hardly to be described.

"In the North exultation, confident expectation, rising almost to the dangerous point of underestimating the remaining

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resources and the enduring valor of the South, were the feelings of the hour. And no one can wonder at it. The whole system of the Confederate defense in the West had been broken up. It seemed well within the limits of possibility to follow up Sidney Johnston until he should be forced to surrender with what was left of his army. Chattanooga, the key of East Tennessee, apparently lay open to the invading Federal armies on one flank, and Vicksburg, the only strong post on the lower Mississippi, lay seemingly unprotected on the other. Of the Confederate army of the West, part had been captured, part was retreating before the large and well-appointed army of Buell, and part was shut up in fortified works on the left (or eastern) bank of the upper Mississippi, whose capture was only a question of time, now that by the fall of the forts on the Cumberland and Tennessee Rivers they were cut off from support and supplies."

LECTURE IX.

THE SHILOH CAMPAIGN.

(80) At the end of the campaign of Forts Henry and Donelson we left General Albert Sidney Johnston, with the remnant of his army, at Murfreesboro; Buell's army, 50,000 strong, was concentrating at Nashville; and Grant had 40,000 troops at the two captured forts. Beauregard, with his headquarters at Jackson, was in immediate command of Johnston's troops between the Mississippi and the Tennessee. The bulk of these, some 17,000, were at Columbus under Polk. Other small garrisons held the Confederate posts along the Mississippi as far down as Memphis; and there were detachments at Corinth and Iuka, with outposts watching the Tennessee River. Threatening Columbus and the posts along the Mississippi, General Pope had a command of about 25,000 Federals at Commerce, on the right bank of the Mississippi; and Generals Van Dorn and McCullough had some 20,000 Confederates in northern Arkansas, opposed to a Union force under General Curtis.

Grant's troops had destroyed the railway bridge above Fort Henry, and the Federal gunboats controlled the Tennessee River as far up as the Muscle Shoals. Johnston's army was thus cut in two; the two wings could unite only somewhere south of the Tennessee River. Beauregard appreciated the situation, and urged Johnston to assemble his scattered troops in the neighborhood of Corinth. He and Johnston made every exertion to increase the strength of their forces, and the Confederate government at Richmond seconded their efforts. Bragg with a force of about 10,000 men was ordered from Pensacola to Corinth; as was, also, Van Dorn from Arkansas. Troops were sent thither, also, from New Orleans and other places.

(81) On the 28th of February, 1862, Johnston began his march from Murfreesboro to Corinth, by way of Decatur, Ala., where a bridge spanned the Tennessee. He had with him about 17,000 men organized in three small divisions, with a "reserve" under General Breckinridge. His command included several regiments of cavalry. On the 2nd of March Polk evacuated Columbus, and withdrew the greater part of

his garrison to the railway junction at Humboldt. About 7,000 men under McCown were left in the works at New Madrid and Island No. 10 to guard the Mississippi, which was still held by the Confederates from this point to Vicksburg.

Buell, foreseeing that Johnston would undertake to reunite the separated wings of his army by way of the Memphis and Charleston Railway south of the Tennessee River, believed that his army and Halleck's should join at some point on the north bank of that river, between Savannah and Florence, and from thence seize the Memphis and Charleston Railway. His object was to unite his own and Halleck's forces under cover of the Tennessee, then to cross the river and defeat Johnston's main army; he believed this would cause the abandonment of the posts up the Mississippi,* and the opening of that river. Halleck, on the other hand, gave no thought to Johnston's main army at first. His mind always turned to strategic points rather than to the hostile army. Memphis was the objective upon which his thoughts now fixed.† Before forming any plan for its capture he seemed to have designed first to destroy its railway connections with the Confederate post at Columbus and with the east.

Accordingly he issued orders on the 1st of March for Grant, with a force of 35,000 troops, to move up the Tennessee in transports. Owing to a misunderstanding between Grant and Halleck Grant was later ordered to remain at Fort Henry; and the expedition was commanded by General C. F. Smith. Halleck's instructions to Smith stated: "The main object of this expedition will be to destroy the railroad bridge over Bear Creek, near Eastport, Miss., and also the connections at Corinth, Jackson, and Humboldt. . . . Having accomplished these objects, or such of them as may be practicable, you will return to Danville, and move on Paris."‡

The expedition soon got off, and, by the 11th of March, the flotilla of more than eighty transports began arriving at Savannah, where the depot was to be established. The force was organized in five divisions, under Generals McClelland, W. H. L. Wallace, Hurlbut, W. T. Sherman, and Prentiss. A sixth division commanded by Lew Wallace arrived later, and was put into camp at Crump's Landing.§

*Ropes.

†Scribner's Series, *From Fort Henry to Corinth*.—M. F. Force.

‡Six miles below Pittsburg Landing.

A detachment was sent over to tear up a part of the railway track from Jackson to Corinth, and on the 14th Sherman's division went by boats up to Eastport for the purpose of destroying the bridge over Bear Creek. Sherman was prevented from carrying out his purpose by a very heavy rain, which flooded the country and made the small streams impassable. In the meanwhile Halleck learned of the evacuation of Columbus by the Confederates. Then, for the first time, it seems to have occurred to him to make the movement up the Tennessee his main operation, of which the object should be to get between the wings of Johnston's army. He had not yet determined whether to assail these separate wings in detail, or both at once. In correspondence with Buell he wrote: "Why not come over and operate with me to cut Johnston's line with Memphis, Randolph, and New Madrid? . . . Come over to Savannah or Florence, and we can do it. We can then operate on Decatur or Memphis, or both, as may appear best."* His mind still dwelt upon places, strategic points, as objectives, rather than upon the hostile army. This was the fulfilment of Halleck's notion of strategy.

On the 11th of March President Lincoln placed all of the territory from Knoxville as far west as the Missouri River, and all the Union troops therein, under the command of Halleck. This command included Buell's army. Thereupon Halleck ordered Buell to march his army to Savannah. The Confederate forces were massing at Corinth, twenty-two miles in a straight line from Savannah, on the opposite side of the Tennessee. Already about 23,000 Confederates were there, or "within easy marches of Corinth," not including the troops that Polk had withdrawn from Columbus. They had not yet arrived.

General Johnston reached Corinth on the 22nd of March; by the end of the month all of the Confederate troops that took part in the battle of Shiloh, some 40,000, were concentrated about Corinth. Van Dorn's command, from Arkansas, did not arrive in time for the battle. Johnston organized his forces, designated the "Army of the Mississippi," into three corps, under the command, respectively, of Major-Generals Polk, Bragg, and Hardee, with a reserve of two brigades under Major-General Breckinridge. Beauregard was to be "second in command," and Bragg, besides commanding a corps, was appointed Chief of Staff by Johnston.

*Force.

Instead of camping his army at Savannah, General Smith, with the authority of Halleck, had selected a place nine miles higher up-stream, and on the opposite bank, known as Pittsburg Landing. Here this Union army was in camp, awaiting the arrival of Buell's forces. General Smith having gone on sick report, on account of an injury from which his death resulted a short while afterwards, Grant was restored to the command of the army, and rejoined it on the 17th of March. He made his headquarters at Savannah, instead of at Pittsburg Landing.

(82) The ground upon which the Union camps stood, and upon which the battle of Shiloh took place, was twenty-two miles by road northeast of Corinth. It was an irregular triangle, with sides three or four miles long, bounded on the east by the Tennessee, which here flows due north, on the north-west by Snake Creek and its branch, Owl Creek; and on the south by Lick Creek and its branch, Locust Grove Creek, a small brook in a considerable ravine.

The highest ground was a ridge lying north of Locust Grove Creek, and extending on towards the west. Its top was 200 feet above the river, and its northern slopes fell gradually to the level of the camps, 100 feet lower. In the hollows of these slopes the branches of Owl Creek found their headwaters. The most important of these branches was Tillman [Tilghman] Creek, whose deep hollow, running north, a mile and a quarter from the river, divided the space into two main plateaus. These plateaus were broken into smaller tables and undulations by the surface drains and ravines of the smaller water-courses. At the time of the battle the ground generally was in forest, partly open, but partly impassable for horsemen, with, here and there, clearings of twenty to eighty acres.

Several roads traversed the battle-field. One, the Hamburg-Savannah Road, usually spoken of as the River Road, led from Crump's Landing, six miles down-stream, and, crossing Snake Creek by a bridge, continued on southward along the eastern plateau. At the eastern end of the ridge north of Locust Grove Creek it forked with the Purdy-Hamburg Road. This road, coming in from Purdy by a bridge over Owl Creek, continued southeasterly along the high ground, and, crossing Lick Creek a mile from its mouth, led to Hamburg, three or four miles farther up the river.

Pittsburg Landing was three-quarters of a mile above the mouth of Snake Creek. From this landing two roads led to

Corinth. One, called the Eastern Corinth Road, followed the backbone of the ridge beyond the headwaters of Locust Grove Creek, and joined the Bark Road; the other, a mile farther west, ran nearly parallel to the Eastern Corinth Road for about four miles, and was known as the Western Corinth Road. There were other by-roads and trails through the timber. Shiloh Church, the little log meeting-house that gave its name to the battle, stood above the bank of Oak Creek,* at the fork of the Western Corinth Road and the Purdy Road.

(83) On this ground the Union army was encamped by divisions. One of Sherman's brigades was on the extreme right-front, along the Purdy Road, and guarding the bridge over Owl Creek. Two others were astride the Western Corinth Road just at Shiloh Church, and behind the ravine of Oak Creek. Stuart's brigade of this division was on the extreme left-front, at the junction of the Purdy-Hamburg Road and the River Road, near the end of the ridge above Locust Grove Creek.

Prentiss's camp occupied the middle-front and was across the Eastern Corinth Road. McClernand's formed an angle at the junction of the Hamburg-Purdy Road with the Western Road. It was about 500 yards behind the left of Sherman's tents. Hurlbut's camp was a mile and a half behind that of Prentiss, at the junction of the River Road and the Eastern Road. W. H. L. Wallace's was in the angle of these two roads, a mile in rear of Hurlbut's. Lew Wallace's division was still camped at Crump's Landing.

Although it was known that Johnston was assembling an army at Corinth, where it was estimated that there were already 50,000 to 80,000 Confederates, no works of any kind were thrown up about the Federal position; nor was any line of defense or plan of action in case of attack arranged. The various camps were established with reference to the convenience of the different commands, and without any system. There were no cavalry outposts between the camps and Corinth. "Probably there never was an army encamped in an enemy's country with so little regard to the manifest risks which are inseparable from such a situation."† True, the 5th Ohio Cavalry often reconnoitered some miles to the front, and frequently encountered parties of hostile cavalry.‡

*On map as Shiloh Branch.

†Ropes.

‡Force.

Johnston and Beauregard appreciated the faultiness, strategical and tactical, of the position of Grant's army, in a pocket between Snake Creek and Lick Creek, with an impassable river behind it.* The position could have been made impregnable by earthworks in one night;† but the Confederate commanders were aware that it had not been intrenched. They resolved to attack Grant's exposed army before Buell's should join it.* They hoped to move on the 1st of April; but, owing to delay in Johnston's arrival, and in the organization of the forces, due mainly to the inexperience of officers and men, the army did not begin its advance until the afternoon of the 3rd. It had, then, to go without Van Dorn's command, 20,000 strong, which was delayed in Arkansas by high water.‡

(84) The order for the march directed that it should begin at noon; the army was to be in position, deployed for attack, at 7 a.m. the 5th. The distance to march was only about eighteen miles, but there were only two narrow earthen roads, through dense forests. Many of the troops were raw; Bragg's corps had never made a march before. There was misunderstanding and delay at the very beginning of the journey. The heads of the two main columns did not start until late in the afternoon. On the 4th the march was slow and confused. Instead of reaching the position from which the attack was to be launched, at the hour appointed, 7 a.m. April the 5th, it was 4 p.m. before the army was deployed. It was then too late in the day to begin the attack, which was postponed to daybreak of the 6th.

(83) Johnston's army was now within two miles of Shiloh Church, Sherman's headquarters. A body of Confederate cavalry had foolishly pushed forward so boldly that it ought to have warned the Federal commanders that there was a strong force close behind it.§ Yet no warning was taken by the Federals. Saturday, the 5th, the Union cavalry and artillery spent the day moving their camps, in obedience to an order changing their assignments.

The advanced Confederate cavalry had already been encountered by small exploring parties of Union troops. On the 3rd, also, Buckland's brigade, sent out by Sherman, had met Confederate cavalry six miles from the Union camp, and had then

*B. & L.

†Sherman's *Memoirs*.

‡Roman's *Beauregard*.

§B. & L.—Beauregard.

returned to camp. The next day, the 4th, a picket of the same brigade was captured by this cavalry, and later in the day Major Lockett and a party, sent to rescue the picket, were also captured. Two of Sherman's brigade-commanders, Buckland and Hildebrand, visited their outposts on Saturday, the 5th, and saw parties of hostile cavalry hovering in the woods beyond. Some of the sentinels claimed that they had seen infantry. Numbers of rabbits and squirrels were noticed scudding from the woods in front of the camps. This was all reported to Sherman, but he had no cavalry to send out to reconnoiter—due to the exchange of the regiments then taking place.

Saturday afternoon Prentiss, in consequence of reports from his outposts, sent out three companies to reconnoiter. They marched three miles, but, taking the wrong direction, passed along in front of Sherman's outposts instead of encountering the Confederate line, which was less than two miles in front. McClernand, and McPherson, then chief engineer of this army, the same day rode with an escort of cavalry towards Hamburg. They saw a few hostile scouts.

(84) Patrols from Lew Wallace's division at Crump's Landing developed a considerable force of the enemy at Purdy and Bethel. It was Cheatham's division at those points making ready to march to the Confederate assembly for battle. Informed of this, General Grant rather looked for an assault on Lew Wallace's camp, and gave orders for supporting Wallace in such an event. Saturday Sherman wrote Grant: "All is quiet along my line now. . . . The enemy has cavalry in our front, and I think there are two regiments of infantry and one battery of artillery about six miles out. . . . I have no doubt that nothing will occur to-day more than some picket-firing. The enemy is saucy, but got the worst of it yesterday, and will not press our pickets far. I will not be drawn out far, unless with certainty of advantage; and I do not apprehend anything like an attack on our position." On the same day Grant, in reporting events by wire to Halleck, said: "I have scarcely the faintest idea of an attack (general one) being made upon us, but will be prepared should such a thing take place. General Nelson's division has arrived. The other two of Buell's column will arrive to-morrow or next day. It is my present intention to send them to Hamburg. . . . From that point to Corinth the road is good, and a junction can be formed with the troops from Pittsburg at almost any

point." Earlier in the day Grant had telegraphed: "The main force of the enemy is at Corinth, with troops at different points east. Small garrisons are also at Bethel, Jackson, and Humboldt. . . . The number of the enemy at Corinth, and within supporting distance of it, cannot be far from 80,000."

General Halleck expected to take command, in person, of the combined forces of Grant and Buell in a few days, and move them on Corinth.*

(83) Johnston's army bivouacked in order of battle the night of April 5, 1862. It was formed in three lines, with Hardee's corps and one brigade of Bragg's in the first line, the rest of Bragg's corps in the second line, and Polk's corps and Breckinridge's division in the third line.†

About 3 a.m. on Sunday, the 6th of April, three companies of the 25th Missouri started out from Prentiss's division upon a reconnaissance. They struck the Confederate outposts in front of Sherman's camp at a quarter after five o'clock. Before six the Confederate lines began to advance; by half after six they had reached the line of the Union outposts, a mile in front of the camps. (85) At six o'clock the 21st Missouri, from Prentiss's division, moved to the front. It encountered the Confederate line about a half-mile from camp, and was driven back.

The direction of Johnston's advance brought Hardee's line first against the right of Prentiss's division and the left of Sherman's. These divisions formed for battle as soon as they were warned of the attack upon their outposts. They were composed of raw troops that had never been under fire before. After a short stand Sherman's left regiment broke and fled to the rear. A little later the other two regiments of his left brigade, Hildebrand's, did likewise.

(86) The first and second lines of the Confederates, struggling through the thick woods, were soon commingled. They became engaged along their whole front. At half after seven o'clock Beauregard ordered Polk and Breckinridge, of the third line, to hasten forward, Polk to the left and Breckinridge to the right.†

(87) McClernand formed his division on the left of Sherman, and Hurlbut sent one of his brigades to their aid. Hurlbut moved his other two brigades toward the gap between the left of Prentiss and the right of Stuart.

*Force.

†B. & L.—Beauregard.

The division of Prentiss, which had formed line of battle a quarter of a mile in front of its camp, was the first whole division of the Union line to give way. (88) About nine o'clock it broke and fell back in confusion. Prentiss rallied about 1,000 of his men upon a line that W. H. L. Wallace and Hurlbut were forming, with parts of their divisions, in a strong position in rear. "Its peculiar feature consisted in a wood in the center, with a thick undergrowth, flanked on either side by open fields, and with open, but sheltering, woods in front and rear." The Confederates gave this place the name of "Hornets' Nest."*

At 8.30 a.m. W. H. L. Wallace had moved his division from its camp, sending two regiments to help Stuart, on the left; one to Sherman; and two to guard the Snake Creek bridge. Two brigades he was forming on the right of the line at the Hornets' Nest. Hurlbut was forming on his left. Prentiss rallied his men on the center of their line, and took position on the summit of a slope covered by a dense thicket. His right was near the Eastern Corinth Road, and his line was partly in an old sunken road running northwest.†

(89) Between ten and eleven o'clock Sherman's division, hard-pressed by the enemy, and now reduced to two brigades, badly broken and disordered, fell back to a new position in rear of the Purdy road. Soon afterwards McClelland's division, both of whose flanks were now uncovered and enveloped, also fell back. It formed a new line between Sherman's left and W. H. L. Wallace's right. Hurlbut was also pushed back.

(90) About noon a strong brigade from the Confederate third line turned Sherman's right, while two other brigades pressed his front. Sherman's battered regiments made a stout fight; but they were gradually forced to the left and rear.† (91) About four o'clock, during a lull, Sherman moved his shattered command still farther in the same direction, and took a position covering the River Road, by which Lew Wallace was expected to bring his division into the battle. In like manner McClelland's division had been outflanked and beaten back step by step. It made its ninth and final stand with its right joining the remnant of Sherman's division.

At three o'clock, or thereabouts, the extreme left of the Union line, which had been pressed back from one position to another, was finally enveloped and forced to give way alto-

*B. & L.—Buell.

†Force.

gether. This exposed Hurlbut's left flank to an overwhelming force of the enemy, under the personal command of General Bragg. Hurlbut and Prentiss and W. H. L. Wallace had successfully held their ground at the Hornets' Nest for five hours. One body of Confederates after another had assaulted them, only to be repulsed with heavy loss. Divisions and brigades from every one of the Confederate corps had striven in vain to carry the position. General Johnston, personally, had led one of the regiments in its assault; and it was in the open ground on the east flank of the Hornets' Nest that he received the wound from which he died at half after two o'clock.

Seeing his flank turned and his rear about to be assailed Hurlbut withdrew his troops. (92) As the last of his regiments were retiring, the left of the Confederate line, under Hardee, which had driven back Sherman and McClelland, was swinging round from the north. It joined flanks with Bragg's line from the south, and these two bodies were now forming a circle of fire round Wallace and Prentiss, at the Hornets' Nest. At this juncture Wallace faced his regiments about. He was killed; but two of his regiments charged to the rear, and, cutting their way through the enemy, marched to the landing. Prentiss, with the fragments of his own and Wallace's divisions, made a desperate stand. It was hopeless; after nearly an hour more of fierce struggle he surrendered with 2,200 men to overwhelming numbers.*

(93) Seeing the Union lines drifting back, Colonel Webster of Grant's staff had collected all of the available artillery, about forty or fifty pieces, including some siege guns, at a commanding position, on the north side of the ravine at the head of Dill's Branch, about a half-mile from the landing. Hurlbut, after his withdrawal from the line at the Hornets' Nest, rallied his troops behind these guns. Other detachments joined him there, making altogether a force of some 4,000 men. Two Federal gunboats at the mouth of the creek lent their aid, also; but the muzzles of their guns had to be raised so high to clear the bluff that most of the shells fell far away in the woods.

Bragg tried to gather together a force in order to assault this position. In the confusion incident to Prentiss's surrender at the Hornets' Nest he could muster only two brigades, those of Jackson and Chalmers. These moved into the ravine in front of Hurlbut's line. Meantime Beauregard, who was now in

*Force.

chief command of the Confederates, had sent out the order, from his position at Shiloh Church, to suspend the attack. Jackson's brigade received the order before it advanced, and did not assault; Chalmers charged with his brigade alone, and was repulsed. Thus ended, at dusk, the first chapter in the bloody battle of Shiloh.

(84) Nelson's division of Buell's army, for lack of a guide to show it the way, and on account of the bad road, had taken all day to march from Savannah. One, only, of his brigades, Ammen's, was ferried across the river just in time to see the end; it had two men killed and one wounded. (93) It went into position near Colonel Webster's guns; the rest of the division formed there as it arrived, and the division bivouacked there.

Hurlbut's troops, with some men of the divisions of W. H. L. Wallace and Prentiss, bivouacked about the position they held at the end of the battle. McClernand's shattered division was on their right; and Sherman's command, which, he says in his report, "had become decidedly of a mixed character,"* prolonged the line of bivouac to the right, on the River Road. Lew Wallace's division, which had taken the wrong road from Crump's Landing in the morning, finally arrived about dark, and bivouacked along the River Road on Sherman's right. Crittenden's division of Buell's army joined during the night; and by five o'clock Monday morning McCook had, also, arrived with a brigade of his division. Buell had come in the afternoon. Two other divisions of his army were far behind. Wood's arrived before the close of the second day's fight, but took little part in it; Thomas's did not reach the field at all during the engagement.† Mitchel's division had gone toward Florence.

(81) In obedience to General Halleck's orders the Army of the Ohio [Buell] had started from Nashville for Savannah on the 16th of March. At Columbia, on the way, the bridge over Duck River was found in flames, and the river very high. The bridge had to be rebuilt. This delayed the column at Columbia until the 30th. The distance from Nashville to Savannah is about 135 miles; it took Buell's leading division twenty-two days to march it. The journey might have been made in less time, in spite of the burnt bridge, the high water,

*Sherman.

†B. & L.

and the bad roads; but Halleck had given Buell no word to make haste. On April 4 Nelson, who commanded the leading division, was notified by General Grant "that he need not hasten his march, as he would not be put across the river before the following Tuesday [the 8th]."*

(83) The Confederates spent the night of April the 6th in the abandoned camps of Sherman, McClelland, and Prentiss, annoyed by shells from the Union gunboats, which were thrown among them at intervals of fifteen minutes during the whole night. The organizations were hopelessly scattered and mixed.

(84) General Grant was at breakfast at Savannah, nine miles by water from Pittsburg, when he first heard the guns in the battle of Shiloh. He sent word at once to Nelson, who had arrived at that point with his division, to march it immediately to the point opposite Pittsburg Landing; then he hurried up the river in his boat. On his way he stopped at Crump's Landing to warn Lew Wallace to be ready to move; from Pittsburg he dispatched an order to Wallace to march his division to the battle. He then rode out to the front, and "visited" his various division commanders. He saw Prentiss at the Hornets' Nest, and ordered him to hold his position there at all hazards. We have seen how Prentiss obeyed the order.

Buell and Grant met, and talked together a little while, on Grant's boat, at Pittsburg Landing, soon after Buell's arrival. Grant was the senior by recent promotion in the volunteers (as a reward for his capture of Forts Henry and Donelson); but he assumed no command over Buell, and gave him no orders. In fact, the two commanders do not appear to have arranged any concerted plan of action. Buell states that he determined on the evening of the 6th to attack the Confederates at day-break on the 7th with his own forces. Grant did not, until the morning of the 7th, issue any order for his troops to advance.

On this day Beauregard's shattered army was no match for its foe. Every Confederate regiment had been engaged the day before, and the losses had been heavy in officers and men; about 8,000 had fallen, killed or wounded. Not many more than 20,000 stood in ranks on the morning of the 7th of April. Opposed to these there were 25,000 fresh troops, Buell's forces and Lew Wallace's division, besides the fragments of Grant's

*B. & L.—Buell.

other divisions, perhaps 7,000 men, who had defended themselves so stanchly the day before.*

(83) The second day's engagement was brought on by the movement of Nelson's division along the River Road in line of battle. It encountered the Confederates a little in advance of Hurlbut's old camp, at 5.20 a.m.† Crittenden's division formed on Nelson's right, and McCook's, on Crittenden's right. Grant's army was on the right of Buell's, with the remnants of the divisions of Hurlbut, McClernand, and Sherman, in order from left to right, and Lew Wallace's fresh division on the extreme right.‡

Generals Hardee, Breckinridge, Polk, and Bragg took charge of the portions of the mixed Confederate line, in the order named, from right to left. The line was forced back step by step, but had not receded as far as Shiloh Church by half after two o'clock. Beauregard still had his headquarters in the church, from whence, about that hour, he dispatched his aides to his several lieutenants with orders to withdraw.

A covering force of some 2,000 men was gathered together and posted on high ground within sight of the church. By four o'clock the entire Confederate army, all that was left of it, had retired beyond this force, and not a single Federal soldier was in pursuit. Breckinridge commanded the Confederate rear-guard, "with Forrest's regiment between him and the enemy." That night the rear-guard bivouacked not more than two miles from Shiloh. The next day [the 8th] Wood's division, and Sherman with two brigades and the 4th Illinois Cavalry, went in pursuit. Towards evening they came upon the camp of the Confederate rear-guard a few miles from the battle-field. Forrest charged them, putting the Federal skirmishers to flight, throwing the cavalry into confusion, and effectually putting an end to the pursuit.§ After this Breckin-

*Ropes.

†B. & L.—Buell.

‡B. & L.—Grant.

§In his report to General Grant Sherman says: "The enemy's cavalry came down boldly at a charge, led by General Forrest in person, breaking through our line of skirmishers; when the regiment of infantry without cause, broke, threw away their muskets, and fled. . . . As the regiment of infantry broke, Dickey's cavalry began to discharge their carbines and fell into disorder. . . . The check sustained by us at the fallen timber delayed our advance, so that night came upon us before the wounded were provided for and the dead buried; and our troops being fagged out by three days' hard fighting, exposure, and privation, I ordered them back to their camps, where they now are." *Wyeth's Life of Forrest. Sherman's Memoirs.*

ridge's detachment rested undisturbed within six miles of the battle-field, while Beauregard's main body retreated to Corinth.

Grant's troops, from the private soldiers up to the highest commanders, appeared to be content with having recovered their camps; and Buell says that "in some way that idea obstructed the reorganization of his line, until a further advance that day became impracticable."* General Grant says that the roads were so bad from the heavy rains of the night before and the wheels of the Confederate artillery, and the men were so worn-out, some from two days of battle, others from marching and fighting, he had not the heart to send them in pursuit.†

In the battle of Shiloh General Grant states that his effective strength in the first day's action was 33,000 men; for the second day's battle Lew Wallace had joined with 5,000 and Buell with 20,000 fresh troops. The Union loss for the two days was 1,754 killed, 8,408 wounded, and 2,885 captured or missing; a total of 13,047. The effective strength of the Confederate army was between 38,000 and 40,000 men. Its loss was 1,728 killed, 8,012 wounded, and 959 missing; a total of 10,699. The Federal loss was more than twenty-four per cent. of their effective strength; the Confederate more than twenty-six per cent.

(81) The defeat at Shiloh was not the only Confederate disaster in the west on the 7th of April. On the same day Island No. 10, with about 7,000 men, surrendered to the combined land and naval forces under General Pope and Commodore Foote. Pope was thereupon ordered to move his army against Fort Pillow; but before he had well begun operations against this post he was ordered to transfer his army to Pittsburg Landing.

COMMENTS.

The campaign and battle of Shiloh are the hardest of all the campaigns and battles of the Civil War for the student to solve—to sift the truth from; the hardest of them all in which to place the little credit that can be found in the generalship on either side upon the proper commanders; the hardest of them all in which to fix the blame for mistakes. It is not hard for the student to find abundant faults; it is only hard for him to fix the responsibility for them. And this all arises from the

*B. & L.—Buell.

†B. & L.—Grant.

fact that the generals on each side have fought more bitterly with the pen, among themselves, since the great battle, than they fought, side by side, against their common foe, during the battle. Grant and Buell have contradicted each other in essential particulars on one side; on the other Beauregard and the friends of Johnston have carried on a bitter controversy. About all the student can do is to follow the actual operations as nearly as possible and determine for himself wherein they were right and wherein they were wrong, without trying to place credit or blame upon individuals.

Napoleon's Twenty-seventh Maxim says: "When an army is driven from a first position the retreating columns should always rally sufficiently in rear, to prevent any interruption from the enemy. The greatest disaster that can happen is when the columns are attacked in detail." This maxim fitted the case of Johnston's army after it was split in two by the fall of Forts Henry and Donelson and the loss of the direct line of communication between its wings. If General Johnston fully appreciated the importance of reuniting the wings of his army "sufficiently in rear," and as quickly as possible, he certainly did not show his appreciation by prompt action. There was no way for him to bring his two separated wings together except to retreat with his own (the right wing) to the south of the Tennessee River. He reached Murfreesboro in his retreat from Nashville about the 20th of February, but he did not start from there for Corinth until the 28th of February. In tarrying for more than a week at Murfreesboro, Johnston, no doubt, was influenced by the state of the public mind. Already he had lost Forts Henry and Donelson, the Tennessee and the Cumberland Rivers, his hold upon Kentucky, and the important town of Nashville. To retreat farther was to surrender the whole of Middle Tennessee to the enemy. The newspapers of the South were all decrying him as a failure, and State delegations were demanding his removal.

After leaving Murfreesboro Johnston's army made the march to Corinth, by way of Decatur, as rapidly as practicable under the circumstances. The roads were terribly bad, and the streams all swollen; the distance was something less than 250 miles, and the head of the column reached Corinth on the 18th of March, having averaged about fourteen miles a day.

For eight or ten days after the fall of Fort Donelson General Halleck does not appear to have had in mind any definite

and comprehensive plan of operations. "I must have command of the armies in the West," he wrote to the Secretary of War on the 19th and 20th of February,—meaning Buell's army in particular,—“and I will split secession in twain in one month.”* How he meant to go about it does not appear. It is plain, however, that he had no thought of destroying Johnston's main army; it is probable that the principal thing he had in mind was to reduce the Confederate forts on the Mississippi, and open that river to navigation. He virtually did nothing until about the 1st of March, when he dispatched the force up the Tennessee under C. F. Smith, to break up the railway junctions, then to return by water to Danville—a sort of steamboat raid.

This led to the selection of Pittsburg as the camp of Grant's army. Merely as a temporary base from which to make raids against neighboring railway points, this place was good enough so long as it was known that the enemy was not in force within striking distance. Even then it ought to have been protected with field-works. Soon, however, several things happened to change matters, and to shape General Halleck's plans. It became known that the Confederates had evacuated Columbus, and moved its large garrison southward on the railway, and that Johnston was concentrating his scattered forces at Corinth; and, on the 11th of March, Halleck was placed in supreme command of all the Union forces in this theatre. Then the plan of moving against Johnston at Corinth took form with Halleck, and he ordered Buell to move to Savannah. Although he believed, however, that Johnston had already assembled from 50,000 to 80,000 troops in the neighborhood of Corinth, he did not enjoin Buell to march speedily; nor did he order Grant to quit his exposed position at Pittsburg. He did, however, order him to intrench.

Nor did the peril of their camps at Pittsburg appeal to General Grant, or to any of his subordinate commanders. That they did not fortify their position may be condoned; “hiding behind earthworks” had not yet become the fashion. For a commander to intrench his camp in the open, at this time, would perhaps have been regarded as showing timidity; yet the Confederates had already set Grant and his generals the example at Donelson, and taught them the defensive strength of field-works. The Confederate generals at Corinth were apparently just as careless about the protection of their

*Ropes.

camp. But that Grant kept his troops at Pittsburg Landing at all, and that his service of "security and information" was performed so inadequately, passes one's understanding. Even though neither side had, as yet, learned how to use its cavalry in this kind of work, one cannot understand how Johnston's entire army could bivouac within two miles of Sherman's headquarters without having its presence discovered, or even suspected, by that general.

The wisdom of President Lincoln's order placing a single general, albeit the choice fell upon General Halleck, in command of this whole theater of operations, was amply verified in the campaign. It brought Buell with his army to the field of Shiloh in time to turn a Union defeat into victory; possibly in time to save Grant's army from capture. After Shiloh it enabled Halleck promptly to assemble there a splendid army of 100,000 troops, nearly every man of which had been tried by the fire of battle.

In leaving Pope, however, with his five divisions, some 25,000 men, to operate against New Madrid and Island No. 10, after he had resolved to concentrate against the Confederates at Corinth, Halleck made a mistake. A small "containing" force might have been left to watch the Confederates at those points; but Pope, with his main body, ought to have been hastened to a junction with Grant and Buell. A commander should have only one main objective at a time, and he should direct all of his troops, all of his operations, with reference to that single objective. Johnston's army assembling at Corinth was, or ought to have been, Halleck's single objective for the time. To overtake that army and destroy it ought to have been Halleck's first single purpose. "When you have resolved to fight a battle, collect your whole force."* Halleck had the three armies of Grant, Pope, and Buell within the theatre; he ought to have let go all other objectives for the time, and concentrated those three armies for battle with Johnston. Every company left operating against the Confederate posts on the Mississippi which did not keep an equivalent force of Confederates from joining Johnston's main body was a company wrongly employed. Pope's army ought to have taken part in the battle of Shiloh.

Nor would the Confederate detachments in those two forward and isolated posts have had any chance of holding out after the main Confederate army had fallen back to Corinth.

*Napoleon's *Maxim XXIX*.

As the little force of 7,000 or 8,000 men, however, "contained" more than thrice their number of the enemy, Pope's army, the sacrifice would have been amply justified if it had resulted in a Confederate victory at Shiloh.

(84) On the 3rd of April, just before the movement on Shiloh, the main body of Johnston's army was at Corinth, with two bad roads to march by; one division was at Burnsville, a railway station fifteen miles to the east; another division was at Bethel, a station twenty miles to the north. These columns were to converge near Mickey's, a road-center about eight miles from Pittsburg Landing. Owing to poor maps, bad roads, and inexperience and inefficiency on the part of officers and men, the concentration was made so slowly that the attack planned for daylight of the 5th could not take place until the 6th. This not only lessened the chances of taking the Union army unawares but also enabled Buell to reach the ground in time to defeat the Confederates on the 7th. This incident illustrates, alike, the importance of good maps; the importance of carefully reckoning with the elements of time, distance, the condition of the roads, and the *quality* of the troops, in combining movements; and the obligation that rests upon every subordinate commander, from the second in command down to the platoon-commanders, to carry out his part of the plan in spite of all hindrances.

By their defeat at Shiloh the Confederates were thrown back upon Corinth, losing all hold upon Tennessee west of the mountains, except two or three forts on the Mississippi, which were soon wrested from them; the South experienced the severest blow it had as yet received; the way was opened for Halleck to assemble 100,000 troops, without any interference; and the opportunity was made for him, if he had possessed the will and the ability to avail himself of it, to crush the remnant of Beauregard's beaten army within a few days, and to "split secession in twain in one month," as he had promised to do.

So much for the strategy of the campaign. We have not enough time and space within an hour's lecture to devote to the tactics of the engagement. Hours might easily be spent in pointing out faults and mistakes; but probably no other great battle of the Civil War furnished fewer examples of good tactics for the student to emulate than the battle of Shiloh, especially the first day's action.

The first and most glaring fault to be noticed is that neither hostile army on that day was *commanded* in fact. The two

armies fought without head. To this circumstance all the other errors and shortcomings may properly be charged. General Grant was not on the field at all until several hours after the engagement began, and neither he nor General Johnston established headquarters from which to direct or control his forces. Grant "visited" his several division commanders, and gave them some verbal orders; but the different positions were taken up without any direction from him. Hurlbut and W. H. L. Wallace had sent forward reinforcements from their respective divisions, as they judged best, and had moved forward to form their line before General Grant arrived. General Johnston went immediately into the thick of the battle, and "was killed doing the work of a brigadier."* At one time General Johnston, Commander-in-Chief; General Breckinridge, Ex-Vice-President of the United States; and Governor Harris of Tennessee were all three found leading a single regiment forward.† General Grant and General Johnston, as army commanders, exerted very little influence upon the character of the tactics in this great battle.

(83) Johnston and Beauregard had planned to make their "main attack" against the Union left, with a view to driving the army back upon Snake Creek and Owl Creek. The onset, however, developed into a simple frontal attack all along the line. "The front of attack, which was at first less than 2,000 yards in length, in three hours extended from the Tennessee River, on the east, to Owl Creek, on the west, nearly four miles. . . . The attack was turning both flanks, and breaking the center, all at once,—a procedure only to be used by an overwhelming force. The Federals, instead of being driven down the river, as the intention was, were driven to the landing, where their gunboats and supplies were."*

The Union army, which should have been in a "position in readiness," "was scattered about in isolated camps. . . . There was no defensive line, no point of assembly, no proper outposts, no one to give orders in the absence of the regular commander, whose headquarters were nine miles away. The greenest troops (the divisions of Prentiss and Sherman) were in the most exposed positions. Sherman had three brigades on the right, and one on the left, with an interval of several miles between them."*

"The Confederate formation shows the mistake of using ex-

*Lecture by Major Swift.

†Force.

tended lines instead of deep formations for attack. The long lines, moving forward, spread out to right and left. Gaps in the forward line were filled by portions of the lines coming up from the rear. Corps, divisions, and brigades were soon mixed in hopeless confusion. Attacks were made and lost before supporting troops came up, and the action degenerated into a series of isolated combats, which were without a general plan, and ineffective. No one knew from whom to take orders. One regiment received orders from three different corps-commanders within a short time. As a result many aimless and conflicting orders were issued which unnecessarily exhausted and discouraged the troops. The highest commanders, including the adjutant-general, went into the fight, and devoted themselves to urging the troops forward, without any plan or system. By 11 a.m. there was not a reserve on the field. Instead of feeding the fight with their own troops, the corps-commanders finally sought various parts of the field, and took command without regard to the order of battle. Bragg may be found at the center, at the right, and then at the left. . . . Beauregard remained near Shiloh, without a reserve, and unable to exercise any influence on the battle.”*

On the Federal side the tactics were, if possible, worse. With no prearranged plan, there was want of cohesion and concert of action between the various units. Regiments were rarely overcome in front, but each one fell back because the regiment on its right or left had done so, and exposed its flank. Then it continued its backward movement, in turn exposing the flank of its neighbor, which then must needs, also, fall back. Once in operation this process repeated itself indefinitely. The reserves were not judiciously used to counteract partial reverses, and to preserve the front of battle.†

The straggling, or rather skulking, on the Confederate side, and the fleeing to the rear on the Union side, were frightful among the raw troops. On the Union side crowds of terror-stricken fugitives, estimated all the way from 5,000 to 15,000, huddled under the bluffs at the riverside;‡ at the close of the day Grant had no more than 4,000 men in line. On the Confederate side it was hardly any better. “The victorious troops had been demoralized by reckless attacks, which were never supported, and thousands of them immediately gave up the bat-

*Major Swift.

†B. & L.—Beauregard.

‡Ropes.

tle to pillage the camps.”* It is probable that “the debris of the army surging back upon” Beauregard at Shiloh, two miles in rear, influenced him to order the attack to cease.† He has been much blamed for that order; but it is not at all likely that he could have carried the last position taken by his enemy that evening. Bragg had only got together two brigades for the attack, and one of them had no ammunition. Furthermore, Nelson’s Federal division was just arriving, and night was at hand.

In his own account of the engagement General Beauregard intimates that he was aware that Buell’s army was arriving.‡ If such was the case, he made a mistake in remaining on the field that night. There was no chance for his depleted army after Buell arrived; he ought to have withdrawn it as quickly, and with as little loss, as possible. All of his stubborn resistance on the second day was a useless sacrifice of life. Nothing was to be gained by continuing the battle against overwhelming numbers of fresh troops.

The character of the battle-field, in general thickly covered with forest, was not favorable for the employment of artillery or cavalry. The artillery, however, in spite of the woods, played an important part in the battle. We find batteries giving strong help at every point of attack and defense. Guns were lost on both sides; some were taken and retaken. The last stand of the Federals, on Sunday evening, was made near a line of guns hastily collected. Those guns played a conspicuous part in the last act of this day of battle. One battery only disgraced itself, the 13th Ohio Battery. When the first Confederate shell fell among them the men deserted their guns and fled incontinently. “The 13th was blotted out, and on Ohio’s roster its place remained a blank throughout the war.”§

The Union cavalry does not appear to have done anything during the battle; on the side of the Confederates Forrest’s horsemen charged a battery, capturing some of its guns; swept through the shattered Union left, cutting off the troops of Prentiss; and, on the second day, covered the withdrawal of the beaten army, forming the very last line of the rear-guard.¶ On the 8th they boldly charged Sherman’s column and put an end to the Union pursuit.

*Major Swift.

†*B. & L.*—W. Preston Johnston.

‡*B. & L.* *Beauregard.*

§Force.

¶Wyeth.

"The first day at Shiloh shows, better than any other in our history," Major Swift thinks, "the kind of work performed by a raw army before it has had experience and discipline." Speaking of the throng of scared fugitives back at the landing, General Grant says: "Most of these men afterwards proved themselves as gallant as any of those who saved the battle from which they had deserted."* That is to say that with training and service they afterwards became good soldiers.

**B. & L.*—Grant.

LECTURE X.

THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN.

(94) The Peninsular Campaign and Stonewall Jackson's operations in the Shenandoah Valley in 1862 were so closely related that, to comprehend the strategy of either, it is necessary to study them together. As we shall take the Valley Campaign in our next lecture, we will only refer to it in this one as occasion may require.

On the 22nd of July, 1861, the day after the battle of Bull Run, the President called General McClellan from the scene of his victories in West Virginia to the command of all the Federal forces in and about Washington. It would not have been possible for the President to select another man whose appointment would have been so acceptable to the people, the newspaper press, and the army. Up to this time McClellan had achieved success in every place that he had occupied in life. He was graduated second in the class of 1846 at West Point—the class in which Stonewall Jackson was graduated seventeenth and George E. Pickett fifty-ninth. As an engineer with Scott's army in Mexico he distinguished himself for efficiency, and won brevets for gallantry. He was selected as one of the Government's observers in the Crimean War, and his report on the campaign was published by special act of Congress. He was appointed a captain in the 4th Cavalry [then the 1st] when it was organized in 1855. Two years later he resigned, and at the outbreak of the war was a railway president. At the time of his appointment to command the troops at Washington the eyes of the whole country were centered upon him. He was the only Union general that had as yet scored complete success. His operations in West Virginia had been pronounced "brief and brilliant." The rest of his military career you will follow in our lectures. He was a man of fine soldierly appearance and engaging manner, thirty-five years of age.

The people of the South were greatly elated over their victory at Bull Run; the people of the North were humiliated rather than disheartened by their defeat. They learned from it that the Southern States were not to be kept in the Union without a tremendous struggle; and they determined at once

to make the struggle. "The very day of the battle the House of Representatives voted for the enlistment of 500,000 volunteers."* Troops immediately began pouring into Washington, and by the middle of October more than 100,000 new men had arrived.

McClellan's immediate task was to organize this mass of recruits into the form of an army and to have them drilled and trained into soldiers. For such work he had a genius, and the Army of the Potomac, which he created, bore the impress of his genius throughout its entire service, even to its last campaign under General Grant in 1865. At first the people, the newspapers, and the President and his advisers had perfect confidence in McClellan, and they left him entirely untrammelled in his work. This condition lasted for about three months; then they all began to lose confidence in him.

On the 1st of November General Scott was retired, and McClellan was promoted to succeed him as Commander-in-Chief of all the land forces. He then wrought out a scheme in which all the armies were to bear a part, and undertook to command them all from Washington. We have seen how poorly his long-distance command succeeded in the West. A part of this general scheme consisted of a series of expeditions by sea, with the assistance of the navy, against points along the Southern coast. These expeditions met with complete success, and by May of 1862 most of the important seaports of the South, among them New Orleans, and with it the Mississippi River as far up as Port Hudson, were occupied by garrisons of Union troops. These successes greatly lessened the task of blockading the coast.

Meantime the Confederate army under Joseph E. Johnston stayed in its trenches at Centreville, and no active steps were taken by McClellan to destroy or dislodge it. This inaction was what aroused the distrust of the people and the Administration in the commanding general. Other things happened to aggravate their distrust. About the 1st of October the Confederates were allowed to set up batteries on the lower Potomac, which closed the navigation of the river and sealed up Washington as a port. McClellan never could be persuaded by the President or public opinion to destroy those batteries. They remained until Johnston retired from Centreville. Then befell the unfortunate affair at Ball's Bluff, on the 21st of October, still further to increase the impatience of the public with

*Ropes.

McClellan's management of the army. At Ball's Bluff, near Leesburg, a small Union force was ferried across the Potomac, and through bad management was destroyed. Colonel Baker, who had lately resigned his seat in the Senate, was slain, and nearly all the men in the detachment were killed, drowned, or captured.

At this time McClellan's army was more than twice as strong as Johnston's, but the Union commander was led by the reports of his secret-service department to believe that the Confederate army was twice as large as it really was.* McClellan at first expected to move against Johnston's army in Centreville as soon as he could feel that his own army was in condition to take the offensive against it. This was the plan of campaign always favored by the President. But toward the end of November McClellan conceived the project of making Richmond his objective.*

His plan was to transport his army as secretly as possible by water to Urbana on the lower Rappahannock; from there to make a dash overland, about fifty miles, and capture the Confederate capital, before Johnston could march his army from Centreville to its protection. Washington was by this time thoroughly fortified, and McClellan purposed leaving a small force to defend the works; but he believed that his movement against Richmond would induce Johnston to march the Confederate army to that quarter immediately. The President and his advisers did not favor this plan or any other that proposed removing the Army of the Potomac from between the main Confederate army and Washington.

But winter was now at hand, and the roads in Virginia had become so bad that McClellan did not believe it practicable to march a large army over them. To make matters worse McClellan took typhoid fever, and was ill for several weeks during December and January. So the army remained in its camps at Washington; the people became more and more impatient; the newspapers demanded an advance; and the President was in despair.

Finally President Lincoln, who stood as a buffer between the insistent public and the newspapers on one side, and the inactive army under McClellan on the other, issued the first of his famous "war orders." It directed that the army should advance against the force under Johnston on or before the 22nd of February—Washington's birthday was chosen doubtless

*Ropes.

for reasons of sentiment. This order was not carried into effect. The President issued two other "war orders" with his own hand. None of them had any influence on the operations of the army, and they are interesting mainly as curiosities of military literature. Their real purpose was probably more to allay the popular impatience than anything else.* After much correspondence and the exchange of several "memorandums" between the President and General McClellan, and many conferences and councils of war, the movement by way of Urbana was finally decided upon about the 8th of March. (95) The very next day Johnston, who must have got secret information of this decision, withdrew his forces from Centreville and the Potomac, and by the 11th of March was in position south of the Rappahannock with his right at Fredericksburg and his left at Culpeper Court House.† This movement placed the Confederate army virtually as near Richmond as the Union army would be at Urbana, and thus destroyed the chief advantage of the movement by way of Urbana. It was therefore decided to transfer the Union army by water to Fort Monroe, and make that fortress the first base of operations. Fort Monroe was in the possession of a Federal garrison.‡

In order, however, first to "give the troops a little experience on the march and in bivouac, get rid of extra baggage, and test the working of the staff-departments," McClellan marched his army out to Johnston's abandoned camps at Centreville and back to Alexandria.§ As soon as McClellan moved into the field the President issued an order relieving him from duty as Commander-in-Chief of all the forces, and restricting his command to the Army of the Potomac. This army was now organized in four corps of three divisions each, as follows: First Corps, McDowell—divisions, Franklin, McCall, and King; Second Corps, Sumner—divisions, Richardson, Blenker, and Sedgwick; Third Corps, Heintzelman—divisions, Porter, Hooker, and Kearny; Fourth Corps, Keyes—divisions, Couch, W. F. Smith, and Casey.§ The reserve artillery under General Hunt, a brigade of regular infantry under Sykes, and the cavalry under Philip St. George Cooke, were attached to army headquarters.¶

*J. F. Rhodes's *History of the U. S.*

†Longstreet's *From Manassas to Appomattox*.

‡B. & L.—McClellan.

§The force under Banks along the upper Potomac with headquarters at Frederick City, Maryland, at this time formed the Fifth Corps of the Army of the Potomac.

The embarkation for Fort Monroe began at Alexandria on the 17th of March. On account of Stonewall Jackson's activity in the Shenandoah Valley, of which we shall hear more in the next lecture, the President held back the First Corps [McDowell] for the safety of Washington. He also withdrew Blenker's division of the Second Corps and dispatched it to Fremont in West Virginia. Other troops that McClellan had expected to have were also withheld; so that when he had got his army well started on his campaign, McClellan found himself in command of only 92,000 men, instead of 155,000, the number he had counted upon.* He was later reinforced to 105,000 men.

(96) Furthermore, in his contemplated advance up the Peninsula from Fort Monroe, McClellan had counted upon the active coöperation of the navy in the York and the James Rivers. In this expectation he was also for a time disappointed. The Confederates had batteries at Yorktown and Gloucester Point which the navy could neither risk to attack nor to pass; and Norfolk, at the mouth of the James, was in possession of a Confederate garrison, and harbored the ram *Merrimac*, effectually closing that river to the Union vessels.

On the 8th of March the *Merrimac* had steamed out of harbor and sunk two Federal frigates in Hampton Roads. The next day the ram engaged the *Monitor*, and was forced to return to Norfolk in a damaged condition. It was not, however, destroyed, and all that the Federal navy could promise McClellan was to protect the ships bearing troops to Fort Monroe.

The Peninsula, lying between the York and the James Rivers, less than six miles wide at its narrowest part, "is a low, level, and marshy region."† Fort Monroe was about seventy miles from Richmond, and the only formidable natural obstacle on the way, known to McClellan, was the Chickahominy River and adjacent swamps. The York River, formed by the junction of the Mattaponi and the Pamunkey, was navigable up to this junction. Here stood West Point, the eastern terminus of the Richmond and York River Railway. Richmond was at the head of navigation, on the north bank of the James. The highways of the Peninsula were all earthen roads.

McClellan knew that the works at Yorktown, some twenty-five miles up the Peninsula, were held by Magruder with

*B. & L.—McClellan.

†*International Encyclopædia*.

10,000 to 15,000 Confederates, and that the enemy had several other intrenched positions along the way. He also knew that Johnston's main army would be able to march promptly to this quarter, and that the Confederate force at Norfolk was 8,000 or 10,000 strong. Without awaiting the arrival of his whole army, therefore, he "determined," he says, "to move at once with the force in hand, and endeavor to seize a point—near the Halfway House—between Yorktown and Williamsburg, where the Peninsula is reduced to a narrow neck, and thus cut off the retreat of the Yorktown garrison, and prevent the arrival of reinforcements."*

The movement began on the 4th of April in two columns, the Third Corps [Heintzelman] on the road to the right; the Fourth Corps [Keyes] on the road to the left. On the afternoon of the 5th both columns had been stopped, the right by the works in front of Yorktown; the left at Lee's Mills, where the Warwick River was found to be unfordable and strongly intrenched. In fact this river, instead of coming down from the north to Lee's Mills, as McClellan had supposed it did, was found to run athwart the Peninsula from the fortifications at Yorktown to the James.* By means of several dams Magruder had rendered the Warwick unfordable throughout almost its whole length, and, with his field-works, had made a formidable and continuous line of defense about thirteen miles long, entirely across the Peninsula. (97) McClellan concluded that the line could not be carried by assault. He brought up the Second Corps [Sumner], and prepared to carry it by a regular siege. At this juncture he was on the point of ordering the First Corps [McDowell], 30,000 strong, to move against Gloucester, when he learned by telegraph that this corps had been detained near Washington.†

As soon as he found out what McClellan's line of operation was to be, President Davis, after consultation with Johnston, ordered that general to march his army to the Peninsula. This army joined the force under Magruder a few days after the Union army arrived in front of his position. Johnston took command of the combined Confederate forces.

Heavy ordnance was shipped to McClellan, and the siege-works were pushed with great energy. Everything would be ready, and the batteries were to open fire on the 5th of May—just a month after the line was reached by the head of the

*B. & L.—McClellan.

†Ropes.

Union columns. "It was confidently expected that the Confederates could not possibly sustain for more than a few hours the terrible fire of the Union seige-guns and mortars."* Johnston had no intention of awaiting this fire; on the night of the 3rd of May he withdrew his army from the works and started for Richmond. The army marched by the two roads that converged at Williamsburg. Stuart with his cavalry covered the rear of both columns.

All the available Federal cavalry, under General Stoneman, took up the pursuit at once. It had four batteries of horse-artillery with it, and was supported by Hooker's division [Third Corps] and Smith's division [Fourth Corps]. (98) The Union cavalry overtook Stuart's squadrons within eight miles of Yorktown on the afternoon of the 4th, and pushed them on toward Williamsburg. About two miles in front of this town Magruder, in anticipation of a retirement from Yorktown, had constructed a strong line of defense. Fort Magruder, near the center, was connected with deep creeks on either side by a string of redoubts.

Longstreet's division formed the rear-guard of the Confederate army; it took post on this line to hold back the Federals until the trains could get well on their way. The roads were so deep with mud, caused by several days of heavy rain, that the trains moved very slowly. The next day, May the 5th, the Federals engaged Longstreet in a battle that lasted nearly all day. Longstreet was reinforced by D. H. Hill's division. Hooker, on the Union left, opened the battle with an attack on Fort Magruder. The Confederates reinforced that part of their line and repulsed Hooker. They then made several counter-attacks upon him, and strove to envelop his flank. Hooker's division suffered severely, but stood its ground, until Kearny's division [Third Corps], which had been delayed by the mud, came up to its relief late in the afternoon.

Smith's Union division, over on the Yorktown road, had not engaged the enemy during the morning. About noon Hancock's brigade of this division advanced by a wide circuit to the north, nearly to the York River, crossed the creek by an old bridge, and seized two redoubts which the Confederates had not occupied. They were on the flank and rear of Longstreet's position. D. H. Hill undertook to dislodge Hancock, but was repulsed. That night Longstreet withdrew, and marched to rejoin the main army, having held back the Union

*Ropes.

army long enough to secure the trains. The Union losses at the battle of Williamsburg were 2,283, of which 1,575 occurred in Hooker's division.* Longstreet lost 1,565.†

General McClellan was not present at this battle until near the close of the day. Franklin's division of the First Corps [McDowell] had, upon his urgent request for reinforcements, been dispatched to him from Washington, and he was back at Yorktown embarking it for West Point. From this point McClellan purposed that a column should move against Johnston's retreating army and trains; but Johnston had anticipated such a movement, and had sent G. W. Smith's division to oppose it. Smith attacked Franklin and drove him back, and the "Confederates passed on unhindered toward Richmond."‡

The left wing and center of the Union army followed the Confederates very leisurely. The right wing moved by water to White House on the Pamunkey, where McClellan established his headquarters on the 16th of May.§

The withdrawal of the Confederates from the Yorktown line left Gloucester and Norfolk isolated and liable to be cut off and captured any day; so they were both evacuated immediately. As the *Merrimac* in Norfolk harbor was of too great draft to be taken up the James, and, of course, could not go to sea with no port to put back into, it was destroyed by the Confederates. The James was now clear for the Union fleet to a point within seven or eight miles of Richmond. At that point obstructions had been placed in the river, and a Confederate fort stood upon Drewry's Bluff, on the right bank. On the 15th of May a fleet of iron-clads under Commodore Rodgers attempted to reduce this fort and pass it; but the fleet was defeated after an action of four hours.§ The York, of course, was open to its head.

Up to these points the Union navy now had undisputed control of these two navigable rivers and the adjacent seas. McClellan had established his base at White House, twenty-two or twenty-three miles from Richmond, and was receiving supplies there by water from Washington and New York. On the withdrawal of Johnston from the Rappahannock, McDowell with the First Corps, 30,000 strong, had advanced to that line, and was now opposite Fredericksburg scarcely sixty miles from White House. Stonewall Jackson having withdrawn

*B. & L.

†Longstreet.

‡Ropes.

his little detachment up the Shenandoah Valley, Shield's division of Bank's corps was, on the 1st of May, ordered to quit the Valley and join McDowell at Fredericksburg. McDowell was now only awaiting the arrival of this division, when he should march his command to join McClellan in order to assist in the capture of Richmond. A Confederate detachment under General J. R. Anderson, 9,000 strong, was in front of McDowell at Hanover Junction.*

The Confederate authorities at this time were "well aware that McClellan's army, apart from McDowell's corps, outnumbered that of Johnston nearly three to two." Johnston's "being only about 50,000 strong."† It looked to them as if Richmond could hardly be saved, and "preparations were made for the instant removal of the military papers" from that city. The real danger would come with the movement of McDowell's corps upon Richmond and the flank of Johnston's army. Something must, therefore, be done to divert this corps.

General Lee was now at President Davis's side, as his military adviser, and was in general charge of the military operations of the Confederacy. He had been in correspondence with Jackson for the purpose of arranging a plan to draw McDowell and the attention of Washington towards the Valley of the Shenandoah. As the result Jackson was reinforced by Ewell's division, and, about the 1st of May, he began a series of rapid movements that caused the President, on the 24th of May, to order McDowell, "laying aside for the present the movement on Richmond, to put 20,000 men in motion at once for the Shenandoah."‡

From White House McClellan had resumed his advance against Richmond on the 17th of May. He had reorganized the troops under his immediate command into five corps, making some changes in the arrangement of the divisions. The Fifth Corps, under Fitz-John Porter, consisted of the divisions of Morell, McCall, and Sykes; the Sixth Corps, under Franklin, of the divisions of Slocum and W. F. Smith. These were the two newly formed corps.

(99) Johnston had withdrawn to the south side of the Chickahominy, and McClellan encountered little opposition to his advance. He moved very leisurely, however, and it was not till the 20th of May that his columns reached the Chicka-

**Military Memoirs of a Confederate*.—E. P. Alexander.

†Ropes.

‡*Rebellion Records*, XVIII-219.

hominy, only about twelve miles from White House. By the 25th the Third and Fourth Corps [Heintzelman and Keyes] had crossed at Bottom's Bridge and taken position on the south side of the stream. The other three corps stayed on the north bank of the Chickahominy, extending from the railway to the Mechanicsville Road. This position astride the Chickahominy was taken when McClellan expected to be joined on his right by McDowell's corps from Fredericksburg. But the position was retained even after McClellan was advised that McDowell should not join him.

The Chickahominy was ordinarily an insignificant stream, but it flowed through a marshy bottom, and was liable to be turned into a formidable obstacle by a heavy rain. Trestle-bridges were built to facilitate communication between the two parts of the army, but they might at any time be carried away by high water. In fact, the Union army was in a hazardous situation.

The army's line of communications was the Richmond and York River Railway. In order to make this line secure from attack, and to clear his right flank and rear of the enemy, McClellan dispatched Porter, on the 27th of May, against Anderson's Confederate detachment, which was supposed to be in the neighborhood of Hanover Court House. Porter defeated this detachment, or a part of it, and drove it toward Richmond.

Johnston's army was now within the intrenchments around Richmond, facing in the direction of the enemy. It was about 63,000 strong, having received some reinforcements, and was organized in four strong divisions under Longstreet, D. H. Hill, Magruder, and Gustavus W. Smith, and two small divisions under A. P. Hill and Huger, and Stuart's cavalry.*

Johnston determined to take advantage of McClellan's faulty position to attack his left wing south of the Chickahominy; he issued the order for his troops to be in position to make the attack at daybreak on the 31st of May. On this day the stations of the Federal corps were as follows: the Fourth Corps [Keyes] was near Seven Pines and Fair Oaks Station, about seven miles from Richmond; Kearny's division of the Third Corps [Heintzelman] was about four miles farther east, near Bottom's Bridge; Hooker's division was three miles south of this point, guarding the bridge over White Oak Swamp Creek; the other three corps were on the north bank

*B. & L.

of the Chickahominy, Sedgwick's division of the Second Corps [Sumner] being at the Grapevine or Upper Bridge, and Richardson's at the Lower Bridge. Franklin's corps [the Sixth] was on the right of Sumner's, and Porter's [the Fifth] prolonged the line to Mechanicsville. The entire line was nearly fifteen miles long.

The country between the Chickahominy and White Oak Swamp was a low wooded marsh, with here and there a patch of clearing. It was difficult for infantry and impracticable for cavalry. A heavy rain fell the night of the 30th of May, making the roads almost impassable, raising the Chickahominy, and rendering the bridges unsafe for passage.

Johnston's plan of attack was simple, and ought to have been effective. The attack was to fall first upon the troops at Seven Pines and Fair Oaks. Longstreet's division was to move by the Nine-mile Road, D. H. Hill's by the Williamsburg Road, and Huger's by the Charles City Road. G. W. Smith's division was to remain at the road-fork near Old Tavern, to guard the left flank of the main attack against troops from the other side of the Chickahominy, or otherwise to support the main attack. Magruder and A. P. Hill were to remain in position, guarding the Chickahominy north of Richmond, but ready to join in the battle if summoned.

Longstreet was to command the main attack. He appears to have mistaken his orders, which were given verbally; instead of marching his own division by the Nine-mile Road he got part of it on the Charles City Road in front of Huger, and part on the Williamsburg Road in rear of D. H. Hill. Instead of attacking at daybreak it was 1 p.m. before the attack was made; then D. H. Hill's division attacked alone. A severe battle ensued, and Hill gained some advantage. After several hours Kearny came up with his division, and for a time the Union line of battle was reestablished. Then one of Longstreet's brigades reinforced Hill, and the Federal line was driven back; the battle on the Williamsburg Road closed at about half-past six, and the troops bivouacked there, a mile and a half east of Seven Pines.*

Huger's division and six of Longstreet's brigades had scarcely fired a shot. There had, however, been other fighting at the battle of Fair Oaks. About 2.30 p.m. Sumner, with Sedgwick's division of the Second Corps and a battery, started to Keyes's assistance by way of the Grapevine Bridge. The

*Ropes.

bridge was so rickety, due to the high water, and the road so deep in mire, that it was near five o'clock when Sumner reached the neighborhood of Fair Oaks. About this time G. W. Smith's division, under command of Whiting, was on its way to reinforce D. H. Hill. Its commander had no suspicion of Sumner's approach, when suddenly he received cannon fire from the north or northeast. Whiting turned and made fierce attacks in the direction of the fire; he was repulsed with heavy loss. Sumner then made a gallant and successful charge, which left his troops masters of the field.

Late in the evening General Johnston was severely wounded, and G. W. Smith, the next in rank, assumed command of the Confederate army. Between one and two o'clock that night he ordered Longstreet to renew the attack "as soon after day-break as practicable, and to fight north rather than attempt to force his way any farther toward Bottom's Bridge."* Longstreet failed almost wholly to carry out this order. Two of his brigades attacked Richardson's division of the Second Corps, which had crossed the river the evening before; they were repulsed with heavy loss. This was all that came of Longstreet's attack. In fact, for several hours Longstreet supposed the enemy was attacking him. At 10 a.m. he wrote to Smith, "Can you reinforce me? The entire army seems to be opposed to me. . . . If I can't get help, I fear I must fall back."* This all shows how little a commander in battle may know about his own troops when he is not connected with them by field-telegraph or telephone. No part of the Union army made any attack that day. General McClellan arrived on the ground early in the forenoon, but gave no orders for an attack.†

About 2 p.m. [June 1] General Lee arrived at Smith's headquarters, and, in compliance with an order from President Davis, assumed command of the Confederate army. In the night he withdrew the troops to their former positions close to Richmond.‡ General Smith, on account of sickness, retired temporarily from active duty, and Whiting took command permanently of his division.

The Confederate losses in the battle of Fair Oaks aggregated 6,134; the Union 5,031.‡ For the Confederates the operation was a complete failure, and it left them in a very dispirited condition. Lee immediately set them to work

*B. & L.—G. W. Smith.

†Ropes.

‡B. & L.

strengthening their line of defenses in front of Richmond; within a fortnight their spirits revived with "the sense of safety it gave them."*

(100) Meanwhile Lee was considering an offensive movement. All of the Union army except the Fifth Corps [Porter] was now on the south side of the Chickahominy, close up to the Confederate works. The Union lines were intrenched. McCall's division held the right of Porter's line, with two brigades under Reynolds strongly intrenched on the east bank of Beaver Dam Creek. The divisions of Morell and Sykes were covering the bridges, several of which had been built. The extreme right was guarded by the cavalry from Meadow Bridge to the Pamunkey.

Lee's project was to overwhelm Porter's corps and seize McClellan's communications and his base at White House, while the First Corps [McDowell] was over toward the Shenandoah, whither it had been sent against Jackson. Preparatory to the movement Stuart was sent to reconnoiter the rear of the Union position. Starting out toward Hanover Court House on the 12th of June with 1,000 troopers, Stuart made a daring and successful raid, completely encircling the Union army, gaining valuable information of its dispositions, and destroying large quantities of its property. He marched nearly 150 miles, crossed the Chickahominy fifteen miles below Bottom's Bridge, and rejoined Lee at Richmond by way of the James River Road on the 15th. He captured a good many prisoners, and lost but one man.† By turning this reconnaissance into a raid, however, and riding entirely round the Union army, Stuart "seriously alarmed McClellan for his rear," and probably caused him to have his transports at White House loaded and ready to start with his supplies for Harrison's Landing, when the occasion befell a few days later.‡

Lee's army had been reinforced by some 17,000 troops brought up from Georgia and the Carolinas; but Lee designed, also, to have the assistance of Stonewall Jackson with his corps from the Shenandoah Valley. Jackson had finished a successful campaign against the three separate commands of Frémont, Banks, and Shields, and was now resting in the neighborhood of Staunton. To mask his purpose and mislead the enemy, Lee dispatched Whiting with his division and Lawton's brigade to Staunton, apparently to reinforce Jackson for fur-

**Memoirs of R. E. Lee.*—Long.

†Long, *B. & L.*—Robins.

‡Alexander.

ther operations in that quarter. No sooner had Whiting joined him than Jackson, according to previous arrangement with Lee, started east with his whole command. So secretly did he move his troops, partly by marching, partly by cars on the Virginia Central Railway, and so skilfully did he deceive the enemy, that he was upon the flank and rear of Porter's corps before the Federals had any knowledge of his intention or whereabouts. Wednesday night, the 25th of June, Jackson had his corps assembled at Ashland, on the railway fifteen miles north of Richmond.

Lee's order for the attack directed Jackson to start at 3 a.m., June the 26th, "turning Beaver Dam Creek and taking the direction toward Old Cold Harbor"; A. P. Hill to cross the Chickahominy near Meadow Bridge as soon as he "discovered" Jackson's movement, and drive the enemy's outposts from Mechanicsville; Longstreet then to cross at the Mechanicsville Bridge and support A. P. Hill; D. H. Hill to follow Longstreet and support Jackson. Magruder with his own division and Huger's was to stay on the south side of the Chickahominy, and to keep up such a demonstration as to make the Federals believe the whole Confederate army was taking the offensive in that quarter. Magruder played his rôle with skill, and was entirely successful.

On the north side Jackson's corps, or "division" as Lee designated it in his order, was to lead in the movement; but Jackson's march had been slow, hindered by felled timber in his road, and he had failed to carry out his part of the programme.* Three o'clock p.m. arrived, but not a sign of Jackson. A. P. Hill waited no longer. He crossed the river, put the few Federals at Mechanicsville to flight, and came upon Reynolds's strong position on the opposite side of Beaver Dam Creek. (101) D. H. Hill's division crossed the river, and one of his brigades went to A. P. Hill's assistance; but the Confederates met "a bloody and disastrous repulse."*

(100) Jackson did not reach the Federal position at all that day, but warning of his approach was brought to Porter by the Union cavalry. By General McClellan's orders Porter withdrew his troops from Beaver Dam Creek before sunrise on the 27th [June] to a new position east of Powhite Creek. Here the battle of Gaines's Mill was fought on this day. (102) Porter's line was formed with convex front along the high wooded bank of a little stream, with its extremities in the val-

*B. & L.—D. H. Hill.

ley of the Chickahominy. Its right flank was its weakest part. The line had four bridges behind it. The ground in rear was cleared, but with undulations, fences, and ditches it afforded cover for both artillery and infantry. In front of the line, from New Cold Harbor road to the right, was a swamp obstructed with felled timber and choked with underbrush.* The line was, as occupied, about 3,500 yards long. There were fine positions for the artillery. Morell's division was put on the left; Sykes's on the right; McCall's in rear, in reserve. "General Cooke's cavalry was placed under the hills in the valley of the Chickahominy to guard the left flank." Stoneman was far out on the right with the rest of the cavalry, probably cut off by Jackson's command.†

(100) A. P. Hill's division followed the Federals in their retreat from Beaver Dam Creek; D. H. Hill's took the Bethesda Church road, with the view of joining Jackson. Longstreet was to support A. P. Hill. (102) At two o'clock A. P. Hill struck Porter's main line across New Cold Harbor road, and assaulted it furiously. About the same hour Jackson and D. H. Hill moved against the right of the line by the Old Cold Harbor road. At four o'clock Longstreet joined the battle on A. P. Hill's right, and about the same time Slocum's division of the Sixth Corps [Franklin] came to Porter's aid from the other side of the river.

The Confederates assaulted again and again; finally, near dark, in a general attack they broke the Union line; but the darkness put an end to the engagement. Twenty-eight hundred Union prisoners were taken, and twenty guns were captured or abandoned. During the night Porter withdrew his troops to the south side of the Chickahominy, destroying the bridges behind him. In this battle Porter had about 30,000 men and twenty batteries of artillery; Lee had perhaps 65,000 men and nineteen batteries.‡ The Federal loss in killed, wounded, and missing was 6,837; the Confederates must have lost at least 6,000 in killed and wounded.§

(100) Magruder with his 25,000 men had succeeded in containing 60,000 Federals on the south side of the river; McClellan from the offensive was forced into the defensive; and his line of communication with White House was in Lee's possession. But Lee was not to reap any advantage from this

*B. & L.—D. H. Hill.

†B. & L.—Porter.

‡B. & L.

§Ropes.

fact, for McClellan had already considered the plan of changing his base to Harrison's Landing on the James River, and had taken some steps to that end. He was now forced to make the change, and he set about it at once. It was a gigantic undertaking, for he had only one narrow road to move by, and a great swamp and creek to cross, with, besides his combatant strength, a train of 5,000 wagons and a herd of 2,500 beeves. The bulk of the stores at White House were moved by water.

(103) Keyes's corps was sent at once to take up a position south of White Oak Swamp to cover the flank of the column on the side toward Richmond in that quarter; the Second, Third, and Sixth Corps [Sumner, Heintzelman, and Franklin] remained north of the Swamp to resist the direct pursuit of the enemy; and the Fifth Corps [Porter] marched toward Malvern Hill to prevent the enemy from seizing that strong position.

Lee could not at first tell which way McClellan would retreat, or whether he would not rather make an effort to recover his lost communications. So Lee did practically nothing with his army on the 28th, the day after the battle of Gaines's Mill, but send Stuart toward White House to break up the railway, and Ewell toward Despatch Station to see if the enemy "showed any disposition to cross the stream and retreat down the Peninsula"*; and have Magruder watch for Federal movements south of the stream.

Magruder reported that the Federals remained quiet in their works that day; yet by the morning of the 29th, Lee was convinced that McClellan was making for the James. He set his own troops in motion at once with the purpose of cutting off the retreat or turning it into a rout. Magruder and Huger were to push forward on the Williamsburg and the Charles City roads; Longstreet and A. P. Hill were to cross by New Bridge and hasten toward the James to strike the flank of the retreating column south of White Oak Swamp; Jackson with his own and D. H. Hill's troops, nearly 25,000 men, was to follow the "shortest and most direct route," that by the Grapevine Bridge "across which Porter had retreated." He was "to press directly upon McClellan's rear with his whole force."*

Magruder came upon Sumner with his own and part of the Sixth Corps [Franklin] at Savage's Station, and in the afternoon engaged him. (104) Every minute Magruder expected

*Alexander.

to see Jackson fall upon Sumner's flank from the direction of the Grapevine Bridge. But Jackson had found the bridge destroyed, and wasted hours rebuilding it, though he might have crossed his army by a ford close to the bridge.* So Magruder was left without aid; his attacks were all repulsed, and toward dark the Federal rear-guard resumed its march.

(103) The morning of the 30th June found the Army of the Potomac with all its artillery and trains south of White Oak Swamp. The bridge over White Oak Swamp Creek had been destroyed after the troops had passed, and Franklin with two divisions stood guarding the creek against the pursuit of the enemy. The road toward the James was blocked with the trains; to give them time to reach the river in safety the Union army had to take up a defensive position, covering the outlets of the Charles City, Darbytown, and New Market roads. All of these roads come together near Glendale. Five divisions took a position near this point, while the Fifth Corps [Porter], supported by the Fourth [Keyes], stood at right angles to the James, covering Malvern Hill.

(105) About noon Jackson and D. H. Hill arrived at the broken-down bridge in front of Franklin; at the same time Longstreet and A. P. Hill arrived by the Darbytown Road near the crossroads. Huger was making slow progress on the Charles City Road, which had been obstructed by the Federals. He did not get through in time to take part in the battle. Another small Confederate column, under Holmes, marched by the New Market Road and made a feeble artillery attack upon the Union trains passing over Malvern Hill; but Holmes's guns were silenced and his whole division was put to flight by artillery fire alone. Magruder stayed back, moving to support first Longstreet, then Holmes, then Longstreet again, and never getting into the battle at all.

Lee expected his whole army to take part in this battle, variously known as the battle of Frayser's [Fraser's] Farm, Nelson's Farm, Glendale, and Charles City Crossroads; but Jackson, for some unaccountable reason, contented himself with simply shelling Franklin's position. He made little effort to cross at the bridge, and none whatever to cross at any one of five fords in the neighborhood.* He held his own and D. H. Hill's troops all day north of White Oak Swamp Creek. Longstreet and A. P. Hill attacked and fought the battle with-

*Alexander.

out assistance; and instead of making a simultaneous attack with their whole force, they let their brigades go into the battle piecemeal. The fight was desperate and lasted until long after dark.* The Union line was broken once, but was soon re-established by reinforcements. "No strategical advantage was gained by the Confederates, nor did they inflict a greater loss of men than they suffered."†

(106) That night the whole Federal army unmolested fell back to the position already selected at Malvern Hill. During the morning, July the 1st, the Union line of battle was formed. The position was very strong naturally. One flank was protected by Western Run and the other by Turkey Run and the gunboats on the James. It was on a commanding plateau whose approaches were all swept by artillery. Immediately in front of the Federal line was an open space, 300 to 400 yards wide, and beyond this space, toward the Confederates, the ground was "broken and thickly wooded, and was traversed nearly throughout by a swamp, passable at but few places and difficult at those."‡

Lee expected to mass his artillery in two great batteries at positions from which they could bring convergent and enfilade fire upon the Union batteries and lines of battle. A charge of heavy columns was to follow. But owing to defects of the artillery organization, the inefficiency of the staff, and ignorance of the ground, the artillery attack amounted to nothing. The reserve artillery, four battalions containing the best guns, did not fire a shot; and the division batteries came into action separately, and were quickly overwhelmed by the concentrated fire of the enemy. "This inefficient artillery service so discouraged the prospects of an assault that before three o'clock Lee abandoned his intention to assault." But later, being misled by a shifting of troops in the Federal line, he thought the Federals were withdrawing, and gave the order to assault. Then followed an untimely and piecemeal attack.* Longstreet and A. P. Hill were held in reserve, and took no part in the engagement. At four o'clock D. H. Hill opened the battle by assaulting the center of the line. His division was repulsed with heavy loss. Jackson sent two divisions to Hill's assistance, but they were too late. Finally Huger, supported by Magruder, assaulted farther toward the Union left. They

*Alexander.

†Ropes.

‡Lee's Report.

also were repulsed. "There were other isolated, useless, and unsuccessful attempts, each resulting in a bloody repulse. The failure of the Confederates was complete"*; but the Union army made no counter-attack. The action lasted till dark. The Confederates lost more than 5,000 men killed and wounded; the Federals lost about one-third as many.

(103) The next day, July 2, the Army of the Potomac fell back to Harrison's Landing, where it fortified itself. Lee rested his army on the 2nd, and on the 3rd advanced to the neighborhood of Harrison's Landing. A reconnaissance of the Federal position convinced him of the uselessness of making another attack, and "he returned to his former camp near Richmond to rest, recruit, and reorganize his army."†

For these "Seven Days' Battles" McClellan had at the outset 105,000 men, and Lee had 80,000 to 90,000 effectives. The Federal losses in the seven days' operations were 1,734 killed, 8,062 wounded, and 6,053 captured or missing; a total of 15,849. The Confederate losses were 3,286 killed, 15,909 wounded, and 940 captured or missing; a total of 20,135.‡

COMMENTS.

One can but sympathize with General McClellan in his determination to have his army properly organized, equipped, and trained before starting out on an offensive campaign against an army that had the prestige of victory on its side. We do not need to go farther than our own War of 1812 to be convinced that however well raw untrained troops may do on the defensive, they are utterly unfit for offensive campaigns and battles. The disastrous outcome of Bull Run was a further lesson fresh in the mind of McClellan. He did not want to repeat McDowell's failure.

But the American people, the newspapers, and the politicians never have learned this lesson of war; and they are the masters. The President and the Commanding General are but their servants; they must do their will, or they must fool them into the belief that they are doing their will. President Lincoln was more to be pitied than General McClellan—his position between the impatient public and his immovable general was one that none but the strongest character combined with the

*Ropes.

†Long.

‡B. & L.

finest tact and the loftiest sense of public duty could support.

General McClellan lacked political tact, without which an American commander-in-chief can seldom succeed; because to succeed the commander-in-chief must have the support of the Administration, and he cannot keep that support unless he has the favor of the people and the newspapers. We saw how General Scott was fettered in his Mexican Campaign by the lack of proper support from Washington, and the reward he received for his brilliant victories, won in spite of the antagonism of the Administration.

(94) Although General McClellan may not have believed that his great army was ready to advance before April, 1862, there were, nevertheless, several things he might have done, during those long months of waiting, simply to appease the public mind and to relieve the President. He ought to have captured Norfolk and broken up the Confederate batteries along the Potomac. He could easily have done those things without any risk of failure. It would have pleased the people and the press and kept their support; and it would have had a depressing effect upon the South. It would have been, in a sense, good strategy.

In the light of history there is little doubt, now, that McClellan could have marched out in November, 1861, and destroyed Johnston's army, if it had stood to fight. The Union army at that time was nearly three times as strong as Johnston's; it was better organized, equipped, and supplied, and had received three months of drill and training. But Johnston would not have accepted battle; it is almost certain that he would have fallen back behind the Rappahannock without fighting. This would completely have restored McClellan's prestige with the country. But General McClellan was, during the whole period of his command, a victim of a tendency of timid and cautious generals to overestimate the strength of the enemy. He appears to have relied wholly upon his secret-service department for information; and the reports furnished by this department usually doubled the strength of the Confederates. Just before the operations around Richmond, for example, this department informed McClellan that Johnston's army numbered 180,000. McClellan took counsel of his fear.

With all his caution, however, the Union commander took some risks at which a less careful, but more experienced, commander would have balked. When he proposed his movement by way of Urbana or Fort Monroe he believed that

Johnston had more than 100,000 men in the neighborhood of Manassas and Centreville; yet he purposed withdrawing the bulk of the Federal army from Washington and transferring it by water to the Peninsula, reckoning that Johnston would forthwith march his whole force to the relief of Richmond.* But if Johnston had really commanded any such number of men he probably would have done nothing of the kind. The capture of Washington at this time, in its effect upon the North and upon foreign nations, would have far outweighed the loss of Richmond. It would probably have caused the Confederacy to be recognized abroad, and might have brought the fleets of England and France to reopen the Southern ports to their trade. If Johnston's army, small as it was, had promptly crossed the Potomac above Washington, upon the departure of McClellan's army for Fort Monroe, this army would have been speedily recalled for the defense of the Capital. But if Johnston had commanded an army of the size supposed by McClellan he would not have waited until April, 1862, for the Union army to take the offensive; the Confederate generals were eager to cross the Potomac in October to cut off Washington's communications with Baltimore and the West, in order to force McClellan to come out with his untrained troops and fight; they asked the Confederate President only to reinforce the army at Centreville to 60,000 for the purpose, by withdrawing troops from the Southern coast. Johnston's army then actually numbered only some 40,000. Mr. Davis could not see his way to comply with the request—the governors of the coast States insisted upon holding troops for their local defense. Some of the Southern governors gave Mr. Davis as much trouble as the Northern press and public gave Mr. Lincoln.

General McClellan also took a very grave risk in transferring his army by water to Fort Monroe and making that place his base while the *Merrimac* was yet afloat at Norfolk. One has but to consider how defenseless troop-ships are at sea without adequate naval protection, how nearly a match the *Merrimac* was for the *Monitor*, and how helpless other ships of the Union fleet had proved against the Confederate ram to appreciate the risk thus taken by McClellan and permitted by the Washington authorities. The importance of having complete command of the sea before committing troops to it in trans-

*B. & L.—McClellan.

ports is so great that it should never be disregarded by generals and governments responsible for the lives of thousands of soldiers. "I have," wrote McClellan to the Secretary of the Navy, "such a living faith in the gallant little *Monitor* that I feel that we can trust her"*; but the floridity of his language in itself suggests a suspicion that he was not entirely confident.

There is no doubt that General McClellan had grievous disappointments to contend with; but he brought them upon himself by allowing himself to expect more than it was possible for him to have. He expected, for instance, in his movement up the Peninsula, to have the Union fleet upon both of his flanks; but at that time the James was closed by Norfolk and the *Merrimac*, and the York by the batteries at Yorktown and Gloucester Point. His failure to receive McDowell and the entire First Corps, even though he did receive two of its divisions and other reinforcements, seemed to paralyze his energies. Until he began his flank movement from the Chickahominy to the James he appeared to be playing merely a "waiting game." There was no determined aggressiveness in any of his operations, such was must characterize every successful offensive campaign.

General McClellan, as Commander-in-Chief of the United States Army, had exhibited a rare genius for organization and administration; but as commander of the Army of the Potomac he had done nothing in strategic conception or performance up to this time to commend or to emulate. Every movement he had ordered had been foreseen and forestalled by his opponent. He expected to put his army at Urbana before Johnston discovered his intention; but Johnston got wind of his plan and withdrew closer to McClellan's objective, Richmond, before the movement began. At Fort Monroe McClellan was exactly as far from Richmond, in an air-line, as Johnston's left flank was at Culpeper, and twenty miles farther than Johnston's right was at Fredericksburg. McClellan knew that Yorktown was occupied, but he expected the garrison to sit still and let him march a column to its rear and cut off its retreat with Richmond.† Then, after the fall of Yorktown, he shipped two or three divisions to West Point with orders to move against Johnston's flank in his retreat to Richmond. But Johnston anticipated this project, and had a larger force at hand ready to drive back the Union detachment.

*Ropes.

†B. & L.—McClellan.

McClellan was methodical and cautious and dependent upon the science of engineering at times when he should have relied upon vigor and activity and battle. This was notably the case at Yorktown, where he spent a month carrying by siege a line that he should have assaulted at its weakest point, and carried, the day he encountered it, before Johnston arrived with his whole army to reinforce Magruder. Failing this, the Confederate line could have been "contained" by 20,000 men intrenched, and outflanked by the rest of the army moving by way of Mob Jack Bay and thence overland to West Point. Or a force might have landed on the other side of York River and captured Gloucester Point, which was open to attack from the rear. This would have opened York River to the Federal fleet and made the Yorktown line untenable.

McClellan had his army at White House and his base established there on the 16th of May; from then to the 31st of May he practically did nothing toward the destruction of Johnston's army or the capture of Richmond but put his army in a dangerous position astride the Chickahominy. He spent those fifteen precious days apparently waiting, hoping, for McDowell; while the Confederates were strengthening their works round Richmond and receiving reinforcements. After the battle of Fair Oaks came another long useless wait, until the Confederates again took the offensive on the 26th of June.

McClellan has been severely criticized for placing his army astraddle the Chickahominy. His own excuse was that he had to reach out toward Fredericksburg in expectation of McDowell; but he kept his army there after he had learned that McDowell was not going to join him. So long as McClellan kept his base at White House it is hard to say what was the best position in which to hold his army. He knew he should have to fight a battle in front of Richmond before he could capture that city. If he had held his army on the north side of the stream and let the Confederates defend the south bank he would have had the task of forcing a difficult river in the face of the enemy; if he had brought his whole army to the south bank he would completely have uncovered his communications, and, in the expected battle, would have had the river at his back. In truth, the mistake that McClellan made consisted not in dividing his army by the Chickahominy, but in failing to provide a sufficient number of strong bridges. With all his skill as an engineer, and all his care and caution, his

mistake in this case was that of an engineer rather than that of an army-commander.

The very minute, however, that McClellan learned that McDowell was not going to join him he ought to have issued an order for the change of base to the James. This change would have enabled him to move against Richmond or the Confederate army without having his communications beyond the Chickahominy to worry about. Or he could have operated by way of Petersburg south of the James, as General Grant did two years later. Petersburg, the back-gate to Richmond, could have been seized at this time without an effort; it took Grant nearly ten months to capture it. If this change had been made voluntarily by McClellan, before he was attacked by Lee at Gaines's Mill, it would not have had the appearance of a retreat before a victorious army; as it happened, it actually had that appearance. The people South and North, the Union army and the Confederate army, believed that McClellan was beaten and driven back to Harrison's Landing. Such was not the case at all. McClellan had already considered the change, and had made some arrangements for it; as soon as he lost his communications with White House he began the movement. He was not driven; he was pursued,—the shade of difference in the meaning of the terms is certainly very thin.

Considering the immense train, the difficulties of the road, and the aggressiveness of the enemy, the change of base was masterly made. From the time when the army quit the Chickahominy until it reached Harrison's Landing the critic will have a hard task to pick a flaw in either the strategy or the tactics of its operations. It took every advantage of streams, woods, and ground, and carried off its trains intact; and it inflicted a heavier loss in men than it suffered. After it had reached Harrison's Landing it was in a better position to operate against Richmond than it had ever been before. Materially Lee had gained nothing; he had failed to cut off or destroy a single Federal regiment; but he had won vast prestige for himself and his army.

In all the operations in the neighborhood of Richmond the plans of Johnson and Lee were bold and excellent. With a smaller army than their opponent's they did not hesitate to take the offensive; and their plans would have succeeded but for the inefficiency of their lieutenants. To be sure, Johnston lost a victory at Fair Oaks, partly by issuing a verbal instead of a written order, but mainly by Longstreet's mistakes and

tardiness. At Beaver Dam Creek A. P. Hill suffered heavy and needless loss by attacking before Jackson's arrival. And this premature attack was, in point of time, the second of the chief causes of Lee's failure to destroy McClellan's army. If Hill had awaited Jackson's initiative, as Lee's order directed, and in spite of Jackson's unaccountable delay, Porter would not have withdrawn his troops from Beaver Dam Creek to the strong position at Gaines's Mill by daybreak of the 27th June; and Lee's project of turning the Union right with Jackson's corps on the 26th would have been effected on the 27th.

The first chief cause of Lee's failure to destroy McClellan's army was Jackson's tardiness on the 26th of June. Whatever excuses may be made for Jackson the fact stands that he failed to reach the ground on that day that he had agreed to reach; that Lee counted upon his reaching. He failed to turn the Union line behind Beaver Dam Creek and take it in reverse. He halted and bivouacked at 5 p.m. when, according to his own report, he was within hearing of the desperate battle A. P. Hill fought till dark.* Jackson bivouacked only three miles from that battle. At Gaines's Mill Jackson was late, and he withdrew D. H. Hill's division from the battle at the critical moment; at Savage's Station Jackson did not arrive at all; and at White Oak Swamp Creek, during the battle of Glendale, he made no apparent effort to force a passage and get into the action. At Malvern Hill "he took no initiative," and gave scant aid to the unfortunate assault. "Malvern Hill should not have been attacked; only the enemy observed and held by Longstreet, while Jackson got a position which they would be forced to assault" in order to reach Harrison's Landing.*

On the whole the Peninsular Campaign was, on the part of the Confederates, a campaign of good plans and bad execution. The chief blame rests upon Stonewall Jackson. In all these operations the "Jackson of the Chickahominy," as General Alexander aptly puts the terms, was a different man from "the Jackson of the Valley." Of all those that marvel at Jackson's brilliant work before and after the Seven Days' Campaign there is none to offer a reasonable excuse for his utter failure in this campaign. On the part of the Federals it was a campaign of neglected opportunities. Perhaps McClellan's best opportunity fell to him on the day of Gaines's Mill. All that day Magruder with only 25,000 men kept up a "clatter" in front of Richmond; while McClellan had 60,000 south of the Chicka-

*Alexander.

hominny, but made no effort to take the city. He and his commanders were completely fooled by Magruder.

In this campaign the great benefit of systematic training was again made manifest. At the first battle of Bull Run two mobs confronted each other; the regular artillery and Sykes's battalion of regular infantry and Palmer's squadron of regular cavalry were the only troops in the battle that acted like soldiers. In the Peninsular Campaign, on the contrary, the rank and file of both armies fought and marched like veterans, and the best of veterans. A year of service and training had made the difference.

LECTURE XI.

JACKSON'S VALLEY CAMPAIGN.

(107) The region known as the Valley of Virginia, or the Shenandoah Valley, played an important part in the Civil War from the beginning almost to the end. Indeed Lee's little army was hastening toward that region in its very last march, and, if it had not been headed off by Sheridan's cavalry at Appomattox, the last hostile action on Virginia soil, like the first,* might have taken place in the Shenandoah Valley.

As already noted, the situation of Richmond and Washington foreordered that Virginia, rather than Kentucky or other border State, should become the principal theater of operations, and the mountain region of the Shenandoah formed a strong natural barrier covering its left flank. All things combined to make the Valley the best line of communications with Virginia and the base at Richmond, for a Confederate army invading the North in this theater of the war; twice it was used for this purpose by Lee. Thus, the general direction of this Valley was northeast, and the Potomac, more easily forded here than farther east, crossed it within fifty miles of Washington. On its eastern or exposed flank it was covered by the Blue Ridge Mountains south of the Potomac, and South Mountain north of this river. These mountains could be crossed only at certain passes, or gaps, through most of which there were good roads. The Valley was connected with Richmond, the Confederate base, by two systems of railway, one leading out of it by way of Strasburg and Manassas Gap, the other by way of Staunton and Rockfish Gap. (We saw the strategical use that was made of the Manassas Gap Railway in the Bull Run Campaign.) A good system of roads connected all the towns and villages in the region. The main thoroughfare was the Valley Turnpike, stretching from Staunton near the head of the Valley, to Martinsburg at its lower end, a distance of 120 miles; and passing through Harrisonburg, New Market, Woodstock, Strasburg, and Winchester. The main Valley of the Shenandoah, averaging about twenty

*"The first" has reference to the capture of the U. S. arsenal at Harper's Ferry, April 18, 1861.

miles in width, is closed on its western side by the Alleghanies, a more difficult chain of mountains than the Blue Ridge.

The Shenandoah River, which drains the Valley into the Potomac, is formed by its North and South Forks, which flow parallel to each other for forty or fifty miles. In their parallel course the two branches are only about eight miles apart, but they are separated by an isolated ridge, called Massanutten Mountain, as high as the Blue Ridge. At Strasburg this ridge drops suddenly to the level of the Valley, and the North Fork of the Shenandoah sweeps round its base and joins the South Fork at Front Royal. The Shenandoah thus formed flows along the very base of the Blue Ridge to the Potomac, into which it discharges its waters at Harper's Ferry. The Valley between the western foot of the Blue Ridge and the South Fork, at the foot of Massanutten Mountain, is known as Luray or Page Valley. The mountains were all covered with forests, and the valleys were well watered and very fertile; indeed the region was often spoken of as the "granary of Virginia"; and from the fields and herds of its well-to-do farmers it furnished a large part of the subsistence of the Confederate army. In the northern section were some families of Union sentiment, but a large majority of the inhabitants were intensely Southern in their feelings.

While the great valley between the Alleghanies and the Blue Ridge was peculiarly well suited to be the route of invasion from Virginia into the North, the reverse was not the case. As was pointed out in the lecture on *Bull Run*, the mountain ranges and valleys led to the southwest, away from, rather than toward, Richmond; and an invasion by that line would have involved a very long line of communication through a very hostile country. So the Valley was never used by the Federals as a main route of invasion. From the start, however, it was occupied and guarded by Federal troops for the double purpose of preventing incursions by way of it into Northern territory, and to protect the Baltimore and Ohio Railway, and the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal, both of which crossed the Valley and were main highways of traffic between the East and the West. The destruction of this railway and canal were among the first operations of the Confederates in the Valley. As early as April, 1861, Stonewall Jackson, who then held Harper's Ferry with a small force of Virginia militia, had seized a large number of the railway's cars, and, after running them back by steam to Winchester, had hauled them by horses

from there to Strasburg. In June of this year Joseph E. Johnston, who had succeeded to the command at Harper's Ferry, had the railway bridge and machine shops at Harper's Ferry and the shops and rolling-stock at Martinsburg destroyed, at the time of his withdrawal to Winchester.*

Soon after the battle of Bull Run Jackson was promoted to major-general, and about the first of November he took command of the Valley District with headquarters at Winchester. His command at first consisted of only a weak body of militia; but he was soon reinforced with his own old brigade ["Stonewall Brigade"], and, about Christmas, with 6,000 poorly disciplined troops under Loring. These reinforcements, with Ashby's cavalry, raised the strength of his command to about 10,000. It constituted the left wing of the Army of Northern Virginia; the right wing was commanded by Holmes at Fredericksburg, while the center was under the immediate command of Joseph E. Johnston at Centreville. Jackson was connected with the main army at Centreville by a detachment under D. H. Hill at Leesburg.

Johnston's orders to Jackson directed him to watch the enemy, and keep his communications with Manassas open, so as to be able to join the main army promptly, in case McClellan advanced. Ashby's cavalry patrolled the frontier, and kept itself busy breaking up the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal and the Baltimore and Ohio Railway.

General Banks commanded the Union troops in this region. The headquarters of his corps,† which was 18,000 strong, were at Frederick City; but his charge extended seventy-five miles farther west, to Cumberland. General Kelly garrisoned Romney with 5,000 Federals. This town was thirty-five miles northwest of Winchester by a good road. The garrison at Romney in its isolation was too much of a temptation for Jackson to resist. So he marched his little army out in the snows of January with the hope of surprising and capturing that body as well as a Federal detachment at the village of Bath. Both Federal detachments escaped; but Jackson captured a considerable quantity of stores, damaged the railway and canal near Bath, and took possession of Romney, severing connection between Banks's command and General Rosecrans's scattered troops in West Virginia.

*Henderson.

†At this time Banks's command constituted the Fifth Corps of the Army of the Potomac.

Jackson had hoped that his taking the offensive would induce McClellan to believe that he had a large detachment from Johnston's army, and would tempt the Union commander to move out to attack Johnston; in which case Jackson expected to hasten with his command by way of the Manassas Gap Railway and repeat the strategy of Bull Run. But we know that McClellan was not tempted. In fact, Jackson's operation, attended by great hardships, amounted to nothing in the end. He left Loring with his troops to garrison Romney; but this officer and his ill-disciplined command were so dissatisfied with their quarters that Loring appealed directly to the Confederate Secretary of War and got his command ordered back to Winchester. Jackson was so outraged by this action of the Secretary of War that he indignantly sent in his resignation. Through the offices of General Johnston and the governor of Virginia, however, he was prevailed upon to retain his command. He had taught the Confederate war department a lesson in military ethics and usage that it did not soon forget. After the withdrawal of Loring from Romney that place was reoccupied by the Federals. Loring and his troops were detached from Jackson, and for a month the Confederates at Winchester enjoyed a rest.

By the end of February Banks had crossed the Potomac by a pontoon-bridge at Harper's Ferry. With about 23,000 men,* including 3,000 cavalry, and accompanied by eighty pieces of artillery, he threatened Winchester. There Jackson had 3,600 infantry, twenty-seven guns, and Ashby's 600 horsemen. On the 7th of March D. H. Hill, by Johnston's orders, fell back from Leesburg; two days later Johnston withdrew from Centreville toward the Rappahannock. Jackson was thus left isolated in his advanced position at Winchester.

We have seen that McClellan upon Johnston's withdrawal advanced his army to Centreville; he ordered Banks to advance at the same time. Banks's leading division occupied Winchester on the 12th of March, Jackson having withdrawn the evening before. Jackson fell back to Strasburg, eighteen miles farther south. On the 17th [March] Banks started Shields with 11,000 men in pursuit. Leaving Ashby with his cavalry to cover his rear and hold the enemy back, Jackson retreated to Mount Jackson, a strong position twenty-five miles farther south. Shields pursued as far as Woodstock with his main force, sending his cavalry on after Ashby toward Mount Jack-

*Ropes.

son. The cavalry returned the next day [March 19], reporting that Jackson had fled from the Valley, leaving only a small force under Ashby for observation. With this information Shields marched back to Winchester.

In accordance with his orders Banks, having rid the Valley of Jackson, as he supposed, left Shields with his division at Winchester to guard the Valley, and marched the rest of his troops to the east side of the Blue Ridge in order to cooperate with McClellan's movement to the Peninsular.* This was precisely what Jackson was to prevent. His instructions from Johnston were "to endeavor to employ the invaders in the Valley without exposing himself to the danger of defeat, by keeping so near the enemy as to prevent his making any considerable detachment to reinforce McClellan, but not so near that he might be compelled to fight."†

On the evening of the 21st [March] Ashby reported to Jackson that the enemy was withdrawing to the east. Other information confirmed the report. On the 22nd Ashby struck Shield's outposts about a mile south of Winchester and had a skirmish with them. Ashby learned by the action that besides cavalry there was infantry and a battery of the enemy present; but he was wholly wrong in his estimate of the force. He reported only four regiments of infantry, besides the artillery and cavalry; the rest of Shield's division was, however, concealed close in rear, 9,000 strong all told.

On receiving Ashby's report Jackson hurried forward from his camp at Woodstock, and after a march of thirty-six miles reached Kernstown, the position of the Federal outposts, at 1 p.m. on the second day, the 23rd. (108) Ashby still confronted the enemy; but Kimball's Federal brigade, supported by Sullivan's was forcing him back. The Federal line, facing south, occupied a position on a rise of ground behind a brook. Its right rested on the Valley Road. Three quarters of a mile to the right and rear was a piece of high ground covered with timber. (109) Leaving a brigade of infantry to assist Ashby in holding the line in front, Jackson moved his other three brigades under cover to this ground. But here he was met by Tyler's Federal brigade. With attacks and counter-attacks the action in this part of the field raged severely but indecisively for an hour. Then Kimball, who was in command of the Union forces, Shields having been wounded in the forenoon,

*Henderson. *B. & L.*—Imboden. Kimball.

†Johnston's *Narrative*.

moved his own brigade to Tyler's support. Jackson was finally defeated and toward dark driven from the field.

(107) The Federal pursuit was checked, and Jackson's weary infantry bivouacked within three miles of the battle-field. Ashby's cavalry stopped within a mile of it. Jackson continued his retreat in good order to Mount Jackson. His tactical failure was a strategical success, but it is not probable that he, as he marched his tired and beaten soldiers back from Kernstown, appreciated the far-reaching effect of his strategy.

Shields could not believe that Jackson would have dared to attack him unless Jackson had been expecting reinforcements. So Shields sent post-haste to Banks for assistance. Banks returned with his other division, and with his whole corps followed as far as Strasburg, where he halted to wait for supplies. Thus, as Johnston had directed, Jackson had kept Banks from going to coöperate with McClellan. But that was the least of the consequences of Jackson's operation. It drew the attention of the authorities at Washington again to the line of the upper Potomac, and to the defense of Washington. It decided the President to withdraw Blenker's division from McClellan and dispatch it by way of Strasburg, where it could be stopped by Banks if needed, to Frémont, who was now in command of the Union forces in West Virginia; and it also decided the President to withhold the First Corps [McDowell], nearly 40,000 men, from McClellan. We saw in the lecture on the Peninsular Campaign how all of this upset McClellan's plans.

But that was not all. At the same time the President broke up the Department of the Potomac, McClellan's territorial command, leaving McClellan in charge of the operations in the "paltry triangle," only, south of the Rappahannock River. McDowell was placed in command of the Department of the Rappahannock, and charged with the defense of Washington. Banks was to command the Department of the Shenandoah and Frémont the Mountain Department, which included West Virginia and part of Kentucky and Tennessee. These commanders were all independent one of another, and reported directly to Washington. In the words of General McClellan, "instead of one directing head controlling operations which should have been inseparable, the region from the Alleghanies to the sea was parcelled out among four independent commanders."* In this remark, however, General McClellan was

*B. & L.—McClellan.

in error: there was to be only one head, but that head was Mr. Stanton, the Secretary of War, whose contempt for all sound principles and usages of war appears to have been exceeded only by his ignorance of them.

Though urged by telegrams from McClellan at Washington to "push Jackson hard" Banks stayed at Strasburg until April 1. His outposts, meantime, were at Tom's Brook, five miles south of Strasburg; but never a cavalryman crossed the brook to gain information of Jackson. Ashby's horsemen, backed by a brigade of Confederate infantry at Woodstock, patrolled the south bank of Tom's Brook. Although Banks believed that Jackson had 15,000 men, and the Union cavalry was so poor as to furnish him practically no information of the enemy, it was not these facts alone that made him hesitate to follow Jackson farther south. He was aware that Johnston had already fallen back from Centreville, and he had information that Johnston's left was at Gordonsville, three or four days' march from Mount Jackson. He also knew that McClellan was not pushing Johnston, but was embarking his army at Alexandria for Fort Monroe. On the 26th of March he wired the Secretary of War that Longstreet and Jackson were going to join forces at New Market. Within the next few days he learned that Jackson had received no reinforcements; yet it was not until the 2nd of April that he crossed Tom's Brook and started southward. He advanced no farther than Woodstock, where he went into camp.

The real cause of Banks's halt now was Massanutten Mountain. This ridge was impassable (save for a few hunters' trails) except by the New Market-Luray road. Banks was afraid that, if he got too far from Strasburg, Jackson, or Ashby's cavalry, covered by this barrier, would slip down through the Luray Valley and intercept his communications at Strasburg or Front Royal. It did not occur to him boldly to advance against Jackson's little force, and himself get possession of the crossroads at New Market, and the Luray Valley road, also. After counting out the troops guarding his communications, he had now some 15,000; Jackson, although he had received some recruits, had no more than 6,000.

Finally, on the 17th of April, Banks struck camp at Woodstock and started south. Meantime McClellan had begun his campaign on the Peninsula, and Johnston had marched thither to oppose him, leaving Ewell with 8,000 men on the upper Rappahannock to coöperate with Jackson. For fear that Banks should cross the Massanutten Mountain and get between

him and Ewell, Jackson made a forced march by way of Harrisonburg and Conrad's Store,* and secured a strong position near Swift Run Gap. Banks advanced very cautiously, and by the 26th [April] had his main force at New Market, with a strong garrison at Harrisonburg.

At Swift Run Gap Jackson was in communication with Ewell, who was at Gordonsville, and with Richmond. So long as he could hold the bridge at Conrad's Store, which he had guarded by a strong detachment, his flank position at this gap also kept Banks from advancing on Staunton.

While these operations were going on General Frémont had worked out an extensive but visionary plan of operations for the troops in his department. His project was to collect his detachments, scattered through the mountains of West Virginia, and march them by way of McDowell to capture Staunton; then to carry out the President's devoutly cherished wish of relieving the loyal inhabitants of East Tennessee, by marching to Knoxville.† In pursuance of this plan General Milroy had advanced with a small force from Monterey to McDowell, and other detachments occupied Franklin and Moorefield. Guarding the passes of the Alleghanies, General Edward Johnston had two Confederate brigades in the Shenandoah Mountains, about 3,000 men. Finding himself threatened in rear by Banks's advance to New Market and Harrisonburg; on his right flank by Frémont at Moorefield; and in front by the detachments at McDowell and Franklin, Johnson fell back to West View, seven miles west of Staunton.

In the lecture on the Peninsular Campaign we saw that, after Jackson's retreat up the valley, Shields was ordered to take his division from the Valley and join McDowell with it at Fredericksburg; that McDowell was only awaiting the arrival of this division, when he should move the combined force to unite with McClellan in front of Richmond; and that General Lee, Mr. Davis's military adviser at the time, had corresponded with Jackson with a view to arranging a plan to divert McDowell toward the Valley. Accordingly Ewell was ordered to report to Jackson with his division, and Jackson was also authorized to use Edward Johnson's command. The details of the enterprise were left for Jackson to work out. The troops at his disposal now numbered 17,000 or 18,000.

Jackson decided first to strike Milroy's detachment, the most

*Conrad's Store was on the South Fork nearly east of Harrisonburg. It was connected with Harrisonburg by a road.

†B. & L.—Cox.

exposed part of Frémont's command, thus widening the distance between Frémont and Banks; and then to turn against Banks. To march by way of Conrad's Store and the valley roads to Staunton and McDowell would expose his flank to Banks, and, also, divulge the direction and object of his movement. So Jackson chose a different route. To mask his movement Ashby, on the 29th and 30th of April, drove back the Federal cavalry, and made feints toward Harrisonburg. On the afternoon of the 30th Jackson, leaving Ewell's division at Swift Run Gap to fall upon Banks's rear, in case Banks should move toward Staunton, set out with his own troops by the muddy valley road to Port Republic. From there he marched over the mountains to Mechum's River Station, five or six miles west of Charlottesville, leaving friend and foe to suppose that he was going to take the cars and unite with Joseph E. Johnston; whether to oppose McClellan, to attack McDowell at Fredericksburg, or to move against Washington, no one could tell.

At Mechum's he did take the cars, trains of which were standing ready for him; but, instead of going east, the trains went west to Staunton. From there Jackson marched on west, picking up Edward Johnson's division on the way. Late in the afternoon of May 7 Johnson's division, which was in the lead, came upon the Union outposts and drove them into McDowell. Milroy had already learned of the enemy's approach, and had asked for assistance. This brought Schenck with his brigade from Franklin. The brigade made the march of thirty-four miles in twenty-three hours.

(110) In the afternoon of the 8th Johnson's division, still in the lead, reached the top of Sitlington's Hill in the Bull Pasture Mountains, from which the Union camp at McDowell could be seen. The camp was in a hard place to attack; the only approach for Jackson was by the turnpike that, passing through the mountain defile, crossed the Bull Pasture River by a bridge at its outlet. Jackson halted his command and sent out parties to look for a trail by which to cross the stream and turn the Union position. But Schenck, who was the senior officer at McDowell, did not wait to be attacked. He crossed his little command, 2,500 strong, climbed the rocky mountainside, and attacked the superior numbers of the enemy.

(111) The Federals were repulsed; but it was not till nine o'clock at night that they gave up the fight and withdrew. The Confederates made no counter-attack, and were content to bivouac on the ground. (112) The next day they took up the

pursuit; but the enemy had set the woods on fire, and the flames and blinding smoke made pursuit very difficult. By the 12th Jackson had driven the enemy to Franklin. He then turned back toward the Valley, and took the road to Harrisonburg, leaving Ashby in front of Frémont to screen the movement.

On the 17th [May] Jackson halted at Mount Solon, twelve miles southwest of Harrisonburg. Banks had fallen back to Strasburg and was now completely cut off from Frémont,* who could join him only by long roundabout trails. On the 20th [May] Jackson was at New Market, having been joined on the way by one of Ewell's brigades. Ewell with the rest of his division was at Luray. Ashby's scouts were as far forward as Woodstock, and everything indicated that Jackson was moving on Strasburg by the Valley Pike. Shields's division had been detached from Banks and sent to General McDowell; so Banks now had only 8,000 men. He had placed 1,000 of these under Colonel Kenly at Front Royal, twelve miles east of Strasburg, to guard the Manassas Gap Railway, and was himself intrenched with the rest at Strasburg. There he expected to be attacked by Jackson, but he entertained no serious fear.

(107) Back in Washington, at this time, where Mr. Stanton was personally directing the operations between the Alleghanies and the Atlantic, everything appeared to be working out right. Jackson's victory at McDowell was considered a minor affair, and all fear of his crossing the Potomac and moving on Washington was at rest. General McDowell was under orders to start from Fredericksburg for the Peninsula on the 26th of May, and the President and the Secretary of War were going to review his army before its departure.*

(112) On the 21st [May] Jackson started northward with his little army at New Market, and every man supposed that Strasburg was to be the first objective. But suddenly the head of the column was turned to the right and took the road across the Massanutten to Luray. In the camp here the men were in the same quandary—"Was 'Old Jack' going to march across Blue Ridge to Warrenton or Culpeper; or was he going down Luray Valley?" they asked one another.

On the morning of the 22nd he took the road down the valley. The next day his battalions suddenly burst out of the forest upon Kenly's detachment at Front Royal. Kenly's little command fought like heroes; but Jackson had planned so well

*Henderson.

that Ashby's cavalry had the roads blocked and the telegraph lines cut on both sides. Kenly had no road left open but the one to Winchester; setting fire to the bridges over the two forks of the Shenandoah he retired by that road. Soon he was overtaken and charged by Colonel Flournoy and 250 Virginian horsemen. Kenly was cut down with a saber, and his command dispersed in flight. Flournoy led back 600 prisoners and a section of artillery as prize of battle. In addition the Federals lost thirty-two killed and 122 wounded. The Confederates had eleven killed and fifteen wounded.*

It was after midnight before Banks at Strasburg could be made to believe that the attack at Front Royal meant anything more than a raid. He thought that Jackson with the bulk of his army was still at Harrisonburg. When urged by his best officer, General Gordon, to retreat before he should be cut off, he replied, "By God, sir, I will not retreat! We have more to fear, sir, from the opinions of our friends than the bayonets of our enemies!" None the less the next morning, the 24th May, he put his command in motion for Winchester.

Jackson could not be sure whether Banks would stay at Strasburg, retreat to Winchester, or, letting Jackson get the bulk of his troops on the north side of the North Fork, would make a dash for Manassas Gap by the road along the south bank. To find out he sent Ashby toward Strasburg, and other columns on all the roads leading toward Winchester and the Valley Turnpike. One of the columns took six hours, however, to march seven miles, and when it reached Middletown Banks's main body had passed. From here on to Winchester, which was reached late at night, Jackson's own division kept up a fight with the Federal rear-guard. But Ashby's cavalry wasted valuable time in looting the Union train; and Gordon managed the rear-guard so skilfully that Banks made good his retreat.

The next morning, May 25, Banks made a useless stand at Winchester, "determined," he said in his report, "to test the substance and strength of the enemy by actual collision."† Jackson attacked him skilfully with Ewell's division on the Front Royal road, by which it had marched, and with his own division by the Valley Turnpike; while a column turned the Union right. Thus surrounded by overwhelming numbers, Banks gave way and retreated to Martinsburg; before midnight he was across the Potomac at Williamsport.

*Henderson.

†B. & L.

Jackson's infantry pursued for five or six miles; then it had to halt through sheer fatigue. Ashby's cavalry had gone off toward Berryville to head off the retreat, if Banks should take the road by way of Snicker's Gap; the commander of the cavalry attached to Ewell's division, a young pedant, refused to receive an order direct from Jackson, transmitted by an aide. He said his orders must come through his immediate commander, General Ewell. So Jackson had no cavalry to turn Banks's retreat into rout. He mounted some gunners on artillery horses; but they made a poor substitute for cavalry.

"Never," states Jackson in his report, "have I seen an opportunity when it was in the power of cavalry to reap a richer harvest of the fruits of victory."*

Already the orders referred to in our Peninsular lecture had gone from Washington to General McDowell, directing him to suspend his movement on Richmond and send 20,000 men to the Shenandoah; and to Frémont, who was at Franklin, "to move against Jackson at Harrisonburg." The strategy of Jackson's operations had thus wholly succeeded. But this was not all. Banks's retreat and expulsion from the Valley renewed the fear at Washington that Jackson would cross the Potomac and swoop down upon that city. It was even believed at Washington that the enemy was making a general movement northward. The President issued an urgent call for more troops, and Mr. Stanton wrote the governor of Massachusetts, "There is no doubt that the enemy in great force are marching on Washington."* Troops were hurried to Harper's Ferry, and McClellan was warned that he might have to take his army back to Washington.

Jackson let his worn-out troops rest for two days near Winchester, then moved them toward the Potomac to increase the fear at the North. By the 29th the bulk of his command was concentrated at Halltown, within three miles of Harper's Ferry.

McClellan and McDowell both protested against the transfer of McDowell's troops to the Valley. It broke up McClellan's plan, and they knew that Washington was in no danger, and that the troops could hardly reach the Valley in time to cut off Jackson's retreat. They also knew that Frémont's advance into the Valley was enough, alone, to induce Jackson to fall back. But Mr. Stanton was directing this campaign; it was he that was pitted against Lee and Jackson in the game of

*Henderson.

strategy. He would listen to no advice nor protests from McDowell and McClellan, and by his obstinacy and his ignorance of the science of war he probably set back the fall of Richmond and the Confederacy just three years.

On the evening of May the 29th Jackson learned that Frémont's army was on its way from Moorefield to Strasburg. The next day he heard of McDowell's movement toward Front Royal. This same day, May 30, he moved his main body back toward Winchester, leaving the Stonewall Brigade to hold in check the troops of Banks and Saxton, about 15,000 men. Arriving at Winchester by cars ahead of his army, Jackson learned that Shields, commanding the van of McDowell's army, had captured Front Royal. Frémont was at Wardensville, twenty-five miles west of the Valley Turnpike. Winchester is eighteen miles from Strasburg; but the head of Jackson's column was seven miles farther back on the pike; and his rear-guard, the Stonewall Brigade, was nigh twenty miles north-east of Winchester.

Frémont had 15,000 men, Banks and Saxton had 15,000, and Shields had 10,000; and 10,000 more were a few miles behind Shields,—all together 50,000 troops. Jackson had 15,000 Confederates with 2,000 prisoners and a double train of wagons seven miles long. His only line of retreat was the Valley Turnpike through Strasburg. He was in a trap, but Shields and Frémont were not the men to close its door upon him. These two generals were not in communication with each other. The Washington authorities kept each informed as well as possible of the other's movements. Neither knew exactly where the other was. Both had learned what manner of man Jackson was, and both were correspondingly cautious. Frémont was checked by Ashby's cavalry, and halted at Cedar Creek, six miles west of Strasburg. Shields was kept back by the demonstration of a small brigade from Strasburg.

Jackson made all haste. The evening of the 31st of May his main body bivouacked at Strasburg; the Stonewall Brigade had reached Newtown, after a march of thirty-five miles. The next morning, June 1, Ewell's division relieved Ashby's cavalry at Cedar Creek, and kept Frémont back until the trains and the Stonewall Brigade had passed. By noon Jackson's whole command had left Strasburg behind. That night it bivouacked at Woodstock guarded by Ashby's cavalry, which took its post along Tom's Brook.

The forces of Frémont and McDowell did not get into direct

communication with each other until the 2nd of June. As soon as it was discovered that Jackson had passed Strasburg and retreated southward both columns took up the pursuit. McDowell had ordered Shields to Luray on the afternoon of June 1, and that night Shields's advance-guard was ten miles south of Front Royal. Frémont, preceded by Bayard's cavalry brigade, took the Valley Pike on the opposite side of the Massanutts, and hastened to Woodstock.

Jackson had anticipated these movements, and had sent detachments to destroy the three bridges on the South Fork to the north of Port Republic. He sent another detachment to hold the bridge at Port Republic for the retreat of his own army. To make matters worse for the pursuit heavy rains had made the road in the Luray Valley well-nigh impassable, and had raised the river so much that it was impossible to construct temporary bridges quickly enough to be of use. So Frémont and Shields could not possibly unite their forces by any route except the Harrisonburg-Port Republic road. At Luray Shields heard the sound of cannon on the other side of the mountain, and conjectured that Frémont was engaged; but he could not go to his assistance.

Over on that side of the Massanutts Bayard's cavalry caught up with Ashby's between Strasburg and Woodstock on the 2nd of June, and sent it flying up the Valley. "Many prisoners were taken, and the pursuit was only checked by a party of infantry stragglers, whom Ashby had succeeded in rallying across the road."* The skirmishing was kept up all the next day. On the 4th [June] the Confederates crossed the North Fork and burnt the bridge. The difficulty of throwing a pontoon-bridge across the swollen river stopped the pursuit until the morning of the 5th, and gave Jackson a lead of twenty-four hours. Contact was not regained until the 6th. In a desperate skirmish on this day Ashby was shot through the heart. Then fell the cavalry leader who first in this war, or in any war since Napoleon's time, used his squadrons right; and Stonewall Jackson taught him how. The death of no other man, save Jackson only, could have caused so great a loss to the Army of the Valley.

"On the 6th and 7th [June] the Confederate infantry rested on the banks of Mill Creek near Cross Keys. The cavalry on either flank of the Massanutts watched Frémont's camps at Harrisonburg and the slow advance of Shields;" and from one

*Henderson.

of the mountain peaks a signal party kept an eye upon the roads converging on the Confederate position.* On the 7th there was not so much as a skirmish. Frémont's pursuit had been checked the day before, and he was uncertain in what direction Jackson's main body had retreated. Shields, meanwhile, had the main body of his troops at Columbia Bridge, and had begun building a new bridge. Late in the day he learned from one of his patrols, which had managed to communicate with Frémont, that Jackson was retreating,* and he set out at once for Port Republic. His only fear was that he might not reach there in time to catch Jackson's troops. His instructions to his advance-guard commander show his elation and anxiety: "The enemy has flung away everything," said he, "and their stragglers fill the mountain. They need only a movement on their flank to panic-strike them and break them into fragments. No man has had such a chance since the war commenced."*

Owing to the bad condition of the road his command was already split into several distinct fractions, although McDowell had cautioned him to keep it together and not to let Jackson defeat it in detail. His leading brigade was south of Conrad's Store; a second was some miles in rear; and two had been stopped at Luray, in consequence of a report that Longstreet with 8,000 Confederates was crossing the Blue Ridge by Thornton's Gap.

The night of June 7 the hostile forces were thus situated: Shields's command was stretched out over twenty-five miles of road in Luray Valley; Frémont was at Harrisonburg; Ewell's Confederate division was near Cross Keys; and Jackson's main body was near Port Republic.* Jackson might easily have escaped with his army on the 7th by way of Port Republic, burning the bridge behind him, and Brown's Gap; but he had other designs in mind. He wanted to defeat Frémont and Shields separately. His plan was to hold Frémont back at Cross Keys with Ewell's division, overwhelm Shields with his main body, then fall upon Frémont with his entire force. He knew that Frémont's command was much the stronger of the two Federal columns.

(113) Ewell placed his troops along a wooded height behind the insignificant brook known as Mill Creek. Trimble's brigade held the right of his line. Before 9 a.m. on the 8th June his outposts were driven in; and by ten o'clock the Fed-

*Henderson.

eral artillery had opened from the heights on the other side of the brook. Frémont's force greatly outnumbered Ewell's in every arm; but the Federal commander supposed he had Jackson's entire army in front of him, and he did not know where Shields was. He had heard nothing from that general for three or four days. In his uncertainty Frémont made his attack in a timid, half-hearted fashion. Of twenty-four regiments present on the field he sent forward five, only, to the assault. These assailed the Confederate right and were repulsed. The action along the rest of the line was not serious. Milroy and Schenck, who fought so well at McDowell, had started to assault the left of the Confederate line, but were recalled by Frémont. (114) The two hostile lines bivouacked that night within sight of each other. This action is known as the battle of Cross Keys.

(112) Earlier the same day Shields's advanced cavalry, through the failure of the Confederate cavalry to guard the road in the valley of the South Fork, got into Port Republic and came near capturing the Confederate trains and Stonewall Jackson himself. It was, however, driven off.

Before six o'clock the next morning, June 9, Jackson's army, except part of Ewell's division, was crossing the streams at Port Republic on its way to attack Shields. (115) Less than two miles down the river two Federal Brigades under Tyler were found in position. Tyler's right rested on the river and his left on a ravine. Here the battle of Port Republic took place. The Stonewall Brigade assaulted the Union line in front and engaged it in a fierce action. The battle lasted for four or five hours. Jackson concluded that he should not be able to defeat Tyler, then return to the other side and overwhelm Frémont; so he ordered all of Ewell's troops to the right bank, and had the bridge at Port Republic burnt. Finally "Dick" Taylor's brigade of Ewell's division, having succeeded in turning the Federal left, and the rest of Ewell's division having come to reinforce the Confederate line, Tyler was forced to quit the field. He was pursued nearly to Conrad's Store. There he met Shields, who was hurrying with the rest of his division to the sound of the battle. Shields formed line and stopped the pursuit.

(112) Before midnight Jackson's entire army was in bivouac at Brown's Gap, and the Valley Campaign was at an end. Here Jackson's army was in direct communication with Richmond; here it remained until June the 17th, when it set

out upon its swift and secret journey to the Chickahominy.

Jackson's counter-stroke at Cross Keys and Port Republic again upset the plans of President Lincoln and Mr. Stanton, and caused them to reverse their orders. Two days before the battle of Cross Keys the division of McDowell's corps left at Fredericksburg had been dispatched to McClellan by water; and on the very day of that battle, the 8th June, McDowell was ordered to join McClellan as speedily as possible with the rest of his corps. The same day Frémont was ordered by telegraph to halt at Harrisonburg. Before these orders reached their destination Frémont and Shields had both been defeated. Thereupon McDowell's order was revoked, and he was directed to leave Shields's division at Luray and his other division at Front Royal. Frémont, feeling himself too exposed at Harrisonburg, fell back to Mount Jackson.

COMMENTS.

(107) The operations carried on during this summer of 1862 in the theater between the Alleghanies and Chesapeake Bay, considered as a whole, present as fine an example as is to be found in the history of warfare, of the strategical advantage of interior lines intelligently employed, over exterior lines unintelligently employed. We shall see later, in our studies of von Moltke's campaigns, how the case may be reversed; how exterior lines with separate lines of operation may be turned to profit by a master of the art of war.

The Federal armies occupied the perimeter of an irregular curve reaching from the James River below Richmond round through Fredericksburg, Manassas, Harper's Ferry, and up the valley of the South Branch of the Potomac. This line was not rigid, it is true; it oscillated more or less in consonance with Stonewall Jackson's movements. Upon the line there were McClellan's army, nearly 100,000 strong; McDowell's corps, 30,000 to 40,000; the troops within the defenses of Washington, 20,000 to 30,000; Banks's army, 15,000 to 20,000; and Frémont's, 15,000,—in all, more than 200,000 soldiers. Opposed to this force, on the inside of the curve, the Confederates numbered, all told, hardly more than 100,000 at any time. If these widely scattered Union forces had all been collected into two or three armies, under a single head, and moved in intelligent combination against a single objective, the main Confederate army or Richmond, what chance of escape would

there have been for this army or the Confederate capital? It should seem that it would have required no great knowledge of the principles of strategy to unite those Union armies and crush their weak foe; but it was Mr. Stanton's lack of just that much military knowledge that enabled Lee and Jackson to keep the Federal armies apart; that enabled them first to defeat Frémont west of the Alleghanies, then Banks, then Frémont and Shields on opposite sides of the rivers at Port Republic; then, finally, to throw every man against McClellan astride the Chickahominy.

The Valley Campaign was, from beginning to end, only secondary to the campaign in eastern Virginia. It was only a strategic diversion; but of such no finer study can be found in modern war. If McDowell with his 30,000 to 40,000 troops had joined the Union army on the Chickahominy Richmond must inevitably have fallen, and with it, in all human probability, the Confederacy. "Three times was McDowell to have marched to join McClellan: first, at the beginning of April [1862], when he was held back by Kernstown; second, on May 26, when he was held back by Front Royal and Winchester; third, on June 25, when he was held back by Jackson's disappearance after Port Republic."*

Johnston and Lee must be credited with conceiving the idea of making a diversion in the Shenandoah Valley in favor of the Confederate main army. It was Johnston that sent Jackson to the Valley in the autumn of 1861, and left him there, when he withdrew the main Confederate army from the neighborhood of Centreville in the spring of 1862. He gave Jackson orders "to endeavor to employ the invaders in the Valley, without exposing himself to the danger of defeat, by keeping so near the enemy as to prevent his making any considerable detachment to reinforce McClellan."† These instructions were noway so definite or positive as those given to Patterson by General Scott a few months earlier, directing him to prevent Johnston from quitting the Valley to go to Beauregard's help at Manassas; yet, how differently the two generals carried out their instructions! Johnston went to Beauregard's aid just in the nick of time; Banks not only never left the Valley, except when Jackson chose to drive him out of it, but other Federal troops had to be sent into the Valley more than once.

"To Lee belongs still further credit. From the moment he

*Henderson.

†Johnston's *Narrative*.

assumed command we find the Confederate operations directed on a definite and well-directed plan; a defensive attitude around Richmond, a vigorous offensive in the Valley, leading to the dispersion of the enemy, and a Confederate concentration on the Chickahominy. . . . From Lee, too, came the suggestion that a blow should be struck at Banks; that he should be driven to the Potomac; and that the North should be threatened with invasion." He sent Ewell with 8,000 men to Jackson; later he dispatched Whiting to him with 7,000 men from Richmond, in order to deceive the enemy, just before Jackson set out on his movement to Richmond.* This was all good strategy; but neither Johnston nor Lee had anything to do with Jackson's method of carrying out their general instructions. The plan of operations in the Valley, and its execution, were Jackson's own work. And those operations considered by themselves, apart from their relation to the main campaign in Virginia, are full of fine lessons in strategy and tactics. Lord Wolseley, late Commander-in-Chief of the British army, has published his opinion of them: "These brilliant successes," he wrote, "appear to me models of the kind, both in conception and execution. They should be closely studied by all officers who wish to learn the art and science of war."†

When the Civil War broke out there was not a man of suitable age in America who was qualified by experience to command a brigade in the field. Those, like General Scott, who had commanded considerable numbers of men, and had proved themselves fit, were too old. Nobody else had ever commanded more than a few hundreds. There had been no peace maneuvers to educate generals. Some had studied a few text-books on the military art, and one at least, General Halleck, had even published such a text-book. Yet, if we judge by their early performances in this war, we must conclude that only a few seem to have profited by their studies. Jackson was preëminent among that few.

One of his staff officers says Jackson always carried three books in his saddle-pockets: the Bible, Webster's Dictionary, and Napoleon's Maxims. He took as the model of his reports Joshua's account of the battle with the Amalekites.* Cromwell also carried a Bible, and Marlborough was weak in spelling. Jackson had seriously and intelligently studied

*Henderson.

†*North American Review*, Vol. 149, No. 2, p. 166.

Napoleon's campaigns; and there is no doubt at all that he made Napoleon's methods his models. One cannot follow his operations in the Valley without being constantly reminded of two of Napoleon's most brilliant campaigns; to wit, his Italian campaign of 1796, but more particularly his campaign against Blücher and Schwarzenburg in 1814. In both of those campaigns Napoleon, like Jackson, commanded comparatively small forces; and like Jackson he kept his enemy in two or more bodies, and defeated them in detail.

Jackson himself had some maxims that are as worthy of a place in the student's note-book as Napoleon's were worthy of room in Jackson's saddle-pockets. Here are a few of them:

1. "Always mystify, mislead, and surprise the enemy if possible;

2. "When you strike him and overcome him never give up the pursuit as long as your men have strength to follow; for an enemy routed, if hotly pursued, becomes panic-stricken, and can be destroyed by half their number;

3. "Never fight against heavy odds if by any possible maneuvering you can hurl your whole force on only a part, and that the weakest part, of your enemy, and crush it;*

4. "To move swiftly, strike vigorously, and secure all the fruits of victory is the secret of successful war;

5. "A defensive campaign can only be made successful by taking the aggressive at the proper time. Napoleon never waited for his adversary to become fully prepared, but struck him the first blow;

6. "I had rather lose one man in marching than five in battle."† This maxim had reference to the terrific marching he exacted of his "foot-cavalry," as his infantry was sometimes styled, in order to gain advantage in battle. Often his men fell out by scores; "but the marches which strewed the wayside with the footsore and the weaklings won his battles."†

There was no other series of operations in the Civil War, covering the same length of time, that presented on the one hand as many brilliant features, and on the other as many examples of blunders to be avoided, as the operations in and about the Valley of the Shenandoah, from the time when Jackson left the neighborhood of Swift Run Gap, April 30, 1862, up to the time when he disappeared into the mountains at Brown's Gap on the night of June 9. By making demonstra-

*B. & L.—Imboden.

†Henderson.

tions with his cavalry against Banks's detachment at Harrisonburg and New Market, on the 29th and 30th of April, then marching in the mud a few miles up Luray Valley, then crossing Blue Ridge to the railway at Mechum's River Station, Jackson completely mystified and misled the enemy, and fell upon Milroy and Schenck at McDowell before Banks or Frémont, or Stanton at Washington, had any notion where he was.

Banks fell back to Strasburg, and Milroy and Schenck were driven back upon Frémont at Franklin. Then Jackson returned to the Valley; and his movement was so thoroughly screened by Ashby's cavalry that Frémont thought he was still in his front; and Banks had no idea where he was until he had flung his army across the Massanutters, united it with Ewell, and hurled the combined force upon Kenly, overwhelming him at Front Royal.

Then he chased Banks beyond the Potomac and threatened to cross that river, thus throwing Washington and the whole North into a panic. This induced Mr. Stanton to order McDowell and Frémont to Strasburg in order to cut off his retreat. Although Frémont had got within twenty-five miles, and Shields within twelve miles of Strasburg when the head of Jackson's army was twenty-five miles and his rear-guard fifty miles from that town, Jackson managed, with swift marching and the uncertainty and hesitation of Frémont and Shields to slip between them, and make good his escape, without the loss of a regiment, or a wagon of his seven-mile train of captured stores and munitions.

From Front Royal McDowell made the mistake of sending only one division, Shields's, up Luray Valley to cut off Jackson's retreat or fall upon his flank; and Shields made the mistake of stringing his division out for twenty-five miles on the road. Jackson was quick to take advantage of those blunders. He had all the bridges over the South Fork destroyed, except the one upon his line of retreat at Port Republic. That one he seized and held, thus preventing the junction of Frémont and Shields, and enabling him to beat them separately and drive them back.

Then Jackson disappeared into the mountains. He had produced another scare in Washington, and induced the Secretary of War, for the third time, to revoke the order for McDowell to join McClellan. It was at the time, too, when McClellan needed McDowell most; for when Jackson reappeared he was

upon McClellan's flank, and Lee had begun his offensive operations.

In all of his operations Jackson made the most effective use of his cavalry. Twice only did it fail him; first in the pursuit of Banks from Strasburg to Winchester; and secondly in the pursuit after the action at Winchester. In both of those instances failure was due to a lack of that discipline which comes only of systematic training. In that, of course, the Virginian horsemen, from their brilliant leader down to the last trooper, were deficient. But in the methods that Jackson taught them, in boldness, in swiftness, in endurance, in the knowledge of the country, in the duties of "security and information,"—screening and reconnaissance,—in action, whether afoot or horseback,—generally speaking, in cavalry efficiency, they have not been excelled by any cavalry of which history has kept the record. No cavalry officer that wishes to know the full value of his arm, when rightly employed, can neglect to study the story of Ashby's work in the Valley.

LECTURE XII.

THE SECOND BATTLE OF BULL RUN.

(116) The failure of Frémont and Banks and McDowell in their operations against Stonewall Jackson in the Valley convinced the President that their three armies ought to be under the orders of a single commander in the field. Accordingly he issued an order on the 26th of June, 1862, consolidating the three armies of McDowell, Banks, and Frémont into a single army. McDowell, Banks, and Frémont all ranked Pope; who had gained a reputation by his capture of New Madrid and Island No. 10, was called from the West to command the new army. McDowell, Banks, and Frémont all ranked Pope; Frémont refused to serve under him and resigned. He was succeeded by General Sigel. Pope's army numbered about 47,000.

The task of the Army of Virginia, as set forth in orders to Pope, "was threefold: to 'cover the City of Washington from any attack from the direction of Richmond; to make such dispositions as were necessary to assure the safety of the Valley of the Shenandoah; and at the same time so to operate on the enemy's lines of communication in the direction of Gordonsville and Charlottesville as to draw off, if possible, a considerable force of the enemy from Richmond, and thus relieve the operations against that city of the Army of the Potomac.' ""*

The very day on which the order issued organizing the Army of Virginia, June 26, 1862, Lee began the turning movement at Mechanicsville that ended with the retreat of McClellan's army and its concentration at Harrison's Landing.

At this time the armies of Banks and Frémont, now corps of the Army of Virginia, were at Middletown and Strasburg in the Shenandoah Valley. McDowell's two divisions, which we left at Luray and Front Royal at the close of the Valley Campaign, were now at Manassas Junction and Falmouth, respectively. Harrisonburg, Charlottesville, and Gordonsville were occupied by Confederate troops.

*Ropes.

GEOGRAPHY.

The Rappahannock River and its branch, the Rapidan, flowing eastward between the regions occupied by the Army of Virginia and the Confederate troops, although they were fordable at many points during the dry season, and were bridged at some points, were, none the less, sufficiently formidable as military obstacles to serve as defensive lines for an army. North and west of Gordonsville the country was mountainous, and the entire theater was more or less thickly covered with forests. The Bull Run Mountains, like the Blue Ridge, could be crossed only at certain passes, or "gaps." The highways were mainly earthen roads, fairly good in dry weather, but muddy and difficult in wet weather. There were a few macadam roads, like the Warrenton-Alexandria Pike, and the Little River Turnpike through Aldie Gap.

The Manassas Gap and the Orange and Alexandria Railways, which come together at Manassas Junction, served as the lines of communication for the Union armies in this region with their base at Washington; while the Virginia Central Railway, which connected with the Orange and Alexandria at Gordonsville, and with the East Tennessee and Virginia at Charlottesville, was the main line by which the Confederate army in Virginia received its supplies from the Southwestern States, and kept up communication between Richmond and the western part of Virginia. The Junctions at Manassas, Gordonsville, and Charlottesville were, therefore, important strategic points. As Gordonsville was near enough to the region occupied by the Federal troops to be particularly exposed to capture, its protection was a matter of special concern to Lee.

OPERATIONS.

(117) Pope, believing that he could best perform his threefold task by assembling the widely separated parts of his army at some central position, issued orders at once for Banks and Sigel to move to Sperryville and Little Washington, and for Ricketts's division of McDowell's corps to move from Manassas to Warrenton. In these positions he would cover the approaches to the Shenandoah Valley and Washington, and threaten Gordonsville and Charlottesville. Pope would have liked, also, to close in King's division of McDowell's corps from

Falmouth; but the National Government had depots and warehouses and wharves at Aquia Creek, and for their protection it required Pope to hold on to Falmouth; and hence to keep his army stretched upon a much wider front than he ought to have covered.

Early in July Pope's army was concentrated as ordered. Meantime Burnside had brought up an army from North Carolina, and had it in camp at Fort Monroe; and McClellan's army had fallen back to Harrison's Landing. General Pope was still in Washington, where he was detained by the President as his military adviser. He ordered Banks to send forward his cavalry to occupy Culpeper, and "to throw out pickets for at least twenty miles in the direction of Gordonsville."

On the 14th of July General John P. Hatch, with the cavalry of Banks's corps, was ordered to seize Gordonsville, then held by about 200 Confederate infantry and a few cavalry.* Hatch encumbered himself with field artillery and a wagon-train which so hindered his march that Stonewall Jackson arrived ahead of him. (118) Jackson had been started by Lee from Richmond with two divisions on July 13 for Gordonsville. He reached that town on the 19th. Thus one of Pope's objects had been achieved—he had induced Lee to send away one of his best generals and a large force. The capture of Richmond was made so much easier for McClellan.

But McClellan was not to be allowed to make another effort against Richmond. On the 11th of July General Halleck was appointed General-in-Chief of all the land forces in the United States, and was called to Washington from Mississippi. Toward the end of July Halleck visited McClellan at Harrison's Landing, and, after looking over the situation and discussing the matter with McClellan, determined, much against McClellan's protest, to withdraw the Army of the Potomac from the James, and unite it with the Army of Virginia. The order for the withdrawal was issued on August the 3rd. From that moment Pope's army, which had been organized for the purpose of playing a secondary part, was to have the principal rôle in the campaign; the Army of the Potomac was, thereafter, to play the secondary part.

General Halleck had proposed that the two armies should unite at Fredericksburg. "Here," said General Halleck, "the armies would find a new base on the Rappahannock River,

*Alexander.

nearer to Richmond than Yorktown, and one which, being 'between Richmond and Washington,' " would cover Washington from any attack by the enemy.* At the same time he ordered Burnside to transfer his army from Fort Monroe to Aquia Creek.

Pope remained in Washington till Halleck's return from Harrison's Landing; then, with a full understanding of Halleck's change of plan, he joined his army at Sperryville on the 1st of August. (119) He began at once issuing orders for the movement of his troops, and, after a good deal of unnecessary marching, and many changes in his orders, he finally got his army together at Culpeper by about the 12th of August. Burnside had reached Falmouth with his force on the 5th.

Meantime Jackson had been eager to attack the first one of Pope's corps to arrive at Culpeper. Could he defeat it "and occupy that central position in time, he might deal with the other two in succession, as he had dealt with Frémont and Shields at Port Republic."† To enable him to take the aggressive Lee had sent him A. P. Hill's division. This raised his strength to 24,000 men. So on the 7th of August he started for Culpeper. The distance was only about thirty miles; but by reason of slow marching, and confusion caused by defects in the orders he gave his division commanders, it was not until about noon of the 9th that his advance reached Cedar (or Slaughter) Mountain, seven or eight miles south of Culpeper. (120) Here he encountered Union cavalry under Bayard, and the whole of Banks's corps, which had been sent forward by Pope to support the cavalry. When only two of Jackson's divisions were on the ground Banks attacked them furiously. He routed the left of their line and threw a whole division into confusion. But A. P. Hill arrived on the field with his division in time to turn the scale and save the day.† Banks had gone into the combat without reserves and had not sent back to ask for reinforcements. So his unaided corps was "utterly overwhelmed and driven back with great loss."* It was now dark, but Jackson pursued Banks by moonlight across Cedar Creek. Here he came upon Ricketts's division of McDowell's corps in line of battle, and was checked. Meantime Jackson's cavalry had brought in prisoners from Sigel's corps. Thus Jackson learned that the last of Pope's three corps was close at hand,

*Ropes.

†Alexander.

and that he had lost, by the slowness of his march, the chance of defeating them one at a time.*

The hostile forces stood for two days watching each other. Jackson hoped Pope would attack him in position. (121) Failing this he fell back all the way to Gordonsville, hoping that Pope would be tempted by this apparent "confession of weakness" and Pope's "own boastings" to come forward and assault him.* But Pope stopped behind the Rapidan. Here he was joined on the 15th of August by General Reno with 8,000 men of Burnside's forces. This reinforcement increased Pope's assembled army to 45,000.

The same day, the 15th of August, General Lee himself arrived at Gordonsville. While McClellan's army had been embarking at Harrison's Landing Lee's troops had been hastening toward Gordonsville. Longstreet started from Richmond on the 13th; Stuart's cavalry and all the rest of the army, except two brigades left to guard the Southern capital against cavalry raids, soon followed.

(122) Lee now had about 55,000 effectives. His army was not well organized like the Union army. Instead of being divided into corps it was separated into two wings under Jackson and Longstreet.* Lee resolved to strike Pope's army before it could be joined by McClellan's. Pope's army, with its center at Cedar Mountain, rested its flanks upon Robertson's River and the Rapidan, respectively, four or five miles above and below the crossing of the Orange and Alexandria Railway. Nearly opposite Pope's left flank on the southern side of the Rapidan was a high wooded hill called Clark's Mountain, with spurs stretching down the river to Somerville Ford, about three miles below. On the 17th of August Lee had his army massed behind this mountain. His purpose was "to cross at Somerville Ford, fall upon Pope's left flank and sweep around it with a superior force, cutting off Pope's retreat to Washington."* From this position behind Clark's Mountain Lee was almost as near Culpeper and the railway beyond as the front of Pope's army was; and he planned to have Stuart's cavalry cross at a ford farther to the eastward, dash for Rappahannock Station, and destroy the bridge behind Pope's position. Failure on the part of Fitzhugh Lee to understand, or to carry out promptly, an order of Stuart, caused a delay, and also occasioned the capture of an officer

*Alexander.

bearing a copy of Lee's order.* Thus Pope learned Lee's project, and he withdrew his army behind the Rappahannock before Lee could put the project into effect.

Lee advanced to the Rappahannock which he found low and easily fordable. He now undertook to turn Pope's right, and spent five days vainly making feints for a favorable opening. Meantime Stuart had made a bold raid in rear of the Union army and captured Pope's headquarters. By this means Lee learned that the corps of Heintzelman [third] and Porter [Fifth], and Reynolds's division of Pennsylvania Reserves, 20,000 men all told, were already within two days' march of Pope's position, and that the rest of the Army of the Potomac, as well as other reinforcements, was not more than five days behind. Thus within five days Pope would have nearly 130,000 troops. Lee's only hope of success depended upon his doing something quickly. Further to add to his embarrassment a heavy rainfall had made the Rappahannock unfordable.†

(123) Lee quickly decided to strike at Pope's communications by a wide turning movement to the left; he started Jackson's wing and Stuart's cavalry, some 24,000 men in all, to make the movement. With the rest of his army, 25,000 to 30,000 men,‡ he remained to occupy Pope's attention on the Rappahannock.

Jackson started on the morning of the 25th of August. He marched through Amissville and Orleans, and bivouacked that night at Salem. The next day [the 26th] he pushed on through Thoroughfare Gap and Gainesville to Bristoe Station, meeting no resistance and reaching that place about sunset. Stuart's cavalry and two regiments of infantry captured Manassas Junction that night, with several hundred prisoners and large depots of quartermaster's and commissary supplies.

Pope and his officers saw Jackson's column moving northward on the morning of the 25th, and concluded that it must be making for the Shenandoah Valley, perhaps covering the flank of Lee's main body, which might be marching toward Front Royal.* No troops were sent in pursuit. Pope's army remained at rest on the 26th also. (124) On the 26th Lee followed Jackson with the rest of the Confederate army, and that night Longstreet's wing bivouacked at Orleans.

"Report of Jackson's raid on the railroad was made to Pope

*Alexander.

†Alexander. Ropes.

‡Ropes.

early in the evening of the 26th. Pope at first thought it must be the work of a small force; but upon the receipt of further information he appreciated the gravity of the situation, and on the morning of the 27th issued orders for the abandonment of the line of the Rappahannock.* (125) Hooker's division of Heintzelman's corps was ordered to move directly to Manassas, to drive away the enemy and reopen communication with Alexandria. McDowell with his own and Sigel's corps and Reynolds's division was ordered to Gainesville; Heintzelman with Reno's corps and Kearny's division of his own corps was ordered to Greenwich in support of McDowell; Porter was ordered to move on Manassas as soon as he should be relieved by Banks, who was to have charge of the wagon-trains.

McDowell and Heintzelman reached their respective positions without opposition; Hooker encountered Ewell's division of Jackson's wing, at about 2 p.m., holding the line of Broad Run at Bristoe Station, and covering the rest of Jackson's force, which was destroying the stores at Manassas. Ewell had more men than Hooker; but his orders were to avoid bringing on a general engagement, and Hooker's attack was vigorous; so after an hour of resistance Ewell retreated to Manassas.†

In the course of the day [the 27th] a small force had been sent by rail from Alexandria under the supposition that there was only a Confederate raiding party at Manassas. This force was repulsed and its commander, General Taylor, was killed.

Pope now perceived that the whole of Jackson's command was at Manassas, so he issued orders with a view to cut it off and capture or destroy it. He ordered Porter to march at 1 a.m. [the 28th] from Warrenton Junction to Bristoe; Heintzelman to move Kearny's division and unite it with his other division [Hooker] at Bristoe; Reno to march his troops direct from Greenwich to Manassas; and McDowell to march his own and Sigel's corps and Reynolds's division from Gainesville to Manassas, resting his right on the railway and extending his left well to the east so as to intercept Jackson in case he attempted to retreat to the north. McDowell was not ordered to move until daylight of the 28th. Pope's orders took no account of the rest of Lee's army, which was but a long day's march behind Jackson and bivouacked the night of the 27th at White Plains. But McDowell took the responsibility of order-

*Ropes.

†Alexander.

ing one of his divisions [Ricketts] to take position in front of Thoroughfare Gap, to oppose the passage of Lee's forces.

(126) Jackson did not wait at Manassas to be destroyed. During the night [27-28] he sent Taliaferro's division northward by the Sudley Springs road, to cross Warrenton Pike and take a position north of Groveton. Here it was joined on the morning of the 28th by Ewell's division, which left Manassas at dawn, crossed Bull Run at Blackburn's Ford, marched through the fields to the Stone Bridge, and recrossed to the right bank. Later in the day A. P. Hill's division also rejoined. It had left Manassas at 1 a.m. and marched to Centreville, and thence westward on the Warrenton Pike. Hill and Ewell, but especially Hill, had been sent by these roundabout routes for the purpose of misleading Pope as to the destination of the Confederates.

About noon on the 28th Pope himself reached Manassas. He found the place deserted, and could learn nothing of Jackson's movements. Later in the day he received reports that Hill had been seen at Centreville, and that Confederate cavalry had been raiding between Bull Run and Alexandria. At 4.15 p.m. Pope issued orders directing all his troops to march on Centreville, whither he supposed Jackson's entire force had gone.

The corps of Heintzelman and Reno marched straight for Centreville; Sigel's corps and Reynolds's division counter-marched to Warrenton Pike, but did not cross Bull Run; King's division of McDowell's corps, which was not far south of the Pike when it received the order to march on Centreville, turned eastward on the Pike. This division found Jackson's position. As it marched along on the turnpike it was suddenly fired upon by artillery from the north, at about 5.30 p.m. Immediately afterwards Jackson attacked it with the divisions of Taliaferro and Ewell. A fierce fight ensued which lasted till nine o'clock. The losses were very heavy on both sides.

"Jackson, about a mile from the road, might have remained hidden and allowed King to pass. Had he known that at that moment Lee and Longstreet were still beyond Thoroughfare Gap, and that Ricketts's division of McDowell's corps was at the Gap, one might suppose that he would hesitate to disclose himself. But if Pope was allowed to withdraw behind Bull Run the result of the whole campaign would be merely to force Pope into an impregnable position. It was the fear of this

which led Jackson to attack King immediately, even though he knew it would draw upon him Pope's whole force."*

News of this action was at once sent to Pope, and he jumped to the conclusion that Jackson had quit Centreville and was in full retreat for Thoroughfare Gap; and that King had met the head of his column. Pope "therefore at once issued orders for the assembling of his troops on the Warrenton turnpike." In his orders he wrote: "Genl. McDowell has intercepted the retreat of the enemy and is now in his front, Sigel on the right of McDowell. Unless he can escape by by-paths leading to the north tonight, he must be captured."† Meantime the head of Longstreet's column had reached Thoroughfare Gap at 3 p.m. of this day [the 28th August]. Finding his passage at the Gap blocked by the enemy [Ricketts's division of McDowell's corps], Longstreet sent detachments round by way of Hopewell Gap and a cattle trail to turn Ricketts's position. Ricketts, therefore, at nightfall retired to Gainesville. The two divisions of McDowell's corps [King and Ricketts] were this night reunited, and Reynold's division and Sigel's corps were in supporting distance to the right. But McDowell was away looking for Pope; so King, without any orders, started at 1 a.m. with his division for Manassas, and Ricketts marched his at the same time on Bristoe.

(127) On the morning of the 29th Pope's troops, worn out by marching and countermarching, were badly scattered. Sigel's corps and Reynolds's division were the only troops near Jackson's position. They were on Bull Run, two miles east of Jackson's position. The corps of Banks and Porter, and Ricketts's division of McDowell's corps were at Bristoe; King's division of McDowell's corps was at Manassas; Reno's and Heintzelman's corps were at Centreville. There was nothing to keep Longstreet from marching through Gainesville to join Jackson.

With a view of preventing his escape Sigel and Reynolds were ordered to attack Jackson at daybreak [the 29th]; Heintzelman and Reno were ordered to reinforce Sigel and Reynolds; Porter was ordered to march to Centreville. McDowell's two divisions [Ricketts and King] were supposed by Pope to be blocking Jackson's retreat on Warrenton Pike. Pope himself was at Centreville.

When Pope learned that King and Ricketts had fallen back

*Alexander.

†Ropes.

during the night he was surprised and greatly incensed. Hoping still to cut off Jackson's supposed retreat, he sent the following order to Porter: "Push forward with your corps and King's division, which you will take with you, upon Gainesville. I am following the enemy down the Warrenton Turnpike. Be expeditious or we will lose much."* Porter was east of Manassas on his way to Centreville, carrying out Pope's last order to him, when he received this order. He immediately turned about and directed his march upon Gainesville.

(128) About noon Porter and McDowell were together on the Manassas-Gainesville road, when they received a joint order from Pope directing them to move on Gainesville, but adding: "I desire that as soon as communication is established between" the troops on the right "and your own the whole command shall halt. It may be necessary to fall back behind Bull Run at Centreville tonight."

Pope's idea when he wrote that order was to capture or destroy Jackson, and then to fall back and take up a strong position at Centreville before Lee's main body could arrive on the scene. But if Jackson had escaped he was not to be pursued beyond Gainesville. Pope added: "The indications are that the whole force of the enemy,"—*i. e.*, Lee's main body,—"*is moving in this direction at a pace that will bring them here [Centreville] by to-morrow night or the next day.*" Pope's joint order further read: "If any considerable advantages are to be gained by departing from this order it will not be strictly carried out."* At that moment McDowell had a dispatch in his pocket from General Buford, who commanded the Union cavalry on the right, saying that seventeen regiments, a battery, and 500 Confederate cavalry had passed through Gainesville from the west about 8.45 a.m. McDowell and Porter felt sure that Pope had not been aware of this fact when he wrote the order. After conferring together McDowell marched his corps up the Sudley Springs road and Porter took the Gainesville road. At Dawkins Branch Porter's column encountered the enemy. It was Longstreet's wing forming on Jackson's right. Porter deployed a part of his command and halted.

Meantime a battle was in progress to the north of Warrenton Pike. Jackson had placed his command in the cut of an unfinished railway, extending from near Sudley Springs southwesterly back of Groveton. His line was about two miles long. Sigel and Reynolds had attacked him first; later they had

*Ropes.

been joined by Heintzelman and Reno. It was 2 p.m. before the battle had reached its height. All during the afternoon portions of Jackson's line were assaulted; but the assaults were not made by all the troops at once; first one division, or part of a division, would charge, and then another. All failed. The weak part of Jackson's line was his left flank. "Pope might have turned this early in the afternoon when Heintzelman and Reno came up. But he made no attempt to do this." He made none but frontal attacks. At dusk King's division of McDowell's corps arrived and took part in the action; it was driven back by a part of Longstreet's force. "The Federal attacks had everywhere been repulsed, and the battle was over" for that day.*

(129) Pope was not aware until the close of the day that Longstreet had arrived and taken his place on Jackson's right. Toward sunset he had sent Porter an order to attack Jackson's right, not knowing that Longstreet's whole command stood between Porter and Jackson's right.

During the night the Confederates fell back to their original line of battle from the advanced position they had reached in following up their repulse of the enemy. This led Pope, as well as McDowell and Heintzelman, the next morning, the 30th, to believe that Lee had retreated toward Gainesville. So Pope issued at noon an order for the "vigorous pursuit of the enemy." McDowell was "assigned to the command of the pursuit," in which his own corps, Reynolds's division, and Porter's corps were to be employed.* (130) Pope had massed nearly all of his army north of the Pike. Porter was to move on the Pike followed by Reynolds. Ricketts's division and Heintzelman's corps were to follow the Sudley Springs-Haymarket road.

Hardly had the troops started before they discovered that the Confederates were not retreating, but were awaiting attack in their strong position. The Confederate line formed an obtuse reëntrant angle, with Jackson's wing on the left in the railway cut, and Longstreet's on the right, the greater part of it south of the Turnpike. Most of the Confederate artillery occupied a high position in the space between the ends of Jackson's and Longstreet's positions. These guns had a clear sweep of the ground between the southern end of Jackson's line and the woods out of which Porter's corps must advance to attack it.

*Ropes.

Reynolds's division was posted on Bald Hill, and other troops were placed on the Henry House Hill to hold the National left and to guard against an attack on that flank, which, if successful, would cut off Pope's line of retreat. Porter, at the center, assaulted Jackson's position; but he was overwhelmed by the Confederate artillery and musketry fire, and repulsed. (131) Thereupon Longstreet advanced his right and captured Bald Hill, from which Reynolds's division had been previously withdrawn by Pope to support Porter. Sigel's corps, which had been in reserve, made great efforts to recover this hill; but without success.

? Reynolds's division, Sykes's brigade of regulars, and other available troops had been sent to the Henry House Hill. The Confederates under Toombs and Wilcox and others made repeated and desperate efforts to carry this position, but failed. The fighting lasted till after dark. Meantime Jackson, having repulsed Porter's charge, was pushing his troops against the Federals north of the turnpike. This part of the Federal line had been so much weakened by sending troops from it to the left that it was unable to arrest Jackson's advance, and was driven from the field. Thus ended the Second Battle of Bull Run.

The retention of the Henry House Hill by the Union forces secured their retreat over Bull Run by the Stone Bridge and the neighboring fords.

(132) The next morning, August 31, Pope's army took position on the heights of Centreville. Banks rejoined with his corps of 9,000, which had taken no part in the battle, but had brought the wagon-train with much-needed supplies safe to Fairfax Court House. Franklin and Sumner, also, with their corps from the Army of the Potomac, reported to Pope at Centreville, having marched out from Alexandria.

Stuart had started with his cavalry at daybreak to recover touch with the Union army, and he soon reported to Lee that it was in position at Centreville. Lee resolved to turn the Union right by the Little River Turnpike. So Jackson moved out in the afternoon [Sunday, August 31] by way of Sudley Springs, and that night bivouacked at Pleasant Valley, about four miles west of Chantilly on the Little River Turnpike. Longstreet followed later in the day, but halted for the night near Sudley Springs.

Foreseeing the possibility of a turning movement by way of the Little River Turnpike, Pope sent out a brigade of infantry

early in the morning of September the 1st to reconnoiter—there being actually no cavalry with his army fit for service. Before long he received report that such a movement of the enemy was in progress. At noon, therefore, he ordered McDowell to march his corps rapidly to Fairfax Court House, and to occupy Germantown. Shortly afterwards he dispatched General Stevens with two brigades across the fields to the Little River Turnpike, with orders to “take a position across it,” and to hold the Confederate force in check.

At Ox Hill Stevens encountered Jackson’s command, and a desperate fight took place. Stevens was killed almost at the start. Finally Kearny arrived with his division; still the Union force was greatly outnumbered by the Confederates. Kearny, mistaking the Confederate troops for Federals in the woods and the darkness of evening, rode right into their midst and was killed. Night put an end to the combat, which is known as the battle of Chantilly.

During the night the Union troops retired to Germantown and Fairfax Court House. Upon the recommendation of General Pope Halleck issued orders on September the 2nd for the withdrawal of the Union army to the intrenchments in front of Washington, there to reorganize. Pope reported that evening to Halleck that the troops would be within the works by the morning of the 3rd. Pope’s campaign in Virginia was at an end.

The losses of the whole campaign, most of which took place in the great battle, were as follows:

Confederates: 1,553 killed, 7,812 wounded, 109 missing; total, 9,474.

Federals: 1,747 killed, 8,452 wounded, and 4,263 captured or missing; total, 14,462.*

The Confederates collected thirty guns and 20,000 small-arms from the field of Bull Run.†

An unhappy incident of this battle was the trial of General Fitz-John Porter by court-martial. Pope preferred charges against him for not obeying the order to attack Jackson late in the afternoon of the 29th of August. There were other minor charges. Porter was dismissed from the service, and the Union army thereby lost one of its very best generals. General Alexander says: “The ex-Federal Confederates who had known Porter considered this result as one of the best fruits

*B. & L.

†Alexander.

of the victory." To this day the question of General Porter's guilt or innocence is not settled in the minds of the American people. There are persons yet that cling to the belief in his martyrdom; there are others of this generation that have inherited the conviction that he ought to have been shot. Pope unquestionably made a scapegoat of him; General Alexander says Porter's "course was proper." My own opinion is that, while Porter could not do what Pope ordered him to do, he ought to have done something. He ought not to have stood idle with 10,000 men during a whole afternoon, while a battle was raging close at his right hand; that is virtually what he did. But if the South had been as severe with Stonewall Jackson for his shortcomings in the Seven Days' Campaign as the North was with Porter for his lesser offense on this 29th of August the victories of the Second Bull Run and Chancellorsville would not have been for Southern arms.

COMMENTS.

The President and Secretary Stanton were conforming to one of the first principles of war when they consolidated the three armies of Frémont, Banks, and McDowell into a single army with one head. "Nothing is so important in war as an undivided command."* And in view of the fact that Washington by reason of the electric telegraph was in such close communication with the armies in the field as, practically, to be inside the general theater of operations, they were further conforming to right principles in appointing a general-in-chief and keeping him at Washington. The theater of this war was so vast, extending from Pennsylvania to the Gulf of Mexico, and from the Atlantic Ocean to the Missouri River, that it was not possible for the Commander-in-Chief to mount a horse and, with his chief of staff at his side, follow the movements of the armies in the field, like the Prussian King with von Moltke in the Franco-German War.

And yet the armies in all this wide theater ought to have been controlled by one person from the very beginning, and continually; and that person ought to have been the best general in the service, and not a politician, nor a statesman. The politicians and statesmen on either side had plunged the country into war; it was now time for them to take a back seat

*Napoleon's *Maxim XLIV*.

and let the men with a knowledge of the science of war, if there were any such, conduct the campaigns.

That is precisely what the President and the Secretary were trying to do when they called General Halleck to Washington and made him general-in-chief. And it does not appear that they fettered him in any manner in his direction of the operations of the two armies at this time in Virginia—McClellan's and Pope's. The mistake the President, or the Secretary of War, made, was in the selection of their men, Halleck and Pope. Yet Mr. Lincoln and Mr. Stanton were not to blame for the choice. They were trying to pick the best generals; and so far success pointed to Halleck and Pope as the best.

That General Halleck made a mistake in withdrawing McClellan's army from the James River after it had established itself at Harrison's Landing is proved by the fact that General Grant, three years later, captured Petersburg and Richmond, and ended the war, upon the very lines of operation that McClellan proposed to follow,—south of the James River,—after seven other lines had been tried without success.

Pope's campaign should have had three distinct phases. First, under his original instructions "to cover the City of Washington; to assure the safety of the Valley of the Shenandoah"; and "to operate on the enemy's lines of communication in the direction of Gordonsville and Charlottesville" in order to assist McClellan's army by drawing away forces of the enemy from Richmond,—under these instructions Pope's operations should have been both offensive and defensive. But they should have been secondary to the operations of the Army of the Potomac. The main objective was Lee's army and Richmond; and the main army operating against this objective was, at this time, McClellan's and not Pope's. The dispositions made by Pope to carry out these instructions were good; he concentrated his army behind the Rapidan River and started a force forward to capture Gordonsville. The operation had the desired effect, too, inasmuch as it obliged Lee to detach Jackson from his army to the threatened point.

But Halleck changed the general plan of the campaign against Richmond, and withdrew McClellan's army from the James River for the purpose of uniting it with Pope's and sending the combined force against Richmond by a new and different line of operations. The withdrawal of McClellan's army set Lee's army free, for the time being, to move against Pope. With this change of situation the second phase of

Pope's campaign began; the character of his operations ought to have changed accordingly. From this moment until every corps of the Army of the Potomac had made the journey around by Aquia Creek, or by Alexandria, and united with his army, Pope ought to have confined himself strictly to a defensive rôle. He ought to have avoided a battle with Lee's army and, if necessary, continued to fall back even as far as beyond Bull Run. After the junction of the two armies he should have resumed offensive operations. This would have been the third phase.

During McClellan's withdrawal Pope ought not to have tried to hold the line of the Rapidan; this river was two days' march farther to the front than the Rappahannock, and—which was of more importance—it was nearly parallel to his line of communications, the Orange and Alexandria Railway from Culpeper Court House to the Rappahannock. The front of an army should be as nearly perpendicular to its line of communications as possible. Moreover, the topography, with Clark's Mountain and thick woods on the south side of the Rapidan, peculiarly lent itself to a Confederate turning movement.

Lee had prepared to turn Pope's left and intercept the railway when, luckily for Pope's army, a copy of the order detailing Lee's plan fell into Pope's hands. Thereupon Pope promptly withdrew behind the Rappahannock, which he ought to have done before. The Rappahannock is perpendicular to the line of the railway.

Pope was greatly hampered and annoyed by Halleck's insisting that he should hold Falmouth to protect the Government wharves and storehouses at Aquia Creek. It obliged Pope continually to pivot his army about that point and to keep it stretched out upon a front of some forty miles. And there was no real use of it. In the end the Union troops abandoned the place and themselves burned the wharves and storehouses.

Being prevented by the nature of Pope's position and the high water of the Rappahannock from turning Pope's flank Lee started Jackson on his raid against Pope's communications. Judged by its results this was certainly a brilliant movement; but judged by any principles of war it was a perilous thing to do. Only Pope's blunders saved it from failure. Not even the successful issue of the expedition can clear General Lee's reputation of the risk he took in ordering or permitting it. It is certainly not a safe example of strategy

for future commanders to copy. Lee's chief motive in sending Jackson with nearly half his army on this great turning movement was to induce Pope to make some move that would give him an opening to strike the Federal army before it was joined by the rest of the Army of the Potomac. So far as the cutting of Pope's communications—the destruction of the railway track and his depots at Manassas—was concerned, it cannot be seen but this could have been done just as well by Stuart's cavalry as by Jackson's wing. This destruction should, however, have had very little effect upon the campaign. There were at this time plenty of Union troops at Washington to reopen the communications within two days, and plenty of supplies at Washington to replace those destroyed at Manassas.

Moreover, Pope had another base at Aquia Creek. In a bombastic address published to his army on his taking command of it, Pope had said, "Let us discard such ideas" as "bases of supplies." Now was his time; indeed he needed to have very little worry about bases of supply. A general quick to take advantage of his adversary's mistakes, like Napoleon or Jackson, in Pope's place, might have let Lee march on to Manassas, or even to Washington, and, basing himself on Aquia Creek, have marched promptly upon Richmond, now defended by only two small brigades. The garrison and works of Washington were strong enough alone to hold out against Lee's army; but the Army of the Potomac was on its way thither, also, and would easily have reached there ahead of Lee. As the United States had full control of the sea, Pope could have shifted his base round the coast as he approached Richmond, like General Grant in his overland campaign of 1864. It must be said, however, that it is hardly likely the Washington authorities would have allowed Pope to undertake such a movement at this time; their fears concerning the capture of the city were too great.

Pope's first movements on finding the Confederate army split in two and Jackson in his rear were, however, certainly judicious. McDowell with about 40,000 men was sent to Gainesville and Heintzelman to Greenwich in support of him. These forces could cut off Jackson's retreat, and, with the Bull Run Mountains to hold, could keep back the rest of Lee's army, which was two days' march behind Jackson. In fact, here was the key to the situation. Here Pope had the opportunity to place his whole army between Lee's separated wings, and the choice of holding either wing with a "containing"

force and falling upon the other with the bulk of his troops. If Jackson had managed to escape at all he ought at least to have been made to lead his footsore command as far northward as Aldie Gap to do so. Meantime Longstreet's wing might have been overwhelmed.

From this time on Pope seems not to have had a "cool head." Napoleon's seventy-third Maxim says: "The first qualification in a general-in-chief is a cool head—that is, a head which receives just impressions, and estimates things and objects at their real value. He must not allow himself to be elated by good news, or depressed by bad. The impressions he receives either successively or simultaneously in the course of the day should be so classed as to take up only the exact place in his mind which they deserve to occupy; since it is upon a just comparison and consideration of the weight due to different impressions that the power of reasoning and of right judgment depends."

When Pope learned that Jackson had his whole force at Manassas he instantly ordered all his corps to concentrate on that point, never seeming to imagine that Jackson would not stay there to be surrounded. In ordering McDowell to quit Gainesville and move to Manassas, instead of guarding Thoroughfare and Hopewell Gaps against Longstreet's advance, Pope committed his fatal mistake. He seems to have given no thought at that time to Longstreet's wing of Lee's army. If he considered it at all he thought it was so far behind that he should be able to capture or destroy Jackson before it could arrive on the field.

Pope ought to have kept himself better informed concerning his enemy; but his cavalry was so exhausted with courier and escort duty that it was in no condition properly to perform the work of reconnaissance. Buford's cavalry did, however, send in the first information of the approach of Longstreet's corps, and it had delayed Longstreet's column several hours at Salem.

When Pope got to Manassas and found Jackson gone, and then, later, learned that Hill's division had been seen at Centreville, he jumped to the conclusion that Jackson had marched his whole force to Centreville; and he immediately sent out orders directing all his corps to change the direction of their march for that town. Then, when King's division of McDowell's corps encountered Jackson on the Warrenton Pike, Pope thought it had struck the head of Jackson's column, which he was sure was in full retreat for Thoroughfare Gap. There-

upon Pope issued another set of orders based upon this conclusion. Then, when he learned that King had given way and fallen back to Manassas, he concluded that Jackson was continuing his retreat toward the Gap, and he issued new orders. Finally, on the 29th August, when his right wing was engaged with Jackson, he ordered Porter to move by the Manassas-Gainesville road and attack Jackson's right flank; when at that very moment Longstreet's whole command was formed or forming on Jackson's right.

Pope did not receive "just impressions" and estimate "things and objects at their real value." He did not form right conclusions; and with each new report he changed his mind concerning the situation and issued new orders. He wore his men out with marching and countermarching, and destroyed their confidence in himself with vacillating and contradictory orders. He never had a true conception of the situation from the time when he learned of Jackson's movement northward, until he reached the fortifications of Washington with his beaten army. He never discerned the opportunity presented him to destroy the two fractions of Lee's army separately.

He ought not to have resumed the battle on the 30th of August. He knew then that the whole of Lee's army had arrived on the ground. But again he drew a false conclusion. He thought Lee had begun to retreat, and he gave orders, accordingly, to pursue. He ought to have taken up a strong defensive position that day and resisted Lee's attack until he was reinforced by the corps of Franklin and Sumner and other troops, which were on their way from Alexandria. And that is what he ought to have done on the night of the 30th, after making the mistake of attacking Lee and being repulsed on that day. His army was not routed on the 30th; it had suffered hardly more than Lee's army. It is doubtful whether Lee would have felt equal to attacking the Union army on the 31st, if he had found it in position in front of him. This army might have spent the night intrenching, instead of marching back to Centreville. And if then it had been attacked by Lee, it could almost surely have maintained itself until the arrival of the corps of Franklin and Sumner, and that of Banks, also, which had been escorting the wagon-train and had taken no part in the battle as yet. These 30,000 and odd fresh troops put into the fight must have decided it in favor of the Union side; for Lee did not have a fresh regiment in reserve to meet their counter-attack. Pope's withdrawal over Bull Run that

night only demoralized his troops, destroyed what confidence they may still have had in him as a commander, and stamped his campaign as a complete failure.*

Except with General Lee's audacious plan for this campaign, which he justified by saying "The disparity of force between the contending forces rendered the risks unavoidable,"† there is not much fault to find with the operations of the Confederates. Yet there is some. Lee ought to have gained a decisive victory on the 29th of August. He arrived with Longstreet's wing on Jackson's right early in the afternoon. If he had put these troops into action promptly and pushed down the Warrenton Pike he might have overwhelmed the right of the Union line, separating it wholly from Porter's corps standing idle behind Dawkins Branch. McDowell's corps would have been struck in flank on the Sudley Springs road, and forced with the right wing back upon Bull Run. This is what Lee started to do, but he allowed himself to be dissuaded by Longstreet. Longstreet wanted time to reconnoiter; then he reported against the movement. He said it would expose his right flank to attack by troops from Manassas. And Longstreet wasted time arranging his elaborate order of battle. The upshot of it all was, the whole afternoon was thrown away. Two of Longstreet's brigades were sent forward only to make a reconnaissance. It was they that drove back King's Union division at dusk.‡

In the accounts of this campaign almost nothing is said of the work of the Union cavalry. At the beginning of the campaign Pope, in a letter to Halleck, spoke of "the large force of cavalry at" his "disposal"; and at Centreville, near the end of it, Pope had to send out a brigade of infantry on reconnaissance because "there was absolutely no cavalry fit for service."* It should have been the business of the cavalry to keep touch with Jackson from the time when he started on his raid till the end. Jackson ought never to have been allowed to play hide-and-seek with Pope's army; every move he made should have been reported to Pope by the cavalry. Likewise, by means of his cavalry Pope ought to have kept himself perfectly informed of the progress of Longstreet's wing. In truth Pope's cavalry was utterly broken down, worn out by courier and escort serv-

*Ropes.

†Alexander, from Allan's *Army of Northern Virginia*.

‡Alexander.

ice. It was not till after this campaign that the cavalry of the National army was allowed to perform its proper duty.

In the work of the Confederate cavalry there was a marked contrast. Stuart was always out looking for information of the enemy. While Pope's army was on the Rappahannock, he rode round its flank and captured Pope's headquarters at Catlett Station in its rear. When Jackson's column marched, Stuart's cavalry was in front of it and covering its flanks. On the morning of the 31st August Stuart was in the saddle by daybreak; and before eight o'clock he had reported to Lee that the Union army was in position on the heights of Centreville. Again, when Jackson started round by the Little River Turnpike, he had Stuart's horsemen in front of him. If the Union cavalry had performed its duty as well as the Confederate cavalry this campaign would have furnished our annals some of the same pretty cavalry combats that we find in the later campaigns; and the outcome might have been very different from what it was.

One of the highest qualifications of an army-commander is to know how to employ the three arms of the service for their proper purposes; to know the possibilities and the limitations of infantry, artillery, and cavalry; to know when to use one and when another; to know when to conserve one and when to expend another. Such a knowledge, also, is among the highest qualifications of the staff officer; but it is a knowledge that can be gained only by serving with the three arms. The day will certainly come in our service when every ambitious young officer that wishes to fit himself for staff duty in campaign will be given the opportunity to serve in peace with all three of the field arms, cavalry, infantry, and field-artillery.

LECTURE XIII.

THE ANTIETAM CAMPAIGN.

(133) We have seen that Pope's campaign in Virginia ended with the withdrawal of the Union forces, consisting of the Army of Virginia and the Army of the Potomac, within the defenses of Washington, on September 3, 1862. The day before, September 2, the Confederate Army of Northern Virginia was concentrated in the vicinity of Chantilly.

There was great excitement and alarm in Washington, and, for a time, the main question with the Administration and the War Department was to save the city from capture by the Confederates. On the 5th of September Pope was relieved from command, and, although no formal order was issued, the two Union armies were merged into one under the old name of the Army of the Potomac. The Army of Virginia was not heard of again. General McClellan was in command of the combined forces.

While Lee never for a moment contemplated moving his army of 55,000 men against Washington he felt that he must take the offensive at once in order to gain any permanent advantage from his victory at Bull Run. He knew that the United States government would immediately take steps to repair and reorganize its forces, and that if his army in the meanwhile remained idle, he should soon have to meet another great army of invasion in some quarter of Virginia. He was well aware that his army was not in fit condition to invade the North. "The army," he wrote President Davis, "is not properly equipped for an invasion of an enemy's territory. It lacks much of the material of war, is feeble in transportation, the animals being much reduced, and the men are poorly provided with clothes, and, in thousands of instances, are destitute of shoes."* But his troops were in the best state of morale; they had perfect confidence in themselves and their leaders; and Lee, like Bragg in his invasion of Kentucky, hoped that the presence of his army in Maryland would stimulate the people of that State to rise and join their fortunes with the Confederacy.

*Ropes.

If successful in his movement into Maryland he would destroy the Baltimore and Ohio Railway, then push on into Pennsylvania and destroy the Pennsylvania Railway. This would leave only one line of communication between the East and the West, the circuitous route by the Lakes. Lee could then turn his attention to Philadelphia, Baltimore, or Washington according to circumstances.* Lee also believed that the presence of his victorious army north of the Potomac "could not fail to alarm the Federal authorities and make them draw forces from every quarter for the defense of their capital, thus relieving the Confederacy of pressure, and—for a time at least—from the exhaustion incident to invasion."† "The relief of Virginia for a time from military occupation, and the support of the Confederate army in a region not yet drained of supplies, were additional inducements."‡ Lee resolved, therefore, to cross the Potomac; and more effectively to threaten Washington and keep alive the alarm for its safety, he chose a route east of the Blue Ridge Mountains rather than the route down the Shenandoah Valley, which would better have concealed his movements.

GEOGRAPHY.

There are a few difficult fords in the Potomac between the Great Falls and Conrad's Ferry, but the river can be forded at many places above this ferry in summer and early fall. "The Chesapeake and Ohio Canal, a more difficult military obstacle than the Potomac itself, runs parallel to the river across the entire" theater of this campaign.§ The Monocacy River and Catoctin and Antietam Creeks are the only tributaries of any military importance on the north side of the Potomac.

The Blue Ridge Mountains cross the State of Maryland in two distinct ranges stretching almost north and south with a fertile valley six or eight miles wide between them. These ranges are known as the Catoctin Mountains and South Mountain. South Mountain is the more difficult obstacle and it can be crossed only at its passes, the most important of which are Turner's Gap, Crampton's Gap, and the pass through which the Potomac breaks. About three miles west of South Mountain,

*J. G. Walker in *B. & L.*

†Long.

‡William Allan.

§Paper by General Geo. B. Davis.

at its southern end, is another short ridge called Elk Ridge, which terminates in Maryland Heights overlooking the Potomac and Harper's Ferry, and commanding Loudon and Bolivar Heights on the south side of the Potomac and on opposite sides of the Shenandoah River. Pleasant Valley lies between Elk Ridge and South Mountain.

The Baltimore and Ohio Railway crosses to the north side of the Potomac at Harper's Ferry, passes along the river-bank until it breaks through the Catoctin Mountains, then turns northeast, and, crossing the Monocacy River at Frederick Junction, leads on to Baltimore. There were in 1862 no other railways within this field of operations. There were several turnpikes in the region, the best known of which was the old National Road, which passed westward through Frederick City and crossed South Mountain at Turner's Gap. There were earthen roads in all directions, and all of them were in good condition in the fall. There were a good many small towns and villages in the country, of which the most considerable was Frederick. The theater was a comparatively thickly settled farming country; the mountains were, generally speaking, covered with woods; and the valleys, also, except where they had been cleared for tillage.

OPERATIONS.

Covered by Stuart's cavalry, which made a demonstration in the direction of Chain Bridge and Alexandria, Lee's army crossed the Potomac by the fords near Leesburg on the 4th, 5th, and 6th of September, and had concentrated about Frederick by the 7th.

On this date the corps of the Army of the Potomac were stationed as follows: the First [Hooker], Ninth [Burnside], including Cox's Kanawha division, at Leesboro; the Second [Sumner] and Twelfth* [Mansfield] in front of Rockville; the Sixth [Franklin] at Rockville; Couch's division of the Fourth at Offutt's Cross Roads.† The Third Corps [Heintzelman], the Fifth [Porter] and the Eleventh [Sigel] were within the lines of Washington. "The Fifth was sent on the 12th of September to join McClellan, thereby raising his entire [nom-

*The Twelfth Corps was composed of the troops lately commanded by General Banks.

†McClellan in *B. & L.*

inal] force to nearly 97,000 men.”* The Union cavalry under Pleasanton was well in front and in contact with Stuart’s cavalry, which, stretching from New Market to Poolesville, formed a strong screen for Lee’s army. Pleasanton’s squadrons got in touch with the Confederate cavalry on the 6th of September, and maintained touch with it until this cavalry crossed Antietam Creek on the 15th; and they fought with it every day from the 6th to the 15th, “generally with success, and always with profit in the way of information as to the movements and designs of the enemy.”†

The first stage in Lee’s invasion ended at Frederick. Here Lee issued a proclamation to the people of Maryland—which had no effect—and gave his troops two days of rest. His next objective was to be Harrisburg, but before entering Pennsylvania he must change his line of communications. The line by which he had advanced, Manassas-Frederick, lay “too near the Potomac, and” was “liable to be cut any day by the enemy’s cavalry.”‡ Lee gave orders, therefore, to move the line back into the Shenandoah Valley. But at this time Harper’s Ferry and Martinsburg were occupied by about 12,000 Federal troops. These garrisons would have to be captured or driven out before Lee’s communications could be safely established by that route.§

(134) Accordingly, on the 9th of September at Frederick Lee issued his famous field order, designated “Special Orders, No. 191,” for a resumption of the march on the following day. Jackson with all of his corps¶ except D. H. Hill’s division was directed to march on Harper’s Ferry by way of Sharpsburg and Martinsburg;** McLaws with his own division and R. H. Anderson’s [Longstreet’s corps] was to march by way of

*Humphreys’s division of the Fifth Corps did not join McClellan until September 18th, after the battle of Antietam.—Ropes.

†Davis.

‡Walker.

§It will be seen, however, in the lecture on the Gettysburg campaign that Lee’s lines of communication and retreat ran by way of the Shenandoah Valley while Harper’s Ferry was still held by Union troops.

¶The different divisions were still only associated, not formed into corps. . . . The organization into corps was slowly developing . . . and was reached at the close of the campaign.—Alexander:

**Fearing that the Union garrison at Martinsburg would retreat to the west and escape him, if he moved on that place by way of Sharpsburg, Jackson took a more northerly route and crossed the Potomac at Williamsport.—Ropes.

Crampton's Gap to Maryland Heights; Walker's division [Longstreet's corps] was to destroy the stone viaduct by which the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal crossed the mouth of the Monocacy, then to cross the Potomac near that point and go to Loudon Heights; the rest of Longstreet's corps (the divisions of Evans [Hood commanding] and D. R. Jones) was to march to Boonsboro and there halt with the baggage and supply trains; D. H. Hill's division was to form the rear-guard of the main column, with Stuart's cavalry still farther behind. The commands of Jackson, McLaws, and Walker were ordered to rejoin the main body at Boonsboro, after accomplishing the objects for which they were detached.

Although it was soon known by the authorities at Washington that Lee's army had crossed the Potomac into Maryland, they could not tell what was its purpose. Ever uneasy about the safety of the capital, Halleck was afraid for McClellan to move his troops far from that city, and McClellan concurred in his view of the case. "But the report of the cavalry under Pleasanton . . . finally satisfied McClellan, who had been slowly marching north with his left on the Potomac and his right on the railroad which connected Washington with Baltimore, that Lee had fallen back behind the Monocacy. Accordingly, on the 10th of September he pushed forward more rapidly, and on the 12th and 13th the right wing and center of his army entered Frederick City."* McClellan had organized his army into two wings and a center column. The right wing under Burnside consisted of the First Corps [Hooker], and the Ninth [now under Reno]; the center under Sumner consisted of the Second [his own] Corps and the Twelfth [Mansfield]; the left wing under Franklin consisted of the Sixth [his own] Corps and Couch's division of the Fourth. The Fifth Corps [Porter] had not yet joined from Washington. The army marched by the three main roads; the right wing by the Brookeville-New Market road; the center by the Rockville-Frederick road; the left wing by the Offutt's Cross Roads-Seneca road.

On the morning of September 13 a copy of Lee's "Special Orders, No. 191" was found at Frederick and handed to McClellan.† This gave him full information of Lee's plans,

*Ropes.

†The copy of the order, wrapped around three cigars, was picked up by a Federal soldier on ground where the Confederates had camped.

and enabled him to judge about where every part of Lee's army should be on that day.

On the evening of the 13th the different corps of the army of the Potomac were bivouacked as follows: the First Corps on the Monocacy near Frederick; the Ninth between Middletown and Frederick; the Second and Twelfth and Sykes's division [regulars] of the Fifth at Frederick; the Sixth at Buckeystown; and Couch's division at Licksville.* Pleasonton's cavalry had pushed the Confederate cavalry before it and was at the foot of Turner's Gap.

Lee's army on the same evening was distributed as follows: Stuart's cavalry at the passes of South Mountain; D. H. Hill's division on the road between Turner's Gap and Boonsboro; Longstreet with his two divisions near Hagerstown; Jackson's detachment close to Harper's Ferry; McLaws between Crampton's Gap and Maryland Heights; Walker's division nearing Loudon Heights. General Lee had meant to have Longstreet wait at Boonsboro until the detached troops rejoined, while D. H. Hill was to hold Turner's Gap with his whole division. On the way, however, it was learned that a body of Pennsylvania militia had collected at Chambersburg; on that account Longstreet was sent forward to Hagerstown and was at that point, thirteen miles from Turner's Gap, when the battle of South Mountain began.†

The night of September 13 Stuart informed Lee that McClellan had come into possession of a copy of his field order, and that the advance of the Federal army was at the eastern foot of Turner's Gap. Thereupon Lee ordered Longstreet and D. H. Hill to move their forces back to dispute the passage of South Mountain. Two of Hill's brigades were already at Turner's Gap, and the rest returned thither early next morning. Longstreet's troops did not reach the ground till late in the afternoon.

(135) On the morning of the 14th Pleasonton's cavalry opened the battle of South Mountain. At about 9 a.m. Cox arrived with his Kanawha division, and took command of the attack. About noon the rest of the Ninth Corps came up under Reno, and later the First [Hooker]. The entire right wing of the Union army was now on the field, and Burnside took charge of the attack. Hooker's corps assaulted the left of the Confederate position, and Reno's the right at Fox's Gap on the old

*Davis.

†Alexander.

Sharpsburg Road.* The battle lasted till 10 p. m., and when it ceased both flanks of the Confederate position had been enveloped. About midnight the Confederates began to withdraw.

(136) Franklin had been ordered to move with the left wing by way of Crampton's Gap to relieve the garrison at Harper's Ferry, and to cut off McLaws on Maryland Heights. At about noon on the 14th the head of his column reached Crampton's Gap and found it held by Confederates. Franklin succeeded in carrying the pass, and by nightfall had "effected a lodgment of his troops in Pleasant Valley."† As soon as McLaws heard of this he "established a formidable line of defense across Pleasant Valley, from Elk Ridge on the west to South Mountain on the east, and succeeded in conveying to his antagonist the appearance of having occupied the line in great strength. Franklin, in fact, thought that he was outnumbered 'two to one.' While he remained in presence of this force Harper's Ferry surrendered, and McLaws, during the afternoon of the 15th, skilfully and without molestation, withdrew his command across the river to the town."‡

Let us now see how the capture of Harper's Ferry was effected. (134) The Federal detachment at Martinsburg had fallen back before Jackson's column to Harper's Ferry. (137) Jackson had been in position in front of Bolivar Heights since the 13th. On that day one of McLaws's brigades had routed the Federal detachment on Maryland Heights, and on the afternoon of the 14th, while the battles were going on at Turner's Gap and Crampton's Gap, McLaws was shelling Harper's Ferry from those Heights. Walker, also, had got into position on Loudon Heights, and had opened fire with his artillery in the forenoon of the 14th. "Early on the 15th fire was opened upon the Federal troops and defenses from all quarters; there was no resistance; the commanders and the troops considered their case hopeless; and at 9 a.m. the post was surrendered."‡ The Federal cavalry of the garrison, however, like Forrest's at Fort Donelson, had made its escape. Led by Colonel B. F. Davis, 8th New York Cavalry, it crossed the river by the pontoon-bridge during the night of the 14th, rode by the Confederate picket at a gallop in the moonlight, and hurried on through Sharpsburg to Greencastle, Pennsylvania; and captured "an ordnance train of Longstreet's on the way."‡

*Reno was killed in this battle.

†Ropes.

‡General Dixon S. Miles, the commandant, was mortally wounded.

(138) Let us now return to General Lee. The morning after the battle of South Mountain the Confederate troops there engaged fell back to Sharpsburg. Lee had been informed that Crampton's Gap had been carried by a Federal column, and he had not yet received word of the surrender of Harper's Ferry. He had with him only about 19,000 men—the rest were investing Harper's Ferry. His chief concern was to reunite his divided army before McClellan could fall upon the separated parts in detail. The night of the 14th, after his failure to hold the mountain passes, he had resolved to withdraw to the south side of the Potomac. He was especially anxious about McLaws's force, which he feared might be overwhelmed or cut off at Maryland Heights. At 8 p.m. of the 14th he "wrote to McLaws, telling him to abandon his position that night, and to cross the river, if possible by a ford east of that at Shepherdstown, leaving the ford at Shepherdstown for the main army to take."*

About noon on the 15th Lee's force was on its way to this ford. Lee was marching with the rear-guard, and had reached the position now occupied by the National Cemetery, when he was handed a dispatch stating that "Harper's Ferry had fallen and Jackson was on his way to rejoin him at Sharpsburg." "He at once ordered the batteries into position, recalled D. H. Hill's division from [the ford at] the Potomac, and established a line of battle on the heights overlooking the Antietam, and commanding the approaches to the town by the Boonsboro Pike" and the bridge since known as the Burnside Bridge. By nightfall of the 15th the divisions of Hood, D. H. Hill, and D. R. Jones were in position for battle.† The extreme left of the line was held by Stuart with the greater part of the cavalry and horse-artillery upon a commanding hill not far from the Potomac, about a mile northwest of the Dunker or Dunkard church. Colonel Munford with his brigade of cavalry was on the extreme right of the line.*

The field of the battle of Antietam lies in a space from two and a half to four miles wide between Antietam Creek and a bend of the Potomac. Sharpsburg is near its central and highest part, in a sort of depression. The space was divided into farms, and most of the ground was under cultivation; but there were several patches of wood. Those since known as the East Woods and the West Woods played an important part in the

*Ropes.

†Davis.

battle. The space was crossed by many farm roads, and by the Hagerstown and the Boonsboro turnpikes which converged on Sharpsburg. At the eastern edge of the West Woods, a little more than a mile north of Sharpsburg, was the little church of the Dunkards.

The Antietam was spanned by four bridges, the Upper, the Middle, the Burnside Bridge, and the bridge near the mouth of the creek. The creek could be forded almost anywhere. From a short way below the Middle Bridge, to its mouth, the bluffs on the west of the creek were steep and rugged. From Pry's Mill down to the Middle Bridge on the east bank there was a line of prominent hills, and a single high ridge from this bridge down to the Burnside Bridge. Other prominent hills were just east of the Burnside Bridge. From positions upon these hills and ridges the Federal batteries swept most of the ground occupied by the Confederate lines. Ledges of rock cropped out in some parts of the battle-field, but, in general, troops could pass in any direction, though the ways were obstructed by many rail fences and a few stone walls.

(139) After a hard night-march Jackson arrived at Sharpsburg with Walker's division and two of his own early on the 16th. He had left A. P. Hill with his division to complete the arrangements for the surrender of Harper's Ferry. McLaws with his own division and Anderson's did not rejoin until the morning of the 17th. Jackson's two divisions took their place on the left of the line, between the Hagerstown Pike and Stuart's cavalry. Next was Hood's division, on the pike; then D. H. Hill's forming a curve parallel to the pike. Longstreet with D. R. Jones's division and Evans's brigade* prolonged the line to the Burnside Bridge. Walker's division was placed in reserve behind the right flank.†

On the 15th McClellan with the right wing and center of the Federal army moved forward from Turner's Gap as far as Keedysville. Franklin with the left wing was at Rohrer'sville (133) watching for McLaws. (139) A few shots were exchanged by the artillery late in the afternoon, but there was no other fighting that day. "The 16th passed without serious fighting," also "though there was desultory cannonading and picket firing."‡

*This brigade belonged to Evans's division now commanded by Hood.

†Alexander.

‡J. D. Cox.

PLAN OF BATTLE.

In his first report of the battle of Antietam McClellan says: "The design was to make the main attack upon the enemy's left—at least to create a diversion in favor of the main attack, with the hope of something more, by assailing the enemy's right—and, as soon as one or both of the flank movements were fully successful, to attack their center with any reserve I might then have in hand."* This, then, was probably the plan of battle he had in mind.

As the first step in the execution of this plan, the First Corps [Hooker] crossed the creek at the Upper Bridge and a ford near by, on the afternoon of the 16th, to look for the Confederate left. The Confederates saw the movement and Hood's division was pushed forward into the East Woods to meet it. Some fighting took place there; during the night Hood withdrew, and Hooker deployed his corps ready to renew the attack in the morning. (140) At dawn the line advanced, with Doubleday's division on the right, Rickett's on the left, and Meade's in reserve close behind. Almost immediately it became engaged with a part of Jackson's command that had formed line in a cornfield from the pike across to the East Woods. Soon, also, Doubleday's division on the right encountered the Confederate left in the West Woods. The combat raged desperately on both sides. Hooker's reserve was quickly brought into action, and the Confederates in the cornfield were driven back; but Hood soon came to their relief with his division, and Early in the West Woods fell upon the flank of the Union line, while Stuart's artillery raked it in enfilade. After more than an hour of hard fighting Hooker's line was forced back, leaving some of its guns in the hands of the Confederates.

But Mansfield's Union corps was now coming upon the field. This corps had crossed the creek in the night, but, taking the wrong direction, had bivouacked more than a mile north of Hooker's corps. (141) It had quitted its bivouac at daybreak and started to Hooker's support; but it made its deployment so slowly that it was half after seven o'clock before any part of it got into the battle. Mansfield had been killed almost at the start, and General Williams, the senior division-commander, was now in command of the corps. Williams deployed his own division on the right and Greene's on the left, and ad-

*J. D. Cox.

vanced his line across the cornfield toward the West Woods. It struck Hood's division in the cornfield, supported on its right by three of D. H. Hill's brigades, and on its left by Walker's small division and another brigade that, by this time, had come up from the right of the Confederate line. Again the combat raged fiercely, and the lines wavered backward and forward across the cornfield. At the end of two hours the Federal line had again forced its enemy back, and reopened still wider the gap that Hooker's corps had made. Greene's division was in possession of the Dunker church and a part of the woods near it. But the whole Twelfth Corps was by now exhausted with its struggle. Greene's division was content to rest where it was, and Williams's had to be withdrawn to the rear to rest and replenish ammunition. For a time the firing ceased altogether.*

But the cessation was not long, for the head of the Second Corps [Sumner] was approaching. From the sound of the first guns Sumner had been eager to cross the Antietam and go into the battle; but not until 7.20 a.m. did he succeed in getting his orders from McClellan to do so. At about nine o'clock he arrived upon the field at the head of Sedgwick's division. "He found affairs in a desperate state;" Hooker's corps had been repulsed and driven back; and the Twelfth was barely holding its own.† Sumner judged that a counter-attack by the enemy might be expected at any moment, and that the situation called for instant action on his part.

(142) So, without waiting for his rear two divisions [French and Richardson] to come up, he led Sedgwick's to the assault in close column with brigade front. In this formation, with the lines of his assaulting column not more than thirty yards apart, he advanced out of the East Woods, across the cornfield, straight for the West Woods. He threw out no skirmishers, stopped not to reconnoiter or to inquire for the position of the enemy. He entered the wood to the north of the Dunker church, passed Greene's division on his left, and pushed straight ahead. Without being aware of it he passed within close range of Early's Confederate brigade, and Walker's division on his left, and was just emerging from the far side of the wood when Early's brigade, which had changed its position under cover of a ridge, opened fire on the flank of his close column. At the same time McLaws's division, from a

*Alexander.

†Davis.

position at the left-front of the column, opened fire upon it at close range, and "the remnants of Walker's two brigades lined up against the left flank of the column, now almost helpless between converging fires."* (141) The divisions of McLaws and Anderson, after their weary night-march from Harper's Ferry, had been allowed an hour's rest, and then hurried to the left of the Confederate line. McLaws's column had not quite finished its deployment when the left-front of Sumner's column came before it. Anderson's division had gone to support D. H. Hill.

(143) Within a few minutes, more than 2,200 of Sumner's officers and men had fallen,—Sedgwick himself received three wounds,—and the division started to the rear. "The Confederates followed in pursuit, and once more the tide of battle swept across the ghastly cornfield. . . . The Federals were driven to the shelter of their strong line of artillery in front of the North Wood. . . . Greene's men about the Dunker church were also forced back to the Federal guns, leaving the Confederate line practically the same that it had been in the morning, although now held only by scattered fragments and almost destitute of artillery."* (142) Meantime where were the other two divisions of the Second Corps [French and Richardson]? French's division crossed the Antietam by a ford a short way below the Upper Bridge; but from there it diverged too far to the south, and came into the battle to the left of Greene's division of the Twelfth Corps, striking the part of the Confederate line held by D. H. Hill near the Roulette house. Richardson's division came up later on the left of French's, and their combined strength amounted to about 10,000 muskets. They were opposed by some 7,000 Confederates "in good order and condition," besides three brigades already "broken and much demoralized" by previous fighting. (143) The Confederates were soon driven back to the sunken road which has since borne the name of the Bloody Lane. "The combat that here took place," says Ropes, "was beyond question one of the most sanguinary and desperate in the whole war. The carnage was awful; the road was speedily filled with the dead and wounded."

At last the Federal line in its extension to the left reached a position from which it enfiladed the Bloody Lane. The commander of the 6th Alabama at that end of the Confederate line was ordered "to throw his right wing back and out of the

*Alexander.

road." He gave the command "Sixth Alabama, about face; forward march!" That command was fatal. The whole line gave way and fled in confusion, (144) leaving the Federals in possession of the Bloody Lane and the adjacent hills to the south of it. General Alexander says that by the mistake of that officer "Lee's army was ruined, and the end of the Confederacy was in sight."*

The casualties in the two Federal divisions exceeding 2,900, but were fewer than those of the Confederates. The Confederate artillery, though suffering heavily from the superiority of the Federal guns on the other side of the creek, kept up a vigorous fire; but the battle was practically at an end in all the left wing of Lee's line. There was not a body of infantry in that quarter that could have resisted a vigorous charge, nor a fresh regiment in reserve. One more assault here was all that was needed to win a decisive Union victory; maybe to destroy the Confederate army. That assault was not made.

Yet the Sixth Corps [Franklin], which had not been ordered back from Pleasant Valley until the night before, had rejoined, and was now in that part of the field. The Fifth [Porter], which formed the general reserve, was also still intact, and the First, Second, and Twelfth, in spite of the hard fighting they had already done, were able to do more. Franklin urged McClellan to let him renew the attack with his fresh troops, but Sumner opposed it, and McClellan agreed with Sumner. All the morning, too, since nine o'clock, Pleasanton's squadrons had stood idle on the high ground to the west of the Middle Bridge, supporting his horse batteries; and with them were several of the regular battalions of Sykes's infantry division.

(143) To Burnside with the Ninth Corps had been assigned the task of attacking the right of the Confederate line. He was notified on the afternoon of the 16th, and a little after 7 a.m. on the 17th he received orders to prepare for the attack. He accordingly moved his command nearer to the Antietam.

The Burnside Bridge was defended by Toombs's brigade of D. R. Jones's Confederate division, posted on the bluffs above it, as well as by Confederate batteries in the vicinity of where the National Cemetery is now situated. At about 9 a.m. Burnside received an order to carry the bridge and assault the Confederate line. "Preparations for crossing the stream were immediately made. (144) Rodman's division," accompanied by one brigade of Cox's division, "was sent down the stream to the

*Alexander.

fords. To Sturgis's division, assisted" by Crook's brigade of Cox's division, "was assigned the task of carrying the stone bridge. Willcox's division was held in reserve."*

With the support of the artillery two efforts were made to rush the bridge, but both were repulsed. As yet no attempt had been made to ford the stream near the bridge, although it was fordable almost anywhere. A third charge was made about one o'clock, and the bridge was carried. Crook crossed at a ford above. (145) Toombs withdrew his brigade to the right of the main Confederate line on the heights three quarters of a mile west of the bridge. Meantime Rodman's division had crossed at Snavelly's Ford, about a mile below the bridge, and it now connected with the left of Sturgis's troops on the west bank. Sturgis was allowed to withdraw his division upon the plea of fatigue, and Willcox's division took its place. General Cox took command of the Union troops on the west of the stream and set about forming them to assault the right of the Confederate line, which was held by four brigades of D. R. Jones's division.

It was after three o'clock before Cox had formed his lines for the assault; at four he began his advance in "handsome style." The Confederates, only 2,000 strong, made a desperate defense, but they were forced back—up the slope of Cemetery Hill and into the edge of the town. A Confederate "battery was captured, and a complete victory seemed within sight. But this was not to be."* At this moment A. P. Hill's division, which had marched out of Harper's Ferry and crossed the Potomac unopposed, was approaching the battle-field. (146) Seizing his opportunity, Hill threw his brigades against the left flank of Cox's victorious troops, recaptured the Confederate battery, and finally drove the Federals in "more or less disorder to the neighborhood of the bridge, where they bivouacked for the night. This ended the battle."*

The hostile armies bivouacked on the battle-field, and with little change of position remained there watching each other all the day of the 18th. (138) On the evening of the 18th Lee's army began to withdraw, and, undiscovered by the enemy, had recrossed the Potomac at Blackford's or Boteler's Ford by the morning of the 19th. Thus ended Lee's invasion of Maryland.

It is very hard to determine what was the number of men on either side at the battle of Antietam, or as it is called in

*Ropes.

Southern reports, the battle of Sharpsburg. General George B. Davis in his description gives the following figures: "The Army of the Potomac 87,164, of all arms, not all of whom were engaged. The Confederate strength at Frederick . . . 60,000; . . . at the battle of Antietam . . . about 37,000." Mr. John Codman Ropes, in his able review of the battle, says: "The Confederate infantry did not exceed 31,200 men or thereabouts, while the First, Second, Ninth, and Twelfth Corps, which were the only troops put in by McClellan . . . numbered about 46,000 men. . . . Adding the Confederate cavalry and artillery to their infantry, therefore, we have a total of 39,200; and adding the Fifth and Sixth Corps and the cavalry and artillery to the 46,000 Federal troops already enumerated, we arrive at a total of about 70,000 men."

Ropes says, further, that it "was one of the bloodiest battles of the war, and it is likely that more men were killed and wounded on the 17th of September than on any single day in the whole war." General Alexander says "it was the bloodiest battle ever fought upon this continent." The Confederate loss "probably amounted to 8,000 men or more"; that of the Union army is given at 12,410 men. For the whole campaign General Alexander gives the following figures:

Confederates: 1,924 killed, 9,381 wounded.

Federals: 3,273 killed, 11,756 wounded.

COMMENTS.

(133) An unusual circumstance of this campaign was the fact that Lee took the offensive and invaded the enemy's country without any intention of seeking or attacking the hostile army. He knew that his army was greatly inferior in numbers and in equipment to that of his adversary. Yet he meant to fight if the Federal army came out to seek him, as he felt sure it would; he had no thought of making a mere raid into Maryland and Pennsylvania; of destroying railways and canals and then making his escape when the National army came after him.

In fact the objective of this invasion was political rather than military; the campaign, like Bragg's in Kentucky, was an example of what Captain Bigelow in his *Principles of Strategy* terms "political strategy." First, the Confederate authorities believed that Maryland was held in the Union by force and in-

timidation, and that the presence of a Confederate army within its borders would encourage and embolden its people to break away and join Secession. We have seen, however, that this did not take place. Secondly, there was a large element in the North opposed to the war and proclaiming it already a failure. It was believed at the South that the presence of a victorious Confederate army within loyal States would strengthen this element, and strengthen the sentiment at the North in favor of terminating the war. And thirdly, it was hoped that the presence of such an army would make for a recognition of the Confederacy by foreign powers. Strategically, then, the campaign, on the part of the Confederates, was offensive; but tactically it could only be defensive, for Lee was not strong enough to attack McClellan,—to fight an offensive battle,—unless, of course, McClellan should divide his army, or commit some other fatal mistake.

It is hard to say whether Lee was right or wrong in detaching a large part of his army—more than half of it—for the capture of Harper's Ferry. Longstreet advised against it, but Jackson favored it. It was certainly contrary to a recognized principle of war,* and it had a very serious effect upon the campaign. Lee supposed that Harper's Ferry would be abandoned by the Federals as soon as his army appeared north of the Potomac. And the place should have been abandoned at that time. It was in an indefensible pocket, and its only supposed importance consisted in the fact that the Baltimore and Ohio Railway crossed the Potomac there. But the garrison was powerless to defend the railway bridge, commanded as the place was by the surrounding hills. McClellan urged Halleck to withdraw the large garrison and order the troops to join his army; but Halleck refused to do so.

Jackson captured at Harper's Ferry about 11,000 prisoners, 13,000 stand of arms, and seventy-three cannon; but it was not for this prize that the expedition was undertaken. Lee says in his report that it was "necessary to dislodge the enemy before concentrating the army west of the mountains," because the garrisons at Harper's Ferry and Martinsburg were upon the new line of communications that he purposed adopting. But Harper's Ferry was not a fortress, it was an absolutely untenable

*Napoleon's *Maxim LXXVII.* . . . Gustavus Adolphus, Turenne, and Frederick, as well as Alexander, Hannibal and Cæsar, have all acted upon the same principles. These were—to keep their forces united; to leave no weak part unguarded; to seize quickly important points.

ble place. Lee's communications could not, of course, cross the Potomac at that point while the garrison stood there; but this alone did not justify Lee in dividing his army—in separating the two parts by rivers and mountains and so many miles of distance that neither part could go to the support of the other, in case the enemy attacked one part with all his strength.

It would have been safer for Lee to abandon his original line of communications and live off the country for a while, if necessary, as Grant did later in the Vicksburg Campaign. Indeed the Confederate soldiers were already subsisting mainly upon roasting-ears and fruit gathered along the way.* While the Union garrison at Harper's Ferry would imperil his line of communications by way of the Shenandoah Valley it was not strong enough to jeopard his line of retreat by that route.

Lee did not expect to hold Harper's Ferry; so what was there to prevent McClellan, or Halleck, from sending another garrison thither as soon as Jackson turned his back upon the place? Likewise McClellan might have sent back a corps to occupy Winchester, and another to Charlestown, and corps to any other places on the Confederate line of communications, if he had chosen to split his army up in so unscientific a manner. There was probably not another point between Richmond and Hagerstown that could not have been held, if once taken, more easily than Harper's Ferry.

With the view, however, that Harper's Ferry had to be captured before Lee could proceed farther, his safest plan would have been to march his main body, by way of Crampton's Gap instead of by way of Turner's Gap, thus keeping it within supporting distance of the troops detached, and leaving no road open by which the enemy could enter between his divided forces.

The truth of the whole matter is, however, that Lee was emboldened to take such a risk as he took by the slow and leisurely way in which McClellan's army was following him. And but for the untoward incident of the "lost order" Jackson would probably have captured Harper's Ferry and rejoined Lee with McLaws and Walker and A. P. Hill before McClellan gained the top of South Mountain. But McClellan was not altogether to blame for his slow and cautious pursuit. True, he reckoned that Lee had an army of 120,000 men, and he was correspondingly careful. But the telegrams he was receiving hourly from Halleck at Washington would have held him back

*Alexander.

even if he had felt any inclination to move fast. Halleck, says General Franklin, "could not divest himself of the notion that Lee was about to play the Union army some slippery trick by turning its left, getting between it and Washington and Baltimore, and then taking each city by a coup-de-main." The burden of Halleck's dispatches to McClellan was to watch his left flank, and not to let Lee turn it and get between him and Washington. There were, in fact, enough troops in Washington to hold that city against Lee's army, even if McClellan's forces had been removed from the theater altogether.

The chance finding on the 13th September of Lee's order No. 191, dated the 9th, ought to have cleared up all doubts concerning Lee's plans. Seldom in war has a commanding general been so favored by luck as McClellan was in getting hold of that order. The circumstances under which it was found, and the fact that officers at McClellan's headquarters recognized the signature as genuine, coupled with what was already known of Lee's columns, left little doubt as to the authenticity of the order. Yet McClellan was slow to take advantage of his good luck. Now was the time for extra exertion. The march so far had been very easy. Instead of resting the night of the 13th, as it did, the army should have pressed forward. There was a moon to light the way.* If McClellan's main army had pressed forward it would have reached Turner's Gap by daylight, and brushed away Stuart's little force of cavalry, and D. H. Hill's two brigades, and been in possession of the pass long before Longstreet's command could have marched back from Hagerstown, and even before D. H. Hill could have brought back his advanced troops from Boonsboro. If there had been any battle at all at South Mountain it would have been a small affair.

Likewise at Crampton's Gap: Franklin's corps did not reach it until noon of the 14th, and did not succeed in getting through it into Pleasant Valley much before dark. Yet it was defended then only "by Munford's cavalry [brigade], assisted, but not very efficiently, by troops of McLaws's command."† Had Franklin reached there earlier and attacked with more vigor and skill he might have saved Harper's Ferry, and ought to have handled McLaws's force, much smaller than his own, very roughly. Instead of these successes, Harper's Ferry

*Alexander.

†Ropes.

surrendered on the morning of the 15th, and McLaws "without molestation withdrew his command across the river to the town."*

But the relief of Harper's Ferry would have been as nothing compared to the greater advantage such prompt action would have brought McClellan—the advantage of having his entire army over the mountains, and upon interior lines, between the separated parts of Lee's army, ready to unite and cut off the troops with Lee and Longstreet from their line of retreat, and maybe to capture or destroy them. A still more certain way for McClellan to have achieved this result would have been to push forward with his whole army on the afternoon and night of the 13th of September for Crampton's Gap. This would almost surely have brought his united corps between the separated parts of the Confederate army. Here he threw away the same sort of chance that Pope lost when he withdrew McDowell from Gainesville.†

After the battle of South Mountain Lee was allowed to escape with his army, and by the afternoon of the 15th he was in position behind Antietam Creek. The distance from Turner's Gap to Antietam Creek is not ten miles; yet so slowly and deliberately did McClellan follow that it was not till late in the afternoon of the 16th when his first troops, Hooker's single corps, crossed the creek and moved against Lee's line. What the purpose of sending this corps over alone was, it is hard to say, unless it was to make a reconnaissance in force in order to ascertain the position of the enemy's left. What it did was plainly to indicate to Lee where McClellan purposed making his main attack, and to enable Lee to place his own troops accordingly.

Franklin, having failed to save Harper's Ferry, and having let McLaws escape on the 15th, should have been ordered to rejoin McClellan without delay, in order to take part in the impending engagement; but it was not till the night of the 16th that he received an order to quit Pleasant Valley and rejoin the main body. He was not then required to bring his whole force, but was directed to leave Couch's division [Fourth Corps] to hold Maryland Heights—for what purpose it is impossible to say.

Longstreet did not favor giving battle at Sharpsburg. He wanted Lee to withdraw to the south side of the Potomac.

*Ropes.

†Alexander.

Lee wanted to fight at Sharpsburg, and Jackson concurred with him. Lee could probably have crossed his army and trains over the Potomac without any serious opposition by McClellan, and no good reason can be seen why he did not do so. Politically his invasion of Maryland had already proved a failure, and his defeat at South Mountain had stopped his progress toward Pennsylvania. But Lee thought the morale and prestige of his army, and, no doubt, public sentiment at the South, required that he should win a victory north of the Potomac. There could have been no other reasons for the battle of Antietam, and those were not sufficient reasons.

Strategically Lee's position in this battle was as bad as it could be. Two miles directly behind it was an impassable canal and river, and his only line of retreat led away from his right flank to a difficult ford less than three miles distant. The wages of defeat ought to have been destruction; while the reward of victory could only have been the enemy's repulse. In their attack the Federals were so well covered by their superior artillery upon the hills on the eastern side of Antietam Creek that they would have been protected from a Confederate counter-attack, in case of their repulse, just as they were later at Fredericksburg by the batteries on Stafford Heights.* A Confederate victory could have had no decisive results.

General Palfrey says in his account of this battle: "If Lee had been in McClellan's place on the 17th of September, and had sent Jackson to conduct the right attack and Longstreet to force the passage of the lower bridge and turn the Confederate left [sic], the Army of Northern Virginia, though commanded by a second Lee, a second Jackson, and a second Longstreet, would have ceased to exist that day." McClellan claims to have defeated Lee in the battle; but it is hard to say which should reflect least credit upon the Union commander, not to have defeated Lee's army, or not to have destroyed it if he defeated it. Truth to tell, McClellan did neither.

The strategical employment of the cavalry on both sides in the campaign was excellent. The hostile cavalry forces were in contact with each other from the moment the Confederates crossed the Potomac, until the two armies confronted each other across the Antietam, each covering the columns of its own army and gathering all possible information of its enemy. Pleasanton's advanced cavalry was in touch with Stuart's

*Alexander.

squadrons at the eastern foot of Turner's Gap on the evening of September 13, and opened the battle the next morning. If it had been promptly supported by infantry in sufficient force, as it should have been, the pass would have been in possession of the Federals within three hours.

It is idle to speculate upon what might have been the outcome of this campaign, if Lee had not detached the expedition against Harper's Ferry, and if his "lost order" had not fallen into McClellan's hands. Even with the garrison of Harper's Ferry out of the way, and his line of communications established through the Shenandoah Valley, it cannot be seen how Lee could have penetrated far into Pennsylvania. Staunton, 150 miles in rear, was the nearest railway point upon his line of communications; he could not have kept his army supplied over so great a distance by wagon-trains.*

He had, moreover, only 55,000 men, with little hope of reinforcements; while McClellan had nearly 90,000, with strong reinforcements on the way to join him. McClellan's army was marching, but marching very slowly, straight against Lee's line of retreat. If Lee's army had remained at Hagerstown or had gone farther northward McClellan could easily have thrown his army across its rear and cut off its retreat. Lee would then have had to fight faced to the rear against almost double his numbers. At best it could only have been the Gettysburg campaign set forward ten months; but Gettysburg might have been otherwise with Stonewall Jackson alive, and McClellan, not Meade, in command of the Union army.

TACTICS.

(139) The field of Antietam was far better tactically than strategically for a defensive battle. The line had a sort of irregular ridge to rest upon, while its left was protected by a bend of the Potomac and its right rested upon heights overlooking the Antietam and had the town of Sharpsburg as a rallying-point behind it. This flank was, nevertheless, the weakest part of the line; it was practically "in the air," and could easily have been turned or enveloped. There were woods, ledges of rock, stone walls, uneven ground, and sunken roads, all of which were used by the Confederates for cover. Sharpsburg contained many old brick buildings, which gave it something of the defensive strength of European villages.

*Alexander.

The right of the Confederate line had already taken refuge in the streets, when A. P. Hill's timely arrival on the field saved the town from the necessity of having its strength put to the test. This was one of the few engagements of the war in which a village was included within the lines of battle.

Antietam Creek in front of the line, though bridged at four places and fordable nearly everywhere, was nevertheless a considerable obstacle. It was not, however, so serious an obstacle as Burnside regarded it. Along the greater part of their position the Confederates had a comparatively clear field of fire for their infantry. The field, however, was generally narrow, and was obstructed in some quarters by high corn and in others by woods. There were fairly good positions for the artillery, but they, like all parts of the field, were commanded by the Federal batteries on the far side of the stream. Good roads in rear of the line enabled troops to march quickly from one place to another, generally under cover. The position could have been greatly strengthened by intrenchments, and there was ample time to dig them. The advantage they would have given was shown by the defense of the Bloody Lane—a sunken earthen road, which could not be carried until it was enfiladed.

On account of the walls and fences and ledges of rock the ground was not suitable for the charge of cavalry; but the squadrons of Stuart and Munford effectually guarded the flanks of the position.

Ropes remarks: "Of General Lee's management of the battle there is nothing but praise to be said"; he might have added: "Of McClellan's management of the attack there is nothing but censure to be said." In the first place, no adequate reconnaissance was made to find out the position occupied by the Confederates; where the creek could be forded, etc. When the attack was finally made it was made piecemeal; in fact there were five separate and distinct attacks by detachments, instead of one single attack by the whole army with a general reserve held back to throw in at the critical moment. First there was Hooker's attack on the afternoon of the 16th; secondly, Hooker's attack on the morning of the 17th; thirdly, Williams's attack with the Twelfth Corps after Hooker's repulse on the 17th; fourthly, Sumner's attack after Williams's, and the attack of French and Richardson about the same time at another part of the line; fifthly, Burnside's attack on the Confederate right. If all the corps engaged in these attacks had assaulted Lee's line at the same time it does

not seem possible for him to have escaped a disastrous defeat. But since they assaulted one at a time Lee was enabled to withdraw troops from one part of his line and send them to another where for the moment they were needed. Thus he withdrew Walker from his right and sent him, as well as McLaws, to his left in time to repulse Sumner's impulsive column.

The Federal troops, however, had fought so well that, notwithstanding the mistakes of their commanders, a decisive victory was still within McClellan's reach, and he had but to close his grasp upon it. By the time that Franklin's corps had reached the field from Pleasant Valley, on the 17th, Lee's army was well-nigh exhausted. Nearly a fourth of his soldiers were dead or wounded, and there was not a regiment in reserve. It was the crisis of the battle. French and Richardson had possession of the Bloody Lane, and if Franklin's fresh battalions had renewed the assault, Lee's spent troops must have been routed. And McClellan had other fresh troops besides Franklin's corps: Porter's Fifth Corps was practically intact. "McClellan had some 24,000 troops who had not been seriously engaged" in the battle.* A still more decisive result might have been achieved if these 24,000 men had been led across Antietam Creek, by the fords near its mouth and by the lower bridge, and hurled against the right of Lee's line. This would have cut Lee off from his line of retreat by way of Boteler's Ford. McClellan's main attack should have been made against this flank of Lee's army.

On the morning of the 18th Couch and Humphreys arrived with more than 12,000 fresh troops. Why did not McClellan renew the battle? In *McClellan's Own Story* the Union commander admits that he was afraid to renew the attack. "At that critical juncture," says he, "I should have had a narrow view of the condition of the country had I been willing to hazard another battle with less than an absolute assurance of success. . . . One battle lost and almost all would have been lost. Lee's army might then have marched as it pleased on Washington, Baltimore, Philadelphia, or New York." Such timidity is not consistent with the character of the commander-in-chief of an army; and it does not win victories. In remaining upon the field and offering battle on the 18th, "Lee had everything to lose and nothing to gain"; all of his commanders were in favor of withdrawing on the night of the 17th. "Lee, alone, was in no wise moved," says General Alex-

*Ropes.

ander. "He had read McClellan's inmost soul and knew he was not to be feared." By standing his ground defiantly another day, instead of taking to flight that night, Lee strengthened the morale of his troops, and saved the prestige of his army.

Burnside's failure to cross the creek and assault the right of the Confederate line before three o'clock in the afternoon of the 17th enabled Lee to draw 6,000 men from that flank with which to save his left; and it also gave A. P. Hill time to come up from Harper's Ferry and reach the field at the exact moment to wrest victory from the assaulting column. If the Union cavalry had been guarding the flanks of the attack, instead of standing idle at the center, the approach of A. P. Hill's division would have been discovered in time for dispositions to be made to meet it.

General George B. Davis, in his review of the campaign, says: "The management of the Army of the Potomac was halting, dilatory, wanting in firm direction and to a degree irresolute and unskilful"; and of the battle, "The artillery alone, everywhere on the field, had been brilliantly handled and had rendered most valuable service to the Union cause. At times, indeed, the Federal lines were practically held by the superb management of the light batteries, which dominated everywhere the enemy's artillery, and compelled his infantry to seek shelter from the effects of their destructive and well-directed fire." From beginning to end of the campaign the Confederate commander's conduct was characterized by boldness, resolution, and quickness; the Federal commander's by timidity, irresolution, and slowness.

LECTURE XIV.

THE FREDERICKSBURG CAMPAIGN.

(147) We saw in the last lecture that Lee's army withdrew from the battle-field of Antietam the night of the 18th September, 1862, and crossed the Potomac at Boteler's or Blackford's Ford. The next morning, the 19th, the Federal cavalry started in pursuit, but found the fords covered by Confederate batteries. The Fifth Corps [Porter] was ordered to support the cavalry and Porter determined to carry the fords. By night he had succeeded in making a lodgment on the south bank of the river, having captured five Confederate guns.

The following morning, the 20th, the divisions of Morell and Sykes were sent across the river to make a reconnaissance in force. They found an overwhelming body of Confederates under A. P. Hill, and were driven back with considerable loss. The result of this reconnaissance was to put a stop to any further pursuit or other offensive movement on the part of McClellan's army for the time being.

Lee's army went into camp in the fertile valley of Opequan Creek to rest and regain strength after its hard campaign, while it kept watch upon the movements of the Federal army. The Confederate army had lost many thousands of men by straggling, much of it due to the soldiers' lack of shoes and their bodily weakness, but much of it due, also, to a lack of discipline in the ranks. The army went into the battle of Antietam with fewer than 40,000 troops, but "its numbers rose by October 20 to 68,000 men 'present for duty.'"^{*} It was now, for the first time, definitely organized into the 1st and 2nd Corps, under Longstreet and Jackson, respectively, who had been made lieutenant-generals. Major-generals and brigadiers were also promoted to command the divisions and brigades, respectively, into which the corps were subdivided.[†] The army, moreover, had received such supplies as the Confederate government was able to furnish it. The Federal army, also, was in need of recruits and supplies, rest and recuperation. McClellan did not consider it in a fit condition to follow up at once the advantage gained by the victory he

^{*}Allan.

[†]Alexander.

claimed at Antietam. So he contented himself with having expelled the enemy from Maryland, and with negative measures to prevent his return, while he looked after the refitting and reorganizing of his army. He garrisoned Harper's Ferry, and fortified Maryland, Loudoun, and Bolivar Heights, where he stationed Sumner with the Second and Twelfth Corps.*

But the authorities at Washington and the people of the United States were impatient for McClellan to resume the offensive while the fine autumn weather lasted and the roads remained good. On the 6th of October Halleck, by direction of the President, sent McClellan an order to "cross the Potomac and give battle to the enemy, or drive him south."* But such were the hindrances encountered by McClellan in getting supplies for his army, due apparently more to the incompetence and hostility of Halleck than to anything else, that it was not till near the end of October that he felt ready to cross the Potomac.

STUART'S RAID.

Meantime Stuart had aggravated the impatience at the North by making a cavalry raid through Maryland into Pennsylvania, and entirely around the Federal army. Skilfully eluding the Federal garrisons along the upper Potomac, he crossed the river near the mouth of Black Creek on the 10th of October with the three Brigades of Fitzhugh Lee, Wade Hampton, and W. E. Jones, about 1,800 troopers, and, avoiding Hagerstown, which was strongly garrisoned by Union troops, pushed on through Mercersburg to Chambersburg. Here he gathered about 500 horses, and destroyed a machine shop and a lot of public stores, then bivouacked in the streets of the town, and was off again by daybreak of the 11th. He marched east as far as Cashtown; then took the Emmitsburg Road and the route down the Monocacy Valley; then he passed out through Hyattstown, and recrossed the Potomac into Virginia near Poolesville. He hastened on by way of Leesburg, and on the 13th crossed the Blue Ridge Mountains to rejoin Lee. "The distance traveled had been 126 miles, of which the last eighty from Chambersburg were accomplished without a halt."†

The news of the raid reached McClellan's headquarters on the evening of the 10th; Pleasanton and Averell with the Union

*Ropes.

†Alexander.

cavalry were at once started in pursuit, and the Federal garrisons along the Potomac, as far as Poolesville, were warned to watch for Stuart at the fords. Pleasanton's scouts came upon the raiding column just before it reached the Potomac, but they were not strong enough to stop it; nor were 200 infantrymen, who had been stationed at the ford to guard it. The Count of Paris says: "It [the Confederate column] had scarcely reached the other side, when it saw Pleasanton approaching in one direction, whose march had been retarded by the slow movements of the infantry and artillery, and in another direction a brigade which had left Poolesville since morning, and which had lost much valuable time on the road." Pleasanton had made a march of fifty-five miles in twenty-four hours, partly over mountain roads; and Averell's brigade had traveled 200 miles in four days; but the commands were broken down by the hard marching, and had to rest and receive several thousand fresh horses before they were fit for further active service. Thus the raid hindered McClellan's operations. Yet the results were hardly worth the risk; Stuart ought to have lost his whole command, but by reason of good luck and better management he lost only one man wounded.*

PLANS AND OPERATIONS.

(148) In his dispatch of October the 6th, mentioned before, Halleck told McClellan that the President preferred that he should move east of the Blue Ridge Mountains, so as to cover Washington; and that, if he should adopt this line of march, he would be furnished 30,000 reinforcements; but, if he decided to move up the Shenandoah Valley, he could be given only 12,000 or 15,000 reinforcements. At this time the waters of the Potomac were very low and McClellan feared that, as soon as he removed his main army from Lee's front, Lee would again cross into Maryland. McClellan replied, therefore, to Halleck that "he had determined to adopt the line of the Shenandoah for immediate operations," but that he did not regard the line of the Shenandoah Valley as important for ulterior objects. . . . "The only possible object," he continued, "to be gained by an advance from this vicinity, is to fight the enemy near Winchester."†

*Alexander.

†Ropes.

By the time, however, that McClellan was ready to start, the October rains had raised the river, and "the Union general felt sure that another invasion of the North was no longer to be apprehended, and that he could safely adopt" the line of advance east of the Mountains.* Nevertheless, the Twelfth Corps, now commanded by Slocum, was left at Harper's Ferry, "and Morell with about 4,500 men was directed to guard the upper Potomac."* McClellan's army began to cross the Potomac at Berlin on the 26th of October, but the last troops were not over before the 2nd of November. With its right flank covered by Pleasanton's cavalry the army then directed its march upon Warrenton as its first objective.

PLAN.

At this time McClellan does not appear to have had a definite plan. His movements were to depend upon those of the enemy. He says: "It was my intention if, upon reaching Ashby's or any other pass, I found that the enemy was in force between it and the Potomac, in the Valley of the Shenandoah, to move into the Valley and endeavor to gain their rear. I hardly hoped to accomplish this, but did expect that by striking in between Culpeper Court House and Little Washington I could either separate their army, and beat them in detail or else force them to concentrate as far back as Gordonsville, and thus place the Army of the Potomac in position either to adopt the Fredericksburg line of advance upon Richmond, or to be removed to the Peninsula, if, as I apprehended, it were found impossible to supply it by the Orange and Alexandria Railroad, beyond Culpeper."†

The army moved up the valley between the Bull Run and the Blue Ridge Mountains. The gaps in the latter range were seized and occupied one after another as they were passed, in order to cover the line of communications with Harper's Ferry, which was now the base of supplies. But by the 6th of November the army had reached the Manassas Gap Railway, and thereafter received its supplies by that line from Washington.

As soon as Lee learned that McClellan's army had crossed the Potomac he put his own in motion to oppose it. He left

*Ropes.

†Scribner's *Campaigns of the Civil War: Antietam and Fredericksburg*.—F. W. Palfrey.

Jackson's corps to hold the Valley and threaten the Union flank until he should determine what were to be the plans of the enemy; and with Longstreet's corps, covered by the cavalry, he moved from Winchester on the 2nd of November toward Culpeper Court House. The main column marched by way of Front Royal, but one division, with cavalry, took the road through Ashby's Gap "to look for the head of McClellan's army."*

In the movement southward the cavalry of the hostile armies were almost constantly in touch with each other, and engaged in combat on November 2 at the village of Union near Ashby's Gap, and on the 3rd at Upperville. On the 5th there was another cavalry fight at Barber's Cross-Roads, near Chester Gap. In all these combats the Federal cavalry was victorious; it had to be driven away from Manassas Gap by Hood's infantry division, and from Chester Gap by McLaws's division.*

On the 7th of November Lee was at Culpeper Court House with Longstreet's corps, 38,110 men, the reserve artillery, 1,027 men, and two brigades of cavalry under Stuart, 5,484 troopers. Jackson's corps, some 40,000 strong, was near Millwood in the Valley.†

On this date the Federal army was distributed as follows: the First, Second and Fifth Corps, and the reserve artillery were at Warrenton; the Ninth Corps was at Waterloo; the Sixth was at New Baltimore; the Eleventh Corps, sent out from Washington, was at New Baltimore, Gainesville, and Thoroughfare Gap; and one division of the Third Corps was between Manassas Junction and Warrenton Junction. Pleasanton with two brigades of cavalry was at Amissville and Jefferson, with pickets on Hazel River, and flank pickets at Newby's Cross-Roads and Gaines's Cross-Roads, and patrols towards Woodville, Sperryville and Little Washington. Bayard with his cavalry was at Rappahannock Station; General Morell with a division of infantry was on the Potomac from Sharpsburg up; and the Twelfth Corps was at Harper's Ferry.‡

It will be seen that the two corps of Lee's army were about forty miles apart in a direct line; while McClellan's army was concentrated about Warrenton, within twenty miles of Long-

*From *Manassas to Appomattox*.—Longstreet.

†General Alexander gives the following figures: Longstreet's corps with its reserve artillery, 34,916; Jackson's corps, 31,692; Stuart's cavalry, 9,146; Pendleton's reserve artillery, 718; total, 76,472.

‡W. F. Smith in *B. & L.*

street's corps, and still nearer the shortest road by which the two corps of the Confederate army could unite. It was, therefore, impossible for Jackson to march to Lee by this road while the Federal army remained at Warrenton.

The time had arrived for McClellan to strike "in between Culpeper Court House and Little Washington," separate the wings of the Confederate army, "and beat them in detail, or else force them to concentrate as far back as Gordonsville"; he purposed making an effort to this end at once, but again the authorities at Washington intervened, as they had done when McClellan had his army concentrated at Harrison's Landing, to prevent his carrying out or even undertaking his project.

As McClellan sat in his tent near Salem, late on the evening of the 7th of November, General Buckingham, special messenger from the War Department, presented himself, and handed the general a sealed envelope. It contained an order from the President, relieving McClellan from command of the Army of the Potomac, and appointing his personal friend, Burnside, in his stead. Burnside formally assumed command of the army on the 9th. The stations of the various units were practically the same as on the 7th, but the headquarters had been shifted to Warrenton.

Burnside was called upon by Halleck to submit a plan of operations, and on the 9th he forwarded a letter explaining his plan. "This was to give up the Orange and Alexandria Railway as his line of communications, and make Aquia Creek his base of supplies";* to "impress upon the enemy the belief that he was to attack Culpeper or Gordonsville, . . . then to make a rapid move of the whole force to Fredericksburg, with a view to a movement upon Richmond from that point."† Burnside stated that a wagon-train of subsistence stores, preceded by a train of pontoons, "enough to span the Rappahannock with two tracks," should be dispatched from Alexandria to Falmouth, and that forage and provisions should be sent to Aquia Creek and Belle Plain. Not until the 14th did the President give his reluctant assent to Burnside's plan.

One of Burnside's first steps was to reorganize the Army of the Potomac into three Grand Divisions and a Reserve Corps. The Second and Ninth Corps [Couch and Willcox] formed the Right Grand Division, under General Sumner; the Third and Fifth Corps [Stoneman and Butterfield] formed the Center

*Ropes.

†Palfrey.

Grand Division, under General Hooker; and the First and Sixth Corps [Reynolds and W. F. Smith] formed the Left Grand Division, under General Franklin. The Eleventh Corps, under General Sigel, formed the Reserve Corps.* It will be noticed that most of the corps have new commanders.

On the morning of the 15th the Right Grand Division [Sumner] started for Falmouth, arriving at that place on the 17th. The other two Grand Divisions followed a day or two later. But the army could not cross the Rappahannock—there were no pontoons. The pontoon-train did not arrive until the 25th. The Reserve Corps did not reach Falmouth until after the battle of Fredericksburg.†

On his arrival at Falmouth Sumner wanted to send a part of his command across the river, which at this time could be forded, to capture and hold Fredericksburg; but Burnside would not consent. He “decided that it was impracticable to cross large bodies there, and he was afraid to cross small bodies.”‡ At this time the Confederate garrison holding Fredericksburg was so weak that it could have offered but feeble resistance to Sumner’s Grand Division of “fifteen brigades and thirteen batteries.”

Lee was not surprised by Burnside’s change of plan and sudden movement upon Fredericksburg. He had already considered it probable that the Federal army, instead of moving against Longstreet at Culpeper, might march on Fredericksburg, and he had, accordingly, sent orders to destroy the railway from that place to Aquia Creek, and had strengthened the garrison of Fredericksburg by a small force. On the 18th of November, being convinced by Stuart’s reports that Burnside’s army was concentrating at Fredericksburg, Lee ordered McLaws’s division thither from Culpeper; the next day he started the rest of Longstreet’s corps for the same place. By the 21st Longstreet’s whole corps was at Fredericksburg.

“Lee had not, however, definitely decided to fight at Fredericksburg.” His first intention had been to make the North Anna his defensive line. So he left Jackson to decide in his own discretion whether to remain in the Shenandoah Valley or to cross to the east side of the mountains. Jackson crossed the mountains and halted with his corps at Orange Court House. But “on the 26th and 27th of November” . . . Lee “wrote

*Ropes.

†Alexander.

‡Palfrey.

to Jackson to join him . . . if in Jackson's judgment nothing was likely to be gained by his remaining away." In giving Jackson this direction Lee was "influenced partly by the lateness of the season and the consequent danger that the roads might become bad, which would render the coöperation of Jackson difficult, and partly by certain indications that the Union general intended crossing the river before long."* Jackson had joined Lee by the 30th of November, at Fredericksburg.

(149) The two hostile armies now occupied the opposite banks of the Rappahannock, the Union army 122,000 strong; the Confederate army about 78,500.

At this point the Rappahannock, about 400 feet wide, breaks through a chain or group of hills, and makes a sharp turn in its course from east to southeast. As one would naturally suppose, the hills on the outer side of the bend, known as Stafford Heights, come down closer to the water's edge than those on the opposite or inner side, and they are also higher, and command the latter. On the right bank the range of heights begins near the river, a little way above the bend, and runs approximately parallel to the river and about a mile from it for two miles. Then it is broken by Hazel Run. From this point southward the slopes are not so steep, they are covered with wood, and they curve away, still farther from the river, approaching it again toward the Massaponax River, which is about six miles from the northern end of the ridge. The range of heights is broken by ravines and small streams, and is marked by several prominent features. The general line of heights from Taylor's Hill, at the northwestern end, to Marye's Hill, just north of Hazel Run, is known as Marye's Heights. Between these two hills are Stansbury's Hill and Cemetery Hill. In the southern portion of the range of heights, Lee's Hill, at the northwest, and Prospect Hill, at the southeast, are the most prominent points.

Fredericksburg was on the river in front of Marye's Heights, and the gently sloping space between the edge of the town and the foot of the heights was crossed by a wide ditch, about 400 yards in front of the heights, that carried off the waste water from a canal along the foot of the hillside farther northward. South of Hazel Run the space between the foothills and the river was crossed by several brooks, the most considerable of which was Deep Run, whose various branches reached back

*Ropes.

into the wooded ravines. The Richmond, Fredericksburg and Potomac Railroad crossed the river at Fredericksburg, and followed down it for about four miles to Hamilton's Crossing, where it turned south. Another railway, unfinished, led out of the town and through the hills by way of Hazel Run Valley. Falmouth was on the left bank, about a mile above Fredericksburg, at the bend of the river.

There were numerous roads traversing the range of heights and the space between its base and the river-bank, the most notable of which were the Plank Road and the Telegraph Road. The Plank Road was in the prolongation of one of the streets in the heart of Fredericksburg. It crossed the ditch in front of Marye's Heights by a wooden bridge, and, ascending the heights, led on west through Chancellorsville to Orange Court House. (148) (149) The Telegraph Road also led out of one of the streets of the town, but it turned round the base of Marye's Hill, and continued out through the valley of Hazel Run southward to Richmond. At the base of Marye's Hill was a sunken road with a stone retaining-wall on each side, the one on the east "just breast-high for a man."* The space in front of the sunken road slopes gently, "until near" the wide ditch, "where it drops off three or four feet, leaving space near the canal [ditch] of a rod or two of level ground."*

The bridges by which the railway and the old Richmond stage road, parallel to it, crossed Deep Run had been destroyed, and the boards had been removed from those by which the Plank and Telegraph Roads crossed the wide ditch in front of Marye's Heights. Marye's Hill is only about half as high as the other hills along the front line of the range; it is really the eastern edge of a bench, which stretches back about a half-mile to the foot of another higher slope. Such was the battlefield of Fredericksburg.

Longstreet's corps at first occupied the line all the way from Taylor's Hill to Hamilton's Crossing; but Jackson's corps, upon its arrival, was "assigned position on the right near Hamilton's Crossing and the Massaponax."* Batteries of position were placed along the heights, and covered with epaulements. Altogether the Confederates had 306 guns in their line. "The line was strengthened by a few slight earthworks at some points, but was nowhere strongly fortified. The heavy works

*Longstreet.

at Fredericksburg, so often referred to, were constructed after the battle, not before it."*

(148) The day after Jackson arrived several Union gunboats were reported in the river, at Port Royal, about twenty miles below Fredericksburg; D. H. Hill's division, with several batteries, was, therefore, detached to drive the gunboats away, and to guard against the enemy's crossing at that point. Hill succeeded in driving the gunboats back, and was left in observation. Early's [Ewell's] division took post at Skinker's Neck, about twelve miles below Fredericksburg. W. H. F. Lee's brigade of cavalry was with D. H. Hill, while Wade Hampton's guarded the fords of the upper Rappahannock.

PLANS AND OPERATIONS.

Finding himself balked in his project of crossing the Rappahannock at Fredericksburg and moving at once against Richmond by delay in the arrival of his pontoon-train, Burnside was at a loss what to do. He had to do something—the press of the country demanded it. He must either force a crossing at Fredericksburg, or, by maneuvering, turn Lee's position and cross the river somewhere else. A turning movement by the upper river does not appear to have been seriously considered, though the country was hilly and wooded in that quarter, and the river narrow and fordable at several points—conditions that "would have made a crossing easy to accomplish by surprise,"† as was later proved in the Chancellorsville campaign. Such a movement, however, would have left Burnside's communications with Aquia Creek, though covered by the river, more or less exposed to Lee's army.

Burnside made some preparations for a turning movement by way of Skinker's Neck, where the river was 300 yards wide; but the appearance of D. H. Hill's division near that point caused him to drop that project. (149) He then resolved to force a crossing in front of the Confederate position. Lee's line was too far away from the river, and the place was too much dominated by Hunt's powerful batteries of 147 guns, on Stafford Heights, for Lee to oppose any effective resistance to the actual passage of the river. His real fight was to be made after the Union Army had got across.

On the night of December 10 arrangements were made to

*Allan.

†Alexander.

span the river with five pontoon-bridges, three opposite Fredericksburg, and two just below the mouth of Deep Run. Sumner's Grand Division was to cross by the upper, and Franklin's by the lower, bridges. Hooker's Grand Division was to remain on the left bank as the general reserve. The Grand Divisions took their positions during the night. Some Confederate sharpshooters were posted along the river-bank in rifle pits; but Franklin's command had little trouble in driving them away from its front, and by noon of the 11th had laid its two bridges. The work was facilitated by a dense fog, which hung over the valley during the morning.

The construction of the bridges at Fredericksburg was a harder undertaking. A brigade of Confederates under Barksdale was posted in cellars and behind brick walls, along the water-front of the town, and their fire was so deadly that it drove the bridge-builders away. Several hours were wasted in unavailing efforts. At ten o'clock Burnside ordered Hunt's artillery to shell the town. "On this," says Swinton, who was an eye-witness, "there opened up from the massive concentration of artillery a terrific bombardment, that was kept up for above an hour. Each gun fired fifty rounds, and I know not how many hundred tons of iron were thrown into the town." The shells set the town on fire, but the guns could not be depressed enough to reach the sharpshooters. "The day was wearing away and affairs were at a deadlock," when General Hunt suggested that a party be sent across in the boats to drive the Confederates away. This succeeded. The 7th Michigan, the 19th and 20th Massachusetts, and the 89th New York volunteered for the apparently perilous exploit. Federal sharpshooters lined the left bank, and kept down the Confederate fire as well as possible. The party landed on the other side without much loss, and had little further trouble in putting Barksdale's men to flight, and capturing about 100 of them. The bridges were then laid in a few minutes.

(150) Of Franklin's command, which had orders to await the construction of the upper bridges, one brigade crossed over on the afternoon of the 11th, and by 3 p.m. of the 12th both of his corps, the First and the Sixth, were on the right bank. One of Sumner's divisions, also, crossed over and occupied Fredericksburg the night of the 11th; the next day the rest of the Right Grand Division crossed to the right bank. Nineteen batteries, 104 guns, crossed with Sumner's Grand Division, of which only about seven batteries could be used in the

battle. Twenty-three batteries, 116 guns, crossed by the lower bridges, all of which, but one battery, were engaged.

On the afternoon of the 12th Burnside was at Franklin's headquarters, and discussed the situation with Franklin and his commanders. It was practically agreed that the left of the Confederate line was too strong to be carried; the right, at Hamilton's Crossing, was plainly the weaker flank, as it rested on no natural obstacle. It was, however, strengthened by abatis and earthworks, and Stuart's cavalry and horse-artillery guarded the space between Hamilton's Crossing and the Massaponax. Franklin's command was reinforced by two of Stoneman's divisions [Third Corps], which raised its strength to about 50,000. It was agreed—and Franklin so understood—that Franklin was to make the "main attack," and that Sumner's would be the "secondary attack." Burnside said he would send Franklin his orders, and Franklin made ready to attack at daybreak.

But it was half after seven on the morning of the 13th before Franklin received his order; and when it came it was wholly different from what Franklin had expected, and it left him in much doubt as to what was required of him. The order directed that "you keep your whole command in position for a rapid movement down the old Richmond Road, and you will send out, at once, a division, at least, to pass below Smithfield, to seize, if possible, the heights near Captain Hamilton's, on this side of the Massaponax, taking care to keep it well supported, and its line of retreat open. He [the commanding general] has ordered another column, of a division or more, to be moved from General Sumner's command, up the Plank Road, to its intersection with the Telegraph Road, where they will divide, with a view to seizing the heights on both of those roads. Holding those two heights, with the heights near Captain Hamilton's will, he hopes, compel the enemy to evacuate the whole ridge between these points. I make these moves by columns distant from each other with a view of avoiding the possibility of a collision of our own forces which might occur in a general movement during the fog. . . ." This order was dated 5.55 a.m.

Sumner's order, dated 6 a.m., directed him to extend his left to Deep Run, connecting with Franklin's right, and his right as far as his judgment might dictate. Sumner was also directed to push a "column, of a division or more, along the Plank and Telegraph Roads, with a view to seizing the heights

in rear of the town." Hooker's order was dated 7 a.m., and directed him to place Butterfield's corps [Fifth] and Whipple's division [Third Corps] in position to cross at a moment's notice at the upper three bridges in support of Sumner's troops and the two remaining divisions of Stoneman's corps [Third] in readiness to cross to Franklin's support. These were the orders that opened the battle of Fredericksburg.

The movements of troops in the Federal camps on the 10th and the reports of his scouts warned Lee of Burnside's purpose, and he gave notice to the commanders along the line, and had D. H. Hill recalled from Port Royal, and Early from Skinker's Neck. They did not reach the battle-field until the morning of the 13th.

On the morning of the 13th the hostile forces were in position about as follows: the Second Corps at the town on the right; the Ninth Corps next, south of Hazel Run; then the Sixth; and then the First. During the day Burns's division of the Ninth Corps crossed Deep Run to support Franklin. Meade's division of the First Corps was on the left of the general line facing southward, with its right touching the left of Gibbon's division of the same corps, and its left resting on the river near Smithfield. Doubleday's division of the same corps was in reserve, formed in column on the bank of the river behind Meade's left. Hunt's artillery reserve was upon Stafford Heights.

In Lee's line, Longstreet's corps was on the left, "with Anderson's division resting upon the river, and the divisions of McLaws, Pickett, and Hood extending to the right in the order named."* Cobb's brigade of McLaws's division was in the sunken road behind the stone wall at the base of Marye's Hill. Jackson's corps held the right of the line. Here the front was occupied by A. P. Hill's division, with the brigades of Brockenbrough, Archer, Lane, and Pender in the first line, from right to left, along the railway, at the edge of a wood. In the second line were the brigades of Gregg and Thomas. A third line was occupied by Early's and Taliaferro's divisions—Early's on the right. D. H. Hill's division was in rear of the right. Batteries were on both flanks. Stuart's horse-artillery and cavalry were on the plain at the right, in the valley of the Massaponax.†

*Palfrey.

†Alexander.

In A. P. Hill's front line Archer's left was separated from Lane's right by 500 to 600 yards of swampy wood which the Confederates carelessly supposed to be impassable. Gregg's brigade, in the second line, was behind this swamp. There was also too wide a space for mutual support between Lane's left and Pender's right.

Carrying out the spirit of Burnside's vague and unintelligible order as well as he was able to interpret it, Franklin selected Meade's division of the First Corps [Reynolds] to assault, "and seize, if possible, the heights near Captain Hamilton's," supported by Gibbon's division on the right, and Doubleday's in reserve. The aggregate strength of these three divisions was about 16,000 men. Meade's division moved out from Smithfield, and encountered its first obstacle at the Richmond Road, where it was delayed by the hedges and ditches alongside. Between nine and ten o'clock it had got over these obstacles, when the fog suddenly lifted and exposed its columns to the Confederates, who, before this, had fired only a few random shots. (151) Pelham, who commanded Stuart's horse-artillery, immediately opened fire upon Meade's left flank, compelling him to halt. Meade replied with twelve guns, and Doubleday's division came up and faced Stuart's command; after a half-hour's halt Meade resumed his march to the front.

Not an enemy was to be seen, but the Federal artillery shelled the woods occupied by A. P. Hill's division, "and inflicted considerable losses." Pelham's batteries had withdrawn, but Doubleday kept his division facing to the left to watch Stuart's threatening squadrons. Meade's columns moved forward again until they came within 800 yards of the batteries on the right and left of Jackson's line. These batteries then opened a cross fire upon the columns and checked them; but the woods in front maintained an ominous silence.

Gibbon came up and deployed on Meade's right, and the left of the Sixth Corps [Smith] connected with Gibbon's right. The whole of Franklin's Grand Division was now in line, and Franklin summoned the two divisions of the Third Corps [Stoneman] to his support. The Federal artillery engaged the Confederate batteries, and, after an hour and a half, succeeded in silencing them.

Meade's lines now charged the woods in their front, and, when at point-blank range, were suddenly fired upon with musketry by the Confederates concealed within them, and by can-

non with shell and canister. (152) But the Federal brigades, now in three lines, pressed forward into the swampy wood between Archer's and Lane's brigades. The first line turned to right and left to assault the flanks of these Confederate brigades, while the other two pushed ahead until they came upon Gregg's Confederate brigade at rest in the Military Road back of the swamp. Gregg himself was taken by surprise, and was slain while trying to stop his men from firing on Meade's troops, which he took for Confederates. Lawton's brigade [Early's division] quickly came to help Gregg's. Meade's advance in the woods was checked, and there were no Federal troops at hand to render assistance. Doubleday, with the reserve, was out of reach, still watching the left on the Richmond Road, and carrying on a desultory skirmish with Stuart's dismounted troopers; Gibbon's division had been stopped at the railway; Smith's corps [Sixth], over on the right, was scarcely engaged at all, but was too far away. Franklin himself was far in rear.

The Confederate brigades rallied, and the rest of Early's division hastened to their support. Together they drove the Federal division back, out of the swamp, and into the plain beyond. Gibbon's division went with it. The Confederates followed; but Birney's division of the Third Corps had now arrived to support Meade, and Sickles's division was behind Gibbon's. The Confederates were in their turn driven back into the woods, with a loss of more than 500 killed and wounded. (153) At two o'clock Reynolds [First Corps], with the assistance of the two divisions of the Third Corps, held the railway line, but he was not strong enough to recapture the woods.*

Meanwhile the battle had been raging at the other end of the line. Burnside personally directed the attack in that quarter, though he remained at the Phillips house on the left bank of the river. The Confederates opened the battle. As soon as the fog rose, about eleven o'clock, and disclosed the streets of Fredericksburg crowded with Union troops, the Confederate artillery from the heights began to shell the town. French's division [Second Corps, Couch], followed by Hancock's in support, led the attack. The division had to keep in column until it had crossed over the damaged bridges of the wide ditch. During this time the Confederate artillery, beyond the

*Comte de Paris.

reach of Hunt's batteries on Stafford Heights, turned all its fire upon the Federal columns. The division then deployed on ground along the ditch sheltered by the low bank; and, in column of brigades, charged the stone wall behind which stood two Confederate brigades in the sunken road. When the Federals came within two hundred yards of the wall the Confederates opened upon them with musketry fire. But the leading brigade pushed on to within sixty yards of the wall; there it was forced to stop. The other two brigades came on, but they too had to halt at sixty yards; and after a single discharge they were all forced to retire, leaving a third of their number on the ground. Three regimental flags were left standing within eighty yards of the Confederate line.

Hancock's division followed immediately and passed beyond the flags planted by French's regiments; it got within thirty or forty yards of the stone wall, but could not reach it. The Confederates behind the wall had been reinforced, till now they were firing in four ranks. Howard's division [Second Corps] followed Hancock's; while Sturgis and Getty crossed Hazel Run with their divisions [Ninth Corps] to support the assault. But all effort was in vain; the Federal line had to yield. It fell back behind the low bank near the ditch, which afforded some shelter. Out of 5,006 men Hancock had lost 2,013. This happened at half after one o'clock, just the moment when Meade was driven out of the woods on the left.

Burnside now sent an order to Franklin to charge the enemy with his whole force, in order to draw all his attention to that quarter; he ordered Hooker, who still held the three divisions of the Fifth Corps in reserve, to renew the attack on the stone wall with two of his divisions, and to support Sturgis and Getty on the left with the other. Hooker started at once to obey the order, and led his troops across the river; but he was convinced by Hancock and French of the hopelessness of making another assault. So he went back to Burnside at the Phillips house, and begged to be excused from taking his men to the sacrifice. Burnside was immovable; "That height must be carried this evening," he repeated, pacing up and down.

Hooker returned to the field and prepared for his assault by causing every available battery to concentrate its fire on the sunken road. Pickett's division, meantime, had gone to Marve's Hill, and one of Hood's brigades had taken post behind the wall in the sunken road where already there were four brigades. Part of the firing line was now six ranks deep. At

four o'clock Hooker gave the signal for the assault, and Humphreys's division charged; but it was stopped like those that had gone before it. As dusk was falling Getty, on the left, made a final assault upon the end of Marye's Hill, but was repulsed. Twilight came on, and Hooker ordered his men to fall back. "Finding," says he, "that I had lost as many men as my orders required me to lose, I suspended the attack." The battle was over.

There has been much dispute, and there is still much uncertainty, as to the time when Franklin received Burnside's afternoon order to attack with his whole force; and what orders he actually received. He probably received the orders before 2.30 p.m. His line was then stretched out three miles long, from Deep Run nearly to the Massaponax. It was a short winter's day, and Franklin considered it too late to collect his extended line and put it to the charge. He contented himself, therefore, with letting his troops continue to occupy the attention of the Confederate right with fire action alone.

Night ended the battle all along the line. The Union side had lost 10,208 men killed and wounded, and the Confederates had lost 5,209. Sixty-three hundred of the Federal soldiers were killed or wounded at the base of Marye's Hill.

Burnside issued an order to renew the attack next morning, but his commanders succeeded in persuading him to recall it. Morning found the troops where nightfall had left them. Jackson and Hood had made new intrenchments during the night, and Lee hoped Burnside would attack him again; but the 14th and the 15th passed without a renewal of the battle. On the night of the 15th the Federal army withdrew to the left bank of the Rappahannock.

COMMENTS.

(148) The battle of Antietam was fought on the 17th of September, but it was the end of October before McClellan's army resumed the offensive, and recrossed the Potomac. To be sure, the army was in need of reorganization, recruitment, and refitting, and there were exasperating delays in the shipment of the stores; but even so, nothing can excuse General McClellan for letting so many weeks of fine autumn weather pass without his making an aggressive movement. Lee's army was, in the meanwhile, recuperating itself at a faster rate than the Army of the Potomac, inasmuch as it was getting

back the large number of stragglers it had lost on its rapid movement in Maryland. Just after the battle of Antietam the Confederate army was certainly in a worse condition than the Union army; and then was when McClellan should have pushed his advantage.

Yet it was, undoubtedly, mainly for political reasons that McClellan was removed from command of the army. Ropes makes this comment: "McClellan ought not to have been removed unless the Government were prepared to put in his place some officer whom they knew to be at least his equal in military capacity. This assuredly was not the case at this moment." Burnside had gained prestige in newspaper and political circles as commander of the expedition to the coast of North Carolina, "where his overwhelming force easily overcame the slight resistance that it met";* but he knew that he was not equal to the office now imposed upon him, and he accepted it with great reluctance. His modest opinion of his abilities was shared by the rest of the army. McClellan was relieved (November 7) just when the Army of the Potomac was concentrated near Warrenton, while the two wings of Lee's army were at Culpeper and Millwood, respectively, forty or fifty miles apart. He was about to move against Longstreet's wing at Culpeper, and says, "Could he have been brought to a battle within reach of my supplies I cannot doubt that the result would have been a brilliant victory for our army."† Many of the reviewers of this campaign agree with McClellan. But Lee and Longstreet would not have stood to fight a decisive battle; they would have fallen back along the railway, destroying it as they retreated, until they formed a junction with Jackson, who would have moved up the Valley far enough safely to cross the mountains and join Longstreet. So McClellan, in his pursuit, would almost surely have found himself beyond "reach of his supplies," and Jackson would probably have found an opportunity to pass through some gap of the mountains, in McClellan's rear, and intercept his communications. This would have forced McClellan to fall back.

Lee, at this time, did not expect to defend the line of the Rappahannock; that river could be crossed at so many points that "Lee expected to use it simply to gain time for the concen-

*Alexander.

†Ropes.

tration of his troops.”* “Lee proposed to take a position behind the North Anna with part of” his forces, “while, with Jackson’s and Longstreet’s corps united, he moved in such a manner as might enable him to fall upon the flank and rear of the Federal army, when it attempted the passage of that river.”† But Lee was in doubt for some days as to what the Federal army was going to do; whether it was going to move against Longstreet at Culpeper, or toward the Valley to cut Jackson off, or on Fredericksburg.

Some of the critics think that Burnside ought to have moved against Longstreet at Culpeper, while others say his movement to Fredericksburg was right, and that it miscarried through the failure of the pontoons to arrive, which was no fault of his. He might, also, have escaped the battle of Fredericksburg by crossing the Rappahannock by the fords higher up, and marching to that town by the right bank; this is what General Halleck and the President expected him to do when they consented to his plan.‡ He certainly made a mistake in not allowing Sumner to cross the river and occupy the heights near Fredericksburg with his Grand Division, as soon as it reached Falmouth. The Confederate garrison at Fredericksburg, at that time, was hardly more than a regiment, and the river was fordable. Burnside would not let Sumner cross for fear the river might rise, before the arrival of the pontoon-train, and cut him off.

Burnside’s plan was based wholly upon the supposition that his pontoons would be at hand, and that he could cross his army to Fredericksburg, before Lee should discover his movement and have time to meet and oppose his passage. Had the plan succeeded Lee would have made his main defense behind the North Anna. But upon Burnside’s letting a week or more pass without making any effort to cross, Lee resolved to make every effort to stop him on the north bank of the Rappahannock, and to compel him either to make another change of base, or to stand fast till the winter came on and suspended the operations. Either of these events Lee knew would cause great dissatisfaction at the North. “It appears to me,” he wrote to Mr. Davis on the 25th of November, “that should General

*Allan.

†Long.

‡Alexander.

Burnside change his base of operations the effect produced in the United States would be almost equivalent to a defeat. I think, therefore, he will persevere in his present course, and the longer we can delay him and throw him into the winter the more difficult will be his undertaking. It is for this reason that I have determined to resist him at the outset and to throw every obstacle in the way of his advance.* With this purpose in view Lee then ordered Jackson to bring his corps up to the Rappahannock, from Orange Court House, where it had remained for several days awaiting developments, and waiting for Lee to decide upon his plan of resistance.

It was during the movement on Fredericksburg that Burnside had his best chance. If after inducing Lee to move Longstreet's corps to that place Burnside had suddenly turned back with his united forces, and, crossing the Rappahannock above Fredericksburg, had fallen upon that wing of Lee's army, he would have had an excellent chance of destroying it. The head of Sumner's Grand Division, it will be remembered, reached Falmouth on the 17th of November, and the rest of the Union army was close behind it; Longstreet's whole corps was at Fredericksburg on the 21st, while Jackson did not leave Winchester until the 22nd. For a few days Longstreet's and Jackson's corps were 150 miles apart, and the united Federal army was practically between them. What an opportunity for a man like Napoleon or Jackson! But Lee and Jackson had both presumed largely on Burnside's want of enterprise in allowing, for even a few days, 150 miles to separate the two corps.† The best part of Lee's strategy appears to have been his understanding of the characters of his enemy's commanders, and the use he made of it. Burnside's foremost mistake was his making Richmond and not Lee's army his main objective.†

Swinton thinks Lee could have stopped Burnside's movement upon Fredericksburg by marching his forces toward the Orange and Alexandria Railway—threatening Washington; but Ropes says "for Lee to have done this would have been to risk a battle in which he would have been opposed by a well-appointed army much larger than his own," and with no other end in view "than that of winning that battle."

*Allan.

†Alexander.

THE BATTLE.

(150) The battle of Fredericksburg was another of the great engagements of the Civil War in which the value of artificial cover was shown. The left of Lee's position was naturally strong against frontal assault, but it was not so much the heights, which afforded commanding positions for the artillery, as the sunken road revetted with stone at the base of Marye's Hill, like the railway cut at the Second Bull Run, that made the position impregnable against direct attack.

From Taylor's Hill, the left of the Confederate line, to its right at Hamilton's Crossing was about six and a half miles. Lee's force was large enough to occupy this position with about six men to the yard. But along the two miles of strong heights, Marye's Heights, Lee placed only 11,000 men; while in the space between Deep Run and Hamilton's Crossing, about two miles, which might more easily have been turned or enveloped, he posted Jackson with 30,000 men. The other two miles of the position, those at the center of the concave line, were defended by only three men to the yard, and most of those were afterwards moved, when the force of the attack developed against the wings. At first examination, then, the center would appear to have been the weakest part of the line—the part against which the Federal main attack should have been launched. But Burnside could not have massed troops for such an attack without exposing them to the view of the Confederates, who could then have concentrated promptly at the center; for roads had been repaired and built in rear of the position for that purpose.

"The Confederate line was strengthened by a few slight earthworks at some points, but was nowhere strongly fortified."* Had it been strongly intrenched along the edge of the woods on the right Meade's frontal assault must have failed to break through it. Yet strategically and tactically the right of the Confederate line was where Burnside's main attack should have been made. Strategically, because, if successful, it would have thrown Lee off the Richmond Road and the railway, his lines of communication, and placed the Federal army between the Confederates and Richmond; tactically, because the Massaponax could easily have been crossed, and that flank of the position might have been turned or enveloped. True,

*Allan.

unless the attention of the Confederates could have been occupied by the secondary attack all along the line, their right could quickly have been reinforced, and by swinging to the right in great force it might have cut off the turning or enveloping columns from their pontoon-bridges. General Alexander, who knows the ground, believes the Confederate left might, also, have been turned. "The most obvious, and the proper attack for the Federal right," he says, "was one turning the Confederate left along the very edge of the river above Falmouth, supported by artillery on the north bank which could enfilade and take in reverse the Confederate left flank." If the main attack, however, had been made against this flank, and had succeeded, it would have thrown the Confederates back upon their line of communications rather than away from it.

The attack was, in point of fact, made without any real plan. It resolved itself into fourteen desperate, unsupported, successive assaults at one impregnable point of the line,* and another at a different point five miles away; while there was practically no fighting along a great part of the line, and large numbers of the troops scarcely fired a shot.

It is hard to say what Burnside expected to accomplish, or why he fought this battle. "The only important reason given by General Burnside for fighting the battle was that he thought that the troops which General Lee had sent down the river to oppose the landing of the Federal army in that region had not returned."† "His balloon," says Colonel Henderson in his life of Stonewall Jackson, "had reported large Confederate bivouacs below Skinker's Neck, and he appears to have believed that Lee . . . had posted half his army in that neighborhood." Colonel Allan remarks: "He appears to have relied chiefly upon his balloons—a wretched substitute at best for scouts and cavalry, and especially so in a broken and heavily wooded country." But he began crossing the night of the 10th and did not attack until the morning of the 13th; this delay enabled Lee to recall his detachments in time for the battle.

As in the battle of Shiloh, so in this battle, Napoleon's Twenty-ninth Maxim was violated on the Union side; the "whole force" within the theater was not collected. This mistake cannot, however, be charged altogether to Burnside, but

*Alexander.

†Ropes.

more to the authorities at Washington in their exaggerated anxiety about the safety of the Capital. There were 46,000 men under Heintzelman within the defenses of Washington—enough to have held the city indefinitely against Lee's whole army. Besides these there were some 12,000 troops scattered in detachments through Maryland, Delaware, southern Pennsylvania, and upon the eastern shore of Virginia; Morell had about 5,000 along the upper Potomac; while Sigel with the Reserve Corps [Eleventh] was at Dumfries, within twenty miles of the battle-field, and Slocum with the Twelfth Corps was near Centreville, not fifty miles away. These two corps at least ought to have been brought to Fredericksburg in time for the battle.*

An unusual feature of the battle, viewed as the passage and defense of a river, was the fact that little real opposition was encountered by the Federal army in the actual crossing of the stream. Owing to the conformation of the ground Lee could not seriously resist this part of the undertaking; he could not place his men to contest the landing of troops, because they would have been at the mercy of the Federal artillery on Stafford Heights.

It has been said that Lee missed his opportunity when he failed to follow up his successful defense by a counter-attack. Less than half of his army, only four out of nine divisions, had been engaged.† Yet, while it is true that Lee had not provided a general reserve, or made any arrangements for a counter-attack;‡ and while he did not know how badly he had defeated Burnside, and “among the Confederates no one conceived that the battle was over”† at the end of the first day, there was no opportunity for counter-attack on the 13th at Longstreet's end of the line, where “the Federal assaults were maintained with unwavering determination till dark. But at the other end of the line, when Meade and Gibbon were driven back, Early's division followed them until it was stopped by Birney.”§ If Early had been followed up and supported by a strong force of reserves at the right moment the effect might have been decisive. Half of Jackson's corps was massed in reserve, but his biographers say it was not practicable for him to put them into the fight at this critical moment; Jackson

*Pamphlet by Captain Alstaetter, C. E.

†Alexander.

‡Henderson.

§Allan.

had to hold them to meet assaults that he momentarily expected at other points of his line. As no such assaults came he resolved to make a counter-attack; but he says: "The first gun had hardly moved forward from the wood a hundred yards when the enemy's artillery reopened and so completely swept our front as to satisfy me that the proposed movement should be abandoned."*

During the next two days, the 14th and 15th, while the Federal army was back in Fredericksburg and on the river-bank, an attack by Lee's army would have had no chance of succeeding. For 70,000 men to come out of their own strong position, and cross an open plain to attack 100,000 behind the bank of a river, would have been foolhardy in itself; but when it is remembered that Hunt had 147 guns on Stafford Heights, which had a perfect sweep of the whole field, it must be concluded that such an undertaking would have been hopeless. Burnside ought not, however, to have been allowed to withdraw his army across the river on the night of the 15th without any interference. True, the night "was dark and rainy, with high wind from the south, preventing" the Confederates "from hearing noises from the enemy's direction." Still the successful passage unmolested under their guns reflects badly upon the vigilance of the Confederates. "It should have been suspected, discovered by scouts, and vigorously attacked with artillery."†

The important effect of stationing cavalry and horse-artillery on the flank of the line was shown in this battle as it was at Antietam. Stuart's guns not only checked Meade's charge for an hour, but his threatening position kept Doubleday's division out of the main fight at that end of the line.

*Allan.

†Alexander.

LECTURE XV.

STONES* RIVER CAMPAIGN.

(154) After the battle of Shiloh [April 6 and 7, 1862] General Halleck took command of the National forces in person at Pittsburg Landing; and after the arrival of Pope with the 30,000 men "fresh from the capture of Island No. 10," and other reinforcements, he had an army of some 120,000.† Beauregard's Confederate army was estimated at about 70,000. It really was much smaller, and was a good deal demoralized. It was at Corinth.

Instead of following the Confederate army vigorously and destroying it with his overwhelming numbers Halleck did not begin his forward movement until the 30th of April; and then, General Grant says in his *Memoirs*, "the movement was a siege from the start to the close." The vast army would build corduroy roads and move forward a mile or two, then halt and intrench. Its objective was the town of Corinth, not Beauregard's army as it should have been. Finally the "grand army" reached Corinth and took possession of the town, almost without bloodshed, on the 30th of May. Corinth, it will be remembered, is only about twenty miles from Shiloh. The Confederate army had retreated south about sixty miles to Tupelo. Halleck did not pursue, but split his army in pieces, sending one division to Arkansas, and stationing others at various points between Memphis and Decatur.

Buell with the army of the Ohio, about 31,000 strong, was started about the 10th of June for Chattanooga, to seize that important town, and to carry out the President's long-cherished desire to have a Union force enter East Tennessee in order to protect and encourage the loyal inhabitants of that region. But Halleck ordered Buell to rebuild and repair the Memphis and Charleston Railway as he proceeded, which was to be his

*This name is variously written Stone, Stone's, and Stones. *Lippincott's Gazetteer* has it "Stone;" the *Century Atlas* has it "Stones;" and *The U. S. Geographic Board* has adopted "Stone." The lecturer wrote to the Mayor of Murfreesboro to inquire what form was used by the people of the country. The Mayor answered that the form "Stones" was the one used. He also sent letter-heads of the "Stones River National Bank" to show the form generally used.

†Grant's *Memoirs*.

line of communications. (155) This task so hindered Buell's march that Bragg, who had succeeded Beauregard in command of the Confederates, had time to transfer his army—the infantry by rail by way of Mobile—from Tupelo, to Chattanooga ahead of Buell. Yet Bragg did not begin to move from Tupelo until the 21st of July. A large part of Bragg's army was left in Mississippi under Price and Van Dorn. The force that assembled at Chattanooga numbered about 30,000. General Kirby Smith, at Knoxville, commanded another Confederate force in East Tennessee of about 18,000, "half of which was opposed by the Federal general, Morgan, at or near Cumberland Gap."*

When his leading divisions had gone as far as Stevenson, Buell, with Halleck's consent, gave up the effort to keep the Memphis and Charleston Railway open in his rear, and adopted the Nashville and Chattanooga Railway as his line of communications, with Nashville as his secondary base of supplies. Louisville was the primary base. But on the 13th of July Forrest with his Confederate cavalry, some 1,400 troopers, suddenly fell upon Murfreesboro, and captured the Union garrison of that town, more than 1,000 officers and men. He broke up the railway so thoroughly that it was not repaired until the 28th of the month; and Buell's advance against Chattanooga was, for the time, brought to a full stop. Buell then moved his divisions forward to the following positions: Wood's division to Decherd; Nelson's to Murfreesboro; McCook's and Crittenden's to Battle Creek; Thomas's to Athens, Ala. His own headquarters were at Huntsville. But his advance was again stopped by a Confederate cavalry raid; John Morgan captured Gallatin, Tenn., and destroyed the tunnel of the Louisville and Nashville Railway, effectually interrupting this line of communications.

Meantime Bragg and Kirby Smith had arranged for an invasion of Kentucky. The plan of invasion proposed that Smith should turn the Union position at Cumberland Gap and intercept its line of communications by a movement to the left of the Gap; while Bragg with the main column, covered by his cavalry, and a small column on his left to threaten Nashville, should advance directly against Munfordville. Here he would be squarely upon Buell's line of communications. Bragg's and Smith's forces were to unite in Kentucky.

*Ropes.

GEOGRAPHY.

An examination of the map shows that there were no railways and no rivers in the direction of the proposed Confederate advance; the columns would have to rely wholly upon wagon-trains for the transportation of their stores, and the roads were part of the way over mountains, and generally poor. Munfordville is about 160 miles from Chattanooga in a straight line. Very little forage and subsistence could be obtained in the country through which the columns were to advance. "Bragg's march presented peculiarly trying features. He had to cross the river Tennessee . . . ; then traverse Walden's Ridge, . . . some 1,200 feet above the level of the sea; then descend into the valley of the Sequatchie River . . . and then ascend the plateau of the Cumberland Mountains, somewhere about 2,200 feet above sea-level, before he could possibly concentrate his army for the invasion proper."*

OPERATIONS.

About the middle of August, Kirby Smith crossed the mountains and cut Morgan's line of communications. Leaving one of his divisions to watch Morgan in the vicinity of Cumberland Gap, he pressed forward into Kentucky, and on August 30 encountered an extemporized force of Federal troops at Richmond and routed them with great loss. On September 2 he was in possession of Lexington, and he established his headquarters there.

"Bragg, too, effected his movement through the Sequatchie Valley and his crossing of the Cumberland Plateau in the first days of September, and on the 5th established his headquarters at Sparta. . . . Up to this point Bragg's movements had been screened by the Cumberland Mountains, and Buell could not obtain any definite information respecting them.

"Buell decided to concentrate his scattered forces at Murfreesboro, where his army would cover Nashville, and where he could easily receive" reinforcements that he was expecting "from Grant's army in western Tennessee. This he accomplished by September the 5th. . . . He had then heard of Kirby Smith's victory at Richmond, and he strongly suspected that Bragg was intending to effect a junction with him."* So

*Ropes.

he planned to leave a sufficient force to defend Nashville, and to march the rest of his army rapidly into Kentucky.

"On the 14th of September Buell was at Bowling Green with the bulk of his army; Bragg had reached Glasgow . . . the day before." On that day Bragg's advance attacked the Federal post at Munfordville, but was repulsed. "Bragg at once brought up his main army, and the Federal commander, on being satisfied that he was largely outnumbered, surrendered on the 17th with 4,000 men."*

Bragg's army was now squarely across Buell's line of communications with his main base at Louisville. Bragg remained at Munfordville several days, hoping Buell would attack him. This Buell would not do, and on the 21st Bragg started for Bardstown to connect with Kirby Smith. Buell immediately moved to Louisville, where he arrived on the 25th. (156) Here his army was largely reinforced. On the last day of September the main hostile armies were posted as follows: Buell's at Louisville, Bragg's at Bardstown, and Kirby Smith's at Lexington.

On the 1st of October Buell with his reorganized army resumed the offensive. He sent two divisions toward Frankfort to "contain or observe Kirby Smith, and with the rest of his army marched in three columns toward Bardstown, with the intention of attacking Bragg."*

On the 30th of September Bragg was at Frankfort with Kirby Smith's army conducting the inauguration of a Secessionist governor of Kentucky. He and Smith were deceived by Buell's movements, and thought the main force of the Federals was advancing toward Frankfort. Bragg, therefore, ordered Polk, who had been left at Bardstown in command of his army and had fallen back before Buell's columns, to march north and attack the Federal army in flank. Polk, however, knowing that Buell's main force was advancing on Bardstown, refused to obey Bragg's order, and retired toward the southeast. Bragg then ordered Polk to concentrate at Harrodsburg, in order to cover the large depot of stores that Kirby Smith had collected at Lexington. Smith moved to Versailles for the same purpose. Bragg's left wing under Hardee had reached Perryville and was there being pressed by the Federal advance. It was then reinforced by a division of his right wing from Harrodsburg.

"Buell's forces, excepting the divisions of Sill and Dumont,

*Ropes.

were also near Perryville, but his troops had arrived from several directions,—‘the distance from one flank of the army to the other was not perhaps less than six miles,’—the different bodies were much separated from each other in search of water . . . and the line of battle had not been formed by noon [October 8]. (157) The presence of the enemy in force does not seem to have been recognized. . . . (158) About 2 p.m. the Confederates assaulted the Federal left under McCook, and drove it back in disorder, capturing some fifteen guns. (159) Later in the day Sheridan drove the Confederates in front of him through the town of Perryville. The Confederates achieved a tactical success against the Union left, but for all practical purposes the battle was a drawn battle. (156) At night the Confederates retired” to Harrodsburg.* Here Bragg’s force was joined on the 10th by Kirby Smith’s.

Bragg waited at Harrodsburg a day or two to see if Buell would attack him in position, then withdrew his army to Camp Dick Robinson, and from there into East Tennessee. On the 12th Buell “started in pursuit, but the Confederate retreat was well managed; their rear,” says Ropes, “was admirably protected by the cavalry of Wheeler and Wharton; and at London, Buell, convinced of the impolicy of carrying his army at that season of the year into the difficult country of East Tennessee, discontinued the pursuit and transferred his troops to Bowling Green and Glasgow, intending, later on, to place his forces at some point or points east of Nashville, on the Nashville and Chattanooga Railroad, in readiness for another season of active campaigning. At this juncture, on October 24th,—by an order received October 30th—Buell was relieved from command, and Rosecrans, who, under Grant, had been commanding the Army of the Mississippi in western Tennessee, was put in Buell’s place.”* Rosecrans had gained considerable reputation by defeating the Confederates under Van Dorn and Price at Iuka, Mississippi, on the 19th of September, and at Corinth on the 3rd and 4th of October.

At this time the garrison that Buell had left at Nashville under Negley was besieged by Forrest’s cavalry and Breckinridge’s infantry division. Rosecrans sent McCook’s corps to Negley’s relief, holding the rest of his army at Bowling Green until the Louisville and Nashville Railway could be repaired. By the end of November he had his whole army concentrated at Nashville.

*Ropes.

Meantime Bragg had withdrawn his army to Morristown in East Tennessee. Thence he transferred it by way of Knoxville and Chattanooga to Murfreesboro. (160) Rosecrans, in spite of urgent and even threatening letters from the War Department, would not move against Bragg until he had collected an abundance (2,000,000) of rations at Nashville to make him independent of the railway back from Nashville to Louisville; he well knew that he could not prevent the interruption of this line of communication by the Confederate cavalry. In fact, Morgan's cavalry broke up this railway again on the 26th of December.

At the same time Forrest's cavalry, also, was absent from Bragg's army upon a raid against Grant's line of communications, the railway from Corinth to Columbus, Kentucky, which it succeeded in breaking up. But Bragg had retained the three cavalry brigades of Wheeler, Wharton, and Pegram, "and their skilful movements," says Ropes, "screened the positions and maneuvers of his infantry, on which he placed his chief reliance, and delayed the advance of the Federal forces until arrangements could be completed for their reception." It would have been better for the Confederate army if Bragg had also kept back the brigades of Morgan and Forrest; but he had sent them off before he was sure that Rosecrans was about to move against him.

The contact squadrons of Bragg's cavalry were in touch with the Federal camps at Nashville; and as soon as Rosecrans's army began the march toward Murfreesboro, on the morning of December 26, Wheeler, who was Bragg's chief of cavalry, sent report of the movement to Bragg, and made ready to dispute the advance of the Federal army, and to delay its march.

This army moved in three columns, designated the "Right Wing," "Center," and "Left Wing," commanded respectively by McCook, Thomas and Crittenden. McCook's column took the Nolensville Turnpike; Thomas's the Franklin and Wilkinson Turnpikes, to threaten Bragg's left.* This had been on the turnpike between Triune and Eagleville, but was immediately drawn in to the position in front of Murfreesboro. Crittenden took the direct road to Murfreesboro. These columns encountered Wheeler's cavalry almost as soon as they had started, and were opposed by it at every step. At Nolensville, at Lavergne, and wherever a strong position could be

*G. C. Kniffin in *B. & L.*

found, the Confederate cavalymen with their carbines, aided by their artillery, compelled the Federal divisions to halt and deploy. Where opportunity offered the squadrons charged with saber and revolver. And there was not a moment when they did not keep Bragg perfectly informed of the movements and whereabouts of Rosecrans's columns. Aided by fogs and hard rains they succeeded in so hindering the progress of the Federals that it was the evening of the 29th December before the leading divisions were within three miles of Murfreesboro, though the distance marched was only thirty miles.

From the accounts of the campaign it does not appear that the Federal cavalry took its place in front of the infantry columns until the 29th. Van Horne says in his *History of the Army of the Cumberland*: "The cavalry moved in three columns. Colonel Minty's brigade, under Colonel Kennett, the division commander, accompanied the left wing. Colonel Zahm's brigade proceeded on the Franklin Road, as a protection to General McCook's right flank, and General Stanley, with the reserve brigade, also accompanied the right wing." Whatever was the cause, the Union cavalry certainly rendered no efficient service on this march until the 29th. On that day, the same historian says, "General Stanley moved in advance of the right wing. . . . The Anderson cavalry, the Fifteenth Pennsylvania, pushed the enemy, at full charge, for six miles." And so poorly was Rosecrans kept informed by his cavalry concerning the movements of Bragg's army that he ordered Crittenden's wing, which was in advance, "to occupy Murfreesboro with one of his divisions on the night of the 29th, and encamp the other two miles outside."* But Bragg's whole army was at that time in line of battle between Crittenden and Murfreesboro. Crittenden could not obey the order, of course.

(161) The field upon which the battle of Stones River was fought lies along the stream of this name about two miles west of Murfreesboro. In a very winding course the river here flows in a general direction slightly west of north. It was, at the time of the battle, spanned by several bridges, and was fordable at various places; hence it was not in itself a serious obstacle in a military sense. The northern part of the main battle-field was traversed by the Nashville Turnpike and the Nashville and Chattanooga Railway, which intersected within it at a very acute angle, and crossed the river each by its own

*Van Horne.

bridge. Across the center of the field, from east to west, was the Wilkinson Turnpike, and across the southern part of it, from east to west, was the Franklin Road. These highways were connected by a country road that crossed the battle-field. West of the battle-field was a fordable stream called Overall Creek, from two to three miles from Stones River. The space between these two streams was rather flat, but with hills here and there high enough to serve as artillery positions. The space was occupied by a considerable number of farm-houses and cultivated fields; but the greater part of it was covered with cedar thickets, through which infantry could pass easily enough and cannon could be taken with difficulty. The thickets were dense enough to conceal troops within them.

On the 29th of December Bragg's army occupied a "position in readiness" covering the approaches to Murfreesboro from the west. Hardee's corps, consisting of the divisions of Breckinridge and Cleburne, with Jackson's brigade as reserve, formed the right wing, and was assigned to the sector extending from the Lebanon Turnpike to the river; while Polk's corps, composed of the divisions of Withers and Cheatham, formed the left wing and guarded the sector from the river to the Franklin Road. McCown's division was held in reserve at the center.* Wheeler's cavalry was out in front and guarding the flanks.

Late in the afternoon of the 29th Crittenden's divisions advancing by the Nashville Turnpike discovered the Confederate army in position; they deployed into line of battle and halted about a mile in front of the enemy. Negley's division, of the "Center," took its place in the same line. These four Federal divisions bivouacked for the night in this position. The other Federal divisions bivouacked on the night of the 29th at different points on the road west of Overall Creek.

(162) Early on the morning of the 30th McCook's divisions, the "Right Wing," moved forward on the Wilkinson Turnpike with orders to form line on Negley's right. Sheridan's division preceded by a regiment of cavalry, was in the lead, followed by the divisions of Johnson and Davis. Sheridan and Davis were met by fire from the enemy's line, and they lost nearly 300 men in getting into place. "The left of Sheridan's division, when in line, rested on the Wilkinson Turnpike. General Davis

*Colonel Urquhart in *B. & L.*

formed his division on Sheridan's right, and General Johnson held his in reserve."*

The "Left Wing" on the 30th remained in about the position it had taken on the 29th. Palmer's division moved a little forward, and the pioneer brigade took its place at the river to prepare the fords. Rousseau's division of Thomas's "Center" took position behind Negley's line. A brigade was left to guard the bridge of the Jefferson Turnpike across Stones River about eight miles in rear; and another, at Lavergne, about fifteen miles back on the Nashville Turnpike.

There was considerable fighting between the hostile lines during the day, especially with artillery. (163) Suspecting from the direction of McCook's advance that the Federals were trying to envelop or turn his left, Bragg placed McCown's division, which had been in reserve, on Polk's left. In the afternoon McCook, learning that the right of Davis's line was opposite the center of Bragg's, placed Johnson's division in position on the right of Davis.

Bragg was disappointed not to be attacked in his position on the 30th. He resolved himself to attack early the next morning, making his main effort against the right of Rosecrans's line. Accordingly he moved Cleburne's division from the right of his line to the left. General Hardee was to command the main attack, and to envelop the enemy's right flank; and the whole line was to swing to the right, pivoting on the river, and drive the Federal army back, off its line of communications and into the river. Bragg designated no general reserve, but he did not believe that Breckinridge's division would be attacked on the east bank of the river; he purposed using it as his general reserve.

Not suspecting that Bragg meant to take the offensive, Rosecrans planned a very similar form of attack for his forces to make on the morning of the 31st, and issued very detailed orders accordingly. He purposed making his "main attack" against the Confederate right on the east bank of the river, while his "secondary attack" should occupy the attention of the left of the Confederate line. His "plan of battle, as revealed in his official report and by his orders on the field, was as follows: General McCook was instructed to take an advantageous position on the right, and hold the enemy in check, if attacked; but if overpowered, to fall back slowly, refusing his right. If

*Van Horne.

not attacked, he was to engage the enemy sufficiently to hold him in his front. Generals Thomas and Palmer were to open with skirmishing, and gain the enemy's center and left as far as the river. General Crittenden was to throw Van Cleve's division across the river, at the lower ford, to advance against Breckinridge, and to cross Wood's division by brigades at the upper fords, and support Van Cleve's right. If successful in driving back the enemy's right, General Wood was to place his batteries on the heights east of the river, and open on his center and left in reverse. Then General Palmer should press the enemy in his front, and General Thomas should sustain the movement in the center."*

As the two plans of battle were identical, the initial advantage would rest with the army which got the start; and that was Bragg's army. Soon after dawn Hardee with nearly half of the Confederate infantry opened the attack on the Federal right; from that moment Rosecrank's army was thrown upon the defensive.

At the start McCown's division inclined to the left, leaving a gap between his right and Polk's left, which Cleburne quickly filled with his division. Then these two divisions wheeled upon McCook's right flank. (164) Johnson's division of McCook's right was driven from the field after a short resistance. This exposed the right of Davis's division which was immediately refused. The divisions of McCown, Cleburne, and Withers then assaulted Davis's line and the right of Sheridan's. These lines were at right angles to each other and presented a salient to the enemy; but they repulsed the Confederate assault.

(165) Cheatham's division, which had been held in reserve, was now put into the Confederate line, and a second assault was made at this angle. This also was repulsed. But the Confederates made a third assault. This time they enveloped the right of Davis's line, and forced it to withdraw. This left Sheridan's right exposed to flank attack, and it also fell back. But Sheridan wheeled his left brigade to the right and charged the Confederates. This action arrested their advance and gave Sheridan time to form a new line facing south. He then wheeled his line farther to the rear and made another stand facing southwest. His line was now parallel to the Nashville Pike and formed a right angle with Negley's.

*Van Horne.

At this juncture Rousseau's division, which had been held in reserve, took its place on Sheridan's right. The entire Confederate force except Breckinridge's division now assaulted the Federal front occupied by the divisions of Rousseau, Sheridan, Negley, and Palmer, arranged in order from right to left. The assaults were at first repulsed; but finally Sheridan's ammunition became exhausted, and he was forced to fall back. (166) His withdrawal left a gap between Rousseau's left and Negley's right into which the Confederates pushed. Rousseau and Negley then withdrew their divisions; but they halted them in a depression between the edge of a cedar thicket and the turnpike, and there stubbornly withstood the enemy's attacks, and forced him to fall back. In this stand Shepherd's brigade of regulars lost twenty officers and 518 men killed and wounded.

(167) The withdrawal of Negley's division involved Palmer's division, which connected with Negley's left. Palmer's right was driven back; but his left under Hazen, which was posted in an oak grove on high ground, crossed by the railway eight or nine hundred yards northwest of the junction with the turnpike, repulsed all the attacks of the Confederates, and held its ground. This was the only part of the original Federal line that had stood fast. The entire right wing and center and the right of the left wing had been forced back about this point as a pivot.

Let us now see how much of Rosecrans's original plan of battle had been carried out. (165) According to the plan Van Cleve's division of Crittenden's corps was in motion before eight o'clock. The firing four miles away on the right had been heard since a little after daybreak; but McCook had said that he could hold the enemy in that quarter for three hours, while the left wing executed the main attack on the other side of the river. As Rosecrans expected fighting on his right, he was not disturbed when it took place there. So Van Cleve's division pushed on, and two of his brigades were actually deployed in front of Breckinridge's position before Rosecrans knew that his right had been enveloped and defeated, and was falling back. As soon, however, as Rosecrans learned the extent of this disaster, he recalled his offensive movement against Bragg's right in order to reinforce his own right wing. (167) The first of the reinforcing troops to get into action were a part of Van Cleve's division. They formed on the right of Rousseau's line just in time to aid it in stop-

ping the pursuit of the Confederates, after the divisions of Rousseau and Negley had been forced back.

By noon Rosecrans had a strong line formed on high ground along the Nashville Turnpike, extending from Hazen's original position to a point about a mile and a quarter to the right of it. The right of this line was occupied by portions of McCook's divisions, and the center by a part of Thomas's and Crittenden's troops. From Hazen's position the left of the line bent back to the river. The Confederates continued to assault this line till about 4 p.m.; but could not break it.

(168) Up to this time Breckinridge's Confederate division had remained on the east side of the river comparatively idle. As early as ten o'clock Bragg had ordered Breckinridge to send two brigades to reinforce Hardee in the main attack. Instead of obeying this order Breckinridge had sent back word that Federal troops were advancing in heavy force against his own position. On receipt of this report, Bragg sent Breckinridge an order to move out and attack the enemy advancing against him—not to stand and be attacked. Thereupon Breckinridge advanced, only to find that the Union troops had already retired across the river. But by this time it was too late for him to send assistance to Hardee. Thus Rosecrans's offensive movement against Bragg's right, while it had to be recalled, and was, to that extent, a failure, nevertheless had a very decided effect upon the battle; it kept Breckinridge's division from reinforcing Hardee just at a time when it might have enabled him "to reach the center and left of the National army."*

The left wing of the Confederate army had been fighting since daybreak; all of its brigades had been engaged, many of them in repeated assaults; and the losses had been heavy.* "At four o'clock it became evident to the Confederate commander that his only hope of success lay in a charge upon the Union left, which, by its overpowering weight, should carry everything before it."† Breckinridge's were the only fresh troops he had for such a charge; Breckinridge was peremptorily ordered to send them over the river. While this movement was taking place "there was a lull in the action on the left."* In fact the Confederate left had ceased its aggressive action, and from this time to the end it remained strictly on the defensive. It was well-nigh exhausted.

*Van Horne.

†Kniffen in *B. & L.*

The angle of the Federal line held by Hazen was the point against which the final assault of the Confederates were mainly to be directed. This place was strongly reinforced from other parts of the Union line to receive the assaults.

Breckinridge was slow in sending his brigades over to the west of the river. As soon as the first two brigades had crossed, Polk, who was to command the attack, hurled them against the Federal position without waiting for the other brigades to cross. The attack was repulsed with great loss. Forming a new line, reinforced by Breckinridge's other brigades which had now crossed, Polk advanced again, only to be repulsed again. This ended the day's battle.

Polk's assaults had cost the Confederates dearly. "Some of the assaulting regiments lost more than half their strength; and none of these attacks were even temporarily successful."* Bragg attributed his failure to the concentration of the fire of the Federal artillery upon his lines.

(169) After the long day's fight the two hostile armies bivouacked on the field within musket range of each other. The Confederates intrenched their lines. There was no fighting along the line on the 1st of January, 1863, although Bragg made some show of attacking the center and right of the Federal line. In the afternoon Crittenden moved a division across the river and formed line of battle in front of Breckinridge, who had resumed his position on that side.

Bragg expected, or hoped, to find the Federal army gone from his front on the morning of January the 2nd. His cavalry had reported the turnpike in rear of the Federal position full of troops and wagons making for Nashville. But he soon found that his enemy had not budged. He resolved to dislodge the enemy from the position on the east of the river, and assigned the task to Breckinridge with four brigades. He ordered Breckinridge to carry a hill occupied by the enemy, and there to halt and intrench. Breckinridge took the hill, but was unable to stop his men, who pushed on after the retreating Federals. Whereupon the enemy's batteries, massed on the other side of the river, opened fire upon the Confederates, and drove them back with great slaughter.† Federal troops were then hurried across the river in large numbers. They recovered the position and intrenched themselves in it.

There was little fighting on the 3rd of January Just before

*Van Horne.

†Urquhart in *B. & L.*

dark Thomas sent forward two brigades, which broke the center of the Southern line, and drove the Confederates out of their intrenchments at that point. (160) That night Bragg withdrew from the battle-field and started in retreat upon Tullahoma. Rosecrans entered Murfreesboro the next morning, but made no pursuit of the Confederate army.

During the whole of this battle Wheeler's cavalry was very active in rear of the main Federal army. An infantry brigade, as we have seen, had to be left to guard the bridge on the Jefferson Turnpike over Stones River; it was attacked by Wheeler on the 30th of December. The same day another part of his cavalry captured McCook's wagon-train and 800 men. At Lavergne a Federal infantry brigade retook the men and animals, but the Confederates had burned the wagons. On the 31st the Confederate cavalry passed entirely round Rosecrans's army, capturing wagons and stragglers, and having several encounters with Stanley's Federal cavalry. On the 1st of January, also, the Confederate cavalry was busy in rear of the Federal army, stopping the passage of trains to and from Nashville, and watching for indications of the retreat of the army. About 2 p.m. a large force of this cavalry appeared in the neighborhood of Lavergne, captured part of a Union train and dispersed the rest, then attacked a regiment of engineers and mechanics in a stockade. The action of Wheeler's squadrons in attacking train-guards, destroying wagons, capturing animals, and terrifying teamsters, created wild confusion on Rosecrans's line of communications all the way back to Nashville.

COMMENTS.

(154) When General Halleck took command of the Federal army in the field, after the battle of Shiloh, and saw it raised to a strength of more than 120,000 men, while the Confederate army under Beauregard at Corinth was not even estimated at more than 70,000, and was really much smaller, he ought to have moved promptly against the Confederate army, with a view to capturing or destroying it. In not doing so he violated what von der Goltz considers the first principle of modern warfare: namely, that "the immediate objective, against which all our efforts must be directed, is the hostile main army."

Halleck made the little town of Corinth his main objective, and, no doubt, congratulated himself that he got possession of

it without a battle, after spending a whole month with his large army in advancing twenty-two miles. Corinth's only military importance consisted in the fact that it was at the junction of two important railways.

After reaching Corinth Halleck still had a chance of overtaking Beauregard's army and forcing it to fight; but he halted his main army, and contented himself with sending a small force to follow the Confederates a short way. Then Halleck gave up all thought of destroying this force of the enemy, and broke up his own large army, scattering it in detachments along the Memphis and Charleston Railway. In doing this he probably acted under orders from Washington. In starting Buell off to Chattanooga we know that he was carrying out instructions from Washington. "To this movement" President Lincoln "had always attached an importance far in excess of its real consequence, if the matter be considered from a purely military standpoint; his sympathies were excited by the sufferings of the Unionists in that region [East Tennessee], and he also deemed it very desirable that the United States Government should show itself capable of affording succor to those who claimed its protection."*

But in ordering Buell to rebuild and repair the Memphis and Charleston Railway as he progressed, Halleck placed upon him a handicap that defeated the object of the enterprise. It so hindered him that Bragg not only reached Chattanooga with the Confederate army ahead of him, but had time, also, to plan and begin an invasion of Kentucky. And in ordering and expecting Buell to use the Memphis and Charleston Railway as his line of supply, Halleck imposed upon him a condition impossible for him to fulfil with the troops at his command. It would have taken Buell's whole force adequately to guard this railway and keep it open from Corinth to Chattanooga. The railway "ran on the boundary between the territory which had just been conquered and the" unconquered "hostile region south of it, and . . . was therefore exposed to interruption in every mile of its course" by the Confederate cavalry, and partisans, and the inhabitants of the country.* With such leaders as Morgan and Forrest to contend with, it even taxed the Federals to their utmost to keep the railways open in their rear, through country wholly conquered, and garrisoned by Federal troops.

*Ropes.

In the operations of the cavalry under Morgan and Forrest and Wheeler in Tennessee and Kentucky we find examples of successful raids, like those of Stuart in Virginia. Later in the war we shall find several cavalry raids that were dismal failures, such as Morgan's raid in Ohio, Stuart's in Pennsylvania during the Gettysburg Campaign, Stoneman's in Virginia during the Chancellorsville Campaign, Kilpatrick's upon Richmond in 1864, Stoneman's upon Macon, Georgia, during the Atlanta Campaign, and Wilson's in Virginia during the operations round Petersburg. The first were made in friendly country, while the latter were all made in hostile country. It may then be laid down as a rule, that a cavalry raid covering many miles of country and a considerable length of time must, in order to achieve success, be made in a country whose inhabitants are friendly. To succeed in hostile country such a raid must be made under exceptional circumstances, like those under which Grierson's raid was made in Mississippi, during the Vicksburg Campaign, or Wilson's in Alabama in 1865, etc.

The halt of Buell's advance against Chattanooga caused by Forrest's breaking up the railway at Murfreesboro, in July, as well as that caused by Morgan's destroying the tunnel at Gallatin, a few weeks later, shows how dependent an army is upon its line of communications. True, commanders have been known to cut loose from their bases, as Scott did in his campaign against the City of Mexico, and as McClellan did in the retreat from the Chickahominy to the James, and as Grant did in the Vicksburg Campaign; but in every such case the commander, like McClellan, must expect to gain a new base before the supplies in his trains become exhausted, or he must expect to live off the country, like Scott and Grant.

(155) When an army finds its communications menaced by the enemy it must fall back to recover or protect them; or it must concentrate and either attack the enemy or seize his communications. When, therefore, it became known to Buell that Bragg was moving against the Louisville and Nashville Railway, that was enough in itself to make him fall back into Kentucky. But he also had another reason—a political reason; so, too, the chief motive of Bragg's invading Kentucky was political and not military. Questions of politics cannot be separated from war; they cause every war; they govern the conduct of every campaign; they fix the terms of every peace. The political motive of Bragg's invasion of Kentucky was to encourage such an uprising among the citizens of the State

favorable to Secession as would place the State in the Confederacy; the political motive of Buell's retreat into the State was to hold it for the Union.

Yet from a purely military point of view, also, Bragg's advance to Munfordville was good strategy and well managed. By threatening Nashville, Buell's secondary base, Bragg made Buell believe for a time that Nashville was his objective; thus he detained the Federal army long enough to enable him to beat it in the race for Munfordville. He had captured Munfordville and was in possession of it when Buell was still at Bowling Green; he was, therefore, squarely across Buell's line of communications. Bragg, strategically, had every advantage of position over Buell. He was not concerned about his own communications with Chattanooga—he had no railway connection with that place nor other line than the long, miserable roads by which he had marched. If defeated at Munfordville he would fall back upon Lexington, Kentucky, where Kirby Smith had gathered a large quantity of stores. So it mattered nothing to him that his army at Munfordville faced toward its original rear. The case was quite different with Buell. He was already deprived of his communications with Louisville, his only base of supplies. He was obliged to recover them soon; even if he could have collected provisions in the country for his army he could not have left the city of Louisville, with its great depots of public stores, to be captured by the enemy. The consequences of defeat for Buell would, therefore, have been very serious.

But Bragg's position athwart Buell's communications gave him no tactical advantage over his adversary; if he had attacked Buell he would have found it as hard to win a victory as it would have been if Buell's communications had been straight behind the Union army. Yet to make sure of his strategic advantage, Bragg had either to attack and win, or else leave a force to "contain" Buell's army, and with the bulk of his own army capture Louisville. But Bragg did not feel himself strong enough for either of these projects; and Kirby Smith's army was a hundred miles away and not under his command. Although he and Smith were coöperating with each other, they were mutually independent of each other. There was lack of a single supreme commander in the theater of war at the critical moment. General Wheeler, in his account of the campaign, says: "Nothing was therefore wanting in Kentucky but absolute authority in one responsible com-

mander. Coöperation of the most cordial character is a poor substitute. The word coöperation should be stricken from military phraseology." "It was another instance of the folly, which both the Union and the Confederate governments were so constantly committing, of having more than one commanding officer in one theater of war."*

(156) Bragg could not remain at Munfordville many days waiting for Buell to attack him in his chosen position. He was out of supplies, so had to move toward Lexington. And having cleared the way and let Buell pass on to Louisville, where he received large reinforcements and reorganized his army, Bragg and Kirby Smith had nothing left to do but to retreat into Tennessee. From the political as well as from the military point of view their invasion had proved a failure. The proclamations to the people had been in vain; they had brought about no uprising in favor of Secession. The Secessionists went through the form of installing a Confederate governor at Frankfort, and Bragg was away at that empty ceremony, when he might better have been with his army, just before the battle of Perryville. That battle "was an accidental encounter of two armies, rather than a pitched battle."*

The North and the South were both disappointed at the outcome of the campaign in Kentucky; the North thought Buell ought not to have let Bragg's army escape, but ought to have destroyed it; the South thought Bragg had achieved a great victory at Perryville and ought to have followed it up instead of retreating. The press of the two sections respectively condemned the two commanders; and the governments at Washington and Richmond yielded to the dictates of the press. Buell was replaced by Rosecrans. Referring to this incident Ropes says: "It cannot be doubted that the cause of the Union was seriously injured by withdrawing Buell from the command of this army. Buell was as able a general as any in the service." Bragg was not removed; General Joseph E. Johnston was sent to his headquarters with orders to relieve him, but was prevented by circumstances from carrying out the order. So Bragg was left in command.

Hardly had Rosecrans taken command of the Army of the Cumberland when he began to receive harassing letters from Halleck, who was now general-in-chief at Washington. About

*Ropes.

the 6th of December he received such a letter. "The President," said Halleck, "is very impatient at your long stay in Nashville. . . . Twice have I been asked to designate some one else to command your army. If you remain one more week at Nashville I cannot prevent your removal. As I wrote you when you took the command, the Government demands action, and if you cannot respond to that demand, some one else will be tried." To this letter General Rosecrans sent a reply for which the country and all its future commanders owe his memory a debt of gratitude. "I reply," said he, "in few but earnest words. I have lost no time. . . . If the Government which ordered me here confides in my judgment it may rely on my continuing to do what I have been trying to do—that is, my whole duty. If my superiors have lost confidence in me they had better at once put some one in my place and let the future test the propriety of the change. I have but one more word to add, which is, that I need no other stimulus to make me do my duty than the knowledge of what it is. To threats of removal or the like I must be permitted to say that I am insensible."* He did not move within a week, and he was not relieved from command.

THE CAVALRY.

The excellence of the work of Bragg's cavalry in the last phase of this campaign—the operations extending from Nashville to Murfreesboro—has already been noticed. This cavalry did equally as good service on the advance into Middle Tennessee and Kentucky, and during the retreat from Kentucky. Of a truth, it would be hard to find in the annals of modern warfare any better cavalry work. Colonel David Urquhart, a member of Bragg's staff, in a narrative of the campaign, says, concerning the retreat from Kentucky: "General Wheeler with his cavalry brought up the rear—fighting by day and obstructing the roads at night. Before the pursuit was abandoned at Rock Castle that officer was engaged over twenty-six times. His vigilance was so well known by the infantry that they never feared a surprise."

On the other hand, Buell's army was so lacking in the number and quality of its cavalry as to be at a great disadvantage. Bragg was kept informed by his cavalry scouts of

*Ropes.

the movements of every part of Buell's army, while Buell was left in ignorance of Bragg's movements. Buell "had again and again applied to the Government to remedy" his deficiency in cavalry, "but in vain."*

THE BATTLE OF STONES RIVER.

In the first place, why was the main part of Bragg's first defensive position, or rather his "position in readiness," taken on the west side of Stones River? Certainly a stronger position would have been one on the east side of the river with the town either in the first line or as a rallying point. On this side a shorter line would have covered all the roads converging on the town; it would have had a clearer field of fire in front of it; it would have had the river in its front as an obstacle for the enemy, rather than in its own rear. If Murfreesboro had been in the enemy's country Bragg would undoubtedly have taken his position on the east side of the river. As it was he wanted to save the town from the horrors of battle; so he put his line as far in front of it as he could, without uncovering the convergent roads.

Rosecrans had 47,000 men, and Bragg had only 38,000—why, then, did Bragg attack instead of waiting in his intrenchments for Rosecrans to attack him? He knew that Rosecrans would attack—it was for this that Rosecrans had marched from Nashville. The answer is found in Bragg's "personal equation." Almost any other general would have waited, but it was Bragg's nature to attack whenever he saw a chance of victory. He was naturally aggressive. He believed in getting in the first lick. In this case he hoped to defeat Rosecrans before all of the National troops could reach the battle-field.

This was the second battle of the war in which the plans of the hostile commanders were practically the same. At the First Bull Run Beauregard meant to attack the Union left, while McDowell purposed turning the Confederate left. In each case the commander that was first to move threw his opponent on the defensive. At Stones River each commander selected his opponent's right flank, instead of his left, to attack, for the reason that he was thereby better able to cover his own communications. If either of these commanders had chosen

*Ropes.

the other flank he would have fought with his army faced to a flank.

That the right wing of the Federal army was beaten and driven back in the early stages of the battle was undoubtedly due to the faulty position of that part of the line, and to poorly performed outpost duty. McCook knew on the afternoon of the 30th December that the Confederate line was extending beyond his right, and he so informed Rosecrans. Rosecrans then said that he thought the line ought to face more nearly south; but he left the matter to McCook, and the direction of the line was not changed. McCook should have turned his line so that his right would have extended along the southern edge of the thicket whose corner rested on Overall Creek, about three quarters of a mile due south of the crossing of Wilkinson Turnpike.

"Few battles," says Ropes, "have been fought which have better exhibited the soldierly virtues than the battle of Murfreesboro or Stones River. The Confederate assaults were conducted with the utmost gallantry and with untiring energy. They were met with great coolness and resolution. . . . The Confederates had a right to claim a victory, for they had taken twenty-eight guns and about 3,700 prisoners. Still, the Federal army was, for all practical purposes, as strong as ever. The truth is, the Confederates were not numerous enough to complete their victory."

The tactics were, in general, good on both sides. The units of troops were brought into action in the proper order and manner; gaps in the line were filled, and supports put in promptly. The artillery, especially on the Federal side, was employed most effectively. Bragg's army fought the battle almost as he had planned it; but not quite. And the little departure from his plan was fatal to his success. He purposed using Breckinridge's division as his general reserve; but Breckinridge failed to send it over the river, when ordered to do so at the crisis of the battle. Finally when he did send over his division, Polk made the mistake of assaulting with a part of it, instead of waiting for the whole division to cross; and he was repulsed.

LECTURE XVI.

THE BATTLE OF CHANCELLORSVILLE.

(170) After the disaster at Fredericksburg the Army of the Potomac resumed its position on the north bank of the Rappahannock. Its morale had never been so badly shaken. "It would be impossible," says Swinton, who was with it as a newspaper correspondent, "to imagine a graver or gloomier, a more somber or unmusical body of men . . . a month after the battle. . . . And as the days went by, despondency, discontent, and all evil inspirations, with their natural consequence, desertion, seemed to increase rather than diminish." And the cause of it all "could not be concealed; it was the lack of confidence in General Burnside."

This cause was soon removed. Burnside issued an order summarily dismissing Hooker and three other general officers from the service, and relieving Franklin and four others from duty with his army, and took it to Washington for the President's approval, or the acceptance of his own resignation as the alternative. The President chose the alternative, and appointed Hooker in Burnside's place.

Hooker had gained an enviable newspaper reputation as a dashing corps-commander, and however he may have been regarded by the higher officers, to the rank and file he was "Fighting Joe." His appointment revived the morale of the army. He at once instituted some excellent reforms. He abolished the clumsy Grand Divisions of Burnside, and reorganized the army-corps. The cavalry, which had hitherto been attached in fragments to infantry divisions, and frittered away at all kinds of uncavalry duty, he consolidated into the Cavalry Corps, under General Stoneman. This corps consisted of three divisions, under Pleasanton, Averill, and Gregg, respectively, and a reserve brigade under Buford.

Hooker reported that, when he took command, there were 2,922 officers and 81,694 enlisted men absent from their colors, scattered all over the country, and the majority from causes unknown.* He adopted a system of furloughs that remedied this evil to a large degree.

*Major J. F. Huntington in *Military Historical Society of Mass.*, Vol. 3.

Sumner and Franklin retired from the Army of the Potomac when Hooker assumed command, and the Ninth Corps [Burnside's old corps] was transferred to Newport News. The infantry of the army now consisted of seven corps, as follows: First under Reynolds, Second under Couch, Third under Sickles, Fifth under Meade, Sixth under Sedgwick, Eleventh under Howard, and Twelfth under Slocum. The Eleventh and Twelfth Corps had not been present at the battle of Fredericksburg. Hooker spent the rest of the winter in building up his army and putting it in trim for campaign. By the end of April, 1863, he had the largest and best organized and equipped army that had ever been assembled on the continent. Hooker spoke of it as "the finest army on the planet." It numbered about 122,000 infantry and artillery, with more than 400 cannon, and about 12,000 cavalry. Its camps reached back to Aquia Creek, its advanced base.

The Southern army, poorly equipped, wretchedly clad, and living upon short rations, occupied camps on the southern bank of the Rappahannock, from Banks's Ford to Port Royal. Stuart's cavalry watched the upper crossings of the Rappahannock. Lee now had no more than 60,000 troops, 6,509 of which were cavalry, and 170 guns, to guard this long line of front; for Longstreet was absent with two of his divisions [Hood and Pickett]. The great need of rations for the coming summer had led the Confederate war department to send him upon a campaign in the neighborhood of Suffolk, the object of which was to gather provisions in the counties near the Federal lines. Lee had, therefore, only six infantry divisions present: those of Anderson and McLaws of Longstreet's corps; and those of A. P. Hill, Rodes, Early, and Colston of Jackson's corps.*

PLANS.

Lee had his army so disposed that he could promptly concentrate it at any point along his front, and the Union failure at Fredericksburg had shown the difficulty of attempting to force a crossing and break through his line. Hooker saw that the position must be turned; but to turn its right was practically impossible, owing to the width of the Rappahannock toward its mouth, the swampy character of the country, and the diffi-

*Alexander.

culty of concealing the movement in the open country below Fredericksburg.* Hooker resolved, therefore, to turn Lee's left. To carry out this plan the cavalry, except one small brigade under Pleasanton, was to start upon a raid, under Stoneman, two weeks in advance, with the object of destroying Lee's lines of communication with Richmond and with Gordonsville—the Fredericksburg-Richmond railway and the Virginia Central Railway—and, should Lee retreat, of holding or delaying him. Sedgwick, with two army-corps, the First and Sixth, was to cross the river below Fredericksburg, and make a demonstration of attack. If the enemy fell back Sedgwick was to pursue him. While Lee's attention was thus occupied, Hooker, with the Fifth, Eleventh, and Twelfth Corps, would move up to Kelly's Ford, and thence, by way of Germanna and Ely's Fords of the Rapidan, push on to Chancellorsville. The Third Corps was to remain on Stafford Heights, ready to move at a moment's notice to reinforce either wing as might be necessary. "The Second Corps was to leave one division on outpost at Falmouth, and to post two divisions on the north bank of the Rappahannock opposite Banks's Ford."†

Hooker believed that Lee, as soon as he found his position turned and Stoneman upon his lines of communication, would fall back. But of this Hooker could not be sure; he thought, however, that the dispositions he purposed making would successfully meet any movement Lee might make. "Either wing was practically equal to the whole Confederate force."‡ Sedgwick would have 40,000 men, supported by the Third Corps, about 19,000, on Stafford Heights, and a division of the Second Corps at Falmouth; the main turning force would have about 42,000, with two divisions of the Second Corps at Banks's Ford; "and Stoneman's 10,000 sabers riding at will amongst Lee's depots would surely prevent him from attacking. Still, precaution was taken in case the attempt were made. Sedgwick, if the enemy detached any considerable part of his force toward Chancellorsville, was 'to carry the works at all hazards, and establish his force on the Telegraph Road.' The right wing, 'if not strongly resisted, was to advance at all hazards, and to secure a position uncovering Banks's Ford.' Were the Confederates found in force near Chancellorsville it was to select a strong position and await attack on its own

*Fiebigger's *Campaigns and Battles*.

†Henderson.

ground, while Sedgwick, coming up from Fredericksburg, would assail the enemy in flank and rear.”*

Lee was on the defensive. He was still tied to Richmond, and his chief business was to cover that city. But, as will be seen, he had not thought of a “strategic retreat from one defensive position to another.” In fact, he was already considering an offensive movement. “On April 16 [1863] he had written Mr. Davis: ‘My only anxiety arises from the condition of our horses and the scarcity of forage and provisions. I think it all important that we should assume the aggressive by the 1st of May.’”* He was contemplating a movement by way of the Shenandoah Valley, but was forestalled by Hooker.

OPERATIONS.

To confuse the Confederates as much as possible, demonstrations were made, toward the end of April, beyond both ends of their line—at Kelly’s Ford on their left, and opposite Port Royal on their right. The main operations were delayed several days by heavy rains, but on the 27th of April the Fifth, Eleventh, and Twelfth Corps started for Kelly’s Ford, under the command of Slocum. They dispersed the small Confederate guard at that point, and by the morning of the 29th had crossed the stream by pontoon-bridges. They then pushed on toward Chancellorsville, the Fifth Corps by way of Ely’s Ford, and the Eleventh and Twelfth by way of Germanna Ford. They reached Chancellorsville on the afternoon of the 30th. The infantry was preceded by Pleasanton’s cavalry brigade.

Two divisions of the Second Corps had marched as far as United States Ford, and there had waited until the other columns had crossed the Rapidan. They then crossed the river and joined the other three corps at Chancellorsville, where they all bivouacked on the night of the 30th. The same night Hooker himself arrived at Chancellorsville. Meanwhile Sedgwick’s force, the First and Sixth Corps, had moved down the river, on the 28th, and bivouacked near where Franklin had crossed at the battle of Fredericksburg. The next day this command laid four pontoon-bridges, and crossed the river.

On the Confederate side Stuart had notified Lee, on the evening of the 28th, “that a strong force of all arms was mov-

*Henderson.

ing up the Rappahannock in the direction of Kelly's Ford"; and the movements of Sedgwick's command had been observed.* On the 29th Lee received word from his cavalry that a force of unknown strength had crossed at Kelly's Ford. Lee could not as yet determine what these movements meant. He even suspected that they might mean an advance against Gordonsville and the Virginia Central Railway.† He, therefore, awaited further developments. Some shells were thrown at Sedgwick's brigades, and Jackson's outposts skirmished with the first troops sent across; but no further opposition to Sedgwick's passage was made by the Confederates.

On the 29th Stuart's cavalry "was actively engaged between the Rappahannock and the Rapidan, testing the strength of the enemy's columns. The country was wooded, the Federals active, and, as usual in war, accurate information was difficult to obtain and more difficult to communicate. It was not till 6.30 p.m. that Lee received notice that troops had crossed at Ely's and Germanna Fords at 2 p.m. Anderson's division was at once dispatched to Chancellorsville."*

The next news Lee received from Stuart arrived on the morning of the 30th, and informed him that three Union corps-commanders, Howard [Eleventh], Meade [Fifth], and Slocum [Twelfth], were with the troops advancing on Chancellorsville. Then came the word that Anderson, who had been directed to select and intrench a strong position near Chancellorsville, was falling back before the Federal advance. It was now evident to Lee that Hooker's purpose was to turn the Confederate left, and that he had divided his army. Lee resolved to attack one of its wings. The question was, which wing to attack? Jackson was at first in favor of attacking Sedgwick, but, after carefully reconnoitering Sedgwick's position on the river-bank, he came to Lee's opinion. This was to leave Early's division reinforced by Barksdale's brigade and the reserve artillery to hold the heights and "contain" Sedgwick; and to march the rest of the army to reinforce Anderson and assault the Federal turning columns in the neighborhood of Chancellorsville. Accordingly McLaws's division started to join Anderson, and Jackson followed soon afterwards with three of his divisions. Before the fog lifted, on the morning

*Henderson.

†*Campaigns of the Civil War, Chancellorsville and Gettysburg.*—Doubleday.

of the 1st of May, these forces were in line with Anderson at Tabernacle Church.*

Up to the evening of April 30 Hooker's plan had apparently worked out so well that he gave vent to his elation by issuing an order to his troops in which he stated, "the enemy must either ingloriously fly, or come out from behind his defenses and give us battle on our own ground, where certain destruction awaits him." And the historian Swinton declares that he heard Hooker say "The rebel army is now the legitimate property of the Army of the Potomac. They may as well pack up their haversacks and make for Richmond; and I shall be after them, etc., etc." But at that time Hooker was not well informed concerning what was taking place on the Confederate side of the forest screen that separated the two hostile armies. "He was only aware, on the night of April 30, that the Confederate position before Fredericksburg was still strongly occupied."†

Hooker appears to have supposed that, as soon as Stoneman's movement against the Virginia Central Railway became known, Lee would send his entire cavalry force against the Federal horse. Instead of doing this, Stuart detached two regiments only‡ to observe Stoneman, and kept the rest of his troopers with him, to hang on the Federal turning force and gather information of it, while they covered the movements of the Confederates. Pleasanton's small cavalry brigade, therefore, which was all the cavalry there was to cover the Federal movement, was not strong enough to break through Stuart's screen and get information of the forces behind it. So while "Lee was fully informed as to his adversary's strength . . . Hooker had no knowledge whatever of what was going on in the space between Sedgwick and himself."† Yet signal stations had been placed on all commanding heights; a field-telegraph had been laid from Falmouth to United States Ford; and there were no less than three captive balloons. The thick woods, the darkness of night, and the fog combined to defeat the observations from the balloons.

THE BATTLE-FIELD.

(171) The ground which was to be the battle-field of Chancellorsville was in the midst of a forest of second-growth pine

*Long. Henderson.

†Henderson.

‡Alexander.

and black-oak. The forest was twelve to fourteen miles long from east to west, and eight to ten wide from north to south; "the soil was poor, farms were rare, and the few clearings were seldom more than a rifle-shot in width."* The undergrowth was dense and tangled with vines, and the space was cut up by numerous crooked little streams with marshy banks. No wonder it was called the "Wilderness." Chancellorsville was no more than a single brick house. It stood within the Wilderness, about a mile from its eastern edge, upon high ground from the direction of which all the little streams flowed. West of the house was a considerable clearing. Here the Orange Plank Road and the Old Turnpike, which merged into a single highway two miles farther west, separated again to come together a second time at Tabernacle Church about half-way to Fredericksburg. The river road to Banks's Ford, and the roads to the other fords, as well as various other roads and trails, radiated from Chancellorsville, while two miles south of it an unfinished railway from Fredericksburg to Orange Court House traversed the Wilderness.

A space less suited to the maneuvering of a great body of troops could scarcely be found. Bodies of cavalry could not move at all off the roads, and infantry could move only with great difficulty. There were few positions for artillery, and almost no range for the guns except in the direction of the roads. Eastward, in the neighborhood of Banks's Ford, the ground was more open. It was there that Hooker expected to fight his battle. With this in view, he ordered his columns to move forward on the morning of May the 1st.

OPERATIONS ON MAY 1.

Pleasanton's cavalry had been in touch with Anderson's outposts all the morning, and now led the advance against the Confederates. Hooker moved out at 11 a.m. in four columns. "Slocum's corps [Twelfth], followed by that of Howard [Eleventh], took the Plank Road on the right. Sykes's division of Meade's corps [Fifth], followed by Hancock's division of Couch's corps [Second], went by the Turnpike in the center. The remainder of Meade's corps—Griffin's division, followed by that of Humphreys—took the river road. Lastly, French's

*Henderson.

division of Couch's corps was under orders to turn off and march to Todd's Tavern."*

Before the advance began the Third Corps [Sickles], which had been ordered up from Stafford's Heights, had arrived. It was left at Chancellorsville as the general reserve, with one brigade guarding United States Ford, and another at Dowdall's Tavern [Melzi Chancellor's], watching the approaches in that quarter.

Anderson had taken a strong position at Tabernacle Church. His line stretched "along a low ridge, partially covered with timber, and with open fields in front. Beyond the fields a few hundred paces" was the edge of the forest. When Jackson, after marching since midnight, arrived (about 8 a.m. May 1), Anderson had strongly intrenched his whole front, from near Duerson's Mill on the right, to the unfinished railway on the left, about three miles. The position effectually blocked the four roads by which the Federals would have to advance out of the forest, and there were available to hold it 40,000 Confederate infantry, more than 100 guns, and Fitzhugh Lee's brigade of cavalry—about eight men to the yard of front.†

But Early had only 10,000 men with whom to keep the large force of Federals that Jackson had seen near Fredericksburg from coming upon the rear of the Confederate position at Tabernacle Church. Therefore, General Lee, who was on the ground, resolved to move against the Federal right wing in the Wilderness. With a regiment of cavalry in front and Fitzhugh Lee on the left flank, the army started forward at 11 a.m. Anderson was in the advance, with one brigade on the Turnpike and two on the Plank Road. Next followed Anderson's other two brigades and McLaws's division on the Turnpike. Jackson's three divisions marched on the Plank Road.

(172) The advanced cavalry of the two hostile forces were soon in contact, and at about two miles from Chancellorsville the Confederate infantry on the Turnpike became engaged with Sykes's division of regulars. "Sykes's orders had been, however, only to advance to the first ridge beyond the forest, and he maintained his position there, though menaced by the extension of the Confederate lines beyond his flank."† The Confederates on the Plank Road were also soon engaged with Slocum's corps [Twelfth]. Slocum formed line

*Doubleday.

†Alexander.

with his right on the Plank Road and his left upon high ground. Wright's brigade of Anderson's division advanced along the unfinished railway to turn this position.* "Altogether the general line" of the Federals "was a good one; for there were large open spaces where the artillery could move and maneuver, and the army was almost out of the thickets."† The Federal column on the river road had by this time arrived, without meeting any resistance, within sight of Banks's Ford.

Everything had gone, apparently, as Hooker wished; "he could scarcely hope for more propitious circumstances, and, by all the rules of the game, a victory was now within his grasp."† Yet, at this stage of the engagement, and in spite of the protests of his amazed and indignant corps-commanders, Hooker ordered his forces to withdraw to Chancellorsville. The unbeaten Federals fell back reluctantly, and the Confederates, unable to comprehend the meaning of such an easy victory, and fearing some kind of trap, pursued them with great caution.

(173) Wilcox's brigade, on the extreme right, moved up the old Mine Road; Wright's brigade on the extreme left followed Fitzhugh Lee's cavalry on the unfinished railway; while the main body kept on the Turnpike and the Plank Road. At Chancellorsville the Federal army took up a defensive position, about five miles in length, reaching from Scott's Dam of the Rappahannock, around to Talley's farm on the Turnpike. The Fifth Corps [Meade] held the left of the line along the low divide between Mine Run and Mineral Spring Run. Then came the Second [Couch], making an angle with the Fifth, and facing more nearly east. French's division of this corps inclined toward the east to cover the junction of roads at Chancellorsville; and Hancock's division of the same corps took an advanced position several hundred yards in front of French's. Next came the Twelfth Corps [Slocum], formed around the crest of Fairview Hill, and facing southward. Then there was a gap in the line of about a half-mile, and beyond the gap the Eleventh Corps [Howard], in echelons along the Turnpike, held the right of the line. The Third Corps [Sickles] was kept in reserve back of the mansion. The next morning, May 2, two brigades of Birney's division of this corps, and two batteries, were placed at Hazel Grove, in the gap

*Doubleday.

†Alexander.

between Howard's left and Slocum's right. "The 8th Pennsylvania cavalry picketed the road and kept the enemy in sight."*

The Union and Confederate batteries fired some rounds wherever they could find an opening through the dense timber, but there was little other fighting during the afternoon. Until nightfall, however, the Confederate skirmishers were pushed forward everywhere, in order to determine the exact position of the Federal line.† The Confederates "formed in line of battle in front of Chancellorsville, at right angles to the Plank Road, extending on the right of the Mine Road, and to the left in the direction of the Catherine Furnace."‡ Both sides spent the night felling trees and preparing their lines for defense.

General Doubleday, writing from the Federal point of view, says: "The thickets which surrounded this position were almost impenetrable, so that an advance against the enemy's lines became exceedingly difficult and maneuvering nearly impracticable, nor was this the only defect. Batteries could be established on the high ground to the east, which commanded the front facing in that direction, while our own artillery had but little scope; and last, but most important of all, the right of Howard's corps was 'in the air'; that is, it rested on no obstacle." On the other hand General Lee said in his report: "He [Hooker] assumed a position of great natural strength, surrounded on all sides by a dense forest, filled with a tangled undergrowth, in the midst of which breastworks of logs had been constructed, with trees felled in front, so as to form an almost impenetrable abatis. His artillery swept the few narrow roads by which the position could be approached from the front, and commanded the adjacent woods." But "the strength of a position is measured not by the impregnability of the front, but by the security of the flanks."§ Let us see how this axiom was exemplified in this battle. The only assailable part of the Union line was its right flank. Lee resolved to assault this flank by a turning movement, and entrusted the execution of it to Jackson. To guard against an attack upon his own right and rear by way of Banks's Ford, he sent Wilcox with his brigade to hold that ford.*

*Doubleday.

†Alexander.

‡Lee's Report.

§Henderson.

There has been a good deal of dispute as to who first suggested this daring project. But regarded as a military study, and that is our chief concern with this battle, it makes no difference whether Fitzhugh Lee or Stuart discovered that the Union right was in the air; whether Lee or Jackson thought out the scheme; who it was that guided the turning column—Jackson commanded the forces and directed the execution until he was borne away wounded from the field. Of this there is no question.

The troops employed in the movement were Jackson's own three divisions, about 26,000 men, some of Stuart's cavalry, and Alexander's battalion of artillery from Longstreet's corps. (174) The infantry and artillery started in a single column about 6 a.m. [May 2], Rodes's division in the lead, then Colston's, and A. P. Hill's last. Fitzhugh Lee covered the front with a regiment of cavalry, and squadrons of three other regiments marched on the right of the column. Lee remained with the divisions of Anderson and McLaws, about 17,000 men, to make feints along the front of Hooker's line, in order to draw attention away from the movement against its right.

Jackson marched by way of Catherine Furnace, and there turned southward by Lewis Creek, and, having crossed the unfinished railway, turned southwestward and entered the Brock Road. His column did not escape the notice of the Federals. About 8 a.m. Birney, from his position at Hazel Grove, reported a column of Confederates moving southward at Catherine Furnace, accompanied by a wagon-train. In that direction lay the road to Orange Court House, one of Lee's lines of retreat; but Hooker, fearing a movement against his right flank, dispatched a note to Howard, saying, "We have good reason to suppose that the enemy is moving to our right," and directing Howard to take the necessary precautions.

About 11 a.m. a battery on Hazel Grove heights opened fire on Jackson's train, and drove it off to another road. A little after midday Sickles was allowed to move Birney's division, followed by Whipple's, against Catherine Furnace, in order to develop the situation there. The reserve brigade of the Eleventh Corps [Barlow] also went forward with Sickles. Sickles's force captured the 23rd Georgia regiment which had been left by Jackson near the furnace to cover his rear, and threatened to cut the Confederate army in two; but Anderson's division opposed the attack so stoutly that Sickles called for reinforcements. Pleasanton's cavalry was sent out to him. The

two brigades at the rear of Jackson's column, and Brown's battalion of artillery, were halted for an hour in observation, but were not engaged. It was after dark before they overtook the column.* Pleasanton's cavalry followed Jackson's column.†

✕ About 2 p.m. Jackson, at the head of his column, arrived at the point where the Brock Road crossed the Orange Plank Road. Here he was met by Fitzhugh Lee and conducted to a high point from which he could see the right of the Federal line as far eastward as Dowdall's Tavern. "Below, and but a few hundred yards distant, ran the Federal breastworks, with abatis in front and long lines of stacked arms in rear; but untenanted by a single company. Two cannon were seen upon the highroad, the horses grazing quietly near at hand. The soldiers were scattered in small groups, laughing, cooking, smoking, sleeping, and playing cards, while others were butchering cattle and drawing rations."‡

Jackson sent back an order to Rodes to continue the march across the Plank Road to the Turnpike. (175) The cavalry and one brigade were immediately placed beyond the fork of the Plank Road to mask the march of the column. The column turned up the Turnpike toward the Union position, and by 6 p.m. had formed for battle across the highway. Rodes's division formed the first line, and Colston's the second, while one of A. P. Hill's brigades formed a third line on the left of the Turnpike. Hill's other brigades remained in column on the roads.* A few hostile patrols had been seen, but not a shot had been fired.

At this time the Eleventh Corps [Howard], forming the Union right, was thus disposed: Devens's division was along the turnpike on the right, with two regiments north of the pike in two lines facing west, and the rest of the division facing south.* Schurz's division came next, part of it deployed along the pike, and three regiments in close column north of the pike. Next, at Dowdall's tavern, was Buschbeck's brigade of Steinwehr's division in a line of rifle-pits at right angles to the pike. Barlow's brigade of this division was away helping Sickles. Batteries were in the roads, and twelve guns were near the Wilderness Church.

*Alexander.

†Doubleday.

‡Henderson.

As the day wore on Hooker appears to have become convinced that the column seen in the morning was retreating. Very early in the forenoon, anticipating attack by Lee, he had ordered the First Corps [Reynolds], which had been acting with Sedgwick, to join him by way of United States Ford, and had recalled Averell's cavalry, which was now approaching Ely's Ford by the north bank of the Rapidan. "As the hours went by, however, and Jackson's column disappeared in the forest, he again grew confident."* At 4.10 p.m. he sent an order to Sedgwick to "capture Fredericksburg and vigorously pursue the enemy." "We know," it stated, "that the enemy is fleeing, trying to save his trains. Two of Sickles's divisions are among them."

Jackson sat on his horse awaiting the formation of his lines, watch in hand; it was six o'clock and less than two hours of daylight remained.

"Are you ready, General Rodes?" he asked.

"Yes, sir," Rodes answered.

"You can go forward, sir."

The lines started forward through the Wilderness. The first warning the Eleventh Corps received was not given by its outposts, for they hardly reached the main position ahead of the Confederates; it was given by the deer and rabbits and wild-turkeys of the forest, put to flight by the advance of the enemy.†

Devens's division, taken in flank, was driven back upon Schurz's before the latter had time to deploy; and the whole mass ran pellmell toward Chancellorsville. Buschbeck, behind in his rifle-pits, held Jackson at bay for three-quarters of an hour. But Rodes's division was reinforced by Colston's "and the two together folded around his flanks, took his line in reverse, and finally carried the position with a rush; and then Buschbeck's brigade retired in good order through" the crowd of fugitives, which was "streaming in wild disorder to the rear, past Hooker's headquarters."‡

At the moment when Jackson was about to attack, the Confederates at the other end of the line attacked Meade vigorously, in order to draw attention away from Jackson; and Lee soon engaged the whole Federal line.

*Henderson.

†Doubleday. Alexander.

‡Doubleday.

(176) Jackson's lines followed the routed Eleventh Corps across a clearing east of Dowdall's Tavern, and was entering the forest beyond when the 8th Pennsylvania cavalry, which was on its way to assist the Eleventh Corps, came unexpectedly upon them and charged them. At the same time about a score of guns opened fire upon their flank from Hazel Grove. This checked the pursuit. As night had now fallen, Rodes's and Colston's divisions, which "were broken, mingled, and exhausted," and had left several of their brigades far behind, had to halt and reform. Hill's division was then deployed to take the lead in the woods.

During this long pause Berry's division [Third Corps], supported by Hays's brigade of the Second Corps, formed line under the bank of a little brook, across the road and at the foot of Fairview Hill; at the same time thirty-four guns took position upon the hill, behind the left flank of the infantry. This hill "became the key-point of the battle. In front of it the open ground extended about 600 yards to the edge of the forest" where the Confederates were forming. The only point from which it could be reached by artillery fire was Hazel Grove, which was within the Federal lines.* By 10.00 p.m. Sickles's troops had returned from Catherine Furnace to Hazel Grove.

Jackson was preparing to press his advantage and, if possible, cut off Hooker from United States Ford. He had ridden forward with some of his staff to reconnoiter, when firing began between the hostile lines. Jackson's party started back, but, in the dark woods, it was mistaken for Federal cavalry, and fired upon by a North Carolina regiment. Two of the party were slain, and Jackson received three shots and had to be borne away. He died on the 10th of May. As A. P. Hill, the next in rank, was soon afterwards wounded, Stuart, who had gone round with his cavalry to attack the Union trains near Ely's Ford, came back and took command.*

Hooker ordered Sickles to attack the Confederate flank by moonlight from Hazel Grove. So Birney's division moved out about midnight; but it glanced by the Confederate right flank, provoking the fire of only about two regiments, and pushed into the woods in front of Fairview. Here it was mistaken for Confederates by the Federal lines, and fired upon. It returned the fire which, it supposed, came from Confederates. Thus a

*Alexander.

noisy, but not bloody, battle raged for an hour or two between friends, while the enemy listened to it but took no part in it.*

SUNDAY, MAY 3.

(177) At daybreak Stuart renewed the attack. He seized the heights of Hazel Grove, from which Hooker had made the fatal mistake of withdrawing Sickles, and placed thirty guns there. The guns opened fire on the space around the mansion and enfiladed a part of the Federal line.† This line had been adjusted, during the night, to conform to the new condition. The Eleventh Corps had been sent to the extreme left to reorganize; the right was held by the Second [Couch], Third [Sickles], and Twelfth Corps [Slocum]. Facing Stuart's line were two Federal lines about a mile and a quarter long, reaching northward from Fairview to the other side of the Plank Road. They were held by some 25,000 men—about as many as Stuart had. The whole Union position was covered with breastworks of earth and logs behind abatis. The roads toward Fredericksburg were covered by Hancock's division of the Second Corps, and a part of the Twelfth Corps. Batteries massed on the high ground at Fairview were behind fieldworks. The First Corps [Reynolds] was covering the road to United States Ford, and the Fifth [Meade] was on the left.

Stuart assaulted the line in his front and after several hours of hard fighting, during which the hostile lines surged to and fro many times, succeeded in driving the Federals back. The artillery at Hazel Grove had been increased to about fifty guns, which moved forward to Fairview Hill when that position was vacated by the retiring Union batteries.

While the battle was raging in this quarter Anderson was assaulting the center of the Union line and McLaws its left; seeing "the enemy withdrawing from their fronts" they "pressed forward at the same time that Stuart's infantry crowned the plateau [of Fairview] from the west."*

(178) Finally the flanks of Anderson's and Stuart's forces made connection at Fairview. Then Lee advanced the whole Confederate line, and at ten o'clock had possession of Chancellorsville, now only a smoking ruin; it had been set on fire by Confederate shells.*

*Alexander.

†Swinton. Alexander.

Just before this Hooker had been knocked down and disabled by a brick torn by a shell from one of the columns of the front porch. Couch, therefore, superintended the withdrawal of the Union forces to a line in rear, which had been selected by the engineers and prepared during the night. The new position was in the space between Hunting Run and Mineral Spring Run, and covered the line of retreat by way of United States Ford. The right rested on the Rapidan and the left on the Rappahannock, and the line followed the direction of the two runs and bent across the space between their headwaters. The First and Fifth Corps, which had been held in reserve all morning and not allowed to take part in the battle, were formed on this new line, and there "joined by the rest of the army falling back from Chancellorsville."*

Lee was making ready to assault this new position when he was stopped by reports that called for his attention in the direction of Fredericksburg.

SEDGWICK'S OPERATIONS.

(179) At nine o'clock the night before [the 2nd] Hooker had dispatched an order to Sedgwick directing him to move through Fredericksburg, drive Early away, continue toward Chancellorsville and be ready at daybreak to attack Lee in reverse, while he himself assaulted him in front. It was nearly midnight when Sedgwick received the order, but he moved almost immediately toward Fredericksburg, skirmishing with the Confederate outposts on the way.

The bulk of Early's own division was on the ridge below the town, and the line from Taylor's Hill to the Howison house, about three miles, was held by the brigades of Barksdale and Hays supported by a few pieces of artillery. Two regiments, only, with eight guns, guarded Marye's Hill from the Plank Road to Hazel Run.

(180) Sedgwick reached Fredericksburg at 3 a.m., and at daybreak moved against Early's position. Four regiments assaulted Marye's Hill, but were repulsed. A second assault was made and also repulsed. Howe's division, south of Hazel Run, tried to turn the hill but met with no success. Gibbon, who had brought his division of the Second Corps over from Falmouth, had no better success against the Confederate left. He was unable to get across the canal. Soon after his effort Wil-

*Swinton.

cox, who had brought his Confederate brigade from Banks's Ford, occupied Taylor's Hill.

About eleven o'clock a third assault was made on Marye's Hill by a whole division supported by a brigade. This assault, also, was repulsed, "although Barksdale's line was so thin that it scarcely averaged a man to five feet of parapet." But in removing the wounded under flag of truce after this assault the Federals discovered how weak the Confederate line was.* Taking advantage of this information, they quickly renewed the attack, and carried the position in the sunken road at the foot of the hill—the rampart against which Burnside had shattered his army.

In defense of their guns on the crest the Confederates made a savage stand; but Sedgwick's line carried everything before it. At the same time Howe's division carried the heights below the town, and the Federals were then in possession of the whole ridge. Early's troops retreated by the Telegraph Road, leaving the way to Chancellorsville open to Sedgwick. These were the tidings that Lee received just as he was about to complete his victory at Chancellorsville. He withdrew four brigades at once from his line and dispatched them, under McLaws, to meet Sedgwick. He counted upon Early's returning to attack Sedgwick in rear. (181) Wilcox formed his brigade across the Plank Road, and, when Sedgwick advanced, fell back slowly toward Chancellorsville, delaying Sedgwick as much as he could. He reached Salem Church about three o'clock, and joined McLaws, who was already there with his four brigades. At four o'clock Sedgwick reached Salem Church and immediately attacked the Confederate line. The combat that ensued kept up until dark, and Sedgwick was stopped in his march. He had lost nearly 5,000 men since morning.†

The next morning, as it did not appear that Hooker was going to take the aggressive, Lee resolved still further to reinforce the troops opposed to Sedgwick, with a view to capture him, or force him to cross the Rappahannock. Accordingly he withdrew the rest of Anderson's division and marched it to McLaws's support, leaving only what remained of Jackson's old corps in front of Hooker.‡

(182) In the meantime Early had retaken Marye's Heights,

*Alexander.

†Swinton.

‡Doubleday.

and then turned his troops on Salem Church. When Anderson's brigades arrived, also, and formed line on the right of McLaws, parallel to the Plank Road, Sedgwick was surrounded on three sides. His position covered the road to Banks's Ford, but he was now upon the defensive, and only hoped to hold his position until night should fall to cover his withdrawal.

Anderson had been delayed several hours in getting away from Chancellorsville; and, also, in forming his line for attack, owing to "Sedgwick's peculiar rectangular formation."* So it was six o'clock in the evening before the Confederates were ready to make a vigorous assault. Sedgwick was forced back on Banks's Ford [Scott's Ford], but darkness fell before he could be cut off by the Confederates. During the night he crossed the river by a pontoon-bridge, which had been laid the day before after Wilcox had quitted his position at the Ford.

(178) Tuesday morning, the 5th, Lee withdrew the divisions of McLaws and Anderson, and, with his united forces, resolved to make a final effort to destroy Hooker. Everything was arranged to assault the Federal position at daybreak on the 6th. "When daybreak, however, came, and the Confederate skirmishers advanced, it was found that" the Army of the Potomac "had, during the night, withdrawn across the Rappahannock," leaving behind "its killed, its wounded, fourteen pieces of artillery, and twenty thousand stand of arms."†

The Federal losses in the few days of this campaign amounted, in killed and wounded, to 11,128, and those of the Confederates to 10,960.*

STONEMAN'S CAVALRY.

(170) Much had been expected of Stoneman's Cavalry Corps. It was the first time since the war had begun that the Union cavalry had been given a chance. The fates, however, seemed to be against it still. The column got off in good season; but it was delayed by the heavy rains, so that it could not cross the Rappahannock till the 29th of April—the same day the infantry crossed.

"Hooker then divided the command into two columns, sending one under Averell" toward Gordonsville and the other under Buford to break up the Fredericksburg-Richmond rail-

*Alexander.

†Swinton.

way. The only cavalry the Confederates could spare to oppose these forces was W. H. F. Lee's brigade. It fell back before Averell's column, and was pursued as far as Rapidan Station. From there Averell was recalled by Hooker, and he reached Ely's Ford the night of May 2. On the 3rd Averell reconnoitered on Hooker's right, but returned, reporting the country impracticable for cavalry work. Hooker thereupon relieved him from command and put Pleasanton in his place.

Stoneman broke up Buford's command into five or six detachments, and sent them in as many different directions. They did considerable damage and spread dismay through Virginia. One detachment went within two miles of Richmond. Several of them wound up their raid at Gloucester on the coast, which was in the possession of Union troops. The Fredericksburg-Richmond railway was not reached until the 3rd of May, and very little damage was done to it; for the Confederates sent prisoners and wounded over it to Richmond, on the 5th.

On the whole the Cavalry Corps exerted no practical influence upon the campaign after the main operations had actually begun; while, if it had been kept with the main army, it would have been of great service. On the 8th of May the entire cavalry force, except what was at Gloucester Point, recrossed the Rappahannock at Kelly's Ford, on its way to rejoin the army. The corps had lost only seventeen killed and seventy-five wounded during all its operations!

COMMENTS.

The first movements of the main force in the Chancellorsville Campaign began on the 27th of April, 1863, and the campaign ended with Hooker's withdrawal across the Rappahannock, on the night of May 5. It would be hard to pick out another nine days of the Civil War so fraught with lessons for the student of the military art. If many of these lessons are to be learned from the mistakes that were made and their fatal consequences, there are others that may be learned from the examples of sound strategy and tactics presented, and their results.

Up to the time when the right wing of the Federal army reached Chancellorsville on the 30th of April, General Hooker's plan, in its conception and its execution, has been characterized by the critics as "masterly"; but from that moment to the end

every item of it was so faulty that no one has arisen bold enough to venture a word in Hooker's defense. Of course Hooker can be criticized for dividing his army into two almost equal parts, separated by nearly forty miles of bad road and a river, and with the enemy between them; but Napoleon took such risks when necessary. "The rules of war only point out the dangers which are incurred by breaking them."* Moreover, either of Hooker's separated wings, by itself, was nearly equal in strength to Lee's whole army. The fact that Hooker's right wing was allowed to reach Chancellorsville without molestation proves that he had taken sufficient measures to deceive Lee. Not until then—not until he received word that Anderson had fallen back from Chancellorsville—did Lee guess what Hooker's project was.

Of the measures taken by Hooker to fool Lee, none other had so great an effect as the march of Stoneman's cavalry corps up the Rappahannock two weeks before the principal movement began. Stoneman marched to Warrenton Junction. Lee at first "believed that" he "was going to the Shenandoah Valley. As, however," he "continued near Warrenton Junction, Lee concluded that the movement was a feint intended to draw his army to the Upper Rappahannock in order that Fredericksburg might be seized."† So Lee clung more tenaciously than ever to the heights of Fredericksburg, while Stuart's cavalry confronted Stoneman's across the upper Rappahannock. Thus Stuart was still at Culpeper Court House with his main force when the Federal right wing had reached Kelly's Ford, on its way to Chancellorsville.

Having arrived at Chancellorsville, on the afternoon of April 30, Hooker's first fatal mistake was his stopping there for the night. He ought to have pushed on out of the Wilderness, until he uncovered Banks's Ford and reached the open ground in that neighborhood, where he could maneuver his large army. A night's march would even have brought him upon the rear of Lee's army at Marye's Heights. Nothing but Anderson's division barred the way, the distance was only ten miles, and he had four army-corps at hand. The failure to march, to keep on marching after nightfall, has lost many a victory in war.

Even, however, after bivouacking at Chancellorsville, if

*Henderson.

†*Principles of Strategy*.—Bigelow.

Hooker had started his army toward Fredericksburg at daylight on the 1st of May, he would have got possession of Banks's Ford, and the open ground near it, before the arrival of Jackson with reinforcements. But Hooker did not move until eleven o'clock. The possession of Banks's Ford would have shortened the communication between the two wings of the army by several miles; virtually it would have united the army. With all of his tardiness Hooker's line, none the less, got within reach of Banks's Ford on the 1st, and attained a good position almost without the forest, when it was withdrawn to Chancellorsville. The enemy had "come out from behind his defenses" as Hooker's order had predicted he must, and now Hooker was going to compass his "certain destruction" on Hooker's "own ground." He made a fatal mistake in undertaking to "consummate offensive strategy with defensive tactics."*

Hooker's object was, or ought to have been, to destroy Lee's army. The strategic situation was not such that the simple repulse of that army meant its destruction; repulse would only have forced it back upon its line of communications. But to achieve a decisive tactical victory from the defensive requires the skill of a master like Napoleon, and unusually favorable conditions. Later battles present no such decisive counter-attacks as that of Austerlitz. Upon the defensive, victory means usually no more than to repulse the enemy's assault, not to destroy the assailant. Certainly Hooker could not hope to do more than repulse Lee's assaults in the jungle about Chancellorsville. If he expected to hold Lee in his front until Sedgwick could come up and strike him from behind he reckoned without his host.

Far more hazardous than the flank march of Hooker's right wing to Chancellorsville was the flank march of Lee's left wing under Jackson, on the 2nd of May. All day long Jackson's column was marching across Hooker's front and within two miles of it, with his right flank covered only "by woods and by Stuart's busy and noisy cavalry."† And Hooker and Howard, and the rest, knew that this Confederate column was marching, yet made no effort to destroy it and no adequate preparation to oppose it. Howard says he "sent out scouts who returned with reports that the enemy was not more than three or four miles off, and in motion." And "we, who were

*Bigelow.†General Howard in *B. & L.*

at Dowdall's, had been watching the enemy's cavalry, which kept pushing through the woods just far enough to receive a fire and then withdrawing."* Hooker and his corps-commanders were sure that the marching column was Lee's army retreating on Gordonsville.

Never was the cavalry of an army more needed in the right place than Hooker's cavalry was needed on the exposed Federal right flank that 2nd of May. If Stoneman's Cavalry Corps had been on the Brock Road Jackson's march would have been impossible; but if Stoneman's cavalry had been there Jackson's march would not have been attempted, for Fitzhugh Lee would not have been permitted to discover that Howard's flank was "in the air."

In view of the exposed condition of the Federal right and the cover afforded by the dense forest "the chief danger" of Jackson's flank movement "lay in this, that the two wings, each left to its own resources, might fail to act in combination,"† for Lee and Jackson had no means, as our Signal Corps has today, of laying a field-telegraph as fast as their troops could march.

The Army of the Potomac was in no sense defeated by the disaster of the Eleventh Corps; if Jackson had not been wounded, and if night had not intervened, this disaster might have extended to the rest of the army. Jackson purposed taking the Union army in reverse and cutting it off from its line of retreat by United States Ford, while Lee held it fast in front. But "Hooker had two corps in position which had hardly been engaged, the Second and the Fifth," with which to meet Jackson; "and another, the First, under Reynolds, was coming up."† If Jackson had made a night-march instead of waiting until day to begin his movement he might not have been shot in the dark by his own men, and he might have had time to push his advantage to a conclusion before nightfall.

There was, in fact, not a moment from the beginning to the end of the engagement at Chancellorsville when the Union army as a whole was beaten; there was not a time when by a vigorous combined assault it might not have defeated Lee's army. General Hooker says the dense forest prohibited a Union victory; but the ground was of his own choosing; Lee

*General Howard in *B. & L.*

†Henderson.

attacked upon it, and turned the dense thicket to his own advantage.

During the whole of Saturday [May 2], while Jackson was making his flank march, the Confederate commander held Hooker's 50,000 troops with only 16,000. Again, from four o'clock Sunday afternoon until midnight on Monday, while the bulk of Lee's army was operating against Sedgwick, Hooker with 60,000 men, strongly fortified, allowed himself to be held in place by 20,000 Confederates, and neither sent a man to Sedgwick's assistance, seven miles away, nor made an effort to break the thin line of the enemy by whom he was himself beleaguered. Swinton truly remarks that "not the Army of the Potomac was beaten at Chancellorsville, but its commander." An army is not beaten so long as there are reserves to put into the fight, and in the action on Sunday, when the Federal line was driven back from Chancellorsville, Hooker "employed little more than half his force—neither Reynolds [First Corps] nor Meade [Fifth Corps] being allowed to go into action, though eager to do so."* Hooker's final decision to retreat on the night of the 5th was, General Alexander believes, "the mistake of his life." He then had his whole united army, upwards of 90,000 men, behind "probably the strongest field-intrenchment ever built in Virginia."† Lee was going to attack this army with only 35,000 troops, which had been fighting and marching for seven days! Nothing but Hooker's withdrawal saved Lee's army from a terrible repulse.

Hooker charged his defeat to Sedgwick's failure to execute the order he sent him Saturday night, May 2. But that order was impossible to execute. Sedgwick was directed to be in rear of Lee's position ready to fall upon the Confederates at daybreak. It was nearly midnight when he received the order, and he had fourteen miles to march, with Early's 10,000 Confederates on the heights of Fredericksburg blocking the way. Day broke before five o'clock at that time. It would be impossible to awaken a body of twenty-odd thousand men and march it in so short a time fourteen miles in the dark, even though no enemy stood in the way. It does, nevertheless, appear that Sedgwick might have made better speed. The assault that carried the sunken road and Marye's Hill was not made until after 11 a.m.; but after driving the Confederates and gaining the ridge "Sedgwick, instead of pushing on, halted to reform

*Swinton.

†Alexander.

his men, and sent for Brooks's division, which was still at its old position three miles below Fredericksburg, to come up and take the advance. It was full 3 p.m. before the final start was made."*

As everything turned out it would have been better if Sedgwick had not advanced at all from the heights of Fredericksburg. If he had intrenched himself there he could have held on against Early and such forces as Lee could have sent against him until reinforcements could come to him by way of United States Ford. Then the whole Army of the Potomac, after withdrawing from Chancellorsville, could have joined him by way of Fredericksburg. This would have given Hooker all that Burnside made his fierce fight to gain. In view of the fact that Hooker made no effort to coöperate with Sedgwick, but remained in his trenches, it is perhaps fortunate for Sedgwick that he was stopped at Salem Church. If he had been allowed to march on a little farther he might have had no line of retreat when Anderson and McLaws and Early surrounded him.

Chancellorsville was the first great battle of the Civil War in which the infantry of both sides made use of field-works.

*Doubleday.

LECTURE XVII.

THE CAMPAIGN OF GETTYSBURG. THE FIRST DAY.

(183) After the battle of Chancellorsville the Army of the Potomac and the Army of Northern Virginia again resumed their positions on opposite sides of the Rappahannock River. The two main armies stretched from about the mouth of the Rapidan to points six or seven miles below Fredericksburg. The right of the Confederate line rested on Massaponax Creek. The hostile cavalry forces confronted each other along the upper course of the Rappahannock, from the mouth of the Rapidan to the Orange and Alexandria Railway.

Both armies were in need of rest, recuperation, and reorganization. The morale of the Union army had suffered from another defeat, while that of the Confederate army had reached the highest point that it attained in the course of the war. The Confederacy had resorted to obligatory service, and Lee's army was at once increased by a large force of conscripts. Longstreet's two divisions, which had been absent during the Chancellorsville campaign, also soon rejoined. On May 31, 1863, Lee had an army of 76,224 officers and men, and 272 guns.*

Lee reorganized his infantry into three corps, commanded by Longstreet, Ewell, and A. P. Hill, respectively. Each corps consisted of three divisions, and each of the divisions, except three, consisted of four brigades. Lee was a full general, his corps-commanders were lieutenant-generals, his division-commanders were major-generals, and all of his brigades—thirty-seven of infantry and five of cavalry—except two, were commanded by brigadier-generals. "Nearly all of these officers were veterans of proved ability, and many had served in the Mexican War." "The artillery had recently received an excellent organization. . . . It consisted, besides the horse-artillery, of fifteen so-called 'battalions,' each of four batteries, with one lieutenant-colonel and a major. To each army-corps were attached five battalions, one for each division and two as reserve, the whole under a colonel as chief of artillery" of the corps.† The general artillery reserve for the army, formerly

*Alexander.

†General Hunt in *B. & L.*

maintained, was broken up. The artillery organization adopted at this time by the Confederacy was the first of its kind ever employed, and it has since been adopted by the leading nations of Europe.* It will be observed that a Confederate army-corps only lacked a complement of cavalry to make it a complete little army in itself, which is the approved organization of an army-corps today. And it approximated in numbers what is today considered the proper strength of an army-corps, that is, about 30,000 men.

On the other hand, in the Army of the Potomac "the average strength of army-corps and divisions was about half that of the Confederates. . . . At the battle of Gettysburg the seven army-corps consisted of nineteen infantry divisions, seven of which had two brigades, eleven had three, and one had four; in all fifty-one brigades. . . . The army and army-corps were commanded by major-generals, the divisions by three major-generals and sixteen brigadier-generals, the infantry brigades by twenty-two brigadier-generals and twenty-nine colonels."† Our Government has always evinced an incomprehensible aversion to bestowing adequate rank upon its higher commanders. Since the very beginning, 1775, there have been only four full generals in our service, Washington, Grant, Sherman, and Sheridan. Not so in the Confederate army; there we find every separate army commanded by a full general, and the army-corps commanded by lieutenant-generals. In the four short years of this army's existence seven full generals and eighteen lieutenant-generals were commissioned.

The returns of June 30, 1863, give the strength of the Army of the Potomac as 115,256 officers and men, with 362 guns.*

PLANS.

In assuming the offensive in the campaign now to be discussed Lee and the Confederate authorities at Richmond were actuated by many considerations, political as well as military. Politically it was believed that the South's recognition by foreign powers awaited only a victory upon Northern soil; and the Southern authorities still believed that an invasion of the North would strengthen the influence of the "copperhead or anti-war party," and increase the disaffection that already existed there on account of the heavy taxation and the draft

*Alexander.

†Hunt.

law; furthermore the financial condition of the Confederacy was becoming worse from day to day, and the notes issued by the government were now hardly worth the paper of which they were made. It was believed that a successful invasion would not only hasten the end of the war but would strengthen the Confederacy's credit in the financial world abroad.

But there were also purely military reasons. The spirit of Lee's army was such that it believed itself equal to any undertaking; a purely defensive war could have no hope of final success; soon or late the army would be forced back on Richmond and ultimately have to surrender; Lee needed supplies of clothing and subsistence for his army, and expected to obtain them in Pennsylvania; and of more consequence than anything else was the serious condition of affairs at Vicksburg. Pemberton's army was there besieged by Grant's and could not hold out many days longer, and Bragg was hard put to it to keep Rosecrans from advancing farther in East Tennessee. Lee not only felt sure that his movement northward would cause the recall of the Army of the Potomac to cover Washington, but he hoped it might also "lead to the calling of some of the forces from the west, and thus relieve the pressure on Vicksburg and Chattanooga."* He felt that, if Vicksburg should fall while he was still on the defensive behind the Rappahannock, it would "dishearten the Southern people and stimulate the North to renewed effort."† He therefore resolved to transfer his army to northern soil by way of the Shenandoah and the Cumberland Valleys. His line of communications would thus be covered by his holding the passes of the Blue Ridge and the South Mountains.

Secondary to his own movements Lee urged that an army "even in effigy," as he expressed it, be organized under Beauregard at Culpeper Court House. This he believed would so menace Washington as not only to hinder the advance of troops to oppose him but also to cause the withdrawal of Federal troops from other points at the South to protect that city. The government at Richmond could not see its way to carry out this part of Lee's plan.

There was another great strategic plan which, at this time, held out far better chances of success to Southern arms, and greater results in case of success, than the plan of invading Pennsylvania. It was a plan that General Longstreet urged

*Fiebeger.

†Doubleday.

upon the Confederate Secretary of War and General Lee, but was unable to persuade them to adopt. If we consider the whole vast theater of war from the Potomac to the delta of the Mississippi, the Southern armies had the advantage of interior lines. Never before in any of the world's great wars would it have been possible to shift armies from one side to another of such a wide theater in time for sudden strategic combinations; but it was possible at this time in this theater, by means of the railways within the Southern lines.

Adopting the figures given by General Alexander in his *Memoirs*: Pemberton had 30,000 men at Vicksburg invested by Grant's 60,000; Joseph E. Johnston had 25,000 at Jackson, Mississippi, looking on at the siege of Vicksburg, but giving no assistance to Pemberton; Bragg had 45,000 in Tennessee confronting Rosecrans with 84,000; Buckner had 5,000 at Knoxville, "and there were also scattered brigades in southwest Virginia and eastern North Carolina." Nothing aggressive was to be expected from Hooker's army for several weeks.

The plan suggested by Longstreet proposed that General Lee should leave the troops that had just defeated Hooker to "contain" the Army of the Potomac on the Rappahannock, and that Lee himself should hasten to Bragg's headquarters and assume command; and that Longstreet with his two divisions, 13,000 strong, which had been absent from the battle of Chancellorsville, and Johnston and Buckner with their commands, and all other available troops, should be hurried by rail to join Bragg's army. Thus General Lee would have had an army of nearly 90,000 with which to take the offensive against Rosecrans. "Rosecrans might have been defeated," says General Alexander, "and an advance made into Kentucky, threatening Louisville and Cincinnati. If anything could have caused Grant's recall from Vicksburg it would have been this. Surely," he continues, "the chances of success were greater, and of disaster less, than those involved in our crossing the bridgeless Potomac, into the heart of the enemy's country, where ammunition and supplies must come by wagons from Staunton, nearly 200 miles, over roads exposed to raids of the enemy from either the east or the west. In this position a drawn battle, or even a victory, would still leave us compelled soon to find our way back across the Potomac."

Toward the latter part of May Hooker got wind of Lee's contemplated advance; he proposed, therefore, "that in case Lee moved via Culpeper toward the Potomac with his main

body, leaving a corps at Fredericksburg," he should be allowed to attack this corps. This, however, he was forbidden by the Washington authorities to do. A little later, learning that Lee's army was in motion, "and that there were but few troops in Richmond, he proposed an immediate march on that place." This plan was also disapproved by the President in a letter to Hooker which shows a very sound sense of strategy.* Hooker was instructed to keep "always in view the safety of Washington and Harper's Ferry";† no plan would receive the assent of the President and his incompetent adviser, General Halleck, that contemplated the removal of the Army of the Potomac from between Lee's army and Washington. Hooker's operations, therefore, must be wholly subordinated to those of the enemy.

OPERATIONS.

(184) Early in June Lee's army began its advance, and by the 8th the corps of Ewell and Longstreet, covered by Stuart's cavalry division, were concentrated at Culpeper. A. P. Hill's corps remained at Fredericksburg to watch Hooker and keep him, as long as possible, from discovering the movement.

Hooker's suspicions, however, were aroused by his seeing a smaller number of tents on the Fredericksburg heights; and on the 6th June he ordered Sedgwick to throw bridges across the river and make a reconnaissance on the other side with his corps. After making such reconnaissance Sedgwick reported that he thought the main Confederate army was still in position. Hooker, nevertheless, ordered Pleasanton, who had replaced Stoneman as commander of the Union Cavalry Corps, to move against Stuart's cavalry at Culpeper and "get information as to the enemy's position and proposed movement."‡ The result was the cavalry combat at Brandy Station on the 9th of June. The Union cavalry encountered Stuart's contact-troops as soon as it crossed the Rappahannock, and pushed them back to Brandy Station. Here it was met by Stuart's main body, and, after fighting all day, it withdrew; but not until it had captured dispatches and sufficient information to enable its commander to report to Hooker "that two-thirds of the enemy were at Culpeper preparing to move on Washington."§

*See Rhodes's *History of the U. S.*, IV-271.

†Hunt.

‡Doubleday.

The battle of Brandy Station was an important one for the Union cavalry—it marked the turning point in its relative efficiency and excellence as compared with its adversary's. It was the first true cavalry combat of the war, "and it enabled the Federals to dispute the superiority hitherto claimed by, and conceded to, the Confederate cavalry."*

(185) As soon as Hooker received Pleasanton's report that a large Confederate force was at Culpeper he extended his right up the Rappahannock.

Meantime Ewell's corps was on its way to Winchester, having left Culpeper on the 10th of June. Imboden's cavalry brigade had already marched toward Cumberland, Maryland, to destroy the railway from that place to Martinsburg, as well as the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal. Winchester was occupied by Milroy's Federal division (about 9,000 men), with an advance brigade at Berryville. Martinsburg and Harper's Ferry were also garrisoned by Federal troops. From Chester Gap Ewell dispatched Rodes's division with Jenkins's cavalry brigade by way of Berryville toward Martinsburg. The Berryville garrison withdrew to Winchester, and the Federals at Martinsburg retreated to Harper's Ferry. (186) With the rest of his corps Ewell pushed on to Winchester, where he arrived on the evening of the 13th June. He skilfully surrounded the town and prepared to storm its fortifications at dawn on the 15th; but Milroy, seeing his line of retreat threatened, had before that hour begun a retreat toward Martinsburg. His command was split in two by a Confederate force posted on the Martinsburg Turnpike, and one part of it reached Harper's Ferry, while the other part crossed the Potomac at Hancock, thirty-five miles in a straight line farther up the river. (187) Ewell crossed the Potomac and occupied Hagerstown and Sharpsburg, sending Jenkins's cavalry on to Chambersburg, Penn., to collect supplies. On the 17th the garrison of Harper's Ferry withdrew to Maryland Heights and the Shenandoah Valley was cleared of Federal troops.

(186) On learning of Ewell's movement toward the Valley, being forbidden to take advantage of Lee's widely extended front to attack his isolated corps separately, and being required to keep his army between Lee and Washington, Hooker started on the night of June 13 toward Manassas Junction, on the way to the Potomac, which he expected to cross near Lees-

*Hunt.

burg. Hooker's withdrawal from Falmouth was immediately followed by A. P. Hill's movement toward the Valley.*

(187) On the 15th of June Longstreet left Culpeper; he marched along the east side of the Blue Ridge mountains, in order to cover the passes. Hill's corps, which had left Fredericksburg on the 14th, crossed the mountains in rear of Longstreet, and, marching down the Valley, reached Shepherdstown on the 23rd.

Stuart's cavalry had been thrown out to the right of Longstreet's column to cover the Confederate movement and keep in touch with Hooker's army. Pleasanton's cavalry was in like manner covering this army. The result was several fine cavalry combats, the most notable of which were those at Aldie, Middleburg, and Upperville. Stuart retreated through Ashby's Gap. (188) Longstreet withdrew through the passes and followed Hill to the Potomac. On the 24th he crossed the river at Williamsport; Hill had crossed it at Shepherdstown the day before. Their columns united at Hagerstown on the 25th. Stuart continued to guard the mountain passes until the Federal army had crossed the Potomac.

(187) Conforming his movements to those of Lee's army, Hooker marched northward. (188) On the 25th and 26th of June his army crossed the Potomac at Edwards's Ferry. (189) On the 27th two army-corps [First and Eleventh] under Reynolds occupied Middletown and the South Mountain passes. The Twelfth Corps [Slocum] was near Harper's Ferry, and the other four corps were concentrated at Frederick.

Ewell's Confederate corps had continued its march toward Harrisburg, which was now Lee's objective. On the 28th of June the divisions of Rodes and Johnson were at Carlisle, and Early's reached York. Early's orders were "to break up the Northern Central Railroad, destroy the bridge across the Susquehanna at Wrightsville, and then rejoin the main body at Carlisle."* At the first signs of invasion Governor Curtin had called out the Pennsylvania militia, but it does not appear to have opposed any effective resistance to Ewell's advance. At Wrightsville, however, a small militia force, after retreating across the fine bridge, set fire to it, which not only destroyed the bridge but came near destroying the town also. Gordon's Confederate brigade helped the citizens put out the fire.

*Hunt.

Hooker ordered the Twelfth Corps [Slocum] to march early on the 28th of June to Harper's Ferry, and there to unite with the force at Maryland Heights and cut Lee's communications; and, in conjunction with Reynolds, to operate on Lee's rear. But Halleck forbade the withdrawal of the troops from Maryland Heights "notwithstanding Hooker's representations that the position was utterly useless for any purpose."* Whereupon Hooker, finding that he was "not to be allowed to maneuver his own army in the presence of the enemy," asked to be relieved from his command. As it had already been decided at a council between the President, Stanton, and Halleck, that Hooker should never again be intrusted with the conduct of a battle, and he had been left in command only for political reasons,† his request to be relieved was promptly granted. Major-General George G. Meade was immediately appointed in his place, and he took command of the Union army on the 28th. Meade was the fifth commander assigned to this army within ten months. Halleck imposed no restrictions upon him as to the use of the troops at Maryland Heights, and they were soon ordered to Frederick.

On the day that Meade assumed command it was known at Federal headquarters that Lee's army was distributed as follows: Longstreet's corps at Chambersburg; A. P. Hill's between that town and Cashtown; and Ewell's at Carlisle and York and in the country between those towns, threatening Harrisburg.

Meade dropped Hooker's plan of operating against Lee's rear and "determined at once to move on the main line from Frederick to Harrisburg, extending his wings as far as compatible with ready concentration, in order to force Lee to battle before he could cross the Susquehanna,"* but, at the same time, covering Baltimore and Washington. To fulfill these conditions he selected the line Emmitsburg-Hanover for the front of his army. Westminster was to be his base.‡ Buford's division of cavalry was ordered to cover the left of the army, Gregg's the right, and Kilpatrick's was put in front.

At this time Lee had no knowledge concerning the position of the Federal army. Stuart, instead of being between the Confederate army and the Federals, was away beyond the Fed-

*Hunt.

†Alexander.

‡Fiebeger.

eral columns with three of his brigades. Longstreet and Hill had been halted in the neighborhood of Chambersburg to await tidings from Stuart; but no tidings had come. So Lee was under the belief that the Federal army was still south of the Potomac, and on the afternoon of the 28th he ordered Longstreet and Hill to join Ewell at Harrisburg. That night, however, one of Longstreet's spies—called a "scout" for the sake of euphony—brought in the startling news that the Federal army had crossed the Potomac and was at Frederick, and that Hooker had been replaced by Meade.*

(190) A speedy concentration of the Confederate army was now imperative. It must hold Meade east of the mountains, and keep him away from its line of retreat by way of the Valley. To this end "Lee's plan had long been formed to concentrate his army somewhere between Cashtown and Gettysburg, in a strong position where it would threaten at once Washington, Baltimore, and Philadelphia. The enemy, he hoped, would then be forced to attack him."† "Before dawn on the morning of the 29th orders were dispatched requiring the immediate junc-

*In a volume called *Stuart's Cavalry in the Gettysburg Campaign*, lately published by Colonel John S. Mosby, the following letter appears, which claims to have been copied from General Lee's letter-book.

"From memory—sketch of letter.

Headquarters Army of Northern Virginia,

Chambersburg, June 28th, 1863, 7.30 A. M.

Lieutenant-General R. S. Ewell,

Commanding Corps.

"General: I wrote you last night, stating that General Hooker was reported to have crossed the Potomac and is advancing by way of Middletown, the head of his column being at that point in Frederick county. I directed you in that letter to move your forces to this point. If you have not already progressed on the road, or if you have no good reason against it, I desire you to move in the direction of Gettysburg, via Heidlesburg, where you will have turnpike most of the way, and you can thus join your other divisions (Johnson's and Rodes's) to Early's, which is east of the mountain (at York).

"I think it preferable to keep the east side of the mountains. When you come to Heidlesburg you can either move directly on Gettysburg or turn down to Cashtown. Your trains and heavy artillery you can send, if you think proper, on the road to Chambersburg. But if the roads which your troops take are good, they had better follow you.

"Official, C. S. Venable,

R. E. LEE,

"Maj. and A. D. C.

General."

It would appear from this letter that General Lee had received reports of Hooker's passage of the Potomac, and had sent a letter on the night of July 27 to Ewell directing him to rejoin the main army with his corps. This view is contrary to all accounts heretofore published of the Campaign of Gettysburg, and contrary to General Lee's official reports.

†Alexander.

tion of the army" at Cashtown.* On the 29th the two hostile armies drew nearer together.

Never did Lee so much need the "eyes of his army," which were now wandering on a fool's errand. Without his cavalry his army was groping in the dark. He was in the enemy's country and could get no information from the people. He did not know where Meade's army was. All he could hope to do was to concentrate his forces and be ready for a blow on any side.

Stuart, by some misunderstanding, instead of marching his squadrons on the right of the main army for the purpose of screening its columns and keeping his chief informed of the movements of the enemy, was making a raid round the Union army. (189) He left two brigades [Robertson and Jones] to guard the passes of the Blue Ridge Mountains, and on the night of the 24th of June, with three brigades [Fitzhugh Lee, Hampton, and W. H. F. Lee], started upon his raid. He expected to complete the circuit and rejoin Lee in Maryland, but the movements of the Union army forced him so far east that he was obliged to ford the Potomac within twenty miles of Washington, on the night of the 27th. The next morning, learning that the Union army had crossed the Potomac, he marched northward to Rockville, where he captured a wagon-train. He pushed on through Westminster, where he had an action with a Delaware squadron, to Union Mills, where he camped the night of the 29th. During the night he learned that the Federal army was still between him and Lee, and that Kilpatrick's cavalry was at Littlestown. So he moved across country on the 30th to Hanover, where his leading brigade encountered Kilpatrick passing through the town; he attacked Kilpatrick and was repulsed.

"Stuart's men and horses were now nearly worn out" and he was encumbered with the captured wagon-train. He was in the enemy's country, and his case was growing perilous. "He made a night march for York only to learn that Early had left the day before."† He pushed on to Carlisle, there to learn that Early had gone, and that the place was held by a Pennsylvania militia force. He fired a few shells into the town and burned the government barracks. That night [July 1] he learned that Lee's army was concentrating at Gettysburg, and he set out for

*Long.

†Hunt.

that place next morning. Thus ended this useless and fatal raid, which captured a few hundred prisoners and a wagon-train, but probably lost a victory for Lee's army.

The two cavalry brigades left by Stuart to cover the flank of the army had, by some misunderstanding, remained in Virginia; Imboden's brigade had tarried on the way to destroy the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal; and Jenkins's brigade was with Ewell's corps. So Lee had no cavalry with his main army.*

(191) On the 30th of June the Federal troops were disposed as follows: Buford's cavalry division was at Gettysburg; the First Corps [Reynolds] was at Marsh Run; the Third [Sickles] at Bridgeport; the Twelfth [Slocum] at Littlestown; the Eleventh [Howard] at Emmitsburg, behind the First. These troops with Kilpatrick's cavalry division at Hanover composed the first line. In the second line were the Second Corps [Hancock] at Uniontown; the Fifth [Sykes] at Union Mills; and the Sixth [Sedgwick] at Manchester. Gregg's cavalry division was covering the rear at Westminster.

On the same day Lee's army was thus situated: two of Ewell's divisions were at Heidlersburg and the third was at Greenwood; two of Longstreet's were at Fayetteville, while Pickett's division was back at Chambersburg guarding the trains; Hill's corps had reached Cashtown and Mummasburg, except Anderson's division, which was back at the mountain pass on the Chambersburg Road.

By rapid movements Meade had placed his corps between Lee's army and the cities of Washington and Baltimore, and his flank-position so menaced Lee's line of retreat as effectually to have stopped his advance toward the Susquehanna. Meade now "proposed to rest and supply his army, and find out more definitely the position and the intentions of his adversary before assuming the offensive. This day he had his engineers examine a position along Pipe Creek for a defensive field of battle; he notified his corps-commanders that circumstances might lead him to take up this position, and outlined their marches to it. He added, however, 'developments may cause the commanding-general to assume the offensive from his present position.'"[†] Meade, like Lee, hoped to fight on the defensive.*

Heth, whose division of Hill's corps was at Cashtown, learned that there was a supply of shoes at Gettysburg, and

*Alexander.

†Fiebeger.

sent Pettigrew's brigade forward on the 30th of June to take possession of them.* This apparently unimportant circumstance brought on the decisive battle of the Civil War.

On approaching the place Pettigrew discovered what he supposed to be a large Federal force moving on the town and he promptly returned to Cashtown. The force discovered by Pettigrew was Buford's cavalry division advancing from Fairfield. "Buford learning that Hill and Longstreet were in the direction of Chambersburg, and Ewell in the direction of Carlisle and York, saw the importance of Gettysburg as a strategic center, and made his dispositions to hold it if possible. He established his" outposts "to the west and north of the town, and sent patrols out in all directions to get information. He also informed Generals Meade and Reynolds of what he had learned."†

The town of Gettysburg lies in a small valley surrounded by low hills. Its strategic importance at this time was due to the fact that great roads diverged from it not only through the mountain passes to Lee's main line of retreat, but southward along the east side of the mountains toward the Potomac, northward and eastward toward Harrisburg and all points of the Susquehanna, and southeastward to Baltimore and Washington. In case of victory Lee had the choice of advancing against Harrisburg and Philadelphia, Baltimore, or Washington, according to circumstances; in case of defeat he had a line of retreat through mountain passes—the easiest kind of line to defend.

(192) Looking westward from Gettysburg the horizon ten miles away is bounded by the South Mountain range. Just west of the town, a half-mile from it, is a somewhat elevated ridge, called Seminary Ridge from the Lutheran Seminary standing upon it. This ridge begins at a commanding knoll nearly a mile and a half north of the Seminary, called Oak Hill on account of the thick grove of oaks that covered it. The ridge extends southward from Oak Hill, and was covered throughout its whole length with open woods. The ground slopes to the west from Seminary Ridge, and, rising again, forms another nearly parallel ridge about 500 yards from the first. This ridge is wider, smoother, and lower than Seminary

*This was related to the lecturer by General Harry Heth in the summer of 1892. It is also mentioned by General Alexander and other historians.

†Fiebeger.

Ridge. The western ridge, like Seminary Ridge, begins at Oak Hill, which has a clear view of both ridges and the shallow valley between them.

West of the second ridge Willoughby Run flows south to Marsh Creek. The Chambersburg Pike and the Hagerstown Road cross the run about a mile apart, and, passing on over the ridges, unite at the end of one of the streets at the western edge of Gettysburg. Parallel to the Chambersburg Pike and 200 yards north of it was an unfinished railway, crossing the ridges and valleys by cuts and fills. Willoughby Run was bordered by woods, a patch of which, known as McPherson's Woods, just south of Chambersburg Pike, reached back to the top of the western ridge. Six or eight hundred yards west of the creek there was another long stretch of wood.

Directly north of the town, and traversed by Rock Creek, the country is comparatively flat and open. About a half-mile directly south of the town is Cemetery Hill, rising eighty feet above the level of the valley below. By a lower ridge, which curves southward and then northward, this hill is connected with Culp's Hill, a rocky, wooded knoll half-a-mile farther east, whose base, on its eastern and northeastern sides, is washed by Rock Creek. Culp's Hill reaches southward nearly a half-mile, ending in low ground near Spangler's Spring. Cemetery Hill is at the junction of the Baltimore Pike with the Taneytown and Emmitsburg Roads. At the time of the battle Rock Creek could be forded at only a few places.* The country was dotted with farms connected by cross roads and cut up and separated by fences and stone walls. It was upon the ground to the west and north of the town that the fighting took place on the 1st of July, 1863—the first of the three days of the battle of Gettysburg.

(191) At 5 a.m. on the 1st of July, A. P. Hill with his leading two divisions [Heth and Pender], and his artillery, started from Cashtown to Gettysburg, eight miles distant. (193) Buford was expecting him. At eight o'clock the Union scouts reported the Confederate advance, and Buford formed his line of dismounted troopers behind Willoughby Run, across the Chambersburg Pike, with two sections of his artillery in the Pike and the third section on the left of the line.

Heth's Confederate division was in advance, and at about ten o'clock it came forward against Buford's line with two

*Alexander.

brigades deployed and two in the second line. Pender's division was close behind. Buford's line, though greatly outnumbered in cannon and small arms, stood its ground and kept the Confederates back, (191) while Reynolds was making all haste to reach the field with the First Corps [his own] and the Eleventh [Howard].

(194) About half after ten Reynolds arrived on the ground and relieved the cavalry with Wadsworth's division, which he deployed southward from the railway cut along the ridge. The cavalry then took post on the flanks of the line. Reynolds's right had hardly deployed at the railway cut when it was enveloped by the Confederate left and driven back to Seminary Ridge. (195) Thereupon Colonel Fowler faced three regiments to the right and charged the Confederate brigade which had got the cut, and drove it from the field with such punishment that it was of no "further effective service that day."*

(194) In the meantime Archer's Confederate brigade had entered McPherson's Woods, but the left of Reynolds's line had charged into the woods about the same time. It engaged the Confederates, enveloped their right flank, captured Archer and a large number of his men, and drove the rest back across Willoughby Run.

(196) Just as this part of the battle began General Reynolds was shot through the head and instantly killed at the edge of the wood, and Doubleday fell into command for the time. Doubleday reformed the Union line on the ridge, and Heth set about reorganizing his front line and preparing to renew the attack with his other two brigades. So there was a lull in the combat.

About eleven o'clock the other two divisions of the First Corps arrived with four more batteries of artillery. The guns and one of the divisions were placed in the line, which was prolonged to the right; the other division [Robinson] was placed in reserve at the Seminary.

At about noon Howard arrived ahead of his corps and assumed command of the Union forces by virtue of his rank. The Eleventh Corps began to arrive at about one o'clock, and its temporary commander, General Carl Schurz, was ordered to prolong the line of the First Corps along Seminary Ridge with two of his divisions, and to post his other division as a general reserve at Cemetery Hill. Before these dispositions

*Hunt.

could be made Buford's cavalry brought in word that Ewell's Confederate corps was advancing from the direction of Heidlersburg straight against the right of the Union position. Thereupon Howard directed the Eleventh Corps to change front to the right in order to meet Ewell, and called on Sickles with the Third Corps at Emmitsburg, ten miles distant, and Slocum with the Twelfth Corps at Two Taverns, five miles distant, for aid. These generals marched promptly to his assistance.

Ewell's leading two divisions were soon at hand. Ewell had been instructed by Lee not to bring on an engagement, if the enemy was in force at Gettysburg, until the rest of the Confederate army was up. Ewell deployed his line facing south, from the Hunterstown Road on his left to the Mummasburg Road on his right, about two miles and a half. He placed a battalion of artillery on Oak Hill, which opened fire on both wings of the Federal line, enfilading the left wing. The artillery fire forced the right of this wing back to Seminary Ridge. The reserve of the First Corps now reinforced this part of the Union line, one brigade facing west and the other north.* The action grew fierce at this angle, and soon extended to the right of the Union line, while the left wing was desperately struggling with Hill's corps. With overwhelming numbers Ewell assailed the right flank and rear of the Union right; then the whole left of the Confederate line advanced, and after a hard fight succeeded in driving the entire Eleventh Corps back. (197) Schurz received reinforcements from the general reserve, and tried to rally his troops and cover the town; but the Confederate force was overpowering in numbers, and it drove the Union right wing back to Cemetery Hill, capturing some 5,000 prisoners. It was now about three o'clock.†

The retreat of the Federal right wing uncovered the right flank of the left wing, and made its position untenable. This wing had been contending for several hours with greatly superior numbers, its left flank had been enveloped, and it had been forced back to Seminary Ridge. Seeing his corps heavily pressed and its right now uncovered Doubleday gave the order

*It was here that General Paul, who commanded one of the brigades of the First Corps, received a shot that put out both of his eyes.

†Alexander.

to fall back to Cemetery Hill. The withdrawal was made in comparatively good order.

(198) Steinwehr's division of the Eleventh Corps was in position on Cemetery Hill, which now became the rallying point for the Union troops. The division was posted behind stone walls on the slopes, and its skirmishers occupied the houses in front of the line. As the retreating troops arrived they were placed in position—the rest of the Eleventh Corps on the right of Steinwehr's, and the bulk of the First on his left. Wadsworth's division of the First was, however, posted on Culp's Hill.

Hancock, whose presence was always an inspiration to the troops that knew him, had arrived with orders from Meade, who had been apprised of Reynolds's death, to take command on the ground. With the assistance of Howard, and Warren, the chief engineer of the Army of the Potomac, he selected a strong position and assigned the troops to it as they arrived.

"Soon after two o'clock Lee had arrived on Seminary Ridge, and seen the defeat of the enemy and their retreat over Cemetery Hill." He immediately sent word to Ewell, who had stopped the pursuit, to press the fugitives and take Cemetery Hill "if possible." Again a fatal qualifying clause in the order was to defeat the purpose of the commanding general of an army. General Ewell did not consider it "possible." He had sent away two of his brigades to meet a column of Federals reported to be advancing on the Hanover Road; and one of his divisions [Johnson] had not yet come up. He decided to await the arrival of this division. It arrived before six o'clock; still Ewell made no attack, though the sun did not go down until 7.30, and there was a full moon. Instead of attacking he rode to General Lee and persuaded him to allow Johnson's division to seize Culp's Hill. About midnight the division moved around the base of Culp's Hill, "and a reconnoitering party ascended, but found the enemy [Wadsworth's division] in possession."*

Johnson's division was not withdrawn from the isolated position it had reached at the base of Culp's Hill until the end of the battle, which General Alexander considers one of the most serious mistakes made by the Confederates. "It was far too weak," he says, "to attack the strong position of the enemy

*Alexander.

on Culp's Hill, and its communication with the rest of the army was long, roundabout, and exposed to the enemy's view. But *the division was allowed to remain until the end of the battle, and, as long as it remained absent, the task before the remainder of the army was beyond its strength.*"*

Narrating the events of this day, General Long in his *Memoirs of Lee* says: "While Lee and his staff were ascending South Mountain," on their way from Chambersburg to Cashtown, "firing was heard from the direction of Gettysburg. This caused Lee some little uneasiness. The unfortunate absence of the cavalry prevented him from knowing the position and movements of the enemy, and it was impossible to estimate the true condition of affairs in his front. He was at first persuaded that the firing indicated a cavalry affair of minor importance; but by the time Cashtown was reached the sound had become heavy and continuous, and indicated a severe engagement. . . . In a short time . . . his suspense was relieved by a message from A. P. Hill, who reported that he was engaged with two corps of the enemy, and requested reinforcements. Anderson's division, which had just reached Cashtown, was at once pushed forward to his support, and General Lee with his staff quickly followed." Near the close of the day's battle Anderson's division reached the field.

Longstreet joined Lee on Seminary Ridge before the battle was over, but his corps was still far behind. It had been cut off at Greenwood, seventeen miles from Gettysburg, by Johnson's division [Ewell's Corps], which crossed the road ahead of it. This division with the trains and reserve artillery of its corps was about fourteen miles long, and delayed Longstreet's two divisions [Hood and McLaws] four hours. They did not reach their bivouac, four miles from the battle-field, until near midnight. Pickett's division was still back at Chambersburg.

After discussing the situation with Longstreet General Lee sent Colonel Long to reconnoiter the Federal position on Cemetery Hill. Long appears to have concluded with Ewell that the position was formidable,† especially as it was known that the Federals had already received reinforcements. A part of the Twelfth Corps [Slocum] had arrived, and the Third was coming up. On receiving Long's report, therefore, Lee considered the "worn-out condition of his men, and the strength of

*The italics are General Alexander's.

†Hunt.

the Federal position, and decided to wait until morning before attempting to follow up the victory gained by the corps of Hill and Ewell. He turned to Longstreet and Hill, and said, 'Gentlemen, we will attack the enemy in the morning as early as practicable.' '* -

*Long.

LECTURE XVIII.

THE CAMPAIGN OF GETTYSBURG.

SECOND AND THIRD DAYS.

SECOND DAY.

(192) The field of the second and third days of battle at Gettysburg lies south of the town between Willoughby Run and Rock Creek. The Union army occupied a defensive position of which Culp's Hill, Cemetery Hill, and the two Round Tops were the key-points. The possession of any one of these points by the Confederates would have rendered the position untenable.

The line, as finally occupied, was about four miles long, and had the general shape of a huge fish-hook, which, with its bent part at Cemetery Hill, had its barb at Culp's Hill, its point at the knoll about 600 yards farther south, its shank along Cemetery Ridge, and its eye at Round Top. Its convex form gave it the advantage of interior lines of operation. While this position presented a salient order of battle, ordinarily the weakest defensive order of battle, it has been selected by Hamley to illustrate the single exceptional case in which the salient position is a strong one. Here the apex of the line rested on Cemetery Hill, which formed a high and strong part of the position, and, Hamley says, "acted as a traverse or great mound protecting the wings from enfilade."* In this statement, however, Hamley is not wholly right. The northern face of the salient was shielded by the hill, but the western face, "extending south from the bend of Cemetery Hill toward Little Round Top, was subject to enfilade fire from the town and its flanks and suburbs."†

From Cemetery Hill the ridge of the same name, stretching almost due south, decreases in height, and its western face, cleared of timber, descends in slopes almost as smooth and gentle as the glacis of a fortress. At a point nearly a mile from the cemetery the crest of the ridge descends almost to the level of the valley west of it; from this point it rises abruptly, taking in the peak of Little Round Top and ending at Round

*Hamley's *Operations of War*.

†Alexander.

Top, whose summit "is not less than 210 feet above Gettysburg."* The summit of Little Round Top is 500 yards north of that of Round Top and 105 feet lower. These two knolls, separated by a narrow depression, look like great heaps of boulders covered with scrubby bushes and trees that spring out of every crack and hole. The knolls command all the country round about, and from a distance appear "inaccessible to man." At the base of their steep western slopes flows a small marshy stream, Plum Run, whose bed is more than 300 feet below the summit of Round Top. Beyond this stream, 500 yards due west of little Round Top, rises another hill not so high but just as wild and steep. It has taken the name of Devil's Den from one of its chasms, which had received that impious name from the country folk thereabout.

The face of the concave ridge leading from Cemetery Hill to Culp's Hill is rather steep and rocky, and Culp's Hill, like Round Top, is covered with boulders and tangled woods and underbrush down to the very edge of Rock Creek, a hundred and fifty feet below its summit. On the opposite side of the stream, a mile from Culp's Hill, is another wooded height known as Wolf Hill. The small knoll at the point of the fishhook is considerably lower than Culp's Hill; its sides are covered with woods.

From Cemetery Hill another low ridge, along which runs the Emmitsburg Road, reaches toward the southwest, becoming lower and flatter until, merging with Seminary Ridge, it joins the foot of the slope from Devil's Den at the Peach Orchard, just one mile west of the lowest part of Cemetery Ridge. The Peach Orchard is higher than this part of Cemetery Ridge.

The space between Willoughby Run and Rock Creek was in the main cleared and under cultivation at the time of the battle, but there were still many irregular patches of wood, generally upon rocky ground or along the swampy margins of the creeks. Highways and by-roads were plentiful, and fences, and stone walls, and farm houses.

OPERATIONS.

General Meade had beforehand no knowledge of the topography of the country about Gettysburg, and had not thought of

*Comte de Paris.

engaging in a battle there. Hancock, however, after examining the position just described, was greatly impressed with its defensive strength. He rode back to Meade's headquarters and recommended that the army occupy the position. Meade approved the recommendation and issued the necessary orders.

(199) Meade reached the field about one o'clock at night, and at seven o'clock a.m. on the 2nd day he had at hand the following troops: the First, Second, Eleventh, and Twelfth Corps, two-thirds of the Third, and two-thirds of the Fifth; by nine o'clock the rest of the Third had arrived, and by twelve o'clock the rest of the Fifth. At 10.30 a.m. the artillery reserve [Hunt] and its large ammunition trains arrived from Taneytown. At two o'clock the head of the Sixth Corps reached the ground. This corps had made a continuous march of thirty-four miles from Manchester and was well-nigh exhausted.*

"Meade spent the morning looking over the field,"† and assigning his troops to position. Early in the day the Confederates were seen deploying beyond Culp's Hill, and Meade ordered Slocum, who commanded the right wing, to attack them; but having received a report from Slocum that the ground was very unfavorable, he withdrew the order.‡

The First and the Eleventh Corps were left in the positions they had taken the afternoon before,—the Eleventh at Cemetery Hill, with two divisions of the First on its left, and Wadsworth's division at Culp's Hill. The other corps were assigned places as they came up—the Twelfth to the right of Wadsworth's division; the Second to the left of the Eleventh and First on Cemetery Ridge. The Third, most of which had arrived the evening before, was directed to prolong the line to the Round Tops on the left. Sickles, however, finding the part of the line assigned to him, just north of Little Round Top, lower than the ground a mile in front of it at the Peach Orchard, asked leave to move his corps forward to the higher position. General Hunt was sent to examine the forward position. While the examination was in progress Sickles sent out some skirmishers to reconnoiter the woods to the west of the Peach Orchard. The woods were found to be occupied by the enemy, and three of his columns were reported to be moving to the left. On receiving this information Sickles, without awaiting

*Fiebeger. Doubleday.

†Fiebeger.

‡Swinton.

the answer to his request for permission to move his line forward, did so on his own responsibility. He placed Humphreys's division along the Emmitsburg Road with its left at the Peach Orchard, and Birney's division on the ridge from Devil's Den to the Orchard. He placed no troops on the Round Tops.

The Fifth Corps was held in reserve near the point where Rock Creek crossed the Baltimore Pike. The artillery reserve and the ammunition trains were parked in a central position from which roads radiated to the various sections of the line. Buford's cavalry division had been posted near Round Top to guard the left flank, but it was ordered on the morning of the 2nd to Westminster to escort the trains, and was not replaced by Gregg's division "as General Meade had understood."* The left of the line was thus left uncovered. The cavalry divisions of Gregg and Kilpatrick "were well out on the right flank, from which, after a brush with Stuart on the evening of the 2nd, Kilpatrick was sent next morning [the 3rd] to replace Buford."†

"In the conversation that succeeded" his announcement to Longstreet and Hill on the evening of July 1, that he would attack the Federal position next morning, Lee "directed them to make the necessary preparations and be ready for prompt action."‡ The corps of Ewell and Hill were on the field and Longstreet's corps, except Pickett's division and one brigade, would bivouac only four miles away. Lee's purpose was to attack the enemy early in the morning, before the rest of the Union troops should reach the field.

Yet time was consumed in reconnoitering the Union position and deciding where to attack it, and it was 11 a.m. on the 2nd before Lee's order for the attack was issued. "Anderson's division of Hill's corps was directed to extend Hill's line upon Seminary Ridge to the right, while Longstreet with Hood's and McLaws's divisions should make a flank march to the right and pass beyond the enemy's flank, which seemed to extend along the Emmitsburg Road. Forming then at right angles to this road, the attack was to sweep down the enemy's line from their left, being taken up successively by the brigades of Anderson's division as they were reached. Ewell's corps,

*Fiebeger.

†Hunt.

‡Long.

holding the extreme left, was to attack on hearing Longstreet's guns."*

The map here shown gives the position of the troops on each side at about half after three in the afternoon. In the Confederate line Johnson's division of Ewell's corps was on the east side of Rock Creek; Early's division was between Rock Creek and the town; and Rodes's division was in the town with its right resting on Seminary Ridge. Then came Hill's corps along this ridge with Pender's division at the left and Anderson's at the right, while Heth's division was on the west side of Willoughby Run, acting as the general reserve of the whole army. Longstreet's corps (except Pickett's division which had not yet come up) formed the right of the Confederate line, with McLaws's division in front of Sickles's position at the Peach Orchard, and Hood's division on the extreme right. The few squadrons of cavalry that were with the army covered its extreme left.

Longstreet's two divisions [Hood and McLaws] had quitted their bivouacs at daybreak, but had halted on the way and lost time in finding a route by which to avoid being seen by the Federal signal party on Little Round Top. "This incident delayed the opening of the battle nearly two hours; and there had been a further delay of a half-hour or more to wait for Law's brigade, which was still behind, to join its division [Hood]. So "it was about 3 p.m. when Hood's division, in the advance, crossed the Emmitsburg Road about 1,000 yards south of the Peach Orchard."*

In his flank march Longstreet had taken every pains to conceal his columns; but his movement had not wholly escaped the notice of the Federals; it was his columns that had been seen by the scouts sent forward by Sickles from the Peach Orchard. Still "his strength and position were very imperfectly known" by the Federals "at the beginning of the battle."†

The artillery, says Longstreet, opened fire at three o'clock against the two sides of the angle at the Peach Orchard. But "Hood's lines were not yet ready." At length Hood was "ordered to bear down upon the enemy's left, but he was not prompt,"‡ and it was after four o'clock when he advanced to the attack.

About this time Warren, the chief engineer of the Army of

*Alexander.

†Fiebeger.

‡Longstreet.

the Potomac, was inspecting the left of the Union line, and discovered that Little Round Top, the key of the position, was occupied only by a small squad of signallers. He sent word at once to Meade and asked for a division to hold the point. Seeing the Fifth Corps moving to the front to reinforce Sickles, Warren hurried to its commander and got him to detach two brigades and a battery to Little Round Top. The two brigades arrived none too soon, for the right of Hood's line had crossed Plum Run and ascended the slopes of Round Top; then it had wheeled to the left and, crossing the depression between the two knolls, was now near the top of Little Round Top. Here a sharp fight took place; but the Federals kept possession of the summit and drove the Confederates back to the foot of the hill.

Meantime Meade had hurried reinforcements to aid Sickles; but Hood's division was fighting alone, for, in the "successive order of battle" adopted by the Confederates, McLaws's division was standing idle, impatiently waiting for Longstreet's order to attack. Hood had been wounded and Law was in command of his division. After nearly an hour of fierce combat Law got possession of Devil's Den; but he could not gain another inch, and took up the defensive on the captured hill, appealing to the troops on his left for help. Two of McLaws's brigades [Kershaw and Semmes] then advanced, but the two on their left [Barksdale and Wofford] were still held back by Longstreet, and the whole of Anderson's division farther to the left also stood fast.

Finally Longstreet started the brigades of Barksdale and Wofford forward. General Alexander says: "Barksdale's brigade advanced directly upon the Peach Orchard. Wofford's inclined somewhat to the right and went to the assistance of Kershaw and Semmes, striking the flank of the Federals opposing them. The enemy was driven back with severe loss and followed across the Wheat Field and on the slopes of Little Round Top. Barksdale had made an equal advance upon our left. But by this time the reinforcements which Meade was hurrying from every part of the Federal line began to swarm around our mixed-up brigades. Barksdale was killed, Semmes mortally wounded, and our lines were slowly forced back. Another partial attack had spent its energy upon a task impossible for so small a force."

After another long delay three brigades of Anderson's division moved forward and charged, in succession from right to

left, each driving the enemy before it toward Cemetery Ridge, and each in turn being repulsed and driven back. One brigade [Wright] actually made a lodgment upon the crest, but, failing to receive prompt support, was obliged to withdraw. Of Anderson's other two brigades, Posey's scarcely advanced a skirmish line, and Mahone's was held in reserve; as was, also, Heth's whole division. Thus the day's battle came to an end in the right wing of the Confederate line.*

(200) Sickles's faulty salient at the Peach Orchard had been crushed in and pushed back, but the Confederates had not reached the main front of the Union position, nor enveloped its flank. In all this conflict, from four o'clock till after seven, only eleven brigades had taken part—eight of Longstreet's corps and three of Hill's. Hill and Ewell had been ordered to coöperate with Longstreet's battle, but they limited their coöperation to an ineffective cannonading of the Federal intrenchments in their front; while Meade was stripping those intrenchments of infantry and concentrating it upon the eleven Confederate brigades engaged. Twenty brigades of reinforcements were sent to that part of the Federal line; eight of the Fifth Corps; four of the Second; five of the First; and three of the Twelfth. Two other brigades of the Twelfth started for the scene of struggle, but lost their way. All of the reinforcements did not become engaged.†

Though Ewell had received orders to attack on hearing Longstreet's guns, he limited his attack to artillery fire until 6 p.m.; then he sent his division commanders orders to attack in their fronts. Johnson's division was to assault the Union right at Culp's Hill, which, besides its great natural strength, was strongly fortified with field-works. Only three of Johnson's four brigades crossed Rock Creek, and it was dark when they entered the woods at the foot of the hill. The left one of the brigades [Steuart] took possession of some trenches that had been vacated by a part of the Twelfth Corps; the other two brigades were stopped in the woods on the side of the hill by fire from the breastworks above; and their "attack resolved itself into a random and ineffective musketry fire."‡

Early's division, supported by Rodes's, was to attack Cemetery Hill. One of his brigades [Smith] was in rear watching the York Pike, and another [Gordon] was held in reserve and not engaged. The other two brigades of the division charged

*Doubleday. Alexander.

†Alexander.

the hill and carried it; but as they were not supported by Rodes's division, and Ames's brigade [Eleventh Corps] on the hill was promptly reinforced by a brigade of the Second Corps, they were driven back;* and the second day's battle was over.

Rodes's division had not fired a shot; Ewell had allowed it to remain all day at the northwestern edge of the town, near where the battle of the day before had ended. There it was when Rodes received the order to assault. Before he could march his column through the town, and across the intervening space of 1,200 to 1,400 yards, and deploy it for attack, Early had made his assault and been repulsed. Rodes, therefore, withheld his attack and bivouacked his troops to the southwest of the town "along the hollow of an old road-bed."*

Such was the second day's battle—on the part of the Confederates a succession of tardy, isolated, unsupported attacks, in which one division, Pickett's, had not reached the field, and three others, Heth's, Pender's, and Rodes's, and four brigades, had scarcely fired a shot; on the part of the Federals a well-managed, if perfectly passive defense, in which every imperiled section of the line had been promptly reinforced, and every assault of the enemy repulsed.

THIRD DAY.

General Lee resolved to renew the assault upon the Union position on the 3rd of July. Stuart had rejoined with his column of cavalry, which was very much the worse for wear; Pickett's division of Longstreet's corps, also, had come up; so that at dawn of the 3rd Lee's whole army was present except a small force (two brigades) of cavalry left to guard the river and the mountain passes on the line of retreat.

About midnight the Union troops that had been withdrawn from the trenches on the extreme right of the line—Geary's division of the Twelfth Corps—returned to their trenches, and were surprised to find them occupied by the enemy—the left of Johnson's Confederate division. Before dawn Ewell had reinforced this advanced portion of Johnson's division with two of Rodes's brigades and one of Early's. Some other changes had been made on both sides in the course of the night, but, on the whole, the two forces occupied at dawn about the same positions they had held at the close of the battle on the night of the 2nd. Longstreet held the rocks and

*Alexander.

woods of Devil's Den, the bases of the Round Tops, and the Wheat Field; at the center three of Anderson's brigades had partly pierced the Union line; and on the Confederate left a part of Johnson's division was inside the Union trenches in a position from which it could take the Federal line in reverse; and Lee had possession of the Emmitsburg Road upon whose ridge there were good positions for his artillery.*

Lee knew that greater successes had not been achieved on the 2nd for lack of proper concert of action on the part of his corps extended over so wide a concave front. In renewing the battle he hoped to have the assaults made by the different parts of his line in a manner to support one another.† He purposed having Longstreet again attack the Union left; while Ewell should hold fast to the advanced position he had gained and assail the enemy's right and rear; and Hill should occupy the enemy at the center.

(201) Before the Confederates were ready to open their attack, however, "in the early gray of the morning" Federal batteries which, during the night, had been placed on all the prominent points in the vicinity of Johnson's position, opened fire. As Johnson, on account of the creek and the steep slope with its rocks and woods, had not been able to take any artillery with him, he could not reply to the fire. He could not, however, lie idle under it; he resolved, therefore, to charge for a better position on higher ground; but he was met in front by Geary's division, and taken in flank by Ruger's brigade. Other Union troops hastened to oppose him, also, and he was repulsed. "At about 11 a.m., finding the contest hopeless, and his retreat threatened by a force sent up Rock Creek, Johnson . . . gave up the position and withdrew to Rock Creek, where he remained until night."‡

This unlooked-for turn of events "induced General Lee, after making a reconnaissance of the enemy's position, to change his plan of assault."§ He was aware that Cemetery Ridge was strongly held from one end to the other, but he judged the weakest part of the line to be at the curve where it approached nearest to the Emmitsburg Road, a half to three-quarters of a mile south of the point where that road and the Taneytown Road intersected. Owing to its convexity this part of the Union

*Hunt.

†Lee's Report.

‡Doubleday.

§Long.

position could not be supported by cross fire from its right or left, except by the cannon on Little Round Top. These Lee thought could be silenced by his own guns.* If the Confederate assaulting column could pierce the Union line at this point it would then take the entire right of the position in reverse; and if the Union troops on the left should fire into the backs of the victorious Confederates they would hurt their own friends on the right as much as their foes. So Lee decided to make the main assault at this point, and directed Longstreet to carry it out.

Most of the forenoon was spent by the Confederates in moving their troops into position for the attack. Ten brigades were assigned to the assaulting column: Pickett's division of three brigades; Heth's of four, under Pettigrew; two of Pender's, and Wilcox's brigade. None of the brigades except Wilcox's had taken part in the battle of the day before. The rest of Hill's corps was to support the assault on the left, and the divisions of Hood and McLaws, in front of the Round Tops, were to support it on the right. Rodes held two of his brigades in the old sunken road that he had found the night before leading out from the southwestern angle of the town; his other two were with Johnson. The two brigades of Pender's division not assigned to the charge took their place on the right of Rodes's line; Early had his brigades, except the one with Johnson, in and near the town; and Johnson was still on Rock Creek at the foot of Culp's Hill.

The arrangement of the brigades in the assaulting column, as it moved out to charge, may be represented thus:

Brockenbrough, Davis, McGowan, Archer, Garnett, Kemper,
Lane, Scales, Armistead,
Wilcox.

The front line was more than a mile long; its right was near the Peach Orchard and its left near the southern end of the hollow road occupied by Rodes. The second line was 200 yards behind the first, and Wilcox's brigade, not having started till twenty minutes after the others, "was much too late to be of any assistance whatever. Both flanks of the assaulting column were in the air and the left without any support in rear."† A hundred and fifty-nine guns had been placed in position, nearly

*Long.

†Alexander.

all of them in an irregular line along Seminary Ridge from the Peach Orchard to the Hagerstown Road. Strangely enough, the Confederate artillerists had not discovered that the Union line could be reached by artillery fire from the town and its flank, and had put no guns at those places "to enfilade the 'shank of the fish-hook,' and cross fire with the guns from the west."*

In the Union line on the front to be assaulted: first came the Eleventh Corps on Cemetery Hill; then one division of the First; then the Second; then another division of the First; then the Third; and the Fifth prolonged the line to the Round Tops. Batteries were stationed along the front wherever positions could be found for the guns; but only seventy-seven pieces were in position to reply to the Confederate cannon.† Kilpatrick covered the left of the line with Farnsworth's cavalry brigade; and later in the day Merritt's brigade of Buford's division came up by the Emmitsburg Road from the direction of Frederick City, and fell upon the rear of Longstreet's right.‡

At one o'clock Colonel Alexander, Longstreet's chief of artillery, opened the cannonade, directing his fire upon a clump of trees on Cemetery Ridge which marked the point of assault. The Union batteries in position replied with all their guns, and the result was the greatest artillery duel that has ever taken place on the American Continent. Most of the Confederate projectiles flew high and only swept the ground behind the front assailed. The main damage they did was to blow up nearly a dozen caissons of the Federal reserve artillery parked in rear. After nearly an hour of firing General Hunt, the Federal chief of artillery, saw that his ammunition was running low, and ordered his batteries to cease firing. Hunt's purpose was to reserve his ammunition for the enemy's assaulting columns, which it was now plain would follow soon.

Before the Union guns ceased firing, however, Colonel Alexander, who knew that the ammunition of the Confederate batteries could not last more than an hour, and who was charged with the duty of giving the signal for the advance, had sent the following note to Pickett: "General: If you are to advance at all, you must come at once or we will not be able to support you as we ought. But the enemy's fire has not slackened materially, and there are still 18 guns firing from the cemetery." (He

*Alexander.

†Hunt.

‡J. T. Long's pamphlet on the battle of Gettysburg.

had been told that the clump of trees marked the position of the cemetery.) Soon afterwards Alexander noticed a falling-off in the enemy's fire and saw some of the guns withdraw. At 1.40 he sent another note to Pickett, saying: "For God's sake, come quick. The 18 guns have gone. Come quick or my ammunition will not let me support you properly."*

In a few minutes Pickett's 15,000 infantry emerged from the woods behind, and passed through the line of Alexander's batteries. In front lay an almost level stretch of farm-land about a half-mile wide which must be crossed before the enemy's line could be reached. It contained scarcely a bit of cover for the assailants, but rail fences to obstruct their advance. Across this space the first and second lines started; and immediately Hunt's batteries reopened their fire and turned it all upon the charging lines. Alexander's guns, some of which moved forward to closer range, supported the charge, until the lines were seen to "close in upon the enemy in smoke and dust." The artillery ceased firing, then, to await the result.

The lines kept up the charge to within close musketry range of the Union position; but there Pettigrew's brigades, on the left, wavered and then fell back. Pickett's brigades were thus left without support; but they pushed on. Stannard's brigade of the First Corps wheeled to the right and charged Pickett's troops in flank and rear, adding to the slaughter and confusion. Still the Confederates were not stopped. The leading troops got over the stone wall behind which were posted troops of the Second Corps, and captured some Federal guns beyond it. But soon they were surrounded on all sides and overwhelmed; many were captured and the rest were driven back; and the losses were far greater in the retreat than in the advance.

Wilcox's brigade was not in this charge; the charge had been made and repulsed before this brigade moved forward. Then it advanced almost alone under a heavy fire, and when Federal infantry came out and attacked its left, it moved by the right flank, and, making a circuit, regained the Confederate line at the Peach Orchard.*

CAVALRY.

While this great battle was raging between the infantry and artillery of the hostile armies the cavalry was not standing

*Alexander.

idle. Stuart with four brigades and four horse-batteries had marched round to the right and rear of the Union line. (202) Between the York and the Hanover Roads, about two miles and a half east of Gettysburg, he took position on a wooded ridge from which he had a view of the roads in rear of the Federal army. He threw out a line of dismounted skirmishers to the south of him.

On another low ridge a half-mile to the east was McIntosh's brigade of D. McM. Gregg's Federal cavalry division. McIntosh sent forward a dismounted skirmish line, which engaged Stuart's near the Rummel House. Gregg, who was not far away with Custer's brigade of Kilpatrick's division, sent Custer and two batteries of artillery to aid McIntosh. The combat which ensued "swayed from side to side" about the Rummel farm, until the Federal cavalry was finally forced back. (203) Then the three Confederate brigades of Wade Hampton, Fitzhugh Lee, and Chambliss charged in close column of squadrons, saber in hand. Custer charged in like manner and met the Confederates in front, while several other detachments struck them in flank; and the Confederates were thrown into confusion and driven back. Afterwards the hostile batteries engaged in an indecisive duel, "and at nightfall each side held substantially its original ground."*

(204) At the other end of the line, about an hour after this fight, Kilpatrick required Farnsworth to make a hopeless and useless sacrifice of his own life and a large part of his cavalry brigade. Two regiments were made to charge the rear of Longstreet's right on the slope of Round Top. They rode in columns as best they could, over rocks and creeks, rail fences and stone walls, and were shot down helplessly by the Confederate infantry. They accomplished nothing, save to end the battle of Gettysburg as it had begun, with a combat between Confederate infantry and Union cavalry.

LEE'S RETREAT.

Lee now gave up the effort to dislodge Meade's army; there was nothing left for him to do but to retreat across the Potomac as quickly as practicable. His ammunition was nearly exhausted, provisions could not be gotten where he was, and his line of retreat was in danger of being cut off by the enemy.

*Hunt.

(192) In anticipation of a counter-attack Lee withdrew Ewell's corps to Seminary Ridge, and had a strong line of intrenchments made from Oak Hill to the Peach Orchard, covering his lines of retreat, the Chambersburg Pike and the Hagerstown Road. (205) On the 4th of July he started off his train of ambulances and empty wagons laden with the wounded by the Chambersburg Pike under escort of Imboden's cavalry brigade. At dark the other trains set out by the Fairfield [Hagerstown] Road, guarded by Hill's corps; Longstreet followed Hill, and Ewell's corps marched as the rear-guard.

The same day Meade ordered French, whose corps had been withdrawn from Maryland Heights to Frederick City, to seize the lower passes of the mountains and reoccupy Harper's Ferry; and he started Kilpatrick with all the cavalry except two brigades [McIntosh and D. I. Gregg] "to harass the enemy's anticipated retreat and destroy his trains and bridges at Williamsport."*

There was a fierce rain storm, and mud and the darkness of night so hindered Lee's movement that day had broken on the 5th before the rear-guard had started. (206) As soon, on the 5th, as Meade was sure that Lee had begun a retreat, he started D. I. Gregg's cavalry brigade in pursuit by the Chambersburg Pike, and the Sixth Corps [Sedgwick] by the Fairfield Road. The rest of the Union army set out the next day (the 6th) by the Emmitsburg Road.

Sedgwick found the Confederate rear-guard intrenched in the Fairfield pass. Thereupon Meade sent two corps to his support and halted the rest of the army. (207) Then Meade concluded that it would cost too much to carry the mountain pass, and withdrew Sedgwick, sending only McIntosh's cavalry brigade and a brigade of infantry to follow the Confederates, while the rest of the army moved toward the lower passes.

(208) On the 8th the Confederate army was at Hagerstown and Funkstown, and the Union army was between Frederick and Boonsboro. Kilpatrick's cavalry had been in action with the Confederates on the evening of the 4th near Fairfield, and cavalry combats had taken place every day for several days. Much damage had been done the Confederate trains and many prisoners had been captured by the Federal cavalry. (206)

*Hunt.

"On the 6th Buford's division had attacked" the trains "at Williamsport, and Kilpatrick toward Hagerstown; but as Imboden's train-guard was strong and Stuart's cavalry was up, and Longstreet close by, they had to withdraw."* (209) On the 9th Meade's headquarters were at Turner's Gap and his leading troops were at Rohrersville and Boonsboro.

Lee had arrived at Williamsport on the 7th and found that Union cavalry sent up by French had destroyed the pontoon-bridge at Falling Waters, and heavy rains had raised the river and made it impassable. (210) Lee therefore took up a strong position covering Williamsport and Falling Waters, on the ridge between Marsh and Conococheague Creeks, with his right resting on a bend of the Potomac and his left on Conococheague Creek. Here he waited for the river to fall, and spent the time building a pontoon-bridge of such materials as were at hand, daily expecting to be attacked by Meade.

On the 10th Meade moved his headquarters to Antietam Creek; the left of his line crossed the creek and the right moved up near Funkstown and Leitersburg. (211) By the 13th Meade had his forces in front of the position taken up by Lee.† He spent the day in reconnoitering the Confederate position and issued orders for a "demonstration in force" to take place on the morning of the 14th. (212) "On advancing that morning it was found that the enemy had abandoned his line" during the night "and crossed the river, partly by fording, partly by a new bridge."* Lee's second and last invasion of the North had ended in failure.

In this campaign the Army of the Potomac had lost: 3,155 killed, 14,529 wounded, 5,365 missing, or 23,049 all told; and the Army of Northern Virginia, as nearly as can be determined, had lost 2,592 killed, 12,709 wounded and 5,150 missing, or 20,451 all told. The Confederate loss was probably greater; Livermore, in his *Numbers and Losses in the Civil War*, makes the following estimate: killed, 3,903; wounded, 18,735; missing, 5,425; total, 28,063.

COMMENTS.

(186) Of all the objects, political and military, for which Lee's invasion of Maryland and Pennsylvania was undertaken, only one was achieved; to wit, the war was transferred for a

*Hunt.

†Swinton.

few days from Southern to Northern soil, and the Confederate army subsisted for the time on stores collected in the North. As the invasion was not crowned with victory it did not increase Southern prestige and credit in Europe nor strengthen the anti-war sentiment at the North; it had a quite contrary effect. Nor did it save Pemberton's army at Vicksburg, which surrendered to General Grant on the 4th of July.

Lee judged Halleck and President Lincoln aright in believing that they would not let the Army of the Potomac take advantage of his movement northward to advance on Richmond, but would require it to march northward, too, and keep between him and Washington. There was apparently some danger that a Union force at Fort Monroe, the Seventh Corps, might move against Richmond; but Lee was right, also, in believing that Halleck would not let this force, either, go farther away from Washington while the Confederate army was north of the Potomac. If the Confederate government could have complied with Lee's recommendation to put an army "even in effigy" under Beauregard at Culpeper Court House to threaten Washington, it is likely that some of the Union corps that took part in the Battle of Gettysburg would have been held nearer Washington.

In stretching his army from Fredericksburg to Williamsport, ninety miles as the crow flies, Lee gave Hooker an opportunity to fall upon its widely separated parts and destroy them in detail. Lee must have felt sure that Halleck's fear for the safety of Washington would restrain Hooker from attacking the divided Confederate forces. "On no other reasonable hypothesis can we account for his stretching his army from Fredericksburg to Williamsport, with his enemy concentrated on one flank, and on the shortest road to Richmond."*

(189) After Lee had crossed the Potomac and started up the Cumberland Valley, Hooker, while still holding the bulk of his forces directly between the Confederate army and Washington, ordered the garrison from Harper's Ferry to intercept Lee's line of communications and join with the troops of Reynolds and Slocum in operating against his rear. This plan, if carried out, would have divided the Union army by South Mountain, and given Lee the chance to fall upon the part west of the mountains. It was not carried out, however, owing to Halleck's interference. Whereupon Hooker asked to be relieved of the command.

*Hunt.

(190) Meade, who succeeded Hooker, made his plans and issued orders for taking up a position on the line Emmitsburg-Hanover covering Washington and Baltimore. This position, moreover, was on the flank of Lee's line of retreat, and thus effectually stopped his further advance northward. It was safe *defensive* strategy; but it was not calculated to destroy the invading army, nor was it the quickest way to expel that army. Lee, meantime, was making for Harrisburg, ignorant, in the absence of his cavalry, of the proximity of the Army of the Potomac. He supposed it was still south of the Potomac. On learning, on the night of the 28th of June, that the Union army was at Frederick, he ordered an immediate concentration of his corps at Cashtown, east of the mountains. This disposition was meant to threaten Baltimore and thereby to induce Meade to move his army northeast to cover that city; possibly to induce him unduly to extend its front in order to cover Baltimore and Washington at the same time. Had Lee assembled his army on the western side of the mountains, in the Cumberland Valley, its position would noway have threatened Baltimore or Washington, and would have left Meade free to cross the mountains by the southern passes and cut off its retreat. This concentration was ordered, also, with a view to taking up a "position in readiness" and waiting for Meade to attack, in accordance with the plan to which Lee had agreed in the beginning of the advance; namely, a combination of offensive strategy with defensive tactics.

(192) The choice of Gettysburg as a battle-field was made wholly by chance. The first day's battle was a rencontre. Neither army was at that time seeking the other to attack it. Neither Lee nor Meade had thought of Cemetery Ridge as a defensive position, or knew anything about the ground in the neighborhood. A part of Heth's Confederate division went down to Gettysburg to seize some shoes. This circumstance brought on the battle and caused the choice of the battle-field; maybe decided the fate of the Union. It was lucky that Buford was there with his cavalry to dispute with Heth the possession of the ground; it was lucky that Reynolds was so near at hand to support Buford.

The possession of Cemetery Hill was decisive of victory. Lee made a great mistake, therefore, in not following up the victory of Hill and Ewell promptly on the 1st of July, and in not making a vigorous effort to carry the hill as soon as the Union troops were driven back to it. True, the Confederate

troops were then well-nigh spent with marching and fighting, and their lines were in confusion. Yet this was apparently the only time during the battle when it would have been possible for them to carry the position. At that moment there were seventeen brigades of Confederate infantry on the ground and only thirteen brigades of Federal infantry and Buford's cavalry. General Lee, who had arrived on the field, saw the importance of taking Cemetery Hill at once and sent Ewell an order to take it; but the order was not *positive*—it contained a condition—an *if*. Ewell took advantage of the conditional clause, and did not assault. Thus Lee's only chance of victory was thrown away. If the First and Eleventh Corps had lost Cemetery Hill on the 1st of July, Meade's army would have withdrawn to the line already selected behind Pipe Creek.

Cemetery Hill was, from the beginning to the end of the engagement, the weakest part of the Federal position. In the first place it was a salient, which is always weak; furthermore, both the sunken road leading from the southwest angle of the town,—the road occupied by Rodes's division during the night of the 2nd and the day of the 3rd of July,—and the position from which Early charged on the evening of the 2nd, afforded cover within 500 yards of Cemetery Hill from which a convergent assault could have been made; and there were positions in and near the town from which direct and enfilade artillery fire could have reached the hill. If instead of the ill-managed attacks of the 2nd and 3rd Lee had concentrated his army and assaulted Cemetery Hill, he would have had a better chance of success.*

It is hard to conceive of a worse-conducted attack than that of July the 2nd. It ought to have begun at daybreak; and Lee's troops were all near enough to the field to have reached their positions at that hour if they had received orders to do so and had exerted themselves. But the order did not issue until 11 a.m., and it was after 3 p.m. when the assault began. The plan of battle had in view successive attacks beginning at the right and progressing toward the left. The Confederates had already used the same "method on four occasions,—at Seven Pines, Gaines's Mill, Frazier's Farm or Glendale, and Malvern Hill,—and always with poor success." The result at Gettysburg was that Hood's division fought single-handed for more than an hour, and was brought to a stand-still; then two of

*Alexander.

McLaws's brigades took up the battle; after they had been engaged for a half-hour or more the other two brigades of McLaws's division charged; and all were driven back. Then three brigades of Anderson's division advanced, one at a time from right to left, and were driven back in the same order. Farther to the left the divisions of Heth and Pender stood virtually idle; while around on the other side of the curve Ewell's corps did not fire a musket until near dark, and then only five brigades assaulted. Two of these carried the Union position at Cemetery Hill, but, for lack of support, were straightway driven back.*

In allowing Johnson's division to go to the east side of Rock Creek, reinforcing it with three brigades to assault the unsailable right of the Union position at Culp's Hill, and leaving it, as well as the three brigades sent to reinforce it, until the end of the engagement, Lee practically surrendered the use of seven of his brigades; he made his line more than a mile longer than it would otherwise have been, and put these brigades in a position where they could do nothing, and from which they could not be moved to assist at any other part of the attack.

There has been considerable controversy as to who was to blame for the tardiness of Longstreet's attack. The dispute is of no moment to us in our study of this battle, except as an illustration of certain points. First, it illustrates the difficulty of combining and harmonizing the action of the various parts of a large army in battle, when they are scattered over a wide space,—a difficulty greatly lessened nowadays by means of the field telegraph and telephone. Secondly, it illustrates the disadvantage of the concave order of battle for the attack—Lee's line was more than six miles long, while Meade's was not four; and Lee could not dispatch troops, or even messages and orders, from one part of his line to another without sending them on the outside of the curve, while Meade could move his troops by the chords on the inside. Thirdly, it illustrates the importance of a cheerful yielding to the will of the commander, who is the person responsible. Longstreet did not approve Lee's plan, and a careful study of the battle from all available sides leads to the suspicion that this had much to do with Lee's failure. Possibly the hand of the Almighty was directing the affair for the salvation of the Union. And fourthly,

*Alexander.

it illustrates the vital importance of dispatch—of promptness in the movement of troops. One can almost show that every defeat of the Civil War happened because somebody was slow; somebody stopped to rest, or lost his way, or marched too slowly, or waited for somebody else to get out of the road, or waited for somebody to join, or waited to get his orders. In this instance Longstreet's corps was blocked in its march for four hours, and kept from bivouac until midnight, on July 1, by a division of Ewell's corps and its trains; and on July 2 Longstreet says: "Fearing that my force was too weak to venture to make an attack, I delayed until General Law's brigade joined the division." Longstreet's column also lost two hours in looking for a route by which to escape the observation of a Union signal party on Little Round Top.

After the first day of Gettysburg Lee's chances of victory steadily diminished to the end. On the morning of the 2nd July he had on the ground thirty-three brigades—all of his infantry except four brigades. At seven o'clock Meade had thirty-nine brigades, at nine o'clock forty-one, and at twelve o'clock forty-three. On the morning of the 3rd, after Pickett had come up with his division, Lee had only thirty-seven brigades; Meade had fifty-one brigades, Sedgwick having brought up the Sixth Corps; the weak and strong points of the position had been developed in the fighting of the day before; the troops were more carefully disposed; and the position was more thoroughly prepared for defense.*

General Longstreet was opposed to assaulting the strong position of the Union army on either the 2nd or the 3rd of July; he wanted to turn the left of the army and threaten its line of retreat. This would probably have forced Meade to fall back. By changing his own trains from the Chambersburg to the Fairfield-Hagerstown road Lee could have made such a maneuver without seriously exposing his own communications. Meade was prepared for such a contingency, and had an order already drafted, to issue in case he should have need to fall back.

As a purely defensive battle there is little to criticize in the Union position or General Meade's dispositions. The most serious mistake in the dispositions was Sickles's putting his corps in the advanced position at the Peach Orchard in place of at the position assigned to him. It was the fear of low ground that induced Sickles to move his line forward. When he

*Fiebeger.

reached his designated place he saw the crest of a ridge three-quarters of a mile beyond, which he fancied would give the enemy command of his position. He moved his corps forward to the ridge and thus placed it beyond the support of the rest of the line; and in bending back his left flank to rest it upon Devil's Den, he formed a salient at the Peach Orchard of which both flanks were exposed to enfilade. The tactical advantage of high ground is not so great as it is generally supposed to be; about its only real advantage is the wider sweep of view and fire it affords. It used to be considered necessary for artillery, but even that is not so to-day. Probably the strongest position that a line of infantry can occupy is a trench with head-cover in a perfectly flat prairie or desert. The engagements in the South African War showed that the defensive advantages of high ground, and the corresponding disadvantages of low ground, are largely imaginary. Another mistake in General Meade's original dispositions was his failure to occupy the Round Tops; but General Warren discovered this error in time to amend it before serious consequences followed.

General Meade defeated and repulsed the Confederates, but he did not reap the full harvest of his victory tactically or strategically. Tactically he had two opportunities to make decisive counter-strokes, but neglected to take advantage of them. The first was after repulsing Longstreet's forces late in the afternoon of the 2nd of July. He had brought twenty brigades to reinforce Sickles, a good many of which he had not employed; if he had "now ordered an advance he would have found Longstreet's left flank in the air, and the whole line of McLaws's and Hood's divisions much exhausted and but poorly supplied with ammunition."* Meade's other opportunity for a counter-attack came after the repulse of Pickett's charge on the 3rd. True, Pickett's withdrawal was covered by the long line of guns on Seminary Ridge and by infantry; but these ought not to have been able to stop the counter-stroke if a fresh corps, the Sixth for example, had been sent forward on the heels of the fugitives. Such a counter-charge ought to have split Lee's line in two, and, possibly, might have destroyed or captured one wing of it. But Meade had not provided a general reserve against such an opportunity. Instead of holding the Sixth Corps together as a general reserve, he had distributed it along the line "wherever he thought it needed

*Alexander.

strengthening.”* Nor did General Meade molest Lee’s army the next day, although it spent the whole day in a defensive position upon Seminary Ridge.

(206) Lee began his retreat on the night of the 4th July. Meade’s cavalry started on the 4th and maintained touch, but his main army did not start until the 6th. By the 7th Lee had reached the Potomac, only to find the bridge gone and the river too high to ford. As soon as his troops arrived he took up a position covering the site of the bridge and ford, and intrenched. The Federal army did not arrive until the 12th. Meade had taken a route much longer than the route of the Confederates. A single corps had followed the retreating column directly; the Confederate rear-guard not only stopped this corps in the Fairfield pass, but caused the entire Union army to halt for a day.

If Meade’s whole army had promptly followed Lee’s by the Fairfield-Hagerstown road it could not have been long held by the Confederate rear-guard at the Fairfield pass or elsewhere, and it ought to have destroyed or captured the Confederate army. For the second time Lee was allowed to retreat across the Potomac under such difficulties that he would have found it impossible to escape, had he been vigorously pursued and attacked by his adversary. As Vicksburg had already fallen, it looks as if here was an opportunity to end the war in a single day. The hour had arrived, but not the man. If General Grant had been in command of the Army of the Potomac at this time, with Sheridan commanding his advance-guard, Lee would not have got across the Potomac; but General Meade and his corps-commanders, whom he called in council on the night of the 12th to consider the question of assaulting Lee’s position, appear to have been content with driving the Confederate army out of Pennsylvania and Maryland.

In this campaign, from beginning to end, the Union cavalry generally performed excellent service. It constantly covered its own army and kept in touch with the Confederates until the two armies joined in battle in front of Cemetery Ridge. It kept the enemy back at the crossing of Willoughby Run on the 1st of July until Reynolds arrived with infantry. This was the most valuable day’s work done by cavalry in the Civil War. In leaving the left of the line uncovered on the 2nd, however, the

*Fiebeger.

Union cavalry allowed Longstreet to march his column by the flank and deploy it before the Federal dispositions had been made to repel it. Luckily the infantry scouts sent forward by Sickles discovered the Confederate column in time to prevent a surprise. On the 3rd of July a part of the Union cavalry defeated Stuart on the east side of the battle-field, and prevented him from disturbing the Union rear; while on the left another part of it so menaced Longstreet's flank and rear as to prevent him "from assailing Round Top with vigor, or detaching a force to aid Pickett."* Yet it did not do all that it might have done on the left that day. To the north and west in the valleys of Marsh Creek and Willoughby Run were all the Confederate trains virtually without any guard. The Federal cavalry might have captured or destroyed them as Wheeler did the Federal trains at the battle of Stones River.†

After the battle of Gettysburg the Union cavalry led the pursuit and kept constantly in touch with the enemy; it captured wagon-trains and harassed the Confederates and hindered their retreat; it destroyed the bridge over the Potomac and thus delayed Lee's passage for six days; and two of its divisions attacked the Confederate rear-guard just before it crossed the Potomac, killing General Pettigrew, and capturing about 1,000 prisoners.‡

On the other hand, Stuart's Confederate cavalry was out of place at the critical time. Its raid around the Federal army was a fatal mistake. From the time when it started for the Potomac upon that raid Lee was left groping in the dark. On the 1st of July, while Stuart was still absent, General Lee, not knowing where the Federal corps were at the time, "said that he had been kept in the dark ever since crossing the Potomac, and intimated that Stuart's disappearance had materially hampered the movements and disorganized the plans of the campaign."§ On the retreat the flank and rear of the Confederates were covered and their trains were well guarded by the cavalry.

*Doubleday.

†Alexander.

‡Fiebeger.

§Long.

LECTURE XIX.

THE VICKSBURG CAMPAIGN.

(213) The object of contention in this campaign was the Mississippi River, which bore the same relation to the seceding Southern States that the Hudson bore to the rebellious Thirteen Colonies in the Revolutionary War; it divided them into two parts. If the Union forces could get control of this river they would split the Confederacy in two, and stop the passage of supplies and men to the Confederate armies in the east from Arkansas, Louisiana, and Texas. This was a purely military consideration, but there was also a political and commercial consideration. The Mississippi was the great highway of trade between the Northwestern States and the outside world; so long as any part of it was controlled by Confederate batteries the highway was closed.

The Confederates in the first year of the war controlled the middle portion of the river by the forts at Columbus, New Madrid and Island No. 10, Fort Pillow and Fort Randolph. Columbus was evacuated a short while after the fall of Forts Henry and Donelson. General Pope, with the help of Foote's fleet, captured New Madrid and Island No. 10, in April, 1862. The victory at Shiloh (April 6 and 7, 1862) advanced the Union line southward to the Memphis and Charleston Railway, Fort Pillow was abandoned by the Confederates on the 4th of June, and Fort Randolph the next day.

At this time the Federals and the Confederates both had fleets on the river. Foote's fleet, now commanded by Commodore Davis, Foote being still disabled by the wound he received at Donelson, pushed on down the river, as one Confederate post after another was evacuated or taken. On May 10, 1862, the Confederate flotilla had attacked the Union fleet at Fort Pillow and been defeated. On June 7 the Union squadron attacked the Confederate fleet at Memphis, destroying three of its vessels, damaging others, and driving the fleet southward. The Mayor of Memphis immediately surrendered the town to Davis. The river was now open southward as far as Vicksburg. On the 25th of April, 1862, Farragut's fleet had arrived at New Orleans and taken possession of that city; in May the fleet moved up the river and took Baton Rouge and

Natchez, and, with the assistance of a small detachment of land troops, tried to take Vicksburg, but failed.

The Confederate authorities, now appreciating the importance and the peril of Vicksburg, had it strongly garrisoned and provided with batteries to command the river. By direction of the authorities at Washington, Farragut, with his fleet of ships and gunboats, and General Williams, with a small force of artillery and infantry, made another unsuccessful effort against Vicksburg, toward the end of June, 1862. Vicksburg was now the only point of the river held by the Confederates, but in August General Breckinridge garrisoned Port Hudson, two hundred miles below Vicksburg, and began setting up heavy batteries there to command the river. Thenceforward this point, also, was occupied by the Confederates until after the fall of Vicksburg. The Confederates also regained control of the river as far northward as Helena, Ark. "Within this distance batteries were erected or strengthened wherever the river touches the eastern bluffs—at Port Hudson, at Natchez, at Grand Gulf, at Vicksburg; and a fort was also erected a short distance up the Arkansas River, from the cover of which gunboats could issue forth and destroy all unarmed vessels."*

Such was the situation along the Mississippi in September, 1862. Halleck, having captured Corinth and dispersed his army, had gone to Washington to assume the office of General-in-Chief, leaving Grant "in command of all troops in the vicinity of Memphis and Corinth and as far back as Columbus, Ky." Buell and Bragg were in their race for Kentucky, and Grant's forces had been drawn upon to reinforce Buell's; Grant now had only about 42,000 men. With these he was required by Halleck to guard the railway from Memphis to Decatur, two hundred miles, and keep open communication with Buell. This constrained him to a passive defensive attitude for the time. (214) "He therefore occupied three important points of this road,—Memphis, Corinth, and Tuscumbia,—with considerable bodies, and posted the rest of his men at Jackson and Bolivar, central points in rear, from which they could readily be moved in any required direction. In this position he awaited the enemy in whose hands the power of initiative had passed."*

The Confederate troops in Mississippi composed two inde-

**Campaigns of the Civil War* (Scribner's).—Greene.

pendent commands, each about 16,000 strong. One force under Van Dorn "was charged with the defense of the river" and was "scattered from Holly Springs to Vicksburg"; the other under Sterling Price "was to guard the Mobile and Ohio Railroad south of Corinth," and was posted about Topelo.* On the 2nd of September Price received word from Bragg that Rosecrans, whose "Army of the Mississippi" formed the left of Grant's line, was about to march to Tennessee in order to join Buell. Bragg asked Price to prevent this movement. Accordingly Price asked Van Dorn to join forces with him to attack Rosecrans. Van Dorn agreed to join him, but replied that he should not be able to assemble his scattered forces before the 12th of the month. Fearing that this would not be early enough to catch Rosecrans, Price moved out without waiting for Van Dorn. On the 14th he occupied Iuka. About the 18th Price and Van Dorn arranged to join their forces at Rienzi for an advance against Corinth.

Meantime Grant had been watching the movements of Price and Van Dorn, and had resolved to attack Price at Iuka, before he and Van Dorn could unite their forces. To this end he assembled Rosecrans's command and Ord's division at Corinth, and started them toward Iuka. Rosecrans took the roads by way of Rienzi and Jacinto, and was to approach Iuka from the direction of the south. Ord marched by way of the railway, and was to attack at the same time from the north and west. The combined attack was to drive Price against the Tennessee River. As usually happens with marches of concentration, this one miscarried. The upshot was, Rosecrans approached by one road only from the south, and attacked the Confederates without Ord. Darkness ended the combat, and during the night Price slipped out by the other road [the Fulton road] to the south.

Rosecrans and Ord returned to Corinth. Van Dorn and Price met at Ripley on the 28th of September, and Van Dorn took command of their combined force by virtue of his rank. Van Dorn marched the united force by way of Pocahontas and Chewalla, and formed line of battle to the northwest of Rosecrans's position, near intrenchments at Corinth, on the morning of October the 3rd. (215) The Confederates attacked, and by sunset had driven the Federals into the redoubts at the edge of the town. The next morning Van Dorn renewed the assault. The combat was ferocious; but by noon it was

*Greene.

over, and the Confederates were retreating from the field. Rosecrans made no pursuit until the next day. (214) Van Dorn made good his retreat to Holly Springs. Rosecrans and Hurlbut pursued to Ripley and were then recalled by Grant to Corinth and Bolivar.

General Pemberton was now sent to Mississippi to take command of all the Confederate forces in the State; Rosecrans was called from Grant's army to relieve Buell of the command of the Army of the Ohio. Grant was promised by Halleck a "large body of new levies," and he purposed taking the offensive without delay.

Meantime McClelland was in Washington working out a secret scheme with the President and the Secretary of War, by which he was to raise a volunteer army in Indiana, Illinois, and Iowa, and lead it down the Mississippi to capture Vicksburg. No intimation of this project was given to General Grant, but Halleck, of course, was informed of it. The result was that when Grant first wrote to Halleck (October 26) asking leave to move against Vicksburg, he received no reply to his letter. Then followed several contradictory and vague dispatches from Halleck, which kept Grant for some time guessing what he was expected to do. (213) At last, however, it was arranged that Grant should move with the main army from Grand Junction to Holly Springs, and be joined by Sherman with the troops from Memphis, on the Tallahatchie River. A force from Helena was to move across the Mississippi and threaten the Confederate rear at Grenada.

At this time Van Dorn commanded the Confederate forces about Holly Springs—some 24,000 men, formed in two divisions, under Price and Lovell. Vicksburg was garrisoned by 6,000 Confederates, and Port Hudson by 5,500. Pemberton had his headquarters at Jackson.

By the 5th of November Grant had reached Oxford with the main body, and Sherman was at College Hill, a few miles northwest of that place. The force from Helena had carried out its part of the plan, and had returned to Helena. Van Dorn had fallen back, before Grant's advance, to Grenada. Up to this time Grant had advanced with no very definite plan, except to attack the enemy if he overtook him. But Van Dorn, by Pemberton's order, had kept falling back. As Grant's line of communication was now more than 200 miles long—a single-track railway back to Columbus, Kentucky,—Grant established a secondary base at Holly Springs.

After considerable correspondence with Halleck, and the discussion of several plans with Sherman for the capture of Vicksburg, it was finally arranged, with Halleck's approval, that Sherman should return to Memphis with one division. There he was to pick up all the newly arrived troops, and, with the troops under Steele from Helena, he was to organize an expedition to move by transports, under escort of Porter's fleet of gunboats, to Vicksburg, while Grant marched his army along the left bank of the Yazoo against the same objective. Sherman was back at Memphis by the 12th of December, and set out for Vicksburg on the 20th.

But events occurred which prevented Grant from carrying out his part of the plan. Forrest's cavalry broke up sixty miles of the railway north of Jackson, Tennessee, thereby interrupting Grant's communications with his base at Columbus for twelve days (Dec. 19-30). About the same time Van Dorn collected a mounted force of some 3,500 men, with which he marched up from Grenada and surprised the Union garrison at Holly Springs. He captured the garrison, 1,500 men, and destroyed the depot of stores valued at \$1,500,000.00; then he moved up the railway as far as Bolivar, attacking one small post after another, and made his escape back to Grenada. As a consequence of these raids Grant was forced to place his army on short rations, fall back to the Memphis and Charleston Railway, and open communications with Memphis. No supplies were to be had in the country; it had been stripped.

Sherman, in the meanwhile, had gone down the Mississippi. He had a force of 32,000 men and sixty guns, which he organized into four divisions. His division commanders were M. L. Smith, A. J. Smith, G. W. Morgan, and Fred Steele. The expedition reached Miliken's Bend, twenty-five miles above Vicksburg, before daylight on Christmas day.

(216) Vicksburg stood 250 feet above the waters of the Mississippi, and from there a line of cliffs, known as Chickasaw Bluffs, ran northward twelve miles, to Haynes's Bluff on the Yazoo River. The space between the base of the bluffs and the rivers was a wooded swamp cut up by bayous and creeks.

Pemberton had learned of Sherman's expedition, and had hurried reinforcements to Vicksburg; so that 12,000 Confederates were now intrenched upon the bluffs, awaiting Sherman's attack. Sherman landed his troops, on the 26th of December, at Johnson's plantation, and his columns, on the 27th and 28th, meandered across the swamps and bayous toward

the foot of the bluffs. Only one of the columns had a bridge-train. On the 29th Sherman assaulted the Confederate position, but was unable to carry it. He remained in position two or three days, vainly trying to find some way by which to dislodge the Confederates. On the 2nd of January he re-embarked his men, and, without opposition, returned to the mouth of the Yazoo. Here he was met by McClernand, with an order assigning that general to command the expedition. The order was dated about the 17th of December. Thus ended in failure the project of a combined movement against Vicksburg by land and water.

(213) This expedition was also to have received the co-operation of an expedition under Banks from New Orleans. Banks, however, got no farther than Baton Rouge. He did not feel strong enough to attack Port Hudson, and his operations afforded Sherman no assistance.

Having assumed command of the Union force near Vicksburg, McClernand designated it the "Army of the Mississippi," and divided it into two corps, under Morgan and Sherman, respectively. McClernand now moved his army up the river to Arkansas Post (called by the Confederates Fort Hindman). This place was attacked by land and water, and on January 11 was surrendered to McClernand, with about 5,000 prisoners. Here McClernand remained two or three days, and was contemplating what General Grant characterized as a "wild-goose chase" farther into Arkansas, when he received a peremptory order from Grant to return to Miliken's Bend.

Under authority from the War Department General Grant now decided to take command in person of the operations on the Mississippi against Vicksburg. By orders from the same source he organized all the troops under his command into four corps, the Thirteenth, Fifteenth, Sixteenth, and Seventeenth, commanded respectively by Major-Generals McClernand, Sherman, Hurlbut, and McPherson. McPherson's corps was sent down the river; Hurlbut's headquarters were to be at Memphis, and his corps was to embrace all the troops left back to guard the bases and lines of communication; McClernand and Sherman were ordered to set their men to digging a canal across the peninsular opposite Vicksburg. Grant hoped to transfer his army by this canal to the south of Vicksburg, there to cross the Mississippi and reach high ground in rear of the town.

GEOGRAPHY.

The Mississippi River from Memphis to Vicksburg flows through a vast bottom of black loam, bounded on the east by a line of hills, which, beginning in the high bluffs at Memphis, curves outward to a distance of forty or fifty miles, coming back to the river again at Vicksburg. This bottom contains the richest cotton-fields of Mississippi, and in the parlance of the State used to be spoken of as "The Swamps"—a name that fittingly applied to it. It is in fact a delta, for all the branches of the great river in the region are really side-channels, not affluents in the usual sense. They begin and end in the main stream. The surface of the ground is very low, and most of it would be under water a great part of the time but for the levees along the river. The courses of the streams through this bottom are so crooked, and the soil is so soft, that the river bends are continually cutting into one another, causing the streams to take new channels, and leaving crescent-shaped bodies of stagnant water. These are the bayous, in which the whole bottom abounds. They appear never to dry up. The rainfall in winter is very heavy, and even to-day there is hardly a large plantation in the region that does not contain some swamp-lands too wet and low to clear for cultivation. There is not a rock nor a stone in the whole country, and the roads are terrible in winter. Today a number of railways traverse the bottom, but at the time of the Vicksburg Campaign there was not one.

On the west side of the river swamp-lands of like character reach many miles farther southward. (217) On the east bank the swamps disappear below Vicksburg, except in the large bends between New Carthage and Grand Gulf; the region back toward Jackson is a rolling country of big plantations, containing much woodland. It is intersected by two unfordable streams, Big Black River and Bayou Pierre, and by many of their branches and branches of Pearl River, which, flowing south by Jackson, bounds the region on the east. The roads were all bad, and the towns, except Vicksburg and Jackson, were villages. Two railways crossed at Jackson, and it was the capital of Mississippi and the base of supplies for the Confederate troops in the State; hence it was a place of great strategic importance.

OPERATIONS.

Grant joined the army at Young's Point on the 29th of January, 1863. On examining the canal undergoing construction he was not favorably impressed with the project. He let the work go on, however, but had two other routes explored, with a view to turn Vicksburg and reach the high ground in its rear: (213) first, by way of Yazoo Pass* and the Tallahatchie and Yazoo Rivers to the rear of Haynes's Bluff, the right of the Confederate position; second, by way of Lake Providence, Bayou Macon, the Tensas, Washita, Red, and Mississippi, to the rear of Warrenton, (217) the left of the position. By this route he might have united with Banks and Farragut.

In spite of floods and other hindrances work was continued on the canal opposite Vicksburg till near the end of March, when it was stopped by the Confederate batteries at Warrenton. The project was then given up as a failure. Meantime McPherson had been at work with his corps on the Lake Providence route; this route was also abandoned about the last of March, by which time Grant had formed plans for moving south from Miliken's Bend by land. (213) The Yazoo Pass project had appeared to be the most likely of all the projects. The levee that stood across the Pass was cut away, and a division from Helena was started in light-draft transports to try the route.

All this while the Confederates in Mississippi had not been idle. On the contrary, they had made extraordinary efforts to save their State and the Mississippi River. The garrison at Vicksburg had been strengthened to more than 25,000. From the force at Grenada, some 20,000, Loring conducted a detachment to the junction of the Tallahatchie and the Yalabusha Rivers. Here, in a bend of the Tallahatchie the neck of which was only 500 yards wide, he built Fort Pemberton, whose guns completely commanded the narrow channel.

After a slow and difficult passage down the crooked streams, hindered all the way by felled trees and other obstructions placed by the Confederates, the Federal gunboats with their convoy from Helena reached the position of Fort Pemberton, and were stopped by its guns. As by this time Grant had found

*Where the Tallahatchie River breaks out of the Mississippi a few miles below Helena.

that it would be impossible to get enough light-draft transports, this enterprise was also abandoned.

(217) But the hope of reaching the rear of Vicksburg by a water route was not given up until a fourth effort was made by way of the Yazoo, Steele's Bayou, and other cross bayous, Deer Creek, and Sunflower River. (213) Sherman, escorted by Porter's gunboats, explored this route; he was met by Confederate sharpshooters behind the trees along the way through the forests, and forced to withdraw. So narrow and crooked were the bayous that his boats could not turn round; they had to back out stern foremost.

General Grant was now about at his wit's end—he had to do something, and that promptly, or pass to the rear with the other failures—McDowell, McClellan, Pope, Burnside. Already the press was calling for his removal. Three plans only were left to try: first, to assault the Confederate batteries at Vicksburg; second, to return to Memphis and begin a new advance along the Mississippi Central Railway; third, to find some way across the swamps opposite Vicksburg to a crossing lower down the river, and from there, without any base of supplies, to move against the rear of the town. The first plan would have been suicide; the second plan would have looked like a retreat, and if Grant had adopted it the public press would probably have forced the administration to relieve him of command; the third plan involved a risk seldom justified in war. He chose the third plan.*

(217) New Carthage was to be the first objective, and a route thither was to be opened by way of the bayous from Miliken's Bend and Duckport, by which troops and supplies were to be forwarded on flatboats and barges. The gunboats and a number of transports were to run past the Confederate batteries; but General Grant found again that, on account of a lack of barges, and other difficulties, he should have to give up the effort to move his army by way of the bayous; but by constructing several miles of corduroy road and many bridges he was enabled to move his troops and a large part of his supplies by land—or rather by mud.

Grant found on arrival at New Carthage that the village "was still surrounded by water, and was entirely unsuitable for concentrating a large force."* So another place called Hard

*Greene.

Times, lower down the river, was selected, and more bridges and corduroy roads had to be built. With some losses the gunboats and transports ran by the Confederate batteries at Vicksburg, and, by the 29th of April, all difficulties had been so far overcome that Grant had the corps of McClernand and McPherson assembled at Hard Times ready to cross. (218)

Let us see what Pemberton's Confederate forces had been doing in Mississippi in the meanwhile. At the last of March Pemberton had in the State about 50,000 effectives. General Stevenson with 22,000 held the line of the Mississippi from Haynes's Bluff to Grand Gulf. The latter place, about as strong naturally as Vicksburg, was fortified and garrisoned. (213) Port Hudson was fortified, and garrisoned by 15,000 or 16,000 men under Gardner. Loring had 7,000 men at Fort Pemberton, Grenada, and other neighboring points, and there were some 3,000 or 4,000 in the north of the State watching the Union troops along the Memphis and Charleston Railway. There was no Confederate cavalry in the State, Van Dorn with all the cavalry in that quarter having been ordered to Tennessee to aid Bragg.

During the months of March and April the Confederates were unable to decide what movement Grant was undertaking. To deceive them Steele's division of Sherman's corps had been sent up the river toward Greenville, and rumor said that Grant was going back to Memphis to begin an advance by way of the railway. Then the report reached Pemberton that a strong Union column was actually moving southward from the Memphis and Charleston Railway.

This was Grierson's cavalry starting on its famous raid. It left Lagrange on the 17th of April, and on the 2nd of May reached the Union camp at Baton Rouge. With barely 1,000 horsemen Grierson had ridden entirely through the State, marching 600 miles in sixteen days—averaging nearly thirty-eight miles a day—destroying many miles of railway and telegraph lines and much other property. "But, far more important than all this, he had distracted the enemy's attention in an extraordinary degree at a most critical moment"—while Grant was making his preparations to cross the Mississippi.

Having no cavalry to oppose or to maintain touch with Grierson's column, the Confederates were kept in a wild state of ignorance, excitement, and alarm. "The most exaggerated rumors were current of" Grierson's "presence in a dozen places

at once,"* and large infantry detachments were sent out from almost every garrison to try to cut him off. He dodged them all. In its strategic effect this was, perhaps, the most successful cavalry raid of the Civil War, or of all modern wars. It drew the attention of the Confederates away from Grand Gulf, and prevented them from sending reinforcements to that place just at the critical hour.

(218) At 7 a.m. on the 29th of April Porter's squadron steamed down from Hard Times to Grand Gulf, followed by all the available transports loaded with men—three of McClernand's divisions. An hour later Porter opened fire on the Confederate batteries, and an artillery duel was kept up until the Confederate guns ceased firing, about 1 p.m. But the result was not such as to let Grant believe that he could successfully land troops from his transports and assault the parapets, and he decided to move five miles farther down, to De Shroon's Landing. Later he was informed by a negro that a good road ran back from Bruinsburg to Port Gibson, and he decided to make his crossing at Bruinsburg. At daylight on the 30th of April the troops began crossing, and by noon McClernand's entire corps, 18,000 men, was on the eastern bank. No Confederates had appeared to dispute the landing. After delaying four hours to issue rations to his men—which ought to have been issued before—McClernand moved out. At sunset he reached the bluffs three miles back of the landing, which he found unoccupied by the enemy. He pushed on toward Port Gibson, and about one o'clock in the night his leading division [Carr] met the enemy some four miles west of Port Gibson. After a slight skirmish the division bivouacked until daylight.

The Confederates encountered at this point were a detachment that had been sent out from the garrison at Grand Gulf. As soon as Pemberton, who was at Jackson, learned by telegraph of the attack on Grand Gulf, he ordered reinforcements to be sent thither at once from Vicksburg. By night two brigades had arrived. One of these [Tracy] marched on toward Port Gibson, and, by daybreak of May 1, was in position with the brigade that had been met during the night by the head of McClernand's corps. At this point the road formed two branches which came back together at Port Gibson. One Confederate brigade [Tracy] was across the northern branch, and the other [Green] across the southern branch. The ground

*Greene.

was very unfavorable for an attack. It was a mass of short steep hills, separated from one another by ravines "filled with a dense growth of cane and underbrush."*

The combat opened on the Confederate right at daybreak. Soon McClernand's whole corps was on the ground, and McPherson's corps was crossing, back at Bruinsburg. McPherson came up with two brigades of Logan's division at noon and joined in the battle. The ground was so difficult to maneuver upon that the Federal troops, though outnumbering the Confederates nearly three to one, found it hard to beat them. The left Confederate brigade nevertheless gave way within an hour or two, but the right one, on the northern road, held fast. Before noon the other Confederate brigade from Vicksburg [Baldwin] arrived, as well as three more regiments under Cockrell. About 5 p.m. McPherson succeeded in enveloping the Confederate right; then the whole line gave way. The brigades on the right retreated directly upon Grand Gulf, burning the bridge over Bayou Pierre; the left brigade fell back by way of Grindstone Ferry, burning the bridges over both forks of the bayou. This brigade finally rejoined the right by way of Willow Springs.

At this time the Confederate troops were scattered all over Mississippi, from Grenada to Port Hudson; from Meridian to Vicksburg. The detachments sent out after Grierson had not returned to their stations. Pemberton had gone to Vicksburg, and he spent the 1st of May "sending telegrams in all directions for the purpose of collecting his scattered forces."* Three more brigades were started from Vicksburg toward Port Gibson. These were met on the morning of May 3, at Hankinson's Ferry, by the Confederates that had retreated from Port Gibson. These fleeing troops had stopped long enough at Grand Gulf to blow up the magazines and dismount the guns; then, with the rest of the garrison, they had hastened on toward Vicksburg, by way of Hankinson's Ferry. Here some troops from the direction of Jackson, also, had joined. So that on the 3rd of May there were retreating beyond Hankinson's Ferry some 17,000 Confederate soldiers, foot-sore and worn-out with long marches and fighting; and more or less demoralized.

McPherson's corps followed the retreating Confederates and halted at Hankinson's Ferry; McClernand's halted at Willow

*Greene.

Springs. Both corps remained in bivouac for three days, awaiting the arrival of Sherman's corps as well as of ammunition and rations. (219) Up to this time Sherman's corps had remained at Miliken's Bend and Haynes's Bluff, making demonstrations against the right of the Confederate line. Sherman now received orders to move his corps up to the line of the other two, leaving Blair's division to guard the depots at the river until it could be relieved by a division sent down from Memphis. One of McPherson's brigades, also, was left on the west of the Mississippi River. By the 7th of May Sherman was across the river at Grand Gulf. The same day McClermand and McPherson moved their corps to Rocky Springs.

Grant now had about 41,000 men on the east side of the Mississippi; Pemberton had, including the garrison of Port Hudson, some 50,000 men in the State. But Port Hudson, which was about as important to hold as Vicksburg, was threatened by Banks and Farragut from the south, and was, moreover, 140 miles by road from Raymond or Jackson, the nearest points at which its troops could effect a junction with Pemberton's main army.

During these operations of General Grant, Banks had a force operating on the west side of the Mississippi from New Orleans. The War Department expected Grant and Banks to coöperate against Vicksburg and Port Hudson. On the 10th of April Grant received a letter from Halleck, "calling special attention to the necessity of coöperating with Banks";* and, when Grant was working to get across the Mississippi near Grand Gulf, he meant to send a corps down toward Port Hudson to coöperate with Banks. But on May 2 he had received a letter from Banks, dated April 12, and written while Banks was on his way northward with an expedition against the Confederates on the Red River, in which Banks said that he should "return to Baton Rouge on May 10," and would then coöperate against Port Hudson, and that he should have 15,000 men available for field service.

Grant had worked for months to reach high ground back of Vicksburg; he had at last succeeded. He had defeated the enemy the day before at Port Gibson, and put him to flight. Banks was not operating against Port Hudson, as Grant had supposed, and he would not be there until the 10th of the month, and then would have only 15,000 men. Under such cir-

*Greene.

cumstances it did not take Grant long to decide that the right thing for him to do was to give up all thought of coöperating with Banks, and to push ahead by himself with the advantage he had already gained.

Grant could spare no cavalry to follow up the enemy, or to reconnoiter far ahead and to the flanks in order to gain information of the hostile forces. He says in his *Memoirs*: "The cavalry was used in this advance in reconnoitering to find the roads; to cover our advances and to find the most practicable routes from one command to another so they could support each other in case of attack." All he knew was, therefore, that the enemy's troops at Hankinson's Ferry had retreated toward Vicksburg; how far they had gone, or what was their strength, he could not tell. It was rumored that another force was assembling at Jackson. He must place his army between these two forces. He resolved, therefore, to advance against the railway between Jackson and Vicksburg, watching closely the ferries of the Big Black to prevent an attack on his left flank.

McClermand's corps was ordered to take the road from Rocky Springs to Edwards's Station; McPherson's was to take the road by way of Raymond for Jackson, and, after destroying the railways and public stores, to rejoin the main army; while Sherman's Corps was to follow in rear of McClermand's, or midway between McClermand's and McPherson's, if it could find a road there, in supporting distance of both flank-columns. It was Napoleon's favorite movement of two wings with a central reserve. The army had a train of 120 wagons and five days' rations. No line of communications was to be maintained with the base on the river. The army was to live off the country.

On the evening of the 11th of May Grant's army bivouacked as follows: McClermand's corps [Thirteenth] at Five Mile Creek on the Telegraph Road; Sherman's [Fifteenth] at Auburn; McPherson's [Seventeenth] five miles northeast of Utica. That evening Pemberton's main army was distributed as follows: Walker's brigade at Jackson; Gregg's at Raymond, guarding some provisions collected there; Bowen's division at Edwards's Station, and the divisions of Loring and Stevenson on the way from Warrenton to Edwards's Station. There were also two divisions [Forney and M. L. Smith] at Vicksburg.

On May 1, Pemberton had telegraphed Joseph E. Johnston, of whose wide territorial command Mississippi formed a part,

that Grant had crossed the great river, "and that a furious battle had been raging all day at Port Gibson."* Johnston replied from Tullahoma, Tennessee, "If Grant crosses, unite all your troops to beat him—success will give back what was abandoned to win it." Pemberton did not attempt to obey this order. He, as well as Jefferson Davis, was of the opinion that Grant's army could not "live more than a few days away from the river." He thought, however, that Grant might make a raid on Jackson, but that his main army would immediately march for the Mississippi, below Warrenton, the left of the Confederate intrenchments. Accordingly Pemberton distributed the bulk of his troops, the divisions of Bowen, Loring, and Stevenson, at the ferries of the Big Black River. He appealed to the war department at Richmond for reinforcements, and Walker's brigade was sent to Jackson from South Carolina. Other troops were withdrawn from Port Hudson and placed at Jackson.

On the 12th [May] Grant's army moved forward. McPherson's corps marched out on the Raymond Road at 4 a.m., covered by the only cavalry regiment with the army. Confederate videttes were soon seen falling back toward Raymond. At about eleven o'clock a line of Confederate artillery and infantry was found drawn up across the road, on high ground beyond a small stream, about two miles from Raymond. It was Gregg's brigade. Logan's division of McPherson's corps was in the lead. It deployed at once, and attacked the Confederate position. Crocker's division came up later, but took little part in the combat. A stubborn little fight took place, which lasted till late in the afternoon, when the Confederates were driven from the field. Logan followed them some distance beyond Raymond, then halted and bivouacked for the night.

The stout resistance met by McPherson at Raymond led Grant to believe that a considerable force of the enemy was at Jackson. On the other hand, the columns of McClelland and Sherman had encountered Confederate skirmishers in large numbers along Fourteen Mile Creek this same day. This satisfied Grant that the reports he had received, to the effect that a large force of Confederates was assembling at Edwards's Station, were true. He resolved to turn first against the force at Jackson, and issued orders accordingly. Pursuant to these

*Greene.

orders McPherson's column moved to Clinton on May the 13th, and to Jackson on the 14th; Sherman moved to Mississippi Springs on the 13th, and to Jackson on the 14th, keeping touch with McPherson; McClellan moved to Raymond on the 13th, and sent a division forward to Clinton on the 14th.

Joseph E. Johnston was at Jackson. On the 9th of May he had received orders from Richmond to "proceed at once to Mississippi and take chief command of the forces there."* He reached Jackson on the evening of the 13th, and found the brigades of Gregg and Walker there. Gist's brigade from South Carolina and Maxey's from Port Hudson were expected to arrive next day. This would give Johnston 12,000 men; but finding that Grant's whole army was between him and Pemberton at Edwards's Station, Johnson wired to Richmond: "I am too late."

(220) In intrenchments previously made Johnston placed Gregg's brigade on the Raymond Road, and Walker's on the Clinton road, "on high ground commanding the approaches over open fields."* He directed them to hold back the enemy, until the public stores and property could be removed northward, by the railway, toward Canton.

Sherman and McPherson approached Jackson at about 10 a.m. on the 14th. It was pouring rain; so McPherson withheld his assault till eleven o'clock for fear of getting his ammunition wet. Gregg's brigade did not stand long; its flank was enveloped by Sherman, and it abandoned its trenches. "Walker made more of a fight. He occupied a fine position on the crest of a semi-circular ridge, his flanks protected by woods, and in front of him a gently sloping open field terminating, about one-third of a mile distant, in a boggy creek, lined with thick willows. His artillery commanded the bridge over this creek."* Walker was, however, unable to resist McPherson's charge, and his men broke and ran from their trenches. McPherson's leading division pursued them for about a mile and a half, and was then stopped by some guns on an inner line of works. The Confederates escaped by the Canton Road; Sherman and McPherson entered Jackson between three and four o'clock in the afternoon.

On the evening of the 14th two of McClellan's divisions were at Raymond, one was at Clinton, and one with the wagon-train between Auburn and Raymond. Frank P. Blair's divi-

*Greene.

sion of Sherman's corps, and the brigade of McPherson's corps that had remained back at the Mississippi, had come up with this train.

Grant was now ready to move on Edwards's Station to attack Pemberton, if he should remain there, before he could be joined by Johnston with the troops from Jackson. Sherman was left with his two divisions to complete the work of destruction at Jackson; all the rest of the army, on the 15th, moved by the various convergent roads on Edwards's Station. Pemberton was at that place with three divisions, about 23,000 men; the Confederate divisions of Forney and M. L. Smith were still on the river at Vicksburg.

On the evening of the 13th, when Johnston learned that Grant was moving on Jackson, he sent an order to Pemberton, "if practicable to come up in Grant's rear at once."* Pemberton called a council of war,† shilly-shallied, and wasted time; did nothing for twenty-four hours; then, instead of obeying Johnston's order, started his force at 1 p.m., on the 15th, southward to intercept Grant's communications—when, in fact, Grant had no communications. Grant's little wagon-train was that day near Dillon's; but it was well guarded by two Federal divisions. Owing to high water, rain, and mud, Pemberton's column got no farther than the cross-road leading from Champion's Hill to the Edwards's Station—Raymond road, where it bivouacked the night of the 15th. On the morning of the 16th Pemberton changed his mind, and decided to try to unite with Johnston by way of Brownsville. He gave orders, therefore, to counter-march to Edwards's Station, there to take the Brownsville Road. He was too late; the enemy was upon him; the Confederate outposts and the Union advance-guards were already skirmishing.

(221) On the night of the 15th Grant's army, except Sherman's two divisions at Jackson, bivouacked on the three roads leading west to Edwards's Station. Its flanks were about four miles from each other, and the line was four miles from Pemberton's bivouac. Neither army appears to have been aware of the nearness of the other.

*Greene.

†Napoleon's *Maxim LXV*: The same consequences that have uniformly attended long discussions and councils of war will follow at all times. They will terminate in the adoption of the worst course, which in war is always the most timid, or, if you will, the most prudent. The only true wisdom in a general is determined courage.

Pemberton formed line of battle across the two roads south of Champion's Hill—a prominent knoll seventy or eighty feet high in Mr. Champion's plantation. The knoll was steep and rugged and covered with timber on the northern side, but gentler and partly cleared on the southern and eastern slopes.

(222) McClernand's divisions were in front of Pemberton's line at 9.30 a.m., and this general sent a dispatch to Grant, who was with McPherson on the northern road, inquiring whether he should attack. It was two o'clock before he received Grant's reply to attack; and then the two leading divisions [Osterhaus and Smith] on the lower roads did not attack very vigorously. On the northern road McPherson's corps came up at eleven o'clock, with Logan's division in the lead. Meantime Stevenson had moved his Confederate division to the left and taken position on the hill. Later, during the combat that ensued, Bowen moved his division to assist Stevenson. Logan swung round and attacked the hill from the north, while Hovey, and later Crocker, assailed it from the east. The possession of the hill was stubbornly contested. It was taken by the Federals, then retaken by the Confederates, and then taken again by the Federals. The battle lasted till nearly dark. "Stevenson's division was completely routed and broken up." It and Bowen's division retreated over Baker's Creek, at the crossing of the Raymond Road. Loring's division covered their retreat, but was itself cut off, and had to retreat southward. The next day it reached Crystal Springs, on the railroad twenty-five miles south of Jackson. "Bowen's division, and the remnants of Stevenson's, made their way back to the Big Black River."*

If the left of the Union line, under McClernand, had attacked as vigorously as the right attacked under McPherson, the beaten Confederates would have been cut off from the ford over Baker's Creek, on the Raymond Road, as they were cut off from the bridge on the Clinton Road; and they would have been captured. On the other hand, while McPherson was assaulting the left of the Confederates and McClernand was standing idle in front of their right, Pemberton ordered Loring to attack McClernand. Loring replied that McClernand was too strongly posted. Later Pemberton ordered him to move to the left to aid Stevenson. This, also, he failed to do, and Pemberton laid upon him the blame for Stevenson's rout.

*Greene.

(223) Grant's army, except Sherman's corps, bivouacked the night of the 16th between the battle-field and Edwards's Station. Sherman had come forward as far as Bolton. Grant took up the pursuit at daylight on the 17th. Sherman marched directly for Bridgeport in order to turn the bridge at the railway crossing. This crossing was in a deep bend of the Big Black, which was concave toward the east, and about a mile wide. The ground within the bend was flat and low, while on the opposite side of the river the banks were high. The Confederates had dug a trench within the bend, straight across the road, and it was now occupied by about 5,000 men—part of the troops that had escaped from Champion's Hill, and a small force that had been stationed at the bridge. None of the troops were placed on the opposite bank. Besides the railway bridge, which had been planked, the Confederates had improvised another bridge by using a steamboat as a sort of pier in the narrow stream.

The head of Grant's column arrived in front of the Confederate trenches about 8 a.m. On the right of the road there was a clump of woods upon the flank of the trench. The leading Union division [Carr] formed line in these woods, preparatory to assaulting. The next division opened fire at the center. There were about 10,000 Federals in the line. The Confederates saw themselves in a pocket, and after a brief resistance fled for the bridges. The fight was all over by nine o'clock. Eighteen pieces of artillery were abandoned, and 1,751 men were cut off and captured.

Pemberton hastened to Vicksburg to prepare for its defense, leaving Stevenson to bring on what remained of the routed army. On the 18th Pemberton received an order from Johnston to evacuate Vicksburg, if not too late, and save his army from ultimate surrender. Knowing that this meant the loss of large quantities of stores and munitions collected at Vicksburg, "the fall of Port Hudson, the surrender of the Mississippi River, and the severance of the Confederacy,"* Pemberton foolishly submitted the question to a council of war, which decided that it was impossible for the army to withdraw. Pemberton therefore made no effort to obey his commander's order.

(224) As stated before, Vicksburg stood upon a bluff 250 feet above the waters of the Mississippi. The country round about was cut up into a jumble of narrow ridges with deep

*Pemberton's Report.

ravines between them. A more or less continuous ridge curved along the heads of the ravines from Fort Hill, overlooking the river a mile above the town, to Stout's Bayou, three miles below the town. Outside the outer curve of this ridge the ground was very broken and difficult; along its crest, almost without a break, the Confederates had constructed very strong fortifications enclosing the town on the land side. To defend these works Pemberton had 128 guns and about 20,000 effective men. He placed Stevenson's division on the right, Forney's in the center, and M. L. Smith's on the left. Bowen's division was held in reserve.

After the battle of the Big Black River Grant pushed on in pursuit of the Confederates. His leading troops reached the neighborhood of Vicksburg by the evening of the 18th [May]. Before two o'clock on the afternoon of the 19th his corps were all three in position—Sherman's on the right, McPherson's in the center, and McClernand's on the left. Grant hoped, by attacking the position of the Confederates promptly, to carry it before they should recover from their demoralization. So he ordered a general assault at 2 p.m. Within the works, however, were troops that had not been beaten; and those that had suffered defeat and rout recovered their nerve as soon as they found themselves behind Vicksburg's thick parapet. The assault failed all along the line. Sherman, on the right, "succeeded in reaching the ditch, but, being unsupported by the other corps, was repulsed."* McClernand and McPherson advanced several hundred yards under a heavy fire, but were brought to a halt by darkness.

(218) Grant now established his base of supplies on the Yazoo River near the mouth of Steele's Bayou. For eighteen days his army had been marching and fighting, and, with the exception of five days' rations, had got its supplies from the country.

(224) Grant resolved to assault the Confederate works again. His army was "flushed with an unbroken series of victories," and was anxious to carry the works and end the campaign; Grant believed the army equal to the task. There were other reasons for making the effort. Johnston was collecting an army with which to come to Pemberton's relief. If Grant could capture Vicksburg he would be free to turn his army to meet Johnston, and then to send a detachment against

*Greene.

Port Hudson. A siege would be a slow and dreary work, and, as his immediate forces were not enough completely to invest the place, he would have to draw troops from Memphis to effect the siege. Grant, therefore, ordered his artillery to open fire on the works at daybreak, on the 22nd, and his infantry to make a general assault at ten o'clock. Admiral Porter was asked to shell the water-batteries. The assault was gallantly made, and, after desperate fighting, the Union troops reached the ditches, and planted their colors in several places upon the parapets; but they could go no farther.

Grant was in a good position from which to see most of his line, and by 11.30 a.m. he was persuaded that the assault could not succeed. But about this time he began receiving notes from McClernand, telling of success in his part of the line. One note, dated 12 m., said: "We are hotly engaged with the enemy. We have part possession of two forts, and the Stars and Stripes are floating over them. A vigorous push ought to be made all along the line." Another, written about 1 p.m., said: "We have gained the enemy's entrenchments at several points, but are brought to a stand. . . ." Grant was doubtful of McClernand's successes; he had seen nothing of them himself. But there was no time for him to ride over to that flank to see for himself. So he ordered one of McPherson's divisions over to help McClernand, and had the rest of McPherson's corps and Sherman's renew the assault. The result was like that of the morning's attack; the works were reached but could not be carried. The hostile lines were so close together that the Confederates behind the parapet could throw hand-grenades among the assailants. The assaults failed all along the line. Just at dark the Confederates in front of McClernand's troops made a sortie, and drove the Federals out of the ditch they had taken. In this day's work 35,000 Union infantry had engaged. The line assaulted was held in the morning by fewer than four Confederate brigades. As soon as the assault had begun the reserves were put into the works; but the entire force of the defenders engaged did not exceed 13,000. Grant's losses were more than 3,000, and he blamed McClernand's misleading dispatches with half of them.

(225) It was now plain that Vicksburg could be taken only by siege, and preparations were accordingly begun at once. Regular siege-works were constructed. Reinforcements were sent from various parts of the country, and, within a few

weeks, Grant had Vicksburg completely invested, with 71,141 men and 248 guns in his line. Twelve miles of trenches were made and eighty-nine batteries were set up. Approaches were dug and mines and counter-mines set off. The lines were brought so close, toward the end of the siege, that hand-grenades were used, and shells were thrown by small mortars made of logs with metal bands shrunk around them. With such implements from ten to a hundred men were killed daily. "On July 1 the approaches were all within from five to a hundred yards of the defenders' works,"* and orders were issued for a final assault to be made on the 6th. But this was not to be; Pemberton surrendered on the 4th of July. The siege had lasted forty-seven days.

(226) All this time Johnston had been organizing an army at Jackson for Pemberton's relief, of troops sent to him from wherever they could be spared; and the Richmond authorities had been urging him to move out. Meantime Grant had sent strong columns under Blair and Osterhaus to reconnoiter for Johnston in the direction of Mechanicsburg and the Big Black. They found no signs of a Confederate army approaching.

At length, on June the 28th, Johnston issued orders for his army to advance. On paper his army numbered nearly 55,000, but it had only 31,000 present for duty. On the 1st of July three of its divisions had reached Birdsong's Ferry, and the fourth was at Edwards's Station. Johnston spent the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th of July in reconnoitering. At this time Sherman was in command of a force of 30,000 men, stretched across from Haynes's Bluff to the Black River Bridge, covering the siege of Vicksburg. "On the night of the 4th Johnston received the news of Pemberton's surrender; he countermarched his columns forthwith toward Jackson. He was none too quick, for Sherman was on his heels in pursuit, with nearly 50,000 men, before sunset of the day on which the garrison laid down their arms."* All arrangements had been made beforehand for this pursuit. Johnston fell back into the works at Jackson; Sherman arrived there on the 10th [July]. Johnston hoped Sherman would assault, but Sherman prepared to besiege the place. Johnston was not to be caught, like Pemberton, in a trap; on the night of the 16th he skilfully withdrew his army across the bridges of Pearl River, and made his escape. Sherman followed him about twelve miles, then was recalled to Vicksburg.

*Greene.

Johnston went into camp half-way between Jackson and Meridian.

The Vicksburg Campaign was over.

(213) Port Hudson surrendered to Banks on the 9th of July, and the Mississippi River was again open to the world's traffic. The Confederacy was split in twain.

COMMENTS.

(217) When General Grant had his army in its camps in the swamps across the Mississippi from Vicksburg, after failing in all his efforts to turn the town by way of bayous and canals, he was at the crisis of his military career. His next effort was to decide whether he was to go down in history as a failure or as a success.

He had already failed in five different projects for the capture of Vicksburg: first, the combined movement in which he was to march a force overland from Northern Mississippi against the rear of the town, while Sherman moved by transports down the great river. This enterprise was brought to naught by the capture of Grant's advanced base at Holly Springs by Van Dorn's cavalry; by the breaking up of the railway in his rear by Forrest, and by Sherman's failure to defeat the Confederates at Chickasaw Bluffs. The second effort was by way of the canal across the peninsular opposite Vicksburg; the third was by way of Lake Providence and bayous and rivers west of the Mississippi; the fourth was the expedition by way of the Yazoo Pass; the fifth was the expedition by way of Steele's Bayou. All of these projects had failed, and months of patient labor had been wasted upon them. The capture of Vicksburg seemed farther away than ever. A year before 10,000 men could easily have taken it; but within the last few months the Confederates had turned it into a fortress and placed 22,000 men in its garrison. A large part of the public press had already declared Grant a failure, and Halleck and the Administration at Washington were about ready to try some one else in his place.

When Grant decided to cut loose from his base and make his campaign without a line of communications, he took the same kind of risk that General Scott took when he abandoned his communications at Puebla and advanced against the City of Mexico. It was not a change of base like McClellan's movement from the York to the James in the Peninsular Campaign;

Grant was not sure where his next base would be, or how long he should be without any base. Sherman advised against the movement, and was in favor of returning to Memphis and making a new start by way of the railway; and Grant's better judgment told him that this was the safer and surer plan. But the cry of the press and public opinion were behind him to pronounce such a movement a retreat—another failure; and almost surely to force Grant's removal. So, like Scott at Puebla, Grant took the hazard of operating without a base; and he won. The stakes were larger, too, than he had reckoned them; they were not only Vicksburg, but Chattanooga, Appomattox, peace in the land, a general's commission, the White House, and a fame immortal.

It has been said that Grant, in case of defeat, could have fallen back upon the Federal posts at New Orleans or Baton Rouge; or that he might have drawn supplies from those places. But such is not the case. Those cities were nearly 200 miles from his line of operations; a beaten army of forty-odd thousand men would have slim chances before an active enemy, in a retreat of 200 miles, with no base from which to draw ammunition and subsistence, and in a hostile country.

Barring the question of a base and a line of communications there has been no more brilliant series of military operations in American history, and none that conformed more closely to the principles of the military art, than the operations of Grant's army from the day on which it fought the battle of Port Gibson until it arrived in front of the Confederate works at Vicksburg. The campaign was full of lessons for the military student; on the Union side, full of examples to be followed; on the Confederate side, full of examples to be avoided. Not a mistake of strategy can be pointed out in Grant's operations, and scarcely a mistake of tactics was made by his subordinate commanders.

In those "eighteen days" Grant "had marched about 200 miles, and, by keeping his army together, had defeated the enemy's scattered detachments, in four engagements, at Raymond, Jackson, Champion's Hill, and Big Black, all fought within six days; he had inflicted a loss upon them of 8,000 in killed, wounded, and missing, had captured eighty-eight pieces of their artillery, and, finally, had driven them into the narrow defenses of Vicksburg, causing their outworks at Haynes' Bluff, Warrenton, and Grand Gulf to be abandoned, and establishing his own base on the Yazoo River, in easy and safe

reach of his gunboats and transports. He had not only prevented the junction of the enemy's detachments, but had still further scattered their forces; so that they had fully 14,000 fewer men available in Vicksburg at the close of this period than at the beginning.* During these eighteen days Grant's men had had but five days' rations, having lived for the rest on the country; their own losses had been a little less than 3,500."*

Grant was fortunate in having two such lieutenants as Sherman and McPherson to command two of his three corps; he was no less fortunate in having a Pemberton as his adversary. If Pemberton issued a single order or made a single move in those eighteen days that was wholly right the historians have failed to record it. It is true, however, that Pemberton had a difficult problem to solve. With the troops and means at his disposal it appears difficult as viewed by us to-day with a full knowledge of all the circumstances; but it was much more so to him, for the situation was by no means as clear to him as it is to us. His task was to guard Vicksburg and Port Hudson, the locks that kept the Mississippi shut. Port Hudson was threatened from below by Farragut's fleet and Banks's army.

As to the struggle for Vicksburg, Pemberton's task at first was to keep Grant from placing the Federal army on high ground back of the town. So long as Pemberton could do that he held Vicksburg secure from capture. While the operations connected with this stage of the struggle were, in many respects, wholly different from any other operations found in military history, they, nevertheless, fall under the general class of those relating to the attack and defense of a river-line. To put an army across a great river, defended by an enemy, and make a firm lodgment upon the other bank, looks like a hard task to undertake; but history shows that the task has never been so hard as the task to prevent the passage of such a river. Not mountains, nor rivers, nor swamps, though defended by an enemy, have ever permanently stopped an army commanded by a skilful and determined general. The task of Pemberton was made doubly hard by General Grant's dogged persistence, and the clever measures employed to deceive him—such as Grierson's raid, Steele's movement to Greenville, and Sherman's feints at Haynes's Bluff. Yet Pemberton, assisted by the unusual features of the topography—swamps, jungle, and a network of creeks and bayous—managed to

*Greene.

thwart all of Grant's efforts for three months—from the end of January to the end of April.

After Grant had succeeded in making a lodgment upon high ground on the east bank of the river Pemberton's task was to destroy the Union army or drive it back; or to delay it until the Confederate government could take measures to destroy it or drive it back. Pemberton had about 35,000 men within the triangle, Haynes's Bluff—Grand Gulf—Jackson, and about 15,000 at Port Hudson. Grant had 41,000, but they were united. (213) If Pemberton had withdrawn the garrison from Port Hudson he would have opened the way for Banks and Farragut to join Porter and Grant; besides, it would have taken ten or fifteen days for the troops at that point to join the main army on the Vicksburg-Jackson line. Pemberton, therefore, was obliged to rely upon the force of 35,000 to defeat or hold Grant, until reinforcements could come. He was further puzzled to decide what Grant meant to do. He believed that Grant would turn northward and take the shortest route to Vicksburg, keeping in touch with the river for his supplies; but Grant might turn southward first, and unite with Banks against Port Hudson. The last thing Pemberton supposed Grant would do was precisely what he did—cut loose from his base and move on Jackson with his whole army; he feared, however, that Grant might send a large detachment, a raiding force, to make a dash for Jackson and destroy the public stores there, and the railways. Jackson was the base from which the garrison of Vicksburg and Pemberton's army drew supplies. To do this was General Grant's first intention—his main force started toward Edwards's Station, and McPherson's corps alone set out for Jackson. It was not until McPherson encountered stout resistance at Raymond that Grant concluded there was a strong enough force of the enemy at Jackson to require the attention of his main body.

(217) To guard Jackson and Vicksburg and the railway connecting them, at the same time, Pemberton made the fatal mistake of stretching his army across the space from Jackson to the Mississippi. He left two divisions at Vicksburg and Haynes's Bluff—one of which, at least, had to stay there so long as Sherman remained thereabouts with his corps, else Sherman would have turned his feints into a real attack and captured the town. One division, however, might have been withdrawn at once, and the bulk of the other as soon as Sherman withdrew to join Grant. Three of his divisions Pember-

ton placed at the different ferries of the Big Black to bar Grant's direct advance on Vicksburg; and the rest of his troops, two or three brigades which had been sent to him from other States, he left at Jackson. Thus he scattered his army so that it could make no effective resistance at any point.

What Pemberton should have done was to assemble his whole force as quickly as practicable at that point nearest Grant's line of march which all the detachments could reach before he should have to fight a decisive battle. Edwards's Station was perhaps the best point for the assembly. Having gotten his forces together he then should have attacked Grant if he felt strong enough to do so; or taken up a strong position such that Grant would have had to attack him in order to advance farther; or made use of his "power of attraction" to lead Grant farther and farther away from the Union base, and to gain time for reinforcements to come.

If Pemberton had taken position at Edwards's Station with his 35,000 men Grant could hardly have dared to move either against Vicksburg or Jackson without first attacking and defeating him. By the 14th of May the force at Jackson would have been reinforced to 12,000 men, if Sherman and McPherson had not taken the town that day. All of these 12,000 might have joined Pemberton at Edwards's Station by the 15th or 16th if he had been in position there with his other 35,000, delaying Grant; or if he had found it necessary to fall back before Grant's superior numbers farther north or east, such of the Jackson troops as had not been able to reach him at Edwards's Station could have joined him at some other point. With these reinforcements his united army would have numbered some 47,000,—a strong enough force to have taken the offensive.

If Pemberton had possessed the soldierly quality of obedience he might still have saved his army in spite of all the mistakes he had made. If he had moved,—as Johnston ordered,—from Edwards's Station to Clinton upon Grant's rear, at the time when Grant moved against Jackson, he might have gained some advantage in coöperation with the Confederate troops at Jackson. He would thus at least have lessened the distance between the two Confederate forces, and made better their chances of uniting. Instead of obeying Johnston's order Pemberton called a council of war and stayed at Edwards's Station nearly two days, then started southward to cut Grant's communications, when Grant had no communications. Then

later, when Johnston, who saw that all hope of saving Vicksburg was lost, ordered Pemberton to evacuate the place, Pemberton by vigorous movement might still have saved the remnant of his army, if he had obeyed Johnston's order. Instead of doing so Pemberton remained in Vicksburg, and lost his army as well as the town.

Vicksburg, Metz, Paris, Plevna, Santiago, Port Arthur, all point the lesson that an army which takes refuge in a fortified place and stays there to be besieged, will be lost. They also point the lesson that surrender is usually brought about more quickly by starvation than by saps and mines; that bombarding a beleaguered city does not shorten the siege; and that assaults in such cases are a useless sacrifice of life.*

Johnston saved his little army at Jackson by slipping away with it across Pearl River, when Sherman had surrounded the town on the side away from the river. Johnston showed a far better judgment throughout the campaign than Pemberton showed; but he lacked the sort of boldness and energy that might have delivered the Confederate army from the toils into which Pemberton had gotten it. If, instead of stopping at Jackson, Johnston had hurried on toward Vicksburg and taken command in person of the right wing of the army, he might have avoided the blunders from which it suffered, and saved it from capture. Johnston did nothing in this campaign that gave him any title to fame as a general.

Too much praise cannot be spoken of Admiral Porter's fleet; without its coöperation the campaign would have been impossible.

In the eighteen days' operations just preceding the siege both sides were greatly hampered by a lack of cavalry to do the work of reconnaissance. And even during the siege an adequate cavalry force, to watch for Johnston's movements, would have relieved Grant of considerable anxiety, and saved him the necessity of sending a large infantry force under Blair and Osterhaus to look for Johnston's army.

*Port Arthur does not point all these lessons.

LECTURE XX.

THE CHICKAMAUGA CAMPAIGN.

AFTER STONES RIVER.

(227) Having taken possession of Murfreesboro after the battle of Stones River, in the first days of January, 1863, Rosecrans, with his Army of the Cumberland, remained with his headquarters at that town until near the end of the following June. Bragg during the same time had his headquarters at Tullahoma, and kept his army so disposed as to cover the routes to Chattanooga.

Within this time there were no operations on a large scale between these two armies; the Confederate cavalry, however, was all the while very active. After capturing Grant's depot at Holly Springs Van Dorn had joined Bragg with three or four more thousands of cavalry. These with the squadrons of Wheeler and Forrest and Morgan made a mounted force greatly outnumbering Rosecrans's cavalry, and were a constant annoyance to the Union commander. They would break up the railways in rear of his army, attack isolated posts and detachments, capture wagon-trains, burn bridges, and do all manner of things to harass the army. For the first few weeks after the battle of Stones River Bragg's cavalry kept the army of the Cumberland on half rations. To oppose it Rosecrans begged the War Department for an adequate cavalry force properly equipped. He begged in vain. He had incurred the hostility of Mr. Stanton and General Halleck by writing them one or two right manly letters, and they would do nothing for him. Partly to make up for his lack of cavalry he mounted one of his infantry brigades [Wilder] on captured horses, and it did good work throughout the Chickamauga Campaign.

All the while the War Department was persuading, urging, and even threatening Rosecrans to induce him to move against Bragg's army and drive it out of Tennessee. Grant, who was conducting the campaign against Vicksburg, joined in urging Rosecrans to take the offensive, as, otherwise, he believed Bragg's army, or part of it, would be transferred to Mississippi—as a small part of it was. Rosecrans, on the other hand, argued that, if he moved against Bragg's army and drove it out of

Tennessee, he should only hurry it to reinforce the troops opposed to Grant in Mississippi. So he remained at Murfreesboro, doing the best he could to put his own army into good shape for active campaign, strengthening his bases, and keeping his communications open.

Meantime, by War Department orders, his troops had been organized into three corps: the Fourteenth under Thomas, the Twentieth under McCook, and the Twenty-first under Crittenden; they consisted practically of the same divisions that had composed the Center, Right Wing, and Left Wing, respectively, in the Stones River Campaign. In addition Rosecrans organized a Reserve Corps of three brigades under General Gordon Granger. The army numbered some 60,000, while Bragg had about 43,000. At the same time Buckner occupied the Valley of East Tennessee with a Confederate corps, and Burnside was organizing the Army of the Ohio with which to advance into East Tennessee from Kentucky, by way of Cumberland Gap.

At length, toward the end of June, Rosecrans was ready to move; Burnside was on his way toward Cumberland Gap; Grant had Pemberton's army invested in Vicksburg; and Lee was on his way to Gettysburg.

THE TULLAHOMA CAMPAIGN.

On the 23rd of June Rosecrans issued his orders for a forward movement. The main part of Bragg's army was at Shelbyville in an intrenched camp; but Hardee's corps was at Wartrace and Fairfield. The two cavalry corps were on the right and left of the line with their headquarters respectively at McMinnville and Columbia.* The position of the army was upon a high plateau, locally called the Barrens, accessible from the north only by way of the breaks and cañons. The principal approaches were by way of Hoover's Gap, Liberty Gap, and Guy's Gap. The railway and one of the roads to Murfreesboro passed through Bellbuckle Gap. All these passes were held by Confederate forces. The Shelbyville position was well-nigh impregnable from the front, so Rosecrans resolved to make a feint against this point with Granger's Reserve Corps and most of the cavalry, while he massed his three main corps

*Columbia is not shown on Map No. 227. It is southwest of Murfreesboro (almost due west of McMinnville) and about as far as McMinnville from Murfreesboro.

against Bragg's right at Wartrace. The army started in a pouring rain, and the roads were terrible. Granger's corps and the cavalry moved toward Shelbyville; McCook's corps took the road through Liberty Gap; Thomas's the Hoover's Gap road; Crittenden's corps marched first to Bradyville. The movement succeeded; there was considerable fighting at the gaps, but the Confederate right was forced back from one position after another, and the left had to fall back to keep from being cut off. By June 30 the Union army had reached Manchester, where it was concentrated; Bragg's army had retired as far as Tullahoma, where it had taken up a position.

(228) On the 1st of July Bragg evacuated Tullahoma and started for Chattanooga. Rosecrans pursued as vigorously as the deep roads and swollen streams would let him. It was now a stern-chase with all the advantages of topography in favor of the Confederates. Within a week Bragg's army was at Chattanooga. The Tullahoma Campaign had lasted nine days, within which time Rosecrans had so maneuvered as to force Bragg to abandon his intrenched camp at Shelbyville, his strong line of defense in the mountain gorges, his fortified base at Tullahoma, and all of the State west of the Tennessee River; and had lost only 560 men killed, wounded, and missing.

PLAN.

Rosecrans's next task was to wrest Chattanooga, the important railway center and key not only to East Tennessee, but to North Alabama, North Georgia, and Middle Tennessee as well, from Bragg. The Tennessee River and Cumberland Mountains were formidable obstacles across Rosecrans's path. Three plans of operations were to be considered: first, to force a passage of the river in the face of the Confederates at Chattanooga—a plan which had little to commend it; second, to cross the river considerably above the town, turn the right of Bragg's army, and strike its line of communications, which was the railway back through Dalton. This was the movement that Bragg was expecting, as it was the movement that would bring the columns of Rosecrans and Burnside more nearly within supporting distance of each other; had it been adopted by Rosecrans, Bragg would undoubtedly have endeavored to watch the movements of the enemy closely enough to be on hand with his main army near the point of passage.

By skilful maneuvers, however, Rosecrans could have deceived him, and, sooner or later, effected a crossing somewhere before Bragg discovered it. But either of these two plans would have taken the Federal army far away from the railway, and made it dependent upon wagon-trains and worthless mountain roads for its supplies. The third plan was to cross the river below Chattanooga and turn the Confederate left, intercepting the army's communications and taking the town in rear. This was the plan Rosecrans decided to adopt.

At the end of the short Tullahoma Campaign the Army of the Cumberland and Bragg's Army of the Tennessee "resumed in the main the attitude of the previous summer, when each was gathering forces for an aggressive movement"—the Army of the Cumberland being then under Buell. The Union army occupied camps from Winchester on the right to McMinnville on the left, forty miles apart. The Reserve Corps [Granger] was guarding the bases and lines of communication, and garrisoning posts as far back as Clarksville and Fort Donelson. Early in July the bulk of the cavalry concentrated at Salem, preparatory to a "general sweep" southward into Alabama.

Bragg stationed his headquarters and Polk's corps at Chattanooga and began at once to fortify the town. Hardee's corps was placed on the line of the railway to Knoxville, with its center at Tyner's Station. All the crossings of the Tennessee were prepared for defense as high up as Blythe's Ferry. Forrest's cavalry was stationed at Kingston,† and had orders to guard the approaches to the river from the Sequatchie Valley, and the crossings of the river, and to keep a watch upon Burnside's movements in East Tennessee. Wheeler's cavalry was out on the left, and a brigade of infantry was stationed at Bridgeport.

Halleck immediately began urging Rosecrans to "advance against the enemy south of the Tennessee."* In Rosecrans's judgment three things were needed for the success of his movement; these were ripe corn in the fields, the repair of the railway to the Tennessee River, and support for his flanks. Vicksburg had fallen, and he thought troops should be sent from Grant's command to cover his advance on the right; he wanted to wait for Burnside to come into East Tennessee on

*Van Horne.

†On the north bank of the Tennessee, about ninety miles above Chattanooga. Not shown on map No. 228.

his left; and it would be more than a month before the harvest of the corn in Tennessee and Georgia. The judgment of Rosecrans did not appeal to the Commanding-General at Washington, who dispatched him, on the 5th of August, a peremptory order to advance. Rosecrans, however, did not move until the middle of the month.

GEOGRAPHY.

Between the Army of the Cumberland and its objective, Bragg's army at Chattanooga or its line of communications, the Western and Atlantic Railroad, lay not only the high plateaus and the gorges of the Cumberland range west of the Tennessee, and this river itself, but also a series of mountain ridges, valleys, and streams, generally parallel to the river, on the eastern side. First is Sand Mountain, with a plateau ten or twelve miles wide and 2,200 feet above sea-level. This mountain ends in a mass of rough ridges and gorges, called Raccoon Mountain, enclosed in a deep bend of the Tennessee, about four miles west of Chattanooga. Next is the valley, two or three miles wide, of Will's and Lookout Creeks. These two creeks have their headwaters very near together, but flow in opposite directions, the first southwest and the second northeast, in a continuous valley. Beyond this valley is Lookout Mountain, another long ridge. About thirty miles south of Chattanooga this mountain divides, throwing off a long thin spur to the right, called Pigeon Mountain, and continuing in its main ridge, narrower and more rugged, straight toward Chattanooga. It ends abruptly, four miles south of the town in a commanding point of rock, rising from the edge of the Tennessee River. At the fork of Lookout and Pigeon Mountains is McLemore Cove, in the head of which are the sources of Chickamauga Creek. Beyond Lookout Mountain, toward the east, are other parallel ridges and valleys.

There were several villages in the valleys. There were no good roads in the region, but along the direction of all the valleys, and also along the tops of some of the plateaus, were ordinary country roads. Radiating from the river at Caperton's Ferry near Stevenson, and from Bridgeport and Shellmound, were roads leading through gaps in the ridges, and across the valleys, to the various towns. One of the roads from Shellmound, with branches coming into it from other

ferries, passed round the upper end of Mount Lookout to Chattanooga. Time would be required to repair all the roads before the wagons could go over them. The valleys contained some farms, but for the main part were covered with timber. The tops of the ridges, also, though of poor sandy soil, and almost destitute of water, had thin woods upon them. Indeed it was a difficult mountain region, different from any other in which a great campaign had as yet been carried on in this war, though not wholly unlike the theater of the Tullahoma Campaign.

OPERATIONS.

Rosecrans's movement began on the 16th of August. The passage of the river was to be made at points between Shellmound and Stevenson. The Twenty-first Corps [Crittenden] was to move in three columns through the Sequatchie Valley, covered by Minty's brigade of cavalry; the rest of the cavalry was to march beyond the right flank of the main army; the Fourteenth Corps [Thomas] was to move in two columns down Battle Creek and Big Crow Creek, respectively; McCook was to send Johnson's division of his corps [Twentieth] by way of Salem to Bellfonte, and Davis's division by way of the mountain road from Winchester to Stevenson; Sheridan's division of this corps had already been sent forward to Stevenson and Bridgeport; the Reserve Corps [Granger] was to follow up the movement of the main army and close up on it as soon as practicable.

To deceive Bragg as to the point of crossing, these movements were to be concealed as well as possible, and a detachment of three brigades under Hazen from Crittenden's corps was to make a feint all along the river, from Chattanooga as far up as the Confederates were defending the crossings. On the 21st of August a battery of this detachment threw shells into Chattanooga from the opposite bank of the river. By the evening of the 20th these movements had all been made and the army was concentrated near the Tennessee.

On the 6th of August "Burnside's advance into East Tennessee was announced by the presence of his cavalry in the vicinity of Knoxville."* Thereupon Bragg ordered Buckner to withdraw his corps from Knoxville to Loudon—back on the

**Campaigns of the Civil War* (Scribner's),—Henry M. Cist.

railway thirty miles nearer Chattanooga. Hazen's demonstration along the river caused Bragg to draw Buckner still nearer, and, a little while later, to order him into Chattanooga. About this time, also, Walker's corps of two divisions from Joseph E. Johnston's Mississippi forces joined Bragg's army, and Longstreet was started with two divisions and Alexander's battalion of artillery from Lee's army of Northern Virginia. Part of Longstreet's corps, however, did not arrive until after the battle of Chickamauga. Hardee had been detached from Bragg's army, and D. H. Hill had been assigned to it; Hill was now in command of a corps.

(229) Rosecrans did not have pontoons enough to build two bridges,—the river was high and wide from the recent heavy rains,—but by eking out his means with a trestle and rafts and boats he succeeded in passing his army to the east bank by the 4th of September. Thomas's corps [Fourteenth] took the road to Trenton; McCook's [Twentieth] took the road to Alpine by way of Winston's Gap; Crittenden's [Twenty-first] was ordered to move from Shellmound toward Chattanooga, threatening that place. All the cavalry except Minty's brigade accompanied McCook's column. Minty's brigade and Wilder's brigade of mounted infantry went with Crittenden's column.

On the 9th of September Rosecrans learned that Bragg had evacuated Chattanooga and was retreating southward. Rosecrans then ordered McCook, covered by the cavalry, to push ahead toward Alpine and Summerville to try to cut Bragg off, while Crittenden, passing through Chattanooga and leaving a brigade to garrison the town, was to pursue by the Ringgold Road, with Minty's brigade of cavalry and Wilder's brigade of mounted infantry covering his front. Thomas continued to advance by the Trenton-Lafayette Road. The two flanks of the army were marching forty miles apart, and the three columns were so far separated, one from another, by impassable mountains, that no two of them were within supporting distance of each other.

By the 10th McCook had reached Alpine; Thomas was at Stevens's Gap; his leading division [Negley] had met the enemy in Dug Gap; Crittenden was at Chickamauga Creek on the Ringgold Road; the head of his column had also met the enemy's cavalry. Reports received by the commanders of all three of the columns indicated that there was a large force of

Confederates in the neighborhood of Lafayette. And such was the case; it was Bragg's army.

Bragg had called in his outlying detachments, and, on the 8th of September, having learned that Rosecrans had crossed the river and was advancing against his rear, had evacuated Chattanooga and moved out on the Lafayette Road to meet the enemy. On this day, the 10th September, his army was concentrated behind Pigeon Mountain with its front and flanks covered by his cavalry. Cleburne's division of D. H. Hill's corps occupied the gaps of Pigeon Mountain.

Bragg was aware of the isolated positions of the Federal corps, and appears to have seen his opportunity to destroy them in detail. He has been greatly censured for his failure to do so. The evening of the 9th of September he had ordered Hindman to march his division [Polk's corps] into McLemore Cove and attack Negley's division in its advanced position; and he had ordered Hill to send or lead Cleburne's division through the gaps of Pigeon Mountain in conjunction with Hindman.

Hindman reached his position on the 10th, but Hill failed to carry out his part of the order. He reported that the gaps—Dug and Catlett's—had been closed with felled trees, and that it was impossible for him to get through them. Bragg thereupon ordered Buckner to march his corps to Hindman's assistance, which he did on the afternoon of the 10th. Thus three Confederate divisions were now within three miles of Negley's Federal division, which was far ahead of the rest of Thomas's corps. Instead of attacking Negley, as ordered, Hindman and Buckner conferred together and decided that another plan was better. They then sent back their recommendation to Bragg and awaited his reply—and lost their opportunity. Negley seeing the danger of his position, hastened back to Stevens's Gap, where he rejoined the rest of Thomas's corps. Bragg refused to adopt the plan recommended by his subordinates and insisted upon their carrying out his orders. At the same time he ordered Polk to march his other division to support Hindman and Buckner; and Walker to move his corps to Dug Gap. The whole combination, which ought to have succeeded, failed, apparently through the sloth and reluctance shown by Bragg's subordinate commanders in the execution of his orders.

Meantime Crittenden's Federal corps had divided; two divisions continued the march toward Ringgold, while one moved

to Lee and Gordon's Mills; both detachments were reconnoitering for Bragg's army. Bragg knew of this, and now turned his attention to Crittenden's corps. On the evening of the 12th of September he ordered Polk to move his corps and Walker's to Lee and Gordon's Mills and strike "Crittenden in detail."* At eleven o'clock that night Polk sent back a dispatch, stating "that he had taken a strong position for defense," and asking "that he be heavily reinforced."† Bragg replied to him that he was already greatly superior in number to the enemy in his front and promised to support him with reinforcements. He urged Polk to attack at dawn of the 13th. Early on the morning of the 13th Bragg moved with Buckner's corps to Polk's support. He found that Polk had not attacked, and that Crittenden had reunited his divisions on the west side of Chickamauga Creek. Finding that the Confederates had not retreated by way of Ringgold, Crittenden had marched his two divisions across from that place to Lee and Gordon's on the afternoon of the 12th.

(230) Bragg now concentrated his army along the east bank of Chickamauga Creek. As soon as his reinforcements under Longstreet from Virginia should arrive he meant to attack with his whole command.†

On the 12th of September, Rosecrans became convinced that Bragg was concentrating his army behind Pigeon Mountain, and he appreciated the danger of his own army's position with its flank columns thirty miles apart—from Lee and Gordon's Mills to Alpine—and Bragg's army holding the direct road between them. He sent an order at once to McCook, directing him to unite with Thomas. McCook began his march in obedience to this order on the night of the 13th by way of Valley Head. On the 17th he had his corps concentrated at the eastern end of Stevens's Gap. The corps of Thomas and Crittenden had been held in place to await McCook's arrival.

THE BATTLE OF CHICKAMAUGA.

On the morning of September the 18th Hood had reached Ringgold with three of Longstreet's brigades; six others and Alexander's battalion of artillery were on the way. Determined, as at Perryville and Stone's River, to get the initiative, Bragg decided not to await the arrival of the hinder six brigades and the artillery, but to advance in force at once. Long-

*Bragg's order to Polk.

†Cist.

street arrived on the night of the 19th with two more of the brigades, but the rest of his troops did not come in time to take part in the battle of Chickamauga.

Rosecrans had decided to take up a defensive position covering the roads to Chattanooga. On the morning of the 18th his troops were situated as follows: Crittenden's corps was in front of Lee and Gordon's; Thomas's corps was at Pond Spring; McCook's was on its right at Stevens's Gap; Granger's Reserve Corps was at Rossville; Mitchell's cavalry corps, except Minty's brigade, covered the right of the army and was along the road from Alpine to McLemore's Cove; Minty's brigade was on the Ringgold Road east of Reed's Bridge; and Wilder's mounted brigade guarded Alexander's Bridge.

Bragg planned to turn the left flank of the enemy and cut him off from the roads by way of Rossville and McFarland's Gap back to Chattanooga. Accordingly, on the morning of the 18th, he issued an order for an immediate movement. (231) Hood with his own and Bushrod Johnson's troops was to cross at Reed's Bridge, "turn to the left by the most practical route, and sweep up the Chickamauga toward Lee and Gordon's Mills."* This turning movement was to be followed progressively by Walker, who was to cross his corps at Alexander's Bridge, and Buckner, who was to cross his corps at Tedford's Ford, about three-quarters of a mile up-stream from Alexander's Bridge. Polk's corps was to cross at Lee and Gordon's, or, if the enemy should be found too strong there, at Dalton's or Tedford's Ford. (Dalton's Ford was about a mile and three-quarters below Lee and Gordon's.) Hill was to cover the left against a possible advance of the enemy from McLemore's Cove, or attack him in flank if he undertook to reinforce the troops at Lee and Gordon's. The cavalry was, of course, to cover the flanks—Wheeler on the left and Forrest on the right.

Rosecrans had guessed what Bragg's plan of battle was to be. The clouds of dust raised by the marching columns—especially by Longstreet's troops marching, on their way to reinforce Bragg, by the road from Dalton to Ringgold—indicated that Bragg's army was massing beyond the left of the Union army for the purpose of seizing the roads to Chattanooga. Accordingly, on the 18th, Thomas's corps, followed by McCook's, was started for the space between the crossings of the Chickamauga, above mentioned, and Missionary Ridge, to pre-

*D. H. Hill in *B. & L.*

vent Bragg from seizing the roads to Chattanooga. Two of the brigades of the Reserve Corps [Granger], also, marched toward Reed's Bridge; while the third moved out on the Ringgold Road to keep watch in that direction.

The advance of the Confederate columns on the 18th was slow, due to the narrow and difficult mountain roads, and to the resistance offered by Minty's cavalry and Wilder's mounted infantry. Minty's cavalry resisted stoutly the advance of Johnson's [Hood's] column (Hood joined this column and took command of it about 4 p.m.), but was finally driven across the creek; it managed to burn the bridge after one of the Confederate brigades had crossed. Wilder's mounted infantry successfully held Alexander's Bridge against Walker, and forced him to move down to Lambert's Ford in order to cross; Wilder was then driven beyond the Lafayette Road. Hood's six brigades and Walker's five bivouacked that night on the west side of the Chickamauga; the other Confederate corps bivouacked on the east bank, Buckner's at Tedford's and Dalton's Fords, Polk's opposite Lee and Gordon's Mills, and Hill's opposite Glass's Mill, a mile and a half above Lee and Gordon's.

(232) The forces on each side were in motion during the night of the 18th, and by morning on the 19th all the Confederate infantry except the divisions of Hindman, Breckinridge, and Cleburne, was on the west side of the creek. On the Union side Thomas's corps had come up. Negley's division of it had been placed at Crawfish Springs; Reynolds's near the Widow Glenn's; while those of Brannan and Baird took position covering the roads from Reed's and Alexander's Bridges. Crittenden's corps still held the crossing at Lee and Gordon's Mills; the two brigades from Granger's Reserve Corps were on the left beyond the road to Reed's Bridge; Minty's cavalry brigade was still on the left, and Wilder's mounted infantry was near the Widow Glenn's; McCook's corps had not come up.

Neither army knew the exact position of the other; none of the Federal commanders were aware that "seven-tenths of Bragg's army was on the west bank of the Chickamauga."* It is probable that division commanders on either side hardly knew where their own commands were, in the thick woods, let alone the other troops of their own army, or the troops of the hostile army. The lines were at this time about six miles long.

(233) Thomas now ordered Brannan to move two of his

*Van Horne.

brigades forward and reconnoiter toward the crossings of the Chickamauga. In carrying out this order, Brannan soon came into contact with Forrest's cavalry dismounted on the Confederate right. This brought on the battle of the 19th of September.

Forrest was driven back, and Walker's corps came into the fight on the Confederate side. Baird with his division came to the support of Brannan; but they were both driven back in disorder. Meantime McCook's corps had arrived at Crawfish Springs, and, at about 10 a.m., Johnson's division of this corps was sent by Rosecrans in all haste to help Thomas on the left. It arrived just in time to fall on the left flank of Liddell's Confederate division [Walker's corps] and drive it back with heavy loss.

A little while later Cheatham's Confederate division [Polk's corps] came into the battle at this point, too late to save Liddell; for about the same time Palmer's division [Crittenden's corps] and Reynolds's division [Thomas's corps] came to Johnson's assistance. Then Stewart's Confederate division [Buckner's corps] attacked Palmer's, which was assailing the flank of Cheatham's division, and drove it back. Johnson's division fell back at the same time. Soon, also, Reynolds's division was retiring, as well as Van Cleve's [Crittenden's corps], which had also been sent to this part of the line. It was now the middle of the afternoon, and all the Federal divisions except those of the Reserve Corps [Granger] were already at this part of the line, or were marching for it. (230) The Reserve Corps remained at McAfee's Church all day watching the Ringgold Road and covering the line of retreat through Rossville.

(233) Davis's division of McCook's corps had arrived from the extreme right in time to check the Confederate advance, and soon afterwards was joined by Wood's division of Crittenden's corps from Lee and Gordon's Mills. Sheridan [McCook's corps] also joined Wood and Davis with the bulk of his division from Crawfish Springs about 6 p.m.

About half-past two Hood had moved his brigades forward and fallen upon the divisions of Reynolds and Van Cleve, and, after desperate fighting, had forced them back, pierced the Union line, and got possession of the Lafayette Road at that point. Thereupon Negley's division and part of Brannan's attacked Hood's troops and succeeded in "driving them until darkness ended the combat."* Bragg had not succeeded in

*Cist.

turning the Federal left, and Rosecrans still had possession of the roads to Chattanooga.

About three o'clock Breckinridge's Confederate division [Hill's corps], from the left of Bragg's line, had relieved Hindman's division [Polk's corps] at Lee and Gordon's; Hindman's division then started for the line of battle by way of Dalton's Ford; Cleburne's division [Hill's corps] had crossed at Tedford's Ford. Later in the evening Breckinridge's division started toward the right of the Confederate line. Cleburne's division joined in the battle at about 6 p.m., but Hindman's and Breckinridge's did not reach the fighting front till darkness had ended the battle. Preston's Confederate division [Buckner's corps], also, had taken no part in the battle.

At eleven o'clock on the night of the 19th Longstreet, with two brigades of McLaws's division, reported his arrival to Bragg. All the Confederate army was now on the west bank of the Chickamauga, and Bragg gave orders to renew the battle with the same plan at daybreak on the 20th. Polk was placed in command of the right wing of the army, and Longstreet of the left wing.

Both armies had bivouacked where they found themselves at the end of the day's battle, but in the early morning of the 20th the lines were rearranged. (234) "Rosecrans withdrew his right from Lee and Gordon's Mill and the vicinity of Viniard's to the high ground west and north of the Widow Glenn's. The left of his line was formed around the northeast corner of the Kelly Field, the extreme left, facing north, being within 200 yards of the Lafayette Road. The line then extended along the low crest east of the Kelly Field, crossed the Lafayette Road at the northern edge of the Poe Field, and ran thence to Widow Glenn's. The Union line by divisions from left to right ran as follows: Baird, Johnson, Palmer, Reynolds, Brannan, Negley, and Sheridan, with Wilder's brigade of mounted infantry on the extreme right, and Van Cleve's, Wood's, and Davis's divisions west of the Crawfish Springs road in rear of the right wing."* During the night the Union position had been strengthened with breastworks made of logs, rails, and rocks. From Lee and Gordon's southward Mitchell's two divisions of Union cavalry and Wheeler's squadrons faced each other. The Reserve corps [Granger] was still at McAfee's Church.

In the Confederate line Forrest's cavalry and the right of

*Legend with *Official Maps*.

Breckinridge's division reached beyond the Union left. The other divisions were arranged as follows: Cleburne, Stewart, Bushrod Johnson, and Hindman in the front line; Walker's corps to the right and rear of Breckinridge; Preston's division to the left and rear of Hindman; the divisions of Cheatham, Hood, and McLaws at first in reserve. Although Bragg expected to renew the attack with his extreme right, Hill's corps, at daylight, and to take it up with his troops successively toward his left, it was not until 9.30 a.m. that Breckinridge's division opened the battle. Apparently Polk, who commanded Bragg's right wing, made no effort to carry out his commander's order to attack at daybreak. Bragg's orders were given to Polk at midnight, but did not reach Hill until 7.30 a.m. The troops were not then in position, and there was a dense fog which hindered their movements. Two hours were spent in getting them into position.*

With part of Forrest's cavalry dismounted on his right, Breckinridge moved his division forward. Within fifteen minutes Cleburne's division advanced on his left. Breckinridge's division enveloped the left of Thomas's line and forced it back; but Cleburne's division and the left of Breckinridge's were stopped by the fire from behind the Union breastworks. Breckinridge's right had pushed on beyond the Rossville Road, and was in position to take Thomas's main line in reverse. But reinforcements had been hurried to Thomas's left. Rosecrans had foreseen, in his inspection of the position before the battle opened, that Bragg was going to repeat the effort to turn his left, and he had personally ordered Negley's division from the right to the left of the Union line. Other troops had been hurried to that part of the line, also, and with their combined effort they checked Breckinridge's envelopment and drove his troops away from Thomas's left and rear. Cleburne's assault had fallen upon Palmer and Johnson, and a desperate fight had ensued.

At eleven o'clock Stewart's Confederate division advanced and struck the divisions of Reynolds and Brannan in the Union line, pressing them back beyond the Lafayette Road. Here it "encountered a fresh artillery fire on both front and flank, heavily supported by infantry, and had to retire."† About this time Walker's corps was put into the battle to assist Breckinridge.

*Alexander.

†D. H. Hill.

Up to this time there had practically been no fighting along the right of the Union line; so Rosecrans had continually withdrawn troops from that part of his line and dispatched them to Thomas on the left. He "sent word to Thomas that he would be supported if it required all of McCook's and Crittenden's corps to do so."* Negley's division, as we have seen, had been withdrawn from its position in the right wing and sent to Thomas early in the morning, and Wood's division had taken Negley's place in the right wing. A little after eleven o'clock Wood's division, through a blunder of one of Thomas's staff officers, was ordered to close to the left of Reynolds. To carry out the order, Wood withdrew his division from the line and started to march it by the rear of Brannan's division. This left a wide gap in the Union line between Brannan's right and Sheridan's left.

Just at this time Longstreet's turn to move out had arrived in Bragg's progressive order of attack. Stewart's division was already in motion, and the order had been given for the rest of the wing to advance. Bushrod Johnson's division was on the right of the front line and Hindman's on the left; Hood's division was behind Johnson's, and Preston's was in reserve on the left. Wood had hardly moved a brigade's length in his flank march when he was struck by Longstreet's column. "Longstreet has been given great credit for it, which, however, he never claimed. It was entirely accidental and unforeseen, but in a brief period it threw the entire left [right] flank of the enemy in a panic."† Brannan and Wood were struck in flank and forced to withdraw; and Davis's division which was moving to fill the gap left by Wood, Sheridan's division on Davis's right, and Wilder's brigade on the extreme right were cut off and driven from the field.

These troops withdrew by a road through McFarland's Gap. After passing round through Rossville, the troops of Sheridan and Davis returned to the Union line at about 7 p.m., in time to aid in covering the withdrawal of the Union army. Rosecrans, McCook, and Crittenden were carried away from the battle-field with these columns and did not return to it. Thomas was left in command of the Union troops.

(235) Contrary to Bragg's original plan of enveloping the left of the Union position, Longstreet's line now swung to the

*Cist.

†Alexander.

right,—a movement justified by the changed condition,—sweeping before it the troops of Brannan and Wood, which it had taken in flank. The Federals took advantage of a pause in the fighting to form a new line facing south, on a wooded ridge just south of the Snodgrass house. This line was composed of Brannan's division, with fragments of Wood's, Negley's, and Van Cleve's divisions. At two o'clock Longstreet assaulted the Union line with five brigades, and came near enveloping Brannan's right. This was prevented by the timely arrival of Gordon Granger with Steedman's division of the Reserve Corps.

Granger, over at McAfee's Church, had heard the heavy firing of the batteries, and without orders, in fact contrary to his orders, had left one brigade to watch the Ringgold Road and the line of retreat through Rossville, and with Steedman's division had hastened to the sound of the battle. He arrived in the nick of time. Steedman led his division against Longstreet's left, and, after a desperate struggle, drove it back and took possession of the hill it had gained on Brannan's right. "At three o'clock Longstreet, with three divisions—McLaws's, Hindman's, and Johnson's—again assaulted the Union line and was repulsed."* Later in the day Longstreet, with a view to recovering this key-point, asked Bragg for reinforcements from the right wing. Bragg replied that the troops of his right wing "had been beaten back so badly that they could be of no service to him."† Thereupon Longstreet formed a column of such troops as he could get together and assaulted the hill that Steedman had taken from him.

The combat that took place here was desperate, and it kept up till dark. The ammunition of the National troops became almost exhausted, and Longstreet's final charges had to be met with the bayonet. Steedman was driven back to the next ridge in his rear, and the Confederates occupied the ground on Brannan's right.

Meantime the battle had been renewed on the left of Thomas's position. At about four o'clock D. H. Hill's corps [Breckinridge and Cleburne], reinforced by a part of Walker's corps, again assaulted this part of the Union line. At six o'clock Cheatham's division joined in the attack. By this time the right of the force had enveloped the Union left, and was across the Rossville Road. Here it was a little while later

**Official Maps and Legend.*

†*Cist.*

attacked by Reynolds's division and driven back to the east of the road. Reynolds's division was at this time withdrawing from the field. Thomas, whom Rosecrans had ordered several hours before to retire, had given the order to withdraw by way of McFarland's Gap to Rossville, and the line was withdrawn by divisions from the right of the Kelly Field.

(236) After seven o'clock the line on Snodgrass Hill was withdrawn. The Union army passed through McFarland's Gap, and between midnight of the 20th and morning of the 21st "reformed in Rossville Gap, upon the adjoining crests of Missionary Ridge, and across Chattanooga Valley to Lookout Mountain."* Here the army remained until after nightfall of the 21st, when it was withdrawn to Chattanooga. The night of the 20th found Bragg's army in possession of the battlefield. Wheeler's cavalry made a "slight demonstration on McFarland's Gap" on the 21st, and Forrest's on Rossville Gap; with this exception Bragg's army did not follow up or molest the Union army that day.

It is hard to determine what were the numbers on each side engaged in the battle of Chickamauga. General Alexander gives the following figures:

Confederates, 47,520 infantry and artillery, and 14,260 cavalry; total 61,780.

Federals, 55,799 infantry and artillery, and 9,842 cavalry; total 65,641.

The figures given in *Battles and Leaders* are as follows:

Federals, 56,965 of all arms; Confederates, 71,551 of all arms.

The Confederates lost about 2,000 killed and 13,000 wounded; the Federals, about 1,700 killed and 10,000 wounded.

COMMENTS.

(227) It is seldom that two hostile armies find themselves in precisely the relative positions that the Army of the Cumberland [Rosecrans] and the Army of Tennessee [Bragg] occupied, when the former was at Murfreesboro and the latter held the line Shelbyville-Wartrace-Fairfield. The two armies used parts of the same almost straight railway as lines of communication, and the front of each was squarely across the road—the very best position an army can have with reference to its line of communications. The Confederate army had

*Legend with *Official Maps*.

the advantage of topography in its position, but the Federal army had the advantage of numbers; the former was on the defensive, the latter on the offensive. Each army had but a single point, its base, and its line of communications to cover. Neither army had a wide stretch of country to defend or several cities to guard; Chattanooga was the single object of contention.

The first phase of the general campaign, that phase usually spoken of as the Tullahoma Campaign, was, on the part of the Union forces, an example of what von der Goltz calls "the strategic attack of a wing"; the last phase of it, the passage of the Tennessee and the operations thereafter, was an example of a "strategic turning movement." The first was, in a way, entirely successful; the second was successful in so far as to gain the main objective for which the campaign was undertaken. Yet the capture of Chattanooga involved an unusual turn of events; to wit, the army that had taken the offensive, in order to get possession of the town, was beaten and driven back into it, and was there besieged by the very army it had successfully maneuvered out of the town. If, in his invasion of Kentucky, after placing his army across Buell's communications, Bragg had proceeded to capture Louisville, and then had been beaten and driven into the city, and there besieged by Buell, his case would have been similar to that of Rosecrans in the Chickamauga Campaign.

The chief end of strategy is to destroy or capture the hostile army. This is the end a commander should keep in view, and not simply to get possession of towns or territory. Viewed from this standpoint, no part of Rosecrans's operations was a success; but viewed as a game of maneuvers, General Rosecrans's first nine days of offensive operations were a triumph of strategic skill. With the loss of only 560 men he forced Bragg's army to abandon a naturally strong line of defense, which it had spent six months in further strengthening with fortifications, and compelled it to retreat all the way back to its base, a hundred miles in rear. He fairly outmaneuvered Bragg.

His first maneuver was to make a vigorous demonstration against Bragg's left, and with the bulk of his army to force back the Confederate right. This succeeded until he finally reached Manchester with the main body of his troops. By this time Bragg was at Tullahoma with his main army. Rosecrans had his own communications covered, and was in reach of

Bragg's. There was, therefore, nothing for Bragg to do but to fall back farther. The stout resistance made by Hardee's corps at Hoover's Gap, and the heavy roads and swollen streams, due to the continuous rain, retarded Rosecrans's enveloping columns enough to prevent them from seizing Bragg's communications and forcing him to fight faced to the rear.

In this short campaign Rosecrans made the first use in the Civil War of the kind of flank or turning movements afterwards successfully employed by Sherman in the Atlanta campaign. Such movements constituted a favorite method of Napoleon in offensive mountain warfare; that is the method by which the attention of the enemy in position at a gorge or upon heights is occupied by one force, while another turns his position and gains or threatens his rear by a different pass.

(229) From the time when the Army of the Cumberland crossed the Tennessee, until it was shut up by the Army of Tennessee in Chattanooga, there was little in the strategy of either Rosecrans or Bragg to commend. Each commander seemed to be more ignorant concerning his adversary's movements than was generally the case in the campaigns of this war; this ignorance was the chief cause of the mistakes. The country was so rugged and wooded, and so lacking in roads and good trails, that it was impossible for the cavalry to do first rate reconnaissance. Yet it should seem that the cavalry ought to have been able to do better work than it did. In fact, if we except the work of Minty's cavalry brigade and Wilder's mounted infantry, the cavalry operations in this campaign do not appear to have been as good as we find in many other campaigns of the war. More fault can be found with the Confederate cavalry than with that of the Federals, mainly because its strength was greater. Bragg had 14,260 troopers, while Rosecrans had only 9,842.* It should seem that Wheeler and Forrest ought to have met the Federal columns as soon as those columns got across the Tennessee, and, by holding the mountain passes, ought to have delayed their progress many days. Time was of great importance to Bragg—a few more days would have brought him four more of Longstreet's brigades and Alexander's battalion of artillery. The trouble with Bragg's cavalry at this time was the lack of unity in its command. It consisted practically of two corps under separate commanders, Wheeler and Forrest, with no single cavalry general commanding them as a body.

*Alexander.

It was misinformation concerning Bragg's movements that induced Rosecrans to send his columns forward on such widely separated roads; and while Bragg was aware that one Federal column was on the Ringgold Road and another in McLemore's Cove, about fifteen miles distant, he could not have known that McCook's column was so far separated from Thomas's column, and that Granger's Reserve Corps was so far in rear, else he must surely have attacked and destroyed one or another of the columns in detail.

He had his own army in hand from the day on which it marched out of Chattanooga [September 8]; from that time until McCook united with Thomas in McLemore's Cove on the 17th all the advantage of position was with Bragg. It is seldom that an army finds itself in so perilous a situation as that of Rosecrans's army during those days; it is seldom a general is given such an opportunity to destroy his adversary's army in detail as there fell to Bragg. Considering the eagerness Bragg usually showed to attack when he had any chance of winning, it can only be concluded that he failed to take advantage of his opportunity through ignorance of the enemy's predicament. To be sure, he did issue orders for an attack against Thomas's advanced division [Negley] in McLemore's Cove, and as late as the night of the 12th of September he ordered Polk to attack Crittenden's isolated divisions; but his subordinate commanders failed to execute his orders. Thereafter he was content to stand fast and wait until Hood arrived with reinforcements from Virginia on the 18th. Four precious days, from the 13th to the 16th, inclusive, were thrown away. Bragg's army without the Virginia troops was superior in numbers to any force Rosecrans could have opposed to him during that time. On the 17th, however, the Federal columns were united. After that Bragg ought to have waited until all of his Virginia reinforcements had joined, before he attacked. In fact he ought to have taken up a defensive position and awaited attack from Rosecrans.

Bragg did not have the knack of getting cheerful service out of his subordinate officers; but as the commander enjoys the reward of his subordinates' fitness and performance, so, also, must he suffer the blame for their unfitness and failure. If they will not, or cannot, do his bidding, he can relieve them on the spot and put others into their places. If Bishop Polk would not obey Bragg's orders he ought to have been sent to the rear in arrest instant. Kitchener's favorite reply is a good one

for a commander to remember: "Your reasons for not doing what you were told to do are the best I ever heard; now go and do it."

Some of Bragg's critics have censured him for quitting Chattanooga. He certainly left the town an easy capture for Rosecrans; but he probably saved his own army by withdrawing it. Had he remained in Chattanooga, Rosecrans would have taken possession of his communications and invested the town. Within a week Rosecrans would have been joined by Burnside's army from Knoxville, and a little later by a part of Grant's from Memphis; and he would have had Bragg's army as securely trapped as Grant had Pemberton's at Vicksburg.

Bragg ought, however, to have been able easily to keep his army between the main part of the Union army and Chattanooga, and at the same time to guard his railway back to Dalton. If, while he was waiting for Longstreet's divisions, from about the 10th to the 18th of September, he had destroyed or captured Crittenden's corps, or forced it back, and had placed his own army across the valley of Chickamauga Creek, facing south and covering Rossville Gap, he would have blocked the road to Chattanooga, and stood in a position to strike the Federal columns in flank if they moved against his own communications, the railway through Dalton. Here also he would have been in position to attack Burnside's army, if it had attempted to slip down from Knoxville to seize Chattanooga. On the arrival of Longstreet's whole force Bragg could then have taken the offensive against the rest of Rosecrans's army.

In putting into effect Longstreet's suggestion to transfer troops from Virginia to Bragg's assistance the Confederate authorities had waited too long; if they had done it, and on a larger scale, before Gettysburg and the fall of Vicksburg, the results might have been decisive; if they had done it as soon as practicable after the defeat of Gettysburg, Rosecrans might have been beaten on the west bank of the Tennessee and Chattanooga saved; if they had done it before Burnside seized Knoxville, near the end of August, Bragg would have had nine of Longstreet's infantry brigades and his artillery at the battle of Chickamauga in place of only five of his brigades. Burnside's presence at Knoxville closed the short line of railway from Virginia, and forced the Confederate reinforcements to travel the long route by way of Petersburg, Wilmington, Augusta, and Atlanta. The first train started from Louisa Court House, Virginia, on September the 9th, but did not reach Ringgold

until the 18th. The artillery did not arrive there until the 25th.*

TACTICS.

(232) The attack at Chickamauga had the usual fault of being made in detail, and the victory, like others, was not made complete by a vigorous pursuit. The fighting was desperate and the losses were heavy. Bragg's plan of attack, an envelopment of the Federal left, was all right, but his method, a successive movement from right to left, was faulty; the execution was tardy and ineffectual, due to the thick woods, the fog on the morning of the 20th September, and the lack of prompt and cheerful obedience on the part of subordinate commanders. It would have been better to let the secondary attack begin first along the enemy's front, to gain and hold his attention in that quarter; then to let the main attack, the enveloping movement, follow.

(233) The penetration made by Longstreet's column on the 20th, and his right-turn, though contrary to Bragg's purpose of turning the Union left, was most effective; but it did not destroy or capture any considerable part of the Union army. In fact Chickamauga was to Bragg's army a Pyrrhic victory—costly and barren.

General Alexander makes the following critical summary of the second day's attack: "The battle was opened by two divisions attacking the whole army of the enemy in a fortified position, the attack being made in a single line without supports at hand. They are defeated and put out of action for the day. Two more divisions try and fare little better. A fifth, in reserve, sends in one brigade without result; four are not engaged. The morning is gone and the battle of the Right Wing is over. That of the Left Wing is scarcely begun. It advances, finds by accident a gap in the enemy's line, and drives off three divisions of the enemy. The Left Wing fights the rest of the enemy's army (three-fourths of it) until near dark, when both wings unite and drive the enemy off the field, darkness covering his retreat. It is the old familiar story of piecemeal attacks." At the time that Longstreet asked Bragg for reinforcements to help him complete his victory by crushing Thomas's right, and received the answer that "there was no fight left in the right wing," Cheatham's division was standing

*Alexander.

idle in that wing, as it had been doing all morning and continued to do until 6 p.m.

The divisions of Davis and Sheridan which were cut off by Longstreet's assault might have rallied within a mile of the battle-field, for they were virtually not pursued. If they had done so, and had returned and assailed Longstreet's left flank, which was in the air, they might have turned the victory against him. Instead of doing that they marched all the way to Ross-ville before countermarching; when they got back near the field the battle was over.

LECTURE XXI.

THE BATTLES AROUND CHATTANOOGA.

(236) Having withdrawn from Rossville Gap on the night of September the 21st, 1863, the Army of the Cumberland formed in front of Chattanooga "from the river above to the river below." The cavalry had covered the movement and occupied the roads in the Chattanooga Valley until it was driven in by the Confederates. (237) The Union army occupied as salients the strong unfinished works left by Bragg's army, and before noon of the 22nd had them connected by rifle-pits. "Within two days these rifle-pits became formidable earth-works."* A little before midday on the 22nd September the Confederate cavalry, supported by McLaws's division of infantry, passed through Rossville Gap and down the other roads in the Chattanooga Valley, and advanced to within three miles of Chattanooga.

Bragg's main army did not quit the field of Chickamauga until the afternoon of the 21st, when Polk's corps started down the valley of the Chickamauga. The movement northward continued on the 22nd and 23rd, and ended by placing the Confederate army in position in front of the Union army. The Confederate line stretched along the western base of Missionary Ridge from near the railway tunnel to a point about two miles farther south than Orchard Knob; thence it bent westward across Chattanooga Valley to Mount Lookout. Bragg now contented himself with investing the Federal army with this incomplete line, leaving to Wheeler's cavalry the task of cutting off its communications with its depot at Bridgeport on the northern side of the river, and the destruction of its railway beyond that point.

(238) Rosecrans placed his cavalry on the northern bank of the river from Washington to Caperton's Ferry (near Stevenson) to protect his trains passing from Bridgeport to Chattanooga, and to watch for the enemy at the river crossings. Wheeler, however, eluded the Union cavalry, and, on the 1st of October, got across the river with a large force of horsemen and made for Rosecrans's communications. At

*Legend with *Official Maps*.

this time the shortest roads from Chattanooga to Bridgeport—the one by way of Brown's and Kelly's Ferries, and the one by way of Wauhatchie and Whiteside—were commanded by Confederate batteries on Mount Lookout, and watched by Confederate sharpshooters; and the only route available for the use of the Federal army was the difficult road, sixty miles long, over Walden's Ridge and thence down the Sequatchie Valley. Wheeler struck this road at Anderson's Cross-Roads in the Sequatchie Valley, and there destroyed 300 wagons of the Federal trains and captured a large number of mules.

But the Federal cavalry, which had started in pursuit, was close on his heels. (227) He made for Murfreesboro with the view to destroy the railway and the Federal stores collected there; but Crook's column of Federal cavalry reached Murfreesboro ahead of him and turned him southward. Without accomplishing the destruction of the Nashville railway he was finally driven out of Tennessee in a very shattered condition, across the Tennessee River, into Alabama. In these cavalry operations "marches were made on several days ranging from forty to fifty-seven miles,"* and many combats took place, in several of which the "saber was freely used."

(238) Meanwhile the condition of the beleaguered army was becoming very serious. At first the wagon-trains were large and in good condition, and it looked as if they would be able to keep the army supplied with provisions even though they had to haul by way of the long Sequatchie Valley—Walden's Ridge road. But early in October rains set in, and soon the roads became almost impassable. "The destruction of hundreds of wagons and animals by Wheeler was almost fatal to the army. The remaining animals, from necessity, were pressed beyond endurance." Each successive trip from Bridgeport was made with fewer wagons and lighter loads; and the rations issued had to be reduced in a like proportion.* The artillery horses died by the score from starvation, and in the end the batteries could not be moved for want of animals. It began to look as if the Union army would have to choose the alternative of surrender or "retreat with great peril and certain loss of all matériel." Bragg believed the army would be forced by starvation to surrender. But this was not so. The country and the authorities at Washington had become thor-

*Van Horne.

oughly aroused concerning the perilous situation of the Army of the Cumberland, and vigorous efforts were making for its relief. Orders had already been sent to General Grant at Vicksburg directing him to dispatch a large force to aid Rosecrans; Burnside, at Knoxville, had also been ordered to go to his assistance; and Hooker had been started for Chattanooga with the Eleventh and Twelfth Corps [Howard and Slocum] from the Army of the Potomac.* These troops ought all to have been sent in time to aid Rosecrans in his battle with Bragg—the battle of Chickamauga. No more troops were now wanted within the lines at Chattanooga, until the railway from Bridgeport to Nashville could be made secure against raids, and a shorter wagon-road could be opened between Bridgeport and Chattanooga. Rosecrans, therefore, ordered Hooker, upon his arrival at Nashville, to place his troops along the railway and guard it until arrangements could be made for opening the shorter route to Bridgeport. The bulk of Hooker's command took station at Bridgeport ready for call to Chattanooga the moment it should be required.

Some changes in the organization and among the subordinate commanders of the two hostile armies had taken place. McCook and Crittenden had both been relieved of command and ordered before a court of inquiry to account for their conduct at the battle of Chickamauga, and their two corps, the Twentieth and Twenty-first, had been consolidated into a single corps, numbered the Fourth, and placed under the command of General Gordon Granger. In Bragg's army Polk had been relieved of command and placed under charges for "failing to open the battle of the 20th (September) at daylight," at Chickamauga, as he had been ordered to do. Most of Bragg's generals were at loggerheads with him, and all that could do so had got away from him. D. H. Hill and Buckner were gone, but Hardee had rejoined. Bragg's army was now organized in three corps under Longstreet, Hardee, and Breckinridge, respectively.

The Washington authorities had at last awakened to the impolicy of having several armies in the field operating independently of one another, and with no common head except General Halleck at the Capital. They had discovered the man equal to the command of all the armies and operations in the southwestern theater. General Grant had already been ordered

*Cist. Grant.

to go to Nashville "to superintend the movement" of the troops sent by him to reinforce Rosecrans. Later he was ordered to proceed "to the Galt House, Louisville, Kentucky, where [he] would meet an officer from the War Department with his instructions."* The officer was the Secretary of War, Mr. Stanton, who joined Grant on the way to Louisville. This was about the 17th or 18th of October.

General Grant says: "The Secretary handed me two orders, saying that I might take my choice of them. The two were identical in all but one particular. Both created the Military Division of the Mississippi, giving me the command, composed of the Departments of the Ohio, the Cumberland, and the Tennessee, and all the territory from the Alleghanies to the Mississippi River, north of Banks's command in the southwest. One order left the department commanders as they were, while the other relieved Rosecrans and assigned Thomas in his place. I accepted the latter." The order was dated October 16. A copy of it was sent to Rosecrans and reached him on the 19th.

While Stanton and Grant were still at Louisville the Secretary received a telegram from Mr. C. A. Dana, at Chattanooga, "informing him that, unless prevented, Rosecrans would retreat, and advising peremptory orders against his doing so."* The telegram was sent, of course, before Rosecrans received his order of relief. There was really no truth in the telegram. All the evidence goes to show that at that time Rosecrans had no notion of retreating, but had all arrangements under way for opening a short line of supply by way of Brown's and Kelly's Ferries, and thence by boat to Bridgeport. So far as I am able to make out, Mr. Dana was a sort of chartered spy placed by the War Department to keep it confidentially advised of what was going on at the headquarters of this army. Truly, the military service of the United States had its drawbacks under Mr. Stanton and General Halleck! Those two men sent many a loyal and able soldier to his grave with a heart crushed under the burden of their injustice. Rosecrans was far too frank and outspoken to last under them. On the receipt of Mr. Dana's telegram Stanton, in a state of great excitement, sent for Grant. The latter wired Thomas, who was now in command at Chattanooga, "that he must hold Chattanooga at all hazards." Thomas replied, "We will hold the town till we starve."

*Grant.

(240) Meanwhile there was practically no fighting between the hostile lines around Chattanooga. The Confederates threw a few shells into the town, but they did no harm. The lines of hostile outposts were so close together that the sentinels could swap yarns and tobacco at some points. The main Confederate position at the foot of the slopes was fortified with breast-works, and there were some unfinished earthworks half-way up the hillside.

The right of the Confederate line was held by Hardee's corps, and the center by Breckinridge's, while Longstreet's corps held the left of the line from Chattanooga Creek to Mount Lookout; batteries occupied the northern point of this mountain, but were too high above the Federal works to be effective. Beyond the mountain Bragg had a string of sharpshooters stretched along the river-bank from Lookout Creek to a point ten miles down-stream. They were to guard the road on the opposite bank and prevent the passage of the Union trains, and were supported by Law's brigade of infantry from Longstreet's corps. The railway and roads toward Bridgeport on the south bank of the river were guarded by the cavalry; but Longstreet says this cavalry "was not found as watchful as the eyes of an army should be."

The project which Rosecrans had begun arranging, and Thomas continued, for shortening the line of communications with Bridgeport, was approved and completed by General Grant, who reached Chattanooga on the 23rd of October. (239) By examining the map it will be seen that the Tennessee River flows west for a mile or two at Chattanooga, then bends and flows south for about two miles until it strikes the rock of Mount Lookout, by which it is turned round to the west again. Then it flows north and makes a deep bend round the northern end of Raccoon Mountain. With two or three more windings round the mountain spurs, in a generally south-westerly course, it passes Bridgeport. Across the narrow tongue of land called Moccasin Point was Brown's Ferry, about two miles from Chattanooga, and at the eastern end of the road that led over Raccoon Mountain to Kelly's Ferry. By this route Kelly's Ferry was only eight miles from Chattanooga; by the river it was twenty-odd miles. Part of the way, between the two ferries, the river, where it flowed through a narrow channel of rock, was too swift to be navigated by such boats as were available. So a plan was devised to throw a pontoon-bridge across the Tennessee at Brown's Ferry, get

control of the country south of the river and west of Lookout Mountain, and establish a line of communications by wagon-road from Chattanooga to Kelly's Ferry, and by boat from the ferry to Bridgeport. The execution of the plan required the coöperation of Hooker's command from the direction of Bridgeport. A steamer had been built at Bridgeport, and one captured at Chattanooga had been put in running order; and pontoons had been constructed for use in the enterprise.

General W. F. Smith, chief engineer of the Army of the Cumberland, had devised the scheme and worked out its details, and he was entrusted with its execution from the Chattanooga side. He was given two brigades, Hazen's and Turchin's, and three batteries. Hooker was ordered to cross the river at Bridgeport with the Eleventh Corps and one division of the Twelfth "and march up by Whiteside's and Wauhatchie to Brown's Ferry. General Palmer, with a division of the Fourteenth Corps, was ordered to move down the river on the north side, by a back road, until opposite Whiteside's, then cross and hold the road in Hooker's rear after he had passed."*

Hooker crossed the river on the 26th of October and began his march; at 3 o'clock on the morning of the 27th Smith's pontoon-boats were cast loose at Chattanooga. They bore 1,500 picked men under Hazen; the rest of Smith's command under Turchin marched overland to Brown's Ferry. The night was foggy, and, by keeping in close to the right bank, the boats passed unnoticed by the Confederate outposts until they were about to touch shore at the western side of Brown's Ferry. Here the Confederate picket fired a "harmless volley and fled." The troops from the boats quickly landed and took possession of the heights above the ferry. A small Confederate force, aroused by the firing of the picket, hurried to attack the Federals on the heights; but, in the short combat that followed, they were defeated, and they retired up the valley. Turchin's part of the Union command, meanwhile, had been brought over from the right bank. The pontoon-bridge was promptly laid. "For an hour or so in the morning the work progressed under an artillery fire from the rebel batteries on Lookout Mountain";† but the Federal losses were only six killed, twenty-three wounded and nine missing. Six Confederates were captured and six left dead on the ground. The position was intrenched by the Federals and held until the arrival of

*Grant.

†Cist.

Hooker's troops the next day. "No attempt was made by Bragg to dislodge this force or to destroy the bridge."*

Hooker marched by the road along the base of Raccoon Mountain into Lookout Valley. On the 28th, near where this road joined the valley road, Howard's corps, which was in the lead, met the Confederate advance post and drove it down the valley. This was a part of the Confederate brigade [Law] placed in the valley to support the line of sharpshooters along the river. The detachment in its retreat destroyed the railway-bridge over Lookout Creek. Hooker's command moved on, and Howard's corps halted for the night at six o'clock, within about two miles of Brown's Ferry. Geary's division of the Twelfth Corps was left at Wauhatchie to guard the road to Kelly's Ferry.

The Confederate cavalry on the left does not appear to have been very vigilant, but Longstreet's signal party reported the advance of a large force of the enemy from the direction of Bridgeport on the afternoon of the 27th. Bragg, according to Longstreet, did not credit the report. The next day, the 28th, Bragg and Longstreet stood on the top of Mount Lookout and watched Hooker's column "marching quietly along the valley toward Brown's Ferry."† Longstreet says: "Presently the rear-guard came in sight and made its bivouac immediately in front of the point where we stood." This was Geary's division at Wauhatchie.

(240) It was arranged to make a night attack upon this detachment with three brigades of Hood's division (now under Jenkins), reinforced by Law's brigade, which, having fallen back before Hooker's advance, was in bivouac "near the northern base of the mountain about a mile east of the" road by which the enemy was marching. Law with his own and two of Jenkins's brigades took a position to check troops from Howard's corps, in case they should be sent to Geary's assistance, and Jenkins led his other brigade to assault Geary.

On hearing the sound of battle at Wauhatchie, Hooker dispatched Howard's corps to Geary's aid. On the way Howard encountered Law's detachment and drove it away, but failed to reach Geary. Geary, however, repulsed Jenkins's attack. The casualties on both sides were heavy.

General Alexander characterizes this night attack as "one of the most foolhardy adventures of the war." "Night-attacks,"

*Cist.

†Longstreet.

he says, "are specially valuable against troops who have been defeated and are retreating. They are of little value under any other circumstances." This attack would have had little effect on the campaign if it had succeeded.

After these combats Lookout Valley and the short line of communication with Bridgeport by way of Brown's and Kelly's Ferries were held by Hooker without further molestation; and the problem of supplying the forces in Chattanooga was solved.

In the early days of November Bragg detached Longstreet's corps with Wheeler's cavalry and Alexander's artillery, in all about 20,000 men, and dispatched them against Burnside at Knoxville. This created great anxiety at Washington, and Grant was urged to act promptly and send relief to Burnside. Grant knew that the quickest way to relieve Burnside was to attack Bragg and force him to recall Longstreet to his assistance. Accordingly, on the 7th of November, he ordered Thomas to attack Bragg's right. As Thomas, however, did not have the animals to move a "single piece of artillery,"* he could not make the attack. "Nothing was left to be done," General Grant remarks, "but to answer Washington dispatches as best I could, urge Sherman forward, although he was making every effort to get forward, and encourage Burnside to hold on, assuring him that in a short time he would be relieved."

By the 14th of November Sherman was at Bridgeport with the Fifteenth Corps [Frank P. Blair] and the Seventeenth [John E. Smith]—the troops Grant had started from the Mississippi River to reinforce Rosecrans. General Grant was now ready to attack. His plan of battle as finally adopted was as follows:

Sherman with his four divisions was to cross to the right bank of the river at Brown's Ferry, and march out behind the hills, concealed from view of the Confederates, and take a position under cover of the woods opposite the mouth of Chickamauga Creek. It was hoped that the Confederates, upon seeing this body of troops cross at Brown's Ferry, then disappear altogether from view, would be confused, and, possibly, deceived into the belief that it had crossed the river higher up and marched to Burnside's relief. Sherman was to recross the river by pontoon-bridge at the mouth of the Chickamauga, "surprise the north end of Missionary Ridge and carry it to the railroad tunnel before the enemy should occupy it. As soon as

*Grant.

Sherman was astride the ridge at the tunnel, Thomas was to move the Army of the Cumberland to the left" and connect with him; then their united forces were to move southward, sweeping the Confederates up the valley of Chattanooga Creek and away from their base of supplies at Chickamauga Station. (238)* (240) Howard's corps [Eleventh] was to take its place as a sort of general reserve on the north bank of the river, in position to go to Sherman or Thomas as circumstances required. Hooker with the Twelfth Corps, and Cruft's division of the Fourth sent to him from Chattanooga, was to hold Lookout Valley. A brigade of cavalry under Colonel Long was to cover the left of Sherman's force, and, when no longer needed there, to cross Chickamauga Creek by a pontoon-bridge to be laid near its mouth, and make a raid upon Bragg's communications in the direction of Chickamauga Station. It will be seen later that this plan was much altered and modified in its execution.

It was intended that Sherman should make his crossing at the mouth of the Chickamauga at daylight on the 21st (November), but heavy rains raised the river and delayed the movement until the morning of the 24th. Even then one of Sherman's divisions could not go with him; for a break in the bridge at Brown's Ferry had prevented Osterhaus from crossing with his division, and he was, therefore, ordered to report to Hooker for duty.

(241) Meantime, contrary to the original plan, there was fighting at other parts of the line. There were rumors, and there appeared to be other indications, that Bragg was withdrawing his army. To test the truth of these indications Thomas was ordered to make a demonstration in his front on the 23rd.

The right of the Confederate outpost line rested upon Orchard Knob, a prominent knoll about a mile in front of the western base of Missionary Ridge. From here the line ran southward and westward across Chattanooga Valley. From Orchard Knob the ground, generally open but partly covered with wood and brush, sloped downward, then upward again, to the high ground upon which the Union line rested. The most prominent point in the Union position was the hill upon which stood Fort Wood, in front of which was a wide plain. Upon this plain, about noon on the 23rd, the assaulting columns

*Legend with *Official Maps*.

formed in echelon of divisions from the left. Wood's division [Fourth Corps] was to be the division of direction, and was on the left at Fort Wood. Next came Sheridan's division [Fourth Corps] to its right and rear, and next Baird's [Fourteenth Corps]. Johnson's division [Fourteenth Corps] remained to hold the trenches, and Howard's corps, which had come over from the north bank of the river, acted as a reserve.

At two o'clock Wood's division moved forward, and, after some resistance, drove off the Confederate outposts and carried Orchard Knob. Sheridan and Baird then moved forward and took possession of high ground to the right and slightly to the rear of Wood. They all intrenched their positions, and an epaulement was constructed for a battery on Orchard Knob. After 4 p.m. Howard's corps advanced and occupied a line on Wood's left. The result of the day's work was to develop the fact that Bragg's army was still in position and meant to stay there until driven out; to gain an excellent vantage-ground from which the Union center was to make a later assault; and to cause Bragg to transfer Walker's division (under Gist) from Lookout Mountain to "Missionary Ridge, to observe the Union movements in the valley. It took position half a mile south of the Tunnel and was the first Confederate division to occupy the crest of Missionary Ridge."* Walker's withdrawal from Mount Lookout lightened the task which Hooker was to have the next day—the task of assaulting and carrying the mountain.

The failure of Osterhaus's division to cross at Brown's Ferry caused a modification of Grant's original plan. This plan required no more of Hooker than to hold Lookout Valley and guard the communications with Bridgeport. But the addition of another division made Hooker's force strong enough to do more. Hooker was, therefore, ordered to try "to take the point of Lookout Mountain."† At this time the top of Mount Lookout was held by two Confederate brigades, and the slope, where Hooker made his assault, was held by Walthall's single brigade, and a few pickets from a brigade higher up the slope—in all about 1,700 men. Later in the fight the two brigades from above went to Walthall's help. Hooker had some 10,000 men.*

*Legend with *Official Maps*.

†Van Horne.

From the plateau of Mount Lookout, nearly 1,100 feet above the waters of the Tennessee, a precipice of solid, bare, jagged rock drops straight down several hundred feet. From the foot of this precipice the mountainsides fall away to the valley below in the natural slope, and are covered with a scrubby growth of wood, and with boulders of all sizes that have fallen down from the cliffs above. At the northern end, however, beyond the foot of the precipice, was a comparatively smooth piece of ground under cultivation, the Craven's farm. Below the farm, and also between it and the base of the palisades, are wooded and rocky slopes; these end abruptly in another rock cliff which drops straight to the railway track at the water's edge. The narrow wagon-road from Chattanooga to Lookout Valley passed over the nose of the mountain just above this cliff. Another road led from Chattanooga up the eastern face of the mountain to Summertown upon the plateau. This road was the only way by which troops from the plateau could reach the slopes of the mountain or the valleys below. The Confederates had intrenchments near the base of the western slope covering the railway and wagon bridges over Lookout Creek; they also had intrenchments at the Craven's farm, and down the northern slope, arranged to meet attacks from either Lookout Valley or Chattanooga Valley.

At eight o'clock on the 24th Geary's division [Twelfth Corps] of Hooker's command crossed Lookout Creek from Wauhatchie, and climbed straight up the mountainside, until the head of the column reached the base of the cliff. The division then moved by the left flank toward the north. About ten o'clock it encountered the Confederate skirmishers and drove them in front of it. Lower down the valley it was joined on the left by Osterhaus's division [Fifteenth Corps] and Cruft's division. These troops, supported by batteries of artillery placed in commanding positions on the left bank of the Creek, had driven the Confederates out of their intrenchments at the bridges, and had crossed near that point. Aided by the fire from batteries on Moccasin Point the whole force now pushed up the rocky slope, driving the Confederates from one position after another. By noon Hooker had possession of the Craven's farm. "At two o'clock the Confederates made a stand about 400 yards beyond the Craven's House. Here they were joined by the two brigades from the plateau. The Confederates held this line until after midnight, when they withdrew from the

mountain.”* All morning there had been a mist over the mountain, but it settled at about two o'clock into so dense a fog that it was impossible to see the lines of troops. It was on account of this fog and the exhaustion of his ammunition that Hooker halted his line and intrenched.

Later in the afternoon Carlin's brigade marched out from the line in front of Chattanooga, carrying a supply of ammunition to Hooker. The brigade took post on the right of Hooker's line. Early the next morning a party from the 8th Kentucky scaled the heights and planted the Stars and Stripes on Point Lookout, where, at sunrise, it floated in full view of the Union and Confederate soldiers in the lines below.

While Hooker was taking Mount Lookout, Sherman, at the other end of the line, was endeavoring to carry out his part of the program. The pontoons, which had been concealed in North Chickamauga Creek (which empties into the Tennessee on the north side two miles above the mouth of the Chickamauga), were quietly floated down-stream during the night of the 23rd, and, by daylight on the 24th, 8,000 men had crossed, and were on the south bank, just below the mouth of the Chickamauga, at work throwing up a bridge-head. Little opposition had been encountered. By noon the pontoon-bridge was finished, and at one o'clock Sherman moved out by echelons from the left, with his own three divisions, and Davis's division of the Fourteenth Corps which had been sent to take the place of Osterhaus's; at 4 p.m. Sherman seized the northern end of Missionary Ridge, which was unoccupied, except by Confederate outposts. To his surprise he found a wide depression separating the high ground he had seized from Tunnel Hill to the south of it. Moreover, Cleburne's Confederate division had been hurried to Tunnel Hill, and had there been getting into position and intrenching itself since half after two o'clock. Sherman made no effort to carry this hill at once, but intrenched his troops where they were.*

(242) During the night of the 24th Bragg withdrew all his troops from Lookout Mountain and Chattanooga Valley to Missionary Ridge, and posted his line from Tunnel Hill on the right to Rossville Gap on the left—more than six miles. Hardee had command of the right wing and Breckinridge of the left wing.

*Legend with *Official Maps*.

Grant's orders for the morning of the 25th were as follows: "Sherman was directed to attack at daylight. Hooker was ordered to move at the same hour, and endeavor to intercept the enemy's retreat, if he still remained; if he had gone, then to move directly to Rossville and operate against the left and rear of the force on Missionary Ridge. Thomas was not to move until Hooker had reached Missionary Ridge." Grant stationed his headquarters upon Orchard Knob, "from which the whole field was in full view."*

By sunrise Sherman's command was in motion. His line moved directly against the hill occupied by Cleburne's division and attacked it vigorously; but the assault was unable to dislodge the defenders, who had strengthened their field-works during the night. Howard's corps went to Sherman's support, and the Confederate position was assaulted several times without success. The combat kept up until three o'clock. Sherman had six divisions against Cleburne's one, but could not carry the works. Such is the strength of field-works against frontal assault; and Sherman does not appear to have tried to out-flank Cleburne's position. Finally, however, the Union troops succeeded in making a lodgment on the slopes of Tunnel Hill;† but "soon after three o'clock a charge of the Confederates from the summit cleared the slopes, and the Union forces thereafter did not reopen the battle" at that point.‡ Thus Sherman's assault, the main attack, had failed; but the battle was not over.

From his position at Orchard Knob Grant saw that Sherman was unable to carry his assault home; he had seen Confederate troops in motion on Missionary Ridge and had wrongly judged that Bragg was weakening his center to reinforce Cleburne on his right;‡ he had watched in vain "to see Hooker crossing the ridge in the neighborhood of Rossville,"* counting upon that to afford some relief to Sherman, by obliging Bragg to send troops to the left of his line. Hooker had started early enough from his bivouac, but he found the bridge over Chattanooga Creek destroyed and the roads obstructed, and was thus delayed four or five hours in his march.

Sherman's situation appeared too critical to wait longer on Hooker for relief; so "Grant ordered Thomas to move out the

*Grant.

†Legend with *Official Maps*. Alexander.

‡Legend with *Official Maps*.

four divisions" he held at the center, and assault the first line of the enemy's rifle-pits in front; and there to halt and await orders. At half-past three Thomas's line started forward with Baird's division on the left, then Wood's, then Sheridan's, and then Johnson's on the extreme right—in all eleven brigades and four field-batteries, on a front two miles and a half long. Idle these troops had been under arms all day; they were now eager for battle, and anxious to redeem their defeat at Chickamauga, and to show Grant that the Army of the Cumberland was not so demoralized as he supposed it to be. Three lines of intrenchments were in front of them, one at the foot of the ridge, another near the middle of the slope, and the third and strongest on the crest. The divisions of Stewart, Bate [Breckinridge], Patton Anderson [Hindman], and Cheatham—eleven and a half brigades and sixteen batteries*—held this part of the ridge; but the commanders had made the fatal mistake of dividing their forces, and occupying the intrenchments both at the crest and at the foot of the slope; and had given private instructions to the superior officers in the lower line "to await the enemy's approach within 200 yards, then to deliver their fire, and retire to the works above." The ridge here was some 200 feet high, with steep slopes broken by many ravines and swales, and, at this time, obstructed by the stumps of recently felled timber. The Confederate engineers had placed the upper line of works, which had been begun only two days before, on the natural instead of the "military" crest; this mistake "left numerous approaches up ravines and swales entirely covered from the fire of the breastworks."†

The Confederates opened fire with all their available guns and musketry upon the advancing lines, but could not check them. The Federals charged at double time, and carried the first line of intrenchments at the point of the bayonet, putting the defenders to flight up the ridge, "killing and capturing them in large numbers."‡ The lines then halted as ordered; but they found themselves exposed to a galling fire from the Confederate trenches on the ridge, and soon, without any orders, they started up the slopes by regiments one after another. Before long the whole line was advancing. The center of Sheridan's division reached the top first; "the rest of the line

*Legend with *Official Maps*.

†Alexander.

‡Cist.

was soon up, and almost simultaneously the ridge was carried in six places."* Van Horne in his *History of the Army of the Cumberland* says: "There is no doubt that General Wood's division first reached the summit." Perhaps this charge was like the one at San Juan Hill thirty-five years afterwards, in which nobody claims to have been the second to reach the crest, but many were the first.

The Confederates made a feeble stand, and then gave way in panic; Bragg's center was broken and driven from the field in rout. Thirty-seven guns and 2,000 prisoners were captured. Some of the captured guns were turned against the fugitives. The assault lasted about an hour.* Sheridan's division reached the crest just too late to capture Bragg, Breckinridge, and other Confederate generals, who quitted Bragg's headquarters when the charge up the hillside began. These generals were making unavailing efforts to rally their beaten and panic-stricken troops. "The victory was gained too late in the day for a general pursuit. General Sheridan's division and Willich's brigade of General Wood's division pushed the enemy for a short distance down the eastern slope. Later General Sheridan advanced and drove the enemy from a strong position."†

Meanwhile Hooker with three divisions had reached the pass at Rossville and driven away the Confederate left. He then turned to the left and, almost unopposed, advanced northward, with one division on top of the ridge and one on each side, until he connected, about sundown, with the right of Thomas's line.‡ During the night Hardee withdrew from the position he had held so stoutly against Sherman's assaults.

Grant's victory was decisive, and the siege of Chattanooga was raised. The next thing was to pursue Bragg's defeated army and send a column to Burnside's relief at Knoxville. (230) The following morning Sherman took up the pursuit by way of Chickamauga Station, while Hooker, and Palmer who now had command of the Fourteenth Corps, marched by the Ringgold and Greyville roads. On this day, the 26th, Bragg's army reached Ringgold, where it made a stand on the 27th. It "then withdrew to Dalton, where, five days later, Bragg at his own request was relieved of the command."‡

*Cist.

†Van Horne.

‡Alexander.

The pursuit was suspended on the 28th; Hooker stayed a few days at Ringgold, and Palmer returned to Chattanooga.

On the morning of the 26th Granger had set out for Knoxville with his own corps [Fourth] and reinforcements enough to make a command of 20,000 men. On the 28th Sherman with his command also started for Knoxville; he had orders to join his forces with Granger's and assume command of the expedition, and to advance with all speed.

Burnside had met Longstreet's column south of Knoxville, but, according to his orders, had offered little resistance, and fallen back, drawing Longstreet as far as possible from Chattanooga. Burnside withdrew behind the fortifications of Knoxville. After ten days of reconnoitering and arranging for one kind of assault and another, and waiting for one thing and another, Longstreet's troops stormed Fort Sanders, the southwestern salient of Burnside's works, just before dawn on the morning of November 29. The fort was provided with a wet ditch and garrisoned by about 220 men including artillery. The storming column consisted of nine regiments supported by three brigades. The assault was repulsed with a loss of 129 killed, 458 wounded, and 226 captured. Longstreet was about to renew the assault when he received a telegram from President Davis informing him of Bragg's defeat at Chattanooga. This decided him to give over the attempt. On the 4th of December he raised the siege and started in retreat for Virginia, and after a march of great hardship halted at Greenville, where he wintered.* Sherman arrived with his column at Knoxville on the 6th of December. Leaving Granger's corps to help pursue Longstreet he returned with the rest of his force to Chattanooga on the 16th of December.

For the first time since the war had begun the whole of East Tennessee was under control of the Union army, and President Lincoln's devoutly cherished wish for the relief and protection of the loyal inhabitants was at last achieved.

In the battles around Chattanooga Grant had, according to Livermore's estimate, 56,359 men, and Bragg 40,929. The losses were not heavy; on the Union side they were: 752 killed, 4,713 wounded, and 350 missing; on the Confederate side, 361 killed, 2,180 wounded, and 4,146 captured and missing.†

*Alexander.

†B. & L.

COMMENTS.

At Chancellorsville we saw that it was the commanding-general and not the Army of the Potomac that was defeated; at Missionary Ridge the case was exactly the reverse: the rank and file, not the Confederate commanders, were whipped. The soldiers fled from sheer animal fear; fear inspired wholly by the sight of their foes. This was the only battle of the war in which the topographical conditions were such that well-nigh every man of the defenders could plainly see the hosts of the enemy forming for the assault. From their position on Missionary Ridge the Confederate soldiers could look down upon all the Federal columns; "The sight was a grand and impressive one," says General Alexander, "the like of which had never been seen before by any one who witnessed it." It was too awful for the nerve of the Confederate soldiers; which is to say that it was too awful for the nerve of any soldiers, for these were the veterans that had fought and won at Chickamauga. In his brief report General Bragg says: "No satisfactory excuse can possibly be given for the shameful conduct of our troops on the left in allowing their line to be penetrated. The position was one which ought to have been held by a line of skirmishers against any assaulting column. . . . But one possible reason presents itself to my mind in explanation of this bad conduct in veteran troops who never before failed in any duty assigned them, however difficult and hazardous: they had for two days confronted the enemy, marshalling his immense forces in plain view."

The result might have been the same, or possibly more disastrous for Bragg's army, if General Grant had withheld Thomas's assault for two hours. By that time Hooker would have been upon the flank and rear of the position assaulted. As it was a short autumn day, however, this would have been to put the attack off till about sunset; and it would soon have been ended by darkness. The consciousness of Hooker's approach against their left and rear undoubtedly added to the demoralization of the Confederates. General Grant ordered Thomas's assault under a misapprehension; he believed that Bragg was reinforcing Cleburne against Sherman. This "was not only wholly erroneous, but on the contrary, when the Union movement against the center began, three brigades were hurried from the Confederate right to the center to resist the

Union advance there.”* Sherman had been repulsed, but he was never in any danger of a serious counter-stroke.

Swinton does not include the battles around Chattanooga among the Decisive Battles of the War, but in a sense they were decisive; they marked a distinct phase of the war and of the life of the Southern Confederacy. They did not mark the beginning of its end, but, taken in connection with Gettysburg and Vicksburg, they marked the end of the beginning of its dissolution. All that was now left of Secession was the narrow strip of country, without harbors or seacoast, lying south of the Potomac and east of the Appalachian Mountains. The end of the war and of the Southern Confederacy was in sight.

The great strategic front of the Confederacy from Richmond to Jackson, Mississippi, was now sundered at its middle. If Grant had been defeated and compelled to withdraw from Chattanooga it would not have taken the Confederates long to capture Burnside at Knoxville, and reopen the line of the East Tennessee and Virginia Railway; but now this railway was lost to them for good and all, and the great strategic advantage of interior lines in the vast general theater of the war, from Virginia to Mississippi, had passed irretrievably from the Confederacy to the Union. Lee still guarded the Virginia end of the railway, and even yet might possibly have moved his army by rail against Knoxville, picking up Longstreet's detachment on the way. This, however, would have risked the loss of Richmond, to which Lee's army was as fast-tethered as the Army of the Potomac was to Washington. From Knoxville to Memphis the railway was now wholly in possession of the Federals.

The War Department order that created the Division of the Mississippi, and placed all the territory and all the Union armies south of the Ohio River and east of the Mississippi under a single commander in the field, was one of the wisest and most important orders issued during the Civil War. Such an arrangement had been needed from the very beginning to bring about concert of action between the several armies. We saw that the lack of it gave the Confederates opportunities in the Henry and Donelson Campaign of which Albert Sidney Johnston neglected to take advantage; barely missed costing the Union arms defeat and disaster in the Shiloh Campaign; and

*Legend with *Official Maps*.

probably retarded the capture of Vicksburg by many weeks. Whereas the immediate consequences of the order were the prompt breaking of the siege at Chattanooga and the defeat of Bragg's army, the relief of Burnside's army at Knoxville, and the total expulsion of Confederate troops from the State of Tennessee.

General Joseph E. Johnston had been nominally in command of all the Confederate armies in this section since November, 1862, but it does not appear that he was at any time allowed to exercise real command. He did no more than make recommendations to the President of the Confederacy, and his recommendations were generally not approved or ordered to be carried out. On more than one occasion Mr. Davis visited the armies in person and issued orders to their immediate commanders without reference to Johnston.

In fact, while the military policies of the Northern and the Southern governments were not identical, they were alike. There was on each side the lack of a *chief objective*, which every commander ought to have kept in mind, and toward which he should have directed the operations of his army. Instead of this, in the vast theater from Virginia to Texas, during the first three years of the war, every army-commander on either side appears to have looked only to his own immediate objective; there was no commander-in-chief in the field to concentrate the efforts of all the armies.

After allowing Rosecrans's army quietly to withdraw into Chattanooga, Bragg then let all the fruits of his victory at Chickamauga gradually slip away from him, apparently through mere inaction. He wisely refrained from assaulting his foe behind fortifications, but in placing his army in front of Chattanooga and holding it there, practically idle, for nearly two months, he gave away the advantages gained by his victory at Chickamauga. Bragg counted upon starving the Army of the Cumberland into capitulation; his failure to do so, however, is no exception to the general rule of modern warfare, that an army which allows itself to be shut up within fortifications is as good as lost. This army was never wholly invested; although its line of supply was for a time over a very long and difficult road, and its means of transportation were very poor, the army was at no time in real danger of starvation; and its line of retreat was always open. Toward the last, after so many of the draft animals had died, and the rest had become weak from hunger, and broken down by

over-work, the army would, undoubtedly, have lost most of its artillery and equipage if it had undertaken to retreat.

The short piece of road, about five miles long, from Brown's Ferry across Raccoon Mountain to Kelly's Ferry, was of the greatest strategic importance during the siege of Chattanooga. So long as the Confederates controlled it the beleaguered Federals had to haul their supplies from Bridgeport by wagon on the long miserable road over Walden's Ridge. Neither Bragg, nor Longstreet who commanded the left of the Confederate line, appears to have appreciated its importance. Nothing more than a picket guarded Brown's Ferry, and Law's brigade was the only Confederate force west of Mount Look-out. "A full division at least should have guarded" this road.*

Bragg expected Wheeler's cavalry so to break up the railway communications of Rosecrans as to cause him to quit Chattanooga and return to Murfreesboro or Nashville, like Grant after Van Dorn's raid upon Holly Springs; but we have seen that Wheeler did little more than destroy some hundreds of Rosecrans's wagons and teams.

What Bragg should have done was to move with his main army against Rosecrans's communications as soon as Rosecrans had made good his withdrawal into Chattanooga. Bragg might have crossed the Tennessee above Chattanooga, and marched across Walden's Ridge and the Cumberland Plateau, or he might have crossed at Bridgeport and Stevenson, or farther down. Either movement would probably have forced Rosecrans to quit Chattanooga. The second movement was actually ordered by Mr. Davis, who visited Bragg's headquarters about the 10th of October. A few days afterwards, however, heavy rains set in and the roads became so bad that Bragg made them an excuse "for his failure to execute the campaign that the President had ordered."† The plan had not been suggested by Bragg; he had, when called upon by Mr. Davis for a suggestion, proposed the other—"to march up and cross the river and swing round toward the enemy's rear and force him out by that means."† It is probable, however, that it was now too late for either plan to succeed, for Hooker had already taken charge of the railway in rear of Rosecrans's army with his 15,000 fresh troops, and Sherman was hastening forward with his two corps from Memphis. "Longstreet reports that he advised crossing the Tennessee and moving

*Alexander.

†Longstreet.

against Rosecrans's communications" on September 21st, the day after Chickamauga, "and that Bragg approved and ordered Polk's wing to take the lead, while his wing cared for the wounded and policed the field. The army, however, was in such confusion and need of ammunition that it was dark before the rear of Polk's corps was stretched out upon the road, and Longstreet's march was postponed until the 22nd. During the night Thomas withdrew into the city; . . . Bragg followed on the 22nd and took position in front of him."* By doing this Bragg gave up his opportunity.

Another project that Bragg might have undertaken with every chance of success at first,—before Rosecrans's army recovered from the moral effects of its defeat, and before the arrival of Union reinforcements,—was to hold the siege of Chattanooga with part of his army, and send the rest against Burnside at Knoxville. Bragg did this, but not until it was too late; and then he did not give Longstreet a large enough force to cope with Burnside behind fortifications. It was too late, because Hooker's command was already at Bridgeport, and Bragg knew that Sherman was soon to arrive. But Bragg appears to have considered his own position impregnable against assault, and he hoped, also, that Longstreet would accomplish his purpose, and return to the main army, before the arrival of Sherman. His detaching Longstreet at that time was certainly a mistake; it could not in any manner aid in the achievement of Bragg's main purpose; namely, to capture the hostile army in Chattanooga. It was at best only a "side issue."

*Alexander.

LECTURE XXII.

THE BATTLE OF THE WILDERNESS.

THE AUTUMN AND WINTER AFTER GETTYSBURG.

(243) The 14th of July, 1863, found Lee's army, after its unsuccessful invasion of Pennsylvania, again on the south side of the Potomac. Lee continued his retreat slowly up the Shenandoah Valley. Toward the end of July Meade reëntered Virginia on the east side of the Blue Ridge Mountains; Lee thereupon withdrew from the Valley and took position in the neighborhood of Culpeper. Meade placed the Army of the Potomac facing him on the north bank of the Rappahannock.

In these positions the two armies remained inactive for several weeks, and both were considerably reduced by the withdrawal of large detachments for service in other theaters. From the Army of the Potomac a detachment went to South Carolina; another went to New York to aid in enforcing the draft. From Lee's army Longstreet had gone with two of his divisions to assist Bragg against Rosecrans in Tennessee and Georgia, and Pickett had been detached with his division to the south of Petersburg to "arrest raiding parties of the enemy and collect supplies for the army."*

(244) Learning of Longstreet's departure, Meade advanced, and Lee withdrew behind the Rapidan. Meade followed and put his army into position about Culpeper. Meade was making ready to try to turn Lee's flank when he was ordered from Washington to send two corps to the assistance of Rosecrans at Chattanooga. It was then that Hooker with the Eleventh and Twelfth Corps went to Tennessee. This reduced Meade's force to the defensive, and Lee was not slow to take advantage of the situation. Lee resolved to try to turn Meade's flank and get between him and Washington. Accordingly, on the 9th of October, he crossed the Rapidan, and there followed from then on into November a series of operations which has been called by the historians and biographers "a campaign of maneuvers," or "a campaign of strategy"; it consisted of much

*Long.

marching and maneuvering, but of little fighting; of much strategy, but of little tactics.

Finding his right turned, Meade fell back along the railway, and, in the series of movements that ensued, the Army of the Potomac continued to retreat until it finally took position on the heights of Centreville—the position from which McDowell had led it to the First Battle of Bull Run, in 1861; the position to which Pope withdrew it after the Second Battle of Bull Run in 1862.* Lee followed as far as Bull Run, but he had failed to cut off Meade's retreat and force him to battle faced to the rear; his biographer charges the failure mainly to Stuart and his cavalry.† As in the Gettysburg campaign, Stuart had yielded to the temptation of trying to capture a wagon-train of commissaries, and thereby got his command into a perilous trap. Lee had to send Ewell's corps to save Stuart from capture; this so delayed the Confederate column that Meade's army got safe across Broad Run at Bristoe Station, where Lee had hoped to intercept it.

Lee now saw the uselessness of further pursuit; his campaign had failed, except that it had driven the enemy nearly out of Virginia; Meade's army was now almost within sight of the intrenchments of Washington and Alexandria, behind which it could withdraw within a few hours. Lee, on the other hand, was a long way from his base. He, therefore, returned to Culpeper, destroying the railway from Cub Run to the Rappahannock. Meade followed up the retrograde movement of the Confederates. On the 7th of November he crossed the Rappahannock at Kelly's Ford, turning the right flank of the Confederates. Lee then withdrew again to the south bank of the Rapidan.

(245) It was now Meade's turn to take the offensive. Ewell's corps of the Confederate army stretched from Clark's Mountain to Mine Run, covering the several fords between those points; A. P. Hill's corps extended from Orange Court House to Liberty Mills, six miles southwest of Orange Court House; Stuart's cavalry covered the flanks; Longstreet and Pickett were still absent with the three divisions of the 1st Corps. Meade resolved to try to cross the Rapidan on the

*This was not called the Army of the Potomac at the time of the First Battle of Bull Run; and at the Second Battle of Bull Run only a part of Pope's forces belonged to the Army of the Potomac. Meade's army, however, was the outgrowth of those two armies.

†Long.

right of Lee's position, and fall upon the Confederate army in reverse before it could assemble from its extended winter-quarters. As secretly as possible he began his march for Germanna Ford on the 26th of November; but his movement did not escape the notice of Stuart's cavalry, which gave Lee warning. So when Meade moved southward from Germanna Ford in the Wilderness he found Lee's army so strongly intrenched behind breastworks on the west bank of Mine Run that he did not deem it expedient to attack. He quietly withdrew to the north bank of the Rapidan and into his winter-quarters at Culpeper, and Lee's army returned to its position on the south side of the Rapidan. Another bloodless game of kriegsspiel was at an end.

This was the last important campaign of the year 1863, the year in which the star of the Southern Confederacy reached its zenith. The Army of the Potomac and the Army of Northern Virginia were content to watch each other from now on, until the following May, and the peace of Virginia was not disturbed during these months, save by the unsuccessful cavalry raid against Richmond in February and March, made by Kilpatrick and Dahlgren.

THE WILDERNESS CAMPAIGN.

In February, 1864, Congress revived the grade of lieutenant-general, which had last been held in the American army by Washington in 1799. The President appointed General Grant to the office and made him general-in-chief of all the Union armies,—and personally gave him assurance that he was to be allowed to exercise the real functions of the office.

Then, for the first time since the war had begun, a definite plan of action was laid out for the armies of the United States—a plan that contemplated the simultaneous and concerted movement of all the armies in the vast theater of the war toward a single ultimate objective; namely, the destruction of the only two organized armed bodies of any considerable strength that the South had in the field. Those two bodies were Lee's army in Virginia and the force then under General Joseph E. Johnston at Dalton, Georgia. That force was composed of the Army of Tennessee, lately under Bragg, and the Army of Mississippi, under Johnston, consolidated.*

*Johnston's *Narrative*.

"The Union armies were now divided into nineteen departments,"* all except four independent of one another and under separate commanders who reported directly to Washington. The four excepted departments were those that had been consolidated, the autumn before, into the Division of the Mississippi and placed under Grant. We saw that the defeat of Bragg's army at Chattanooga was the direct result of that consolidation. Sherman succeeded Grant in the command of the Division of the Mississippi. The Army of the Potomac was a separate command, and had no territorial limits.

Grant's general plan for the spring campaign was outlined in a confidential letter to Sherman from which the following extracts are made:

"WASHINGTON, D. C., *April 4, 1864.*

"It is my design, if the enemy keep quiet, and allow me to take the initiative in the spring campaign, to work all parts of the army together, and somewhat towards a common center. . . . I have sent orders to Banks . . . to finish up his present expedition against Shreveport with all dispatch; to turn over the defense of Red River to Genl. Steele and the navy . . .; to abandon all of Texas, except the Rio Grande, and to hold that with not to exceed four thousand men; to reduce the number of troops on the Mississippi to the lowest number necessary to hold it, and to collect from his command not less than 25,000 men. To this I will add 5,000 men from Missouri. With this force he is to commence operations against Mobile as soon as he can. . . .

"Gillmore joins Butler with 10,000 men (from South Carolina), and the two operate against Richmond from the south side of the James River. This will give Butler 33,000 men. . . . I will stay with the Army of the Potomac, increased by Burnside's corps [Ninth] of not less than 25,000 effective men, and operate directly against Lee's army, wherever it may be found. Sigel collects all his available force in two columns, one under Ord and Averell, to start from Beverly [West], Virginia; and the other under Crook, to start from Charleston on the Kanawha, to move against the Virginia and Tennessee Railroad. . . . You I propose to move against Johnston's army, to break it up and to get into the interior of

*Grant.

the enemy's country as far as you can, inflicting all the damage you can against their war resources. . . . "

The movement was to be simultaneous "all along the line." The plan did not work out successfully in all its details; Banks did not carry out his part of it; Butler let his army be "bottled up" by Beauregard between the James and the Appomattox Rivers; and Sigel did nothing but retreat. "Just as I was expecting to hear of good work being done in the Valley" (by Sigel's command), General Grant remarks in his *Memoirs*, "I received, instead, the following announcement from Halleck: 'Sigel is in full retreat on Strasburg. He will do nothing but run; never did anything else.'" But the main armies under Grant and Sherman moved simultaneously with their campaigns.

In one of his early interviews with the President, Grant expressed his dissatisfaction with the work so far done by the cavalry of the Army of the Potomac, and his belief that the cavalry could do more "under a thorough leader." He said he "wanted the very best man in the army for that command."*

So Sheridan was called up from Sherman's army and given command of the Cavalry Corps.† Pleasanton, who had commanded the Cavalry Corps in the Gettysburg Campaign, was transferred to Missouri; of the old division-commanders, Buford had died in the previous December, and Kilpatrick was transferred to Sherman's army. D. McM. Gregg remained in command of his division; two officers who had not served before with cavalry, Torbert and J. H. Wilson, were given command of the other two divisions, while Merritt and Custer remained brigade-commanders.

OPERATIONS.

On the 26th of March, 1864, General Grant established his headquarters at Culpeper Court House. Meade retained command of the Army of the Potomac and all orders to it were given through him. The Ninth Corps [Burnside] was not until the 24th of May incorporated with the Army of the Potomac; it, however, went through the campaign with this army. (246) For the present this corps, with its headquarters at Warrenton, was guarding the railway from the Rappa-

*Grant.

†He was suggested by Halleck.

hannock back to Bull Run. The five corps of the Army of the Potomac had been consolidated into three, "the Second, Fifth, and Sixth Corps being retained, and the divisions of the First and Third Corps transferred to the three retained corps." Hancock still commanded the Second Corps and Sedgwick the Sixth; Warren was now in command of the Fifth. The Army numbered 73,390 infantry and artillery and 12,424 cavalry; the strength of the Ninth Corps was 19,331.*

Longstreet had rejoined Lee with his detachment from Tennessee, and the Confederate army was still organized as in the Gettysburg Campaign, in three corps under Longstreet, Ewell, and A. P. Hill, and the cavalry division under Stuart; Pickett's division of Longstreet's corps was still absent. There were present for duty with this army 53,554 infantry and artillery and 8,399 cavalry. Lee's headquarters were at Orange Court House, and his line extended from Barnett's Ford, about five miles above the railway crossing, to Morton's Ford, a distance of fifteen or eighteen miles. Ewell's corps was on the right and Hill's on the left. Longstreet was at Mechanicsburg, six miles south of Gordonsville. The bulk of Stuart's cavalry was over in the neighborhood of Fredericksburg, where forage was more plentiful than it was nearer the main body.

PLAN.

As has already been said, Grant's main objective was to be Lee's army. Behind its intrenchments and the Rapidan this army was unassailable in front; Grant must turn one or the other of its flanks, and thus force it to come out of its intrenchments and fight, or suffer itself to be attacked in reverse. He resolved to turn its right flank, and hoped by concealment and celerity, to cross the Rapidan and get out of the Wilderness on its south side before Lee should discover his movement; or at least before Lee could take effectual means to oppose it.

With a view to swift marching, and on account of the bad roads and forest country, the baggage was cut down to the smallest limit, and a large portion of the artillery was left behind. Ammunition and ten days' rations, and three days' forage, however, had to be carried in wagons, which made a train "that would have extended from the Rapidan to Richmond,

**The Campaigns of Grant in Virginia* (Scribner's).—Humphreys.

stretched along in single file,"*—that is, a wagon-train sixty or seventy miles long. The order for the movement of the army issued on the 2nd of May, and the movement began at midnight of the 3rd. Sheridan with two of his cavalry divisions led the way, while Torbert's division was left to cover the rear.

(247) The army marched by the roads to Ely's and Germanna Fords, the same fords that Hooker's right wing had used in crossing the Rapidan a twelvemonth before. Two pontoon-bridges were laid at each of these points, and another was laid between them at Culpeper Mine Ford. Hancock's corps [Second], preceded by Gregg's cavalry division, and followed by the reserve artillery, took the Ely's Ford road for Chancellorsville, where it arrived at 9 a.m. on the 4th. Here it remained the rest of the day; the cavalry pushed out to Piney Branch Church, and threw out patrols on all the roads from there. The Second Corps bivouacked that night on the old battle-field of Chancellorsville.

The Fifth Corps [Warren], preceded by Wilson's cavalry division, marched by way of Germanna Ford, and, on the afternoon of the 4th, reached Old Wilderness Tavern, at the junction of the Germanna Ford road and the old Orange-Fredricksburg Turnpike—just about a mile west of where Stonewall Jackson's turning-column struck the Turnpike on the evening of the 2nd of May the year before. Here the Fifth Corps bivouacked. Sedgwick's corps [Sixth] followed the Fifth and bivouacked the night of the 4th with the head of its column three miles south of Germanna Ford. Wilson's cavalry division moved on to Parker's Store, throwing out patrols on all the roads from that point. No opposition had as yet been offered by the enemy, and the troops were all on the south side of the Rapidan and in the heart of the Wilderness.

But for the great wagon-train the army might have marched on and gained five or six miles of its way through the forest before nightfall. The trains, however, were not up; they did not finish crossing at Ely's and Culpeper Mine Fords until after 5 p.m. on the 5th. The army could not move on without them. Signs of the enemy appeared before one o'clock in the afternoon of the 4th. Shots were heard in the direction of Locust Grove, and a considerable force was seen moving from Orange Court House toward New Verdiersville on the Plank

*Grant.

Road. In fact, Lee's army was in motion on the Turnpike and the Plank Road. Lee had anticipated the movement of the Federal army. He had not been deceived by feints that had been made on his left. Standing with a group of his officers at the signal station on Clark's Mountain, on the 2nd of May, he had expressed the belief that Grant would move round his right flank. According to his wont he took no steps to prevent Grant's passage of the river, but as soon as he learned that the Union army was in march, he started his corps forward to strike it in flank before it should get out of the Wilderness.

Thus it happened that on the night of the 4th the head of Ewell's corps was at Locust Grove, on the Turnpike within five miles of Old Wilderness Tavern, where Warren's corps was bivouacked; and the leading division of Hill's corps [Heth] was at Mine Run on the Plank Road, seven miles from where Wilson's cavalry had its bivouac at Parker's Store. It does not, however, appear that either of the hostile armies was aware of the nearness of the other. Longstreet's corps, which had a march of forty-two miles to make, received its orders about noon on the 4th and was on the way at 4 p.m. Stopping only long enough to feed and water, it marched all that night and until nearly sunset on the 5th; then it bivouacked at Craig's Meeting House, on the Catharpin Road, having marched thirty-six miles.*

(248) We learned in the study of the Chancellorsville Campaign that the great dismal forest called the Wilderness was about fourteen miles long from east to west and ten miles wide from the Rapidan southward. It was no primeval forest of great trees, "the survival of the fittest," standing apart in the midst of a sparse undergrowth struggling to live under their shade; it was the worst kind of thicket of second-growth. For more than a hundred years iron mines had been worked within it, and all the original timber had been cut as fuel for the furnaces. The space was now covered with a dense coppice of cedar, pine, black-oak, and other scrubby and tangled undergrowth. Hancock in his report says: "It was covered by a dense forest, almost impenetrable by troops in line of battle, where maneuvering was an operation of extreme difficulty and uncertainty. The undergrowth was so heavy that it was scarcely possible to see more than one hundred paces in any direction. The movements of the enemy could not be observed

*Alexander.

until the lines were almost in collision.”* As stated before, the uneven surface of the ground was cut up by a number of small streams with marshy banks; the clearings were few and narrow; the highways were not many, but there were numerous crooked wood-roads and trails leading and misleading in every direction. To Grant’s army the Wilderness, especially that part west of the old Chancellorsville battle-ground, was totally unknown; but Lee’s men had a far better knowledge of the roads and trails than they had possessed at the time of Jackson’s last battle.

(246) Early in the afternoon of the 4th Grant telegraphed Burnside, whose first division was then at Brandy Station, to make a forced march to Germanna Ford. The fourth division of the Ninth Corps, the first negro troops to do service with the Union army in Virginia, had started that morning from Manassas Junction, forty miles from Germanna Ford. Burnside promptly obeyed Grant’s order, and his first division [Stevenson] crossed the Rapidan at Germanna Ford the next morning, the 5th. By the night of the 5th, the divisions of Potter and Willcox had also come up; they bivouacked two or three miles south of the ford. The fourth division [Ferrero] crossed on the morning of the 6th.

At 6 p.m. on the 4th Grant issued, through Meade, orders for the army to resume the march southward at five o’clock the next morning. (248) Sheridan, with Torbert’s and Gregg’s cavalry divisions was to march toward Hamilton’s Crossing in quest of Stuart’s cavalry. Wilson was to move his cavalry division to Craig’s Meeting House, and send out reconnoitering parties on the Orange Turnpike and the Plank Road, and on other roads converging on the line of march of the army. Hancock’s corps [Second] was to march by way of Todd’s Tavern to Shady Grove Church; Warren’s [Fifth] to Parker’s Store; and Sedgwick’s [Sixth] to Old Wilderness Tavern, leaving a division to cover Germanna Ford until the arrival of Burnside’s corps. Each corps was to keep in touch with the troops on its right and left. The march began on time and the corps were soon stretched out upon the narrow roads.

Lee, whose purpose was to attack the Union army while it was at a disadvantage in the narrow roads and jungle of the Wilderness, hoped not to have to bring on a general engage-

*Humphreys.

ment before Longstreet's corps should reach the front. He gave his orders accordingly to Ewell and Hill. At this time, the morning of the 5th of May, Longstreet's corps was still far behind; it did not reach the battle-field until the next morning. It does not appear that there was any cavalry in front of the columns of Ewell and Hill—Stuart's squadrons had not rejoined from Fredericksburg—or that the infantry advance-guards were very far in front. "Ewell's corps was the first to find itself in the presence of the enemy. As it advanced along the Turnpike on the morning of the 5th the Federal column was seen crossing it from the direction of Germanna Ford. Ewell promptly formed line of battle across the Turnpike."*

It was Warren's corps that was crossing the pike in front of Ewell's column. At 7.15 a.m. Warren reported to Meade that the enemy's infantry was on the pike in "some force" about two miles from the Wilderness Tavern. A few minutes later Meade ordered Warren to halt his whole corps and attack the Confederates on the pike. The Federal commanders did not suspect the presence of Lee's main army. Meade remarked, "They have left a division to fool us here, while they concentrate and prepare a position toward the North Anna."† Warren's attack, however, would develop what force there was of the enemy.

At the same time Meade dispatched an order to Hancock to halt his corps at Todd's Tavern and await developments. This order did not reach Hancock until nine o'clock, and found him two miles beyond Todd's Tavern. Sedgwick was ordered to move out on the road that left the Germanna Plank Road at Spottswood's, about two miles north of the Tavern, and attack the enemy. He was to keep in touch with Warren's right. (249) Grant joined Meade, and they took their post upon a knoll on the Lacy farm, where they remained during most of the day.

Johnson's division of Ewell's corps was formed across the pike, Rodes's division was forming on its right, and Early's on its left. Griffin's division of Warren's corps, advancing down the Turnpike, met the first line of Johnson's division at about noon, and drove it back. Robinson's division was ordered to support Griffin, while Wadsworth's division was to form on his

*Law in *B. & L.*

†Swinton.

left, and Wright's division of the Sixth Corps was to support his right. Wadsworth's division in passing through the dense thicket moved northwest, instead of southwest parallel to the Turnpike. This exposed its left flank to the right wing of Ewell's line. Wright's division found the jungle so close that it could not get to the front in time to be of assistance. So Warren's three divisions after a short but fierce fight were driven back, losing two pieces of artillery and several hundred prisoners. Ewell's corps advanced to where Johnson's line had first stood, and there intrenched.

Crawford's division of the Fifth Corps was at the head of the Union column when the march began in the morning, and its leading troops had reached the Chewning farm, three miles from Wilderness Tavern, when the order reached it at eight o'clock to halt. Wilson had left a small party of cavalry at this point, and Crawford found it skirmishing with what he took for Confederate troopers dismounted. Crawford halted as ordered, but finding presently that Wilson's cavalry at Parker's Store was engaged, he threw out a skirmish line toward that place. The skirmish line soon became engaged with the flankers of a column of Confederate infantry. In fact, Heth's division of Hill's corps was advancing on the Plank Road; Wilson's cavalry retired before it. About this time Crawford was ordered to close in to the right with one of his brigades and join in the attack along the Turnpike. The brigade lost its way in the underbrush, and became enveloped by the right of Ewell's line; it had many men killed and wounded, lost several hundred prisoners, and fell back. (250) About two o'clock Crawford drew in his division and posted it "about a half-mile southwest from the Lacy house, facing toward Chewning's."*

As soon as Meade learned, between nine and ten o'clock, that there was a Confederate column on the Plank Road also, he dispatched Getty's division of the Sixth Corps, which had not advanced with the rest of that corps, but was now at the Tavern, out on the Brock Road to its junction with the Plank Road. At the same time he sent Hancock an order to return with his corps to the same point. On reaching the Plank Road, about eleven o'clock, Getty sent forward a skirmish line, which soon encountered Heth's skirmishers driving back the Union cavalry from Parker's Store. Getty learned

*Humphreys.

from prisoners that Hill's corps, except Anderson's division, was on the road; instead of attacking, therefore, he halted in the Brock Road and threw up slight intrenchments, pending the return of Hancock's corps.

Hill had the same orders as Ewell, to avoid bringing on a general engagement. So Heth's division, which was in advance, took up a position early in the afternoon facing Getty. His line was on comparatively high ground, across the road, with its flanks resting on marshy ground about the headwaters of the Ny and Wilderness Run. Wilcox came up with his division, and, at about two o'clock, formed line on Heth's left. He extended his line at first beyond Chewning's in order to connect with Ewell's, which was in sight upon the open ground at the Hagerson farm. Toward five o'clock he was recalled to the right to support Heth—"a movement which was observed by General Warren."* The two divisions of Wilcox and Heth were then merged into one line. General Lee was with Hill.

At 2 p.m. the head of Hancock's corps reached the Plank Road. As the divisions came up they were formed on Getty's left in the following order from right to left along and in front of the road by which Jackson had made his turning movement a year before: Birney's, Mott's, Gibbon's, and Barlow's. Hancock was ordered to support Getty and drive the enemy beyond Parker's Store and was urged to lose no time; he nevertheless spent about an hour completing the intrenchments begun by Getty. "This delay was of great value to Hill, enabling him partially to select and prepare his ground."† (251) "At a quarter past four Getty, in compliance with his orders from Meade, advanced to the attack, through the thick undergrowth." At about 400 yards from the Brock Road Getty's line became engaged with Heth's division, "part of which was lying down behind the crest of a small elevation." Finding Getty engaged with a large force of the enemy, Hancock sent two divisions to his assistance—Birney's to his right and Mott's to his left. Hancock says the fight became "very fierce at once; the lines were exceedingly close, the musketry continuous and deadly along the entire line."* General Alexander says: "There was never more desperate fighting than now ensued." Gibbon's division was sent

*Humphreys.

†Alexander.

forward, but Wilcox had reinforced Heth, and the Confederates could not be driven; finally, after nightfall, two brigades of Barlow's division attacked Hill's right flank and forced it back. The combat lasted till eight o'clock.

Grant and Meade heard the roar of musketry at this end of the line, and, judging rightly that Hancock was having a hard fight, dispatched Wadsworth's division of Warren's corps, late in the afternoon, southward through the thicket, to attack Hill's flank and rear. Wadsworth's movement was so slow through the tangled underbrush that he was overtaken by night before he reached a position from which he could assault; his men therefore lay on their arms, where night caught them—"in contact with the skirmishers on Hill's left flank."* There was heavy skirmishing at the other end of the line, also, during the afternoon, but without decisive results. Artillery was used wherever practicable, but owing to the denseness of the woods it played no great part in the battle.

(248) The Union squadrons that reconnoitered toward Hamilton's Crossing found that Stuart's cavalry had been drawn in to the right of Lee's army. Wilson's division met part of it on the Catharpin Road and skirmished backward and forward with it during most of the day. At last Wilson, having fallen back to Todd's Tavern, was there joined by Gregg, and their combined forces drove the Confederate squadrons across Corbin's Bridge.

(251) As soon as the battle ceased on the evening of the 5th the Union commanders issued orders for its renewal at five o'clock the next morning.

We have seen that Burnside had arrived with three of his divisions south of the river by the evening of the 5th. He had, however, not come in time to take any part in the battle of this day. At the end of the day's fighting, and indeed all during the day, there was a wide gap between the two wings of the line of battle—between Hancock and Warren on the Union side, and between Hill and Ewell on the Confederate side. Two distinct battles had been fought on fields more than a mile apart. Burnside was ordered to place two of his divisions in the interval between Warren and Hancock, and to be in position to advance at five o'clock next morning with the rest of the army. He was to get possession of the high, clear ground at Chewning's, and attack Hill's left and rear.

*Swinton.

Stevenson's division of Burnside's corps was to remain at the Tavern as a reserve. During the night both sides strengthened their field-works.

(252) Punctually at 5 a.m. on the 6th the right and left of the Union line renewed the attack; but it was two o'clock in the afternoon before any part of Burnside's corps on the left-center of the Union line got into the battle. Sedgwick and Warren on the right attacked Ewell furiously, but could make no headway against his breast-works, defended by artillery and musketry. At about half-past ten the battle had become so fierce at Hancock's end of the line that Sedgwick and Warren were ordered to suspend their attacks and strengthen their works, in order that troops might be spared from their corps to assist Hancock.

Leaving Gibbon with two divisions to hold his left on the Brock Road, Hancock sent Birney forward along the Plank Road with his other two divisions and Getty's division of the Sixth Corps, to attack the Confederate right. Wadsworth's division of the Fifth Corps advanced on the right of this line. Within four or five hundred yards Birney came upon Hill's line in the thicket, but was unable to budge it, until he enveloped its right flank, and Wadsworth struck his left. Seeing their line thus rolled up toward the center, the Confederates broke from both flanks and ran down the Plank Road past General Lee.* Just at this time, however, Longstreet's corps began to arrive, and a little later Anderson's division of Hill's corps. These fresh troops were thrown into the fight and checked Birney's advance, and drove his left back. The battle raged and the hostile lines surged backward and forward in this dense thicket over a space of two or three hundred yards until nearly eleven o'clock, when the firing died away and there was a lull.

(253) The divisions of Wilcox and Heth, after Longstreet's arrival, were withdrawn and moved to the left, at the Chewning farm, to connect with Ewell's corps at the Hagerson farm. Stevenson's division of Burnside's corps and other troops had been sent to reinforce Hancock; Gibbon's two divisions kept their post across the Brock Road, though Hancock had sent Gibbon an order to move them to the front. It had been expected or apprehended that Longstreet's corps, which it was known had not yet arrived, would approach by way of the

*Alexander.

Catharpin Road, and Gibbon had been on the lookout for this corps all the morning. Between 7 and 8 a.m. a column was seen on the Brock Road approaching from the direction of the Catharpin Road. The column was thought to be Longstreet's; but it turned out to be some Federal convalescents that had marched out by way of Chancellorsville and Todd's Tavern to catch up with the army, and were now counter-marching. Then later Sheridan's cavalry, which had marched out from Chancellorsville, had a dismounted combat with Stuart's on the Brock Road out toward Todd's Tavern. Again Gibbon thought Longstreet was approaching. His anxiety concerning the advance of Longstreet by the Catharpin and Brock Roads seems to be the only explanation of Gibbon's failure to go forward to Hancock's relief.

Learning, about 10 a.m., that there was an unfinished railway grading south of the Plank Road, from which an attack could be made against Hancock's left flank, which was in the air, Longstreet organized a force of four brigades under Mahone to make the attack. Mahone marched his command by the flank through the undergrowth to the unfinished railway, and formed line behind the grading, facing to the northeast; at about eleven o'clock he advanced, striking the Federal line in flank and rear. The movement was wholly successful, and Hancock's line fell back in confusion to its trenches on the Brock Road. The panic extended across the Plank Road, where General Wadsworth was killed and his troops were routed.*

Longstreet had ordered the advance of all his troops—which included five fresh brigades—to follow up the advantage gained by Mahone, and was riding at the head of Jenkins's brigade at the side of its commander, down the Plank Road, when some of Mahone's troops facing this road from the south side opened fire across the road. The head of the column was just passing, and came under the fire. Jenkins was killed and Longstreet severely wounded. Longstreet, nevertheless, instructed General Field, the next in command, to press the attack in front by the Plank Road and in flank by the Brock Road. But soon afterwards General Lee came up, and, although Longstreet explained to him "the plans, orders, and opportunity," he "did not care to handle broken lines, and ordered a formation for parallel battle." This delayed the

*Alexander.

attack until 4.15 p.m.* A part of Hancock's front line of breastworks was then carried, and the Confederate flag was planted upon it. But soon the captors were driven out, and by five o'clock the whole Confederate line at this point had been repulsed and driven back with heavy loss.

Meantime Burnside's corps had taken but small part in the battle. Willcox's and Potter's divisions, ordered to enter the gap between Hill and Ewell, did not reach the ground before 2 p.m.; by that time Heth and Wilcox had closed the gap, and were able to repel the Federal assault.*

Early in the forenoon General John B. Gordon had learned that the right of the Union line was exposed in the woods, and could be surprised and taken in reverse. He was anxious to attack it, but could not prevail on General Ewell to allow him to do so. Ewell had let himself be persuaded by Early that Grant had that flank supported by Burnside's corps; which was not so. Toward sunset General Lee was at Ewell's end of the line, and, on being told of the situation, he ordered Gordon to make the assault with his own and another brigade.* Gordon moved out of his trenches at sunset and enveloped the Union flank, took it in reverse, and rolled it up, capturing Generals Shaler and Seymour and several hundred prisoners. (254) Darkness put an end to the battle and Gordon took up a new position in advance of the old one. During the night the lines of the Sixth Corps were drawn back, and a new position was intrenched.

Neither side renewed the engagement on the 7th of May; both armies remained behind their breastworks, and Grant prepared to continue his movement southward, with the hope of getting outside of the Wilderness, and bringing Lee to battle in the open, where the Union superiority in numbers would be of more account.

In the battle of the Wilderness the Union losses were 2,246 killed, 12,037 wounded, and 3,383 captured or missing.† The Confederate returns were not complete; General Alexander estimates the Confederate killed and wounded as 7,750. General Grant says in his *Memoirs*, "More desperate fighting has not been done on this continent than that of the 5th and 6th of May." Livermore estimates the numbers engaged as:—101,895 Federals, 61,025 Confederates.

*Alexander.

†B. & L.

COMMENTS.

In reviving the grade of lieutenant-general in our army in the spring of 1864 for General Grant, and making him commanding-general of all the troops in the field, the Government was not only showing recognition of qualities of leadership that Grant had proved by an unbroken chain of successes, but it was continuing and enlarging the policy of having a single commander in a given theater—a policy that had succeeded so well at Chattanooga. It was the first time in this war that Napoleon's maxim, that "nothing is so important in war as an undivided command . . . conducted by one chief" (Maxim LXIV.), was to have full effect. And it was the first time that any Union army east of the Appalachian Mountains was not to be trammelled by the authorities at Washington. The President did suggest a plan of campaign to Grant, but fortunately did not insist upon its adoption.* Grant was allowed to command in fact. (246) Having "arranged for a simultaneous movement all along the line,"† the main objectives of which were to be Lee's army in Virginia and Joseph E. Johnston's in Georgia, Grant joined the main army in Virginia. This army was composed of the Army of the Potomac under Meade, and the Ninth Corps under Burnside. Grant found the army in the neighborhood of Culpeper Court House, and Lee's Confederate army confronting it on the south bank of the Rapidan River.‡ We shall consider that the hostile forces in the Shenandoah Valley, and those under Beauregard and Butler, respectively, south of the James River, neutralized each other for the time being; and we will confine our attention to the single campaign, or single phase of the campaign, described in the lecture.

Grant's army was nearly twice as large as Lee's, being more than 100,000 strong, while Lee had only 61,000; and the Union army was far better equipped in every way than its adversary. This disparity necessarily obliged Lee to hold his army on the defensive. He not only had to cover Richmond, but he also had to protect the Virginia Central Railway, the Orange and Alexandria Railway south of the Rapidan River,

*Grant's *Memoirs*.

†Grant.

‡The Ninth Corps was at this time at Annapolis awaiting orders, but it was soon afterwards ordered to take station within supporting distance of the Army of the Potomac, along the Orange and Alexandria Railway.

and the Richmond and Danville Railway upon which Richmond and the Confederate army were dependent for all kinds of supplies.

Grant's main objective was to be Lee's army and not Richmond. He was at first undecided whether to cross the river above or below Lee's army. The only apparent advantage he could have had in crossing above, that is, west of the railway, was that the streams were smaller and probably more easily passed in that quarter, and the country was more open and better suited to the maneuvering of large forces. In such a movement Grant's army would have operated on a front parallel to its line of communications, the Orange and Alexandria Railway; while Lee would have operated on a front perpendicular to his communications with Richmond.

Barnett's Ford was defended by Confederate intrenchments, which would have forced Grant to cross the Rapidan higher up; yet if he had undertaken to pass entirely beyond Gordonsville, to turn the Confederate left, he would completely have exposed his own flank and rear. On the other hand, by selecting Lee's right flank to turn, Grant was able to keep his own communications, the wagon-roads back to Brandy Station and the railway thence to Washington, covered; as soon as he should put his army across the Rapidan he could change his base to Fredericksburg and Aquia Creek. That is exactly what he did. The movement, also, if it succeeded in placing Grant's army upon the south bank of the Rapidan, before it should be discovered by Lee, would compel Lee to quit his position and fight faced toward Richmond.

While Grant took all means to conceal his movement on the 4th of May, he, nevertheless, hardly hoped that he should be allowed to cross the Rapidan without opposition. "This," he says in his report, "I regarded as a great success, and it removed from my mind the most serious apprehension I had entertained,—that of crossing the river in the face of an active, large, well-appointed, and ably-commanded army," "It was well known," says General Humphreys, chief of staff of the Army of the Potomac, "that daylight would divulge our movement to Lee's signal officers . . . and it was believed that he would at once move by the Orange and Fredericksburg Pike and Plank Roads to oppose us."

Yet it does not appear that Grant, on the morning of May 5, expected to encounter Lee's main army on these two roads in the Wilderness. Indeed he hoped to have his army beyond

the Wilderness, in open country, before he should have to engage battle with the enemy. Neither army appears to have done very effective patrolling during the evening of the 4th or the early morning of the 5th of May. It is almost inconceivable that two large armies should bivouac within four or five miles of each other without either's suspecting the nearness of the other; yet such appears to have been the case. And when Confederate troops were discovered at about 7 a.m. on the Turnpike, Meade supposed they were only a division of the Confederates, left there to deceive and delay the Union army, and that the main Confederate army was falling back to the North Anna.

No poorer cavalry work was done in the Civil War than that done by the cavalry of Sheridan and Stuart on the afternoon and evening of May 4 and the early morning of May 5, 1864. It was no better than the work of the Prussian and Austrian squadrons on the day before Königgrätz. That the armies were in the Wilderness is no excuse. For Stuart the excuse may be made that his troops were away from the main army by Lee's authority—over near Fredericksburg, where he had to take his lean horses in order to forage them. He did not rejoin the main army until May 5. For Sheridan and at least two of his division commanders, Torbert and Wilson, it is enough to say that they had not learned the lesson. The record shows that General Sheridan's only cavalry service in the Civil War had been as colonel of a Michigan cavalry regiment for one month and seven days,* and that neither of the other two had ever commanded as much as a squad of cavalry until they were given their high commands in the Army of the Potomac. General Torbert's entire service had been with infantry, and General Wilson's as an engineer officer until he was placed in charge of the Cavalry Bureau at Washington on the 17th of February, 1864. He joined his division of cavalry on the 4th of May. Sheridan unquestionably learned before the end of the war how to use his cavalry; but he did not use it right on these two days, else Grant would have been informed that Lee's army was bivouacked within five miles of him.

*Like most active young infantry officers, General Sheridan had done much service with small detachments of cavalry, when he was an infantry lieutenant in the Indian country in the far West; but such service alone does not qualify one to take command of a great body of cavalry in war.

It was a bold act for Lee to march his army to attack the Union army of twice its strength; a more timid commander would have fallen back promptly to the south bank of the North Anna, and made that stream a new line of defense; or, if he had wished to take advantage of the dense forest to make a stand within it, he would have made all haste to reach the Catharpin Road, and taken up a position there, barring Grant's way to Richmond. A more timid commander, also, would have guarded the crossings of the Rapidan more closely, and tried to prevent its passage. Lee made no opposition to Grant's passage, and was pleased to have the Union army enter the Wilderness, and put the Rapidan at its back. General Grant violated the maxim of war "never to do what the enemy wishes you to do." Lee and his army were better acquainted with the Wilderness and its roads and trails than they had been a year before, and Lee believed he had the chance for another such victory as Chancellorsville. He did have the chance, but the Union army was not commanded by Hooker, and Lee no longer had Jackson.

Longstreet was behindhand again, but through no fault of his. Longstreet's corps was cantoned too far away; it ought to have been near Orange Court House instead of at Gordonsville. Furthermore, Lee did not dispatch the order for an advance to his corps-commanders until near noon on the 4th of May. At least as early as the 2nd of May Lee was convinced that Grant was going to turn his right flank; he ought then, by all means, to have drawn Longstreet's corps toward his other two—Longstreet had forty-two miles to march after he received Lee's order on the 4th of May, while Hill had twenty-eight, and Ewell only eighteen.* If Longstreet's corps had been on the Plank Road close behind Hill's on the 5th, the combined forces might have destroyed Getty's division at the Brock Road, before the return of Hancock's corps from Todd's Tavern; then they might have cut off and overwhelmed Hancock's corps.

TACTICS.

Most of the bad tactics of the battle of the Wilderness can be charged to the dense undergrowth and lack of roads. Organizations could not be kept intact; commanders could not

*Alexander.

see or keep in touch with their lines; positions could not be pointed out, described, or identified; columns could not be directed; distances could not be estimated, nor could the time be calculated that troops would take to go from one point to another; at fifty paces friends could not be distinguished from foes, and neither could be seen a hundred yards away.

Although Ewell and Hill must have expected to encounter the Union army in the Wilderness, they seem, nevertheless, not to have been aware of its presence until they came upon it in the thickets; and the Federal commanders were certainly surprised to find Lee's main army upon the flank of their column. To this extent the battle was a rencounter. There was no plan of battle on either side to start with, and none appears to have been evolved as the battle progressed. No concerted effort was made on either side, at any stage of the battle, to envelop the flank of the other or to pierce its center.

First one part of a line and then another would attack and be driven back to its breastwork. On the first day there were two distinct battles, one on the Plank Road and the other on the Turnpike, with a wide stretch of brush between them without a soldier in it. Meade did finally, on the second day, suspend the Union attacks on the Turnpike and hold his troops there on the defensive, in order to send reinforcements to Hancock on the Plank Road; beyond this there was no co-operation nor mutual support between the two wings of the Union line. There was none whatever between the two wings of the Confederate line—no such concerted action as at Chancellorsville. On the contrary we find Mahone at noon rolling up the left of the Union line, and Gordon, at sunset, rolling up its right, or the novel tactical project of an army of 60,000 trying to envelop both flanks of an army of more than 100,000. Yet either of these Confederate flank-attacks ought to have given decisive results; the first one probably would have done so but for the untimely wounding of Longstreet, and the second might have done so if it had been made earlier in the day; but it was stopped at the height of victory by the darkness of night.

If the Union army had held the breastworks on each of its flanks with a single corps, and concentrated its bulk at the center, on the forenoon of the 6th of May, it might have pierced the center of the Confederate line and destroyed one or both of its wings. The flanks were more than five miles apart, while there was a stretch of a mile or more at the mid-

dle without a soldier in it. Burnside was ordered to put two of his divisions into position to penetrate this gap at daybreak; but it was 2 p.m. before the divisions reached the ground, and in the meanwhile the gap had been closed by the Confederate divisions of Heth and Wilcox. Apparently Burnside's troops took twelve to eighteen hours in going three miles through the underbrush, and had small part in the battle.

There was, of course, little chance for the action of cavalry or artillery on such a battle-field; yet, by hovering out on the flank toward Todd's Tavern, and engaging Sheridan in combat, Stuart's cavalry had the effect of holding Gibbon with two divisions across the Brock Road at a time when Hancock sorely needed his help at the front.

The battle was indecisive; the tactical advantage rested with the Confederates, but neither army wanted to renew the engagement on the 7th of May. Strategically Grant had failed to make Lee come out into the open; but Lee had failed to stop Grant's army—it was the first time, so far, that the Union army had fought a great battle on the soil of Virginia and advanced immediately afterwards. It was the first step gained in General Grant's policy of "continuous hammering"; the Confederacy could not stand many more such battles, call it victory or defeat.

LECTURE XXIII.

THE BATTLE OF SPOTTSYLVANIA COURT HOUSE.

(255) Having resolved to continue his advance southward from the Wilderness battle-field, and, if possible, to cut Lee off from Richmond, Grant set his army in motion on the evening of May 7, 1864.

As the movement was to be made mainly with a view to getting outside of the Wilderness and inducing Lee to go out and give battle in the open, the first objective points assigned to the various army-corps, and the routes, were merely preliminary; subsequent movements would depend upon the movements of Lee's army. Hancock's corps [Second], which occupied the left of the line, was to remain in position until the trains and the rest of the army marched off the battle-field by the rear of his line. The trains were started in the afternoon, and at half-past eight the troops took up the march. Passing behind Hancock's line, Warren's corps [Fifth] moved by the Brock Road toward Spottsylvania Court House. Sedgwick's [Sixth] marched by way of Chancellorsville, Aldrich's, and Piney Branch Church, toward the same point. Burnside's corps [Ninth] followed Sedgwick's as far as Aldrich's. Hancock was ordered to follow close behind Warren to Todd's Tavern. The cavalry covered the movement in flank and rear, and pushed out ahead of the infantry columns.

Todd's Tavern was about six miles from Wilderness Tavern by the Brock Road, and Spottsylvania Court House was about twelve miles. By way of Chancellorsville Spottsylvania was about fourteen miles from Wilderness Tavern. In this preliminary movement the corps on different roads would be within short distances of one another; but the woods were so close and the cross-trails so little known that it would be difficult to pass troops from one road to another.

Lee was informed by Stuart on the afternoon of the 7th concerning the movement of the Federal wagon-trains, and he made no doubt that Grant's objective was Spottsylvania Court House. He, therefore, ordered Anderson, now commanding Longstreet's corps, to make a night march for the same point, by way of by-roads and Shady Grove Church Road. Stu-

art's cavalry was to retard the march of the Federal columns as much as possible, in order to enable Anderson to reach Spottsylvania ahead of them and take up a position.

At Spottsylvania Court House several roads came together from the direction of Wilderness Tavern and Chancellorsville, as well as from Fredericksburg, now the Union base. Other roads led from Spottsylvania toward the east and south. The junction of all these roads gave the place a temporary strategic importance, and made it the field of a battle.

(256) So well did Fitzhugh Lee's cavalry division perform its task along the Brock Road by "felling trees across it" and disputing "every foot of ground" that Merritt, whose cavalry brigade was marching ahead of Warren's corps, "found it exceedingly difficult to make any progress."* It was the dark of the moon which increased the difficulty and slowness of the advance. So it was half-after eight in the morning before the head of Warren's column emerged from the woods into open ground at Alsop's, about two miles and a half from the Court House. Merritt's cavalry had withdrawn from the front, and Robinson's infantry division was in the lead.

This division marched on across the clearing in brigade columns of regiments covered by a line of skirmishers. When the skirmishers arrived within two or three hundred yards of the next wood, a dense pine thicket,—at the point where the prongs of the road from the New Court House and the Old Court House came together,—"suddenly a severe musketry and artillery fire was opened upon their front and right from" a breastwork of rails at the edge of the thicket. "This staggered them, and in a short time they fell back to the shelter of the woods in their rear."* It was Kershaw's division of Anderson's [Longstreet's] corps that had done the firing from the pines. Robinson was badly wounded at the first volley. Griffin's division had come up on Robinson's right, but it was also forced back, until the other two divisions of the Fifth Corps [Crawford and Wadsworth] got to the front and joined in the engagement. (257) The corps then pushed the Confederates back to their line of breastworks, and intrenched its own position, "from two to four hundred yards" in front of the Confederate line.

Meanwhile Field's division of Anderson's [Longstreet's] corps had come up and joined the line with Kershaw's. About

*Humphreys.

noon Sedgwick's corps [Sixth] arrived, and at one o'clock it and Warren's corps [Fifth] were ordered to attack the Confederate position. The ground was unknown and the troops were tired; so the arrangements for the attack were not made promptly. It was late in the afternoon before the assault was made—too late to have been followed up, if it had succeeded. But it did not succeed, for Ewell's corps reached Spottsylvania at five o'clock—in time to form on Anderson's right and save his flank from being enveloped. Both sides strengthened and extended their intrenchments during the night. (256) Early in the morning Wilson's cavalry division from the direction of Fredericksburg had pushed Rosser's Confederate cavalry brigade before it and got possession of Spottsylvania Court House. But Fitzhugh Lee, having been relieved by Kershaw's infantry in front of Warren's corps, had hastened to Rosser's assistance. Seeing Lee's and Rosser's combined forces about to move against him, Wilson, after having held the town two hours, withdrew his division, leaving the town in possession of the Confederates.*

Let us now see where the other troops of the two armies were—Hill's corps of the Confederate army; Hancock's and Burnside's of the Union army. Hancock, who was to follow close behind Warren's corps as far as Todd's Tavern, found his road blocked by Warren's troops until daylight. He then marched to Todd's Tavern and there intrenched. He sent Miles with his own brigade and a detachment of cavalry and artillery to reconnoiter toward Corbin's Bridge on the Catharpin Road. Miles had a skirmish with Wade Hampton's Confederate cavalry and part of Hill's corps. Burnside's corps [Ninth] bivouacked at Aldrich's in charge of the trains. Ewell had followed on the road taken by Anderson, and Early, who now commanded Hill's corps, Hill being ill, was ordered to march by Todd's Tavern and the Brock Road "as soon as his front was clear of the enemy." He was moving on the Catharpin Road toward Todd's Tavern when he encountered Miles's detachment. Seeing that Todd's Tavern was occupied by Union troops, and that night was falling, Early bivouacked on the Catharpin Road. He marched to Spottsylvania the next morning, May 9, by the Shady Grove Church Road.

(258) It was on the 8th of May that Grant gave Sheridan an order "to cut loose from the Army of the Potomac, pass

*Alexander.

round the left of Lee's army and attack his cavalry; to cut" the Virginia Central and the Richmond and Fredericksburg Railways, "and, when compelled to do so for want of forage and rations, to move on to the James River and draw these from Butler's supplies."* The main object of this raid was stated by Sheridan at the time; he was impatient at being tied fast to the army, guarding the wagon-train and hovering along the flanks and rear, while Stuart's cavalry was keeping Lee informed of every movement the Union army made, and blocking the march of its columns. "If I am permitted," said he, "to cut loose from this army, I'll draw Stuart after me, and whip him, too."† This was the main object of the raid. Sheridan started at daylight on the 9th of May, and it was sixteen days before he rejoined the army.

Stuart followed him, as he had predicted, and, before night, came upon his rear, but did not stop him. Then, seeing that Sheridan was making for Richmond, Stuart quitted the pursuit and, by a hard roundabout march, placed his command across Sheridan's path at Yellow Tavern, only six miles from Richmond. Here a severe combat took place in which Stuart was mortally wounded and his command beaten and driven back. Sheridan passed through the outer defenses of Richmond, but he had been delayed long enough by Stuart to enable the small force left for the defense of Richmond to take its place in the inner works; there he was checked. Sheridan then turned toward the James. He tried to cross to the north side of the Chickahominy at Mechanicsville, but was stopped by Confederate batteries and cavalry. His position was now perilous, with the troops at Richmond on one flank and the Chickahominy with its bridges destroyed, held by the enemy, on the other. He built a bridge under fire and forced a crossing; on the 14th May he was at Haxall's Landing. Now he did not know where either Lee's army or the Union army was. On the 17th he started back to look for the latter. He marched by way of White House, where he had to build a bridge, and on the 24th rejoined the army near Chesterfield. He "had passed entirely around Lee's army; encountered his cavalry in four engagements, and defeated them in all; recaptured four hundred Union prisoners, and killed and captured many of the enemy; destroyed and used many supplies and munitions of war; destroyed miles of rail-

*Grant.

†Rodenbough in *B. & L.*

road and telegraph, and freed us from annoyance by the cavalry of the enemy for more than two weeks.”*

(259) By noon on the 9th of May Burnside's corps [Ninth] had come up from Aldrich's, and was on the Fredericksburg Road with the leading division [Willcox] south of the Ny River. Ferrero's division [negroes] was left with the train.

No attack was made by either side on the 9th. “The Fifth and Sixth Corps [Warren and Sedgwick] readjusted their lines, made more intrenchments, strengthened those already made, and put artillery into position. The skirmishers and sharpshooters were very active on both sides, and in the morning General Sedgwick was killed close to the intrenchments at the right of his corps . . . at the point where the forks of the road in Alsop's field unite.”† General Wright then took command of the Sixth Corps. The Federal skirmishers of the Fifth and Sixth Corps were pushed forward again on the morning of the 10th, with a view to developing the position of the Confederate line.

The Confederates occupied a nearly continuous line of intrenchments running in a broken and irregular trace from the Po, at a point 600 yards above the crossing of the Shady Grove Church Road, to a point a half-mile south of the Fredericksburg Road. Without considering the angles and small curves the line was more than four miles long. It inclosed Spottsylvania Court House on the northwest, north, and east, and covered the roads southward to Richmond. The center of the line formed a sort of loop a half-mile across from east to west, having a sharp apex upon “a high open point” a quarter of a mile north, slightly east, of the McCool house. The left of the line, about a third of a mile, rested on comparatively high open ground, between two small branches of the Po. In front of this part, at no point more than two hundred yards distant, was a narrow belt of dense cedars.

The intrenchments crossed the Brock Road at the fork whose branches led to Spottsylvania and the Old Court House. From this fork the earthworks ran through woods in a north-easterly direction for a quarter of a mile to Harrison's open ground; thence north and northeast for half a mile, partly in open and partly in wooded ground; thence easterly on the outer edge of a wood for nearly four hundred yards to the high,

*Grant.

†Humphreys.

cleared point mentioned before; there the line turned southeast, and ran "six or seven hundred yards," with the woods about the McCool house behind it, and "fairly open ground in front"; then it turned southward and continued a half-mile with broken and wooded ground in front of it, and a mile in open ground.

Anderson's [Longstreet's] corps, with Field's division on the left and Kershaw's on the right, held the trenches from the Po to the reëntrant angle about west of the Harrison house. Ewell's corps held the intrenchment from Anderson's right, around the loop or "salient," to a point nearly a mile southeast of the McCool house. Hill's corps, except Mahone's [Anderson's] division, occupied the trenches to the right of Ewell's. Mahone's division formed to the left of Field, overlooking the Po.* Gordon's [Early's] division of Ewell's corps, in reserve, dug a trench nearly across the loop from east to west a quarter of a mile south of the McCool house. Artillery was placed at the most suitable points along the line of the intrenchments. "Where there was wood in front of them it was slashed, and where the ground was open" abatis was made.

On the Union side, on the evening of the 9th of May, Hancock's corps [Second], which had come up from Todd's Tavern, occupied the right of the line in an intrenchment overlooking the Po; Warren's corps [Fifth] was next, intrenched in front of Anderson. The left of Warren's trench was at the fork of the road in Alsop's field. Wright's corps [Sixth], with its right at this fork, was intrenched along a brook in a northerly direction. Burnside's [Ninth] was still near the Ny River on the Fredericksburg Road. On coming up on the 9th, Burnside had encountered a small force of Confederate cavalry dismounted, which he mistook for infantry; this led General Grant to believe that Lee's whole army was about to move on the Union base at Fredericksburg, and he ordered Hancock to cross the Po and reconnoiter Lee's left by recrossing the Po at the bridge on the Shady Grove Church Road, and turning the Confederate line.

(260) By 9 p.m. Hancock had crossed three of his divisions to the right bank of the Po. His other division [Mott], which had come up late from Todd's Tavern, had been sent to the left of Wright's corps [Sixth]. Hancock had three

*Alexander.

bridges built across the Po during the night, to secure his retreat, and "pushed forward toward the Blockhouse* bridge; but . . . it was impracticable to keep the skirmish line moving through the dense woods in the darkness,"† and Hancock found himself compelled to wait for daylight before trying to cross the bridge. The river was unfordable. On examining the bridge by daylight on the 10th Hancock found it strongly defended by Confederate infantry and artillery behind earthworks. These troops were part of Mahone's division. Hancock concluded not to attempt to carry the bridge, but had Brooke's brigade cross a mile lower down to reconnoiter the position of the Confederate left. About ten o'clock, however, Hancock received an order to leave one division to threaten the enemy's left, and to take his other two divisions to Warren's position. There he was to command these two divisions and the corps of Warren and Wright in a general attack that was to be made all along the line at five o'clock.

He left Barlow's division on the south side of the Po. The division was exposed to the artillery fire from the Confederate left, and in the afternoon was attacked by Heth's division of Hill's Corps, which Lee had dispatched to oppose Hancock's movement. (261) After desperate fighting in which the losses were heavy on each side, Barlow withdrew his division to the north side of the river. The Confederates then prolonged their intrenchments a mile upon the high ground west of the bridge, thus covering the approach by the Shady Grove Church Road.

Preliminary to the general attack, which was to take place at 5 p.m., Warren and Wright had been skirmishing more or less in their front during the day, with the view of determining the enemy's position in the dense woods. Before Hancock reached Warren's position Warren had reported "the opportunity for immediate attack to be so favorable that he was ordered to attack at once"† without waiting for Hancock and the appointed hour. Wright with the Sixth Corps, and Mott's division of Hancock's corps, were ordered to join in the assault. Gibbon's division of Hancock's corps, also, arrived in time to take part in this assault with Warren's line. The advance to the attack was made about four o'clock. In front of

*This was a log house near the bridge of Shady Grove Road, called the Blockhouse on account of its peculiar form. Alexander.

†Humphreys.

the right of Warren's line was the narrow dense thicket of dead cedars already mentioned—the most difficult kind of thicket to go through. On emerging from the cedars into the open space immediately in front of the Confederate trenches, Warren's ranks, under heavy cannon and musketry fire, were badly disordered. Yet the troops "went forward, some to the abatis, some to the crest of the parapet, but were all driven back with heavy loss."*

Farther to the left Upton with his own brigade and four other regiments of the Sixth Corps was to assault what appeared to be the weakest part of the Confederate line—the face of the salient west of the McCool house. This face was exposed to enfilade fire from Union batteries, and a large force could approach it within 200 yards without being seen. The trench here, however, was in open ground, with abatis in front of it, and traverses at intervals to protect it from enfilade fire; and a hundred yards back of it was a second trench, partly dug, occupied by a line of troops. Two hundred yards in front of it was the edge of a pine wood. Upton formed his assaulting column in four lines inside this wood, while batteries were shelling the point of attack. Mott's division [Second Corps] was to coöperate from the direction of the Brown house. Upton's column came out of the pines and charged with a hurrah at 6.10 p.m. "Under a terrible front and flank fire, it gained the parapet, had a hand-to-hand, desperate struggle, which lasted but a few seconds, and . . . poured over the works, capturing a large number of prisoners."*

Gordon's Confederate division, which had been in reserve, hurried to the breach in the line, but was unable to stop Upton's victorious troops; they spread to right and left, and carried the second Confederate line in rear. But Mott's division had failed to come to Upton's support. It had formed in the open, and was driven back by heavy artillery fire.† Hancock was now on the ground with Birney's division. To relieve Upton, Grant ordered the assault to be renewed by Hancock's troops and those of Warren and Wright. This assault failed, and Upton withdrew his men from the Confederate lines under cover of darkness. On the extreme left Burnside, "with but little fighting and almost without loss," had got up to within a few hundred yards of Spottsylvania Court House,

*Humphreys.

†Alexander.

and there intrenched.* This left a wide gap between his corps and the right wing of the Union army, and before morning of the 11th he was ordered to return to the north bank of the Ny and connect with Mott's division at the Brown farm.

"On the 11th there was no battle and but little firing; none except by Mott, who made a reconnaissance to ascertain if there was a weak point in the enemy's line."* This reconnaissance discovered the salient at the center of the Confederate line. Grant resolved to assault this salient, and ordered Hancock to move three of the divisions of his corps during the night to connect with the right of Burnside's corps, which had returned to its trenches in front of the Court House. These two corps were ordered to make "a vigorous attack against the enemy at four o'clock a.m." on the 12th. Warren and Wright were ordered to "hold their corps as close to the enemy as possible."

On the Confederate side Heth had moved the bulk of his division back from the Shady Grove Church Road to its position in front of the Court House. (262) Hancock marched his divisions to the Brown house, and formed them for attack in the open space, 400 yards wide, to the south of it. He had 1200 yards of ground to traverse before reaching the Confederate breastworks. Barlow's division was to lead the assault with the brigades of Miles and Brooke abreast in the first line. The four brigades of this division formed in mass, with a depth of ten double ranks—twenty lines of muskets. On account of a heavy fog, Hancock postponed the attack until 4.35 a.m. The Confederate artillery had been withdrawn from this part of the line during the night, and was not in place to fire into Hancock's dense column. The charge was received with a sharp musketry fire only, and was not stopped. The Federals carried the trenches in a rush, capturing the Confederate division-commander [Johnson], one brigade-commander [Steuart], 4,000 prisoners, thirty colors, and twenty guns. The guns were caught in column hastening back to their position.† The victors pushed on over the intrenchments, through the woods, until they were checked by a line within the intrenchments, south of the McCool house. Reinforcements had been hurried to this quarter from the left of the Confederate position, and Hancock's men were pushed

*Grant.

†Alexander.

back to the outside of the parapets; but they could be driven no farther.

Writing of this charge, General Alexander says: "Had they [the Confederate guns] been in their places, it is quite certain that the charge would not have been successful. Nowhere else in the whole history of the war was such a target, so large, so dense, so vulnerable, ever presented to so large a force of artillery. Ranks had already been lost in the crowd and officers could neither show example nor exercise authority. A few discharges would have made of it a mob which could not have been rallied."

At 6 a.m. Meade received report of Hancock's success, but he was informed that the Confederates were trying to take the offensive in that quarter. He, therefore, ordered Wright to move his corps at once to Hancock's assistance and to attack on Hancock's right. Wright directed his assault against the "west angle." The struggle lasted all day long, and till after midnight, and was one of the fiercest and bloodiest of the whole war. Its memory has been perpetuated in the name of Bloody Angle, which the narrow space has borne since that day. Five other Federal brigades came to this point, making twenty-four brigades that engaged in assaulting a few hundred yards of the intrenchments. Union soldiers stood from twenty to forty deep outside the parapet; the bodies of the slain were shot to pieces and mangled beyond recognition; the whole forest thereabouts was killed by the fire, and one tree* twenty-two inches in diameter was literally cut down by bullets.†

On the extreme right of the Union line Warren had opened with all his artillery and pushed his skirmishers forward against Anderson's intrenchment early in the morning. "At 9.15 a.m. he was ordered to attack at once at all hazards, with his whole force if necessary." He did so and was repulsed. He was then ordered to move his whole corps to Wright's assistance at the salient, with the hope of carrying the intrenchment at that point. This order was revoked before the corps reached its position and "the project of further assault was given up."‡ In his *Memoirs* General Grant charges Warren with being slow in his movement.

*The stump of this tree is still preserved in the National Museum at Washington.

†Alexander.

‡Humphreys.

On the Union left Burnside "accomplished but little of a positive nature," says General Grant, "but negatively a great deal. He kept Lee from reinforcing his center from that quarter." Burnside moved to the attack at 4 a.m., as directed, and struck the part of the Confederate line held by Hill's corps and the right of Ewell's; he connected on the right with Hancock's corps and was more or less engaged till late in the day; but the fighting in this quarter was noway as severe as it was at the salient where Hancock and Wright were engaged. Burnside intrenched his position. The Union losses in killed and wounded on this 12th of May were about 6,000; the Confederate losses between 4,000 and 5,000.* Hancock's corps on the Union side lost the greatest number, some 2,500.

(263) During the night Lee withdrew his troops from the loop around the McCool house to ground south of the Harris house, where they intrenched a new and shorter line. This was the line the Confederates should have intrenched at the start. The salient—the entire loop about the McCool house—was another example, like Sickles's salient at the Peach Orchard, at Gettysburg, of a weak position taken solely for the sake of high ground. In the hasty extension of the Confederate line on the afternoon of May 8, "Ewell, to keep on high ground, had changed direction and gone a mile north."† This caused the salient, because he had to bend his line southward again to cover Spottsylvania Court House, and to avoid being taken in reverse by Burnside's column. Ewell ought to have disregarded the high ground and continued the intrenchment eastward along the trace adopted on the night of the 12th. It must not be forgotten that the direction of a line is often of more consequence than its elevation.

There was no battle on the 13th. Grant ordered another general assault to be made at 4 a.m. the 14th. Warren was directed to march his corps during the night of the 13th by the rear of the Second and Ninth, and connect it with Burnside's left, and to attack by the Fredericksburg Road. The Sixth Corps was to follow Warren's and to attack by the next road south of the Fredericksburg Road. It rained during the night, and the way was so dark and muddy that the head of Warren's corps did not reach its position before 6 a.m.; then the whole day was spent in putting the tired, straggling men into position, and the assault had to be given up. If the assault

*Humphreys.

†Alexander.

could have been made as planned it would have proved serious for the Confederates, because they did not suspect the movement, and the intrenchments on their right flank did not then extend much beyond the Court House.*

The Sixth Corps massed out of sight near the Anderson Mill on the north side of the Ny. Upton's brigade crossed the stream and occupied a commanding position covering the crossings; but it was attacked by Chambliss's cavalry brigade and Mahone's infantry, and driven away. (264) The position was later retaken by the Federals, and the Sixth Corps crossed to the right bank of the Ny and intrenched. Early on the morning of the 15th Hancock's corps, except Birney's division, was moved round to the Fredericksburg Road, near the Ny. Birney's division was left to cover Burnside's right.

The withdrawal of the Union right was not discovered by the Confederates until the afternoon of the 14th. Thereupon Anderson moved his line forward and occupied the intrenchments abandoned by Warren's corps. On the night of the 14th Anderson's corps was transferred over to the right of Hill's; it prolonged the Confederate intrenchments to the Po, covering the Richmond Road and the bridge over the Po.

There was little fighting on the 15th, 16th, or 17th. During those days the Fifth and Sixth Corps advanced their intrenchments. The left of the Union works did not follow those of the Confederates to the Po, but was shorter and bent back eastward. Grant's purpose was to hold this part of his line with a reduced force, while he assembled a strong column to make another effort against Lee's new line south of the Bloody Angle. He hoped to find that Lee had weakened this part of his line by withdrawing troops from it to prolong his line to the right.* Accordingly Hancock and Wright marched their corps during the night of the 17th to the intrenchments they had captured on the 12th. From this position they assaulted the Confederates at daybreak on the 18th in their new breastworks south of the Harrison house. The Confederates were on the lookout, and their works were very strong. They received the charges with a heavy fire of artillery, supported by infantry, which completely swept the ground in front, and they repulsed the assault. Burnside's corps attacked at the same time on the left of Hancock and Wright, and was also repulsed. Warren's corps coöperated with artillery.

*Alexander.

(265) Wright's corps returned to its place on the left of Warren's; Hancock's took post near the Anderson house on the north bank of the Ny. During the night of the 18th Burnside's corps was moved to the left of the Sixth. The Fifth Corps now became the right of the Union line, and its intrenchments reached across the Ny River, above the crossing of the Fredericksburg Road. This road was the Union army's main line of communication with its base at Aquia Creek.

Grant now gave up all further hope of carrying the Confederate works at Spottsylvania Court House, and prepared to make another movement by his left flank. Lee anticipated this movement, and on the 19th ordered Ewell to make a demonstration in his front to see if the enemy had gone. As the Federals in his front were strongly intrenched, Ewell got leave to move round their right toward the Fredericksburg Road, which he thought he could do with less loss. He encountered the extreme right of Warren's corps. Other troops of the Fifth Corps and of the Second were hurried to this point, and a Federal regiment, on its way from Fredericksburg to join the army, took part in the action. The upshot was, Ewell was defeated with a loss of 900 men, and driven back. But he found out that the Federal army had not yet gone. Hancock's corps had, however, actually been under orders to start southward on the afternoon of the 19th, but this encounter with Ewell led to its being held back until the night of the 20th.*

In the battles around Spottsylvania Court House the Union losses numbered 2,725 killed and 13,416 wounded; the Confederate losses can not be stated, but they were probably much smaller than these.

Grant now hoped that, by starting a single corps off one or two marches ahead of the main army, he might tempt Lee to move the bulk of his forces against this corps; then he hoped to get a chance to strike the Confederates with his main army in open country before they should have time to intrench. (258) It was with this object that Hancock was ordered to march on the 19th. Hancock got away on the night of the 20th and marched to Guiney's Station; thence he was to go southward toward Hanover Court House.†

*Humphreys.

†In the Official Atlas all the maps taken from reports of Union commanders show Guiney's Station to have been about ten miles almost due east of Spottsylvania Court House.

Sheridan with the bulk of the Union cavalry was still absent upon his raid, but all the horsemen that could be got together went with Hancock under Torbert. The Confederate cavalry, now commanded by Wade Hampton, observed and hindered the Union movement.

Lee was no longer strong enough to make any offensive movement; all he could now hope to do was to keep his army between Grant and Richmond. On learning, therefore, through his signal stations and cavalry patrols, about noon on the 21st, that the head of Hancock's column had reached the railway near Guiney's Station, he started Ewell's corps at once for Hanover Junction. He supposed Hancock's march simply meant another turning movement aimed at his communications with Richmond.* At 10 a.m. on the 21st Warren's corps took the same route that Hancock's had taken; later Burnside's, followed by Wright's, took up the march. Lee now moved his whole army to the neighborhood of Hanover Junction, and put it into position on the south side of the North Anna River, covering Richmond and the Virginia Central Railway. (266) The Confederate position here was a peculiar one; it was convex, or rather angular, with the center or apex of the angle resting on the convex side of a bend in the river.

Moving southward from Guiney's Station, the Union army arrived in front of this position on the 23rd and 24th of May. Warren's [Fifth] and Wright's [Sixth] corps crossed above Ox Ford and Hancock's crossed at Chesterfield Bridge. Only one of Burnside's divisions got across. The river thus split the Union army into three pieces and would have had to be crossed twice before one wing of the army could have reinforced the other. Both armies intrenched. There was some fighting on the 23rd and 24th, but Grant decided that the Confederate position was too strong to assault; he resolved, therefore, to continue the movement by his left flank.

(258) Accordingly the army was again set in motion immediately after dark on the 26th of May. Its objective was Hanover Town, near which it expected to cross the Pamunkey River. Sheridan's cavalry, which had now rejoined the army, preceded the infantry columns, and cleared the way. At Haw's Shop it defeated the Confederate cavalry under Wade Hampton in a fierce combat, which lasted a whole day.*

*Alexander.

The topography now was wholly different from that of the Wilderness. After leaving Spottsylvania Court House the armies found themselves in a rich farming country, and the farther south and east they marched the broader and deeper they found the streams, the flatter, lower, and more marshy the country. On the 30th of May the Union army again encountered Lee's forces blocking its way on the south bank of the Totopotomoy, a small branch of the Pamunkey. The Confederates were so strongly intrenched that Grant decided not to assault.

(267) The hostile lines then shifted toward the southeast, and Cold Harbor became the central point of a great battle. General W. F. Smith had joined Grant with about 10,000 men of the Tenth and Eighteenth Corps from Butler's army;* and General Lee had received about 14,000 reinforcements, consisting of two brigades brought by Breckinridge from the Shenandoah Valley, where he had lately defeated Sigel; Pickett's division; and Hoke's division, which had come over from Drewry's Bluff.† Grant assaulted Lee's strongly intrenched position, on the 3rd of June, and, in one hour, lost nearly 6,000 men killed and wounded. "At half-after one o'clock the assault was suspended, and corps-commanders were directed to intrench the positions they held, and make reconnaissances with a view to moving against the enemy's works by regular approaches."‡ Cold Harbor was within six miles of the outer works around Richmond, and the right of Lee's line on the Chickahominy was only three miles from those works. Another movement by the left flank would not have brought Grant any nearer Richmond; but could he have broken Lee's center at Cold Harbor, and thrown the Confederate army back upon the Chickahominy, he might have destroyed or captured it.

Grant's army remained in position in front of Lee's until the night of the 12th of June, and a more trying experience has seldom fallen to the lot of soldiers than that of the soldiers in these two armies during this time. The fire of the sharpshooters on both sides was terrible and incessant, and the country was so flat that no man dared rise during the daylight from his cramped position in the shallow trenches; by day the heat of the sun was terrific and at night the mosquitoes

*B. & L.

†Alexander.

‡Humphreys.

and insects were torture; the stench of the dead bodies of men and animals was sickening; cooking could scarcely be done at all; bathing was not thought of, and the water for drink was foul; the lines were in the midst of marshes, and malarial fever and other sickness increased with each day.* On the night of the 12th Grant withdrew his army to cross the James River.

The Union losses from June 1 to June 12 numbered 1,905 killed and 10,570 wounded; the Confederate losses have not been determined, but they were much smaller. It has often been stated that Grant's losses in this bloody campaign of "continuous hammering" exceeded the whole number of men in Lee's army. This is somewhat an exaggeration. General Long, Lee's biographer, says Grant's "losses aggregated the enormous total of 60,000 men—a greater number than the whole of Lee's army at the beginning of the campaign; Lee's losses, on the contrary, were not more than 20,000." No part of this statement is quite accurate. According to the statistical table given in *Battles and Leaders*, Grant's losses from the 5th of May, the first day of the Wilderness, to the 12th of June, were 7,620 killed, 38,342 wounded, 8,967 missing; a total of 54,929. Lee began the campaign with an army of 61,953 men, and received before the end of it 14,400 reinforcements; Grant began it with 105,145 men; up to the 1st of June he had lost 42,192; and on that day he had an army of 113,875. As it had not been four weeks since the first battle (May 5), it is not probable that many of the wounded had returned to duty. If we suppose that 5,000 of them were included in the 113,875 present on the 1st of June, we find that Grant had received 45,922 reinforcements.

COMMENTS.

(258) The main result of Grant's operations from the Rapidan to the James was to wear out Lee's army, to a greater or less degree, by the policy of "continuous hammering"; but Grant's own army had suffered nearly three times as great a loss in men as Lee's, and it is claimed that after the desperate assault at Cold Harbor, in which the Federal loss was very great and the Confederate loss comparatively small, the morale

*Alexander.

of the Confederate soldiers was left in a better state than that of the Union soldiers.

Grant's successive strategic turning movements had all failed to reach Lee's communications—to get between Lee's army and Richmond. In the first one Lee had taken the offensive and attacked the Union army in flank in the Wilderness. In each one thereafter Grant had found Lee's army intrenched across his road; at Spottsylvania Court House; at the North Anna; at the Totopotomoy; at Cold Harbor. True, with each movement the Union army got nearer to Richmond; but that was not the object of the campaign. The destruction of Lee's army was the end sought. At the outset of the operations General Grant had said to General Meade, in his letter of instructions: "Lee's army will be your objective point. Wherever Lee goes, there you will go also."* If Grant's purpose had been merely to place his army at a point of the James River near Richmond, he would have transferred it thither by water.

Yet Grant's campaign was not a failure. His army had kept on advancing and fighting; that was much in itself. It was what the Union army had not done in Virginia under any other commander. This result was not due to a greater disparity of numbers in the two hostile armies than had existed in previous campaigns. In the Chancellorsville campaign, for instance, Hooker had 130,000 men, and Lee only 60,000; in this campaign, as we have seen, Grant had 105,000 in round numbers, and Lee 62,000, at the start. The Confederate commander was the same, and he had lost none of his cunning. The success of the campaign, therefore, for the Union arms, as compared with that of the other campaigns in Virginia, must be accredited to qualities of the Union commander-in-chief, General Grant.

Yet, if the student looks for anything brilliant of strategy or tactics in General Grant's operations in this campaign, he will look in vain. Lee anticipated every movement the Union army made, and took prompt steps to meet it. Every battle appeared to be fought without any real plan of attack. At Spottsylvania, first one part of the Confederate intrenchments would be assaulted, then another; and the corps were kept marching from one side to another. Hancock's corps marched round the Confederate position two or three times.

*Grant's *Memoirs*.

Orders were frequently issued and countermanded; corps were sent to places only to be at once recalled. It all only testifies to Grant's tenacity of purpose; he would not give up and quit while there was another thing left to try; while there was another chance left of succeeding. He never lost his head, and he appeared never to know when he was getting the worst of it. The tenor of all his telegrams and letters during the campaign was to the effect that the enemy was suffering more than his own army.

The campaign on the Union side had several distinctive features. They were: first, the several flank, or more correctly, turning movements; second, the changing of the base of supplies as the army progressed. The base was at first on the Orange and Alexandria Railway; then at Aquia Creek; then at Port Royal on the Rappahannock; then at White House on the Pamunkey; then it was shifted to the James. Another distinctive feature was the night-marching. A large part of the marching was done at night; more than in any previous operations. Lee's corps, also, made several night-marches. Both armies made greater use of field-works than they had ever made before; as soon as troops halted they began digging trenches, or piling logs for breastworks.

The theatre of operations was, by reason of the forests and the bad roads, so ill-adapted to the use of artillery, that, at Spottsylvania, Grant did away with the Reserve Artillery as a separate corps. Some of the batteries were attached to the different army-corps; the guns of others were sent back to the base, and the caissons were put to use in the wagon-trains.

This was the first campaign in which Lee was reduced to a strictly strategic defensive. After the battle of the Wilderness he never felt strong enough to assume the strategic offensive. Tactically, however, parts of his army acted on the offensive in every battle up to and including Cold Harbor; and, as will be seen in the next lecture, almost up to the day of his surrender at Appomattox.

It was more the necessity of guarding the seat of the Confederate government from capture than the preservation of his communications with Richmond that compelled Lee repeatedly to throw his army across Grant's path. Lee was tied to Richmond, just as the Army of the Potomac had been tied to Washington in the Gettysburg Campaign. What would have happened if Lee had not blocked the Union army at Spottsylvania or at the North Anna? If Lee had simply stayed

at the Wilderness battle-field or at Spottsylvania, and let the Union army move on unmolested? Would Grant have dared to march on to Richmond and leave Lee in his rear? The distance from the Wilderness Tavern to Washington, and the distance from the Tavern to Richmond, are almost exactly the same; and the ease with which Early marched his raiding column into the suburbs of Washington a few weeks later might, at first glance, lead one to ask why Lee, by letting Grant pass, and then making a bold dash to the north, might not have captured that city? The answer to the question is, simply, that Grant would not have gone far. Grant only wanted to place his army upon the road to Richmond a very little in rear of Lee's army. He was in no hurry to reach Richmond. Lee's army was his main objective. If Lee had started toward Washington, Grant would have been close upon his heels as well as firm upon his communications.

Suppose, then, that Lee, instead of stopping to fight at Spottsylvania Court House, had retreated straight to the south or to the southwest, what would Grant have done? Grant had announced that Lee should be followed wherever he went; furthermore, the "attractive power of the defender" is a recognized principle of strategy. "As long as the defender's army is not thoroughly defeated, it exerts an entirely natural power of attraction on the assailant. . . . The assailant will arrive at whatever place the defender may have chosen for his position."* He will follow the retreating enemy. In such a movement as this Lee would have had the south of Virginia and the Carolinas and Georgia to fall back upon. He might possibly have succeeded in transferring his army, or a large part of it, by way of the Danville Railway, to unite with Johnston in northern Georgia. This distance, however, was more than six hundred miles; and if Lee had adopted this course, he would have given up all the territory as far southward as he retreated, with scant chance of ever getting it back. It would have been an acknowledgment to the world that the Confederacy was on its last legs. It was the last resort.

In the position at the Wilderness "Grant's left (Hancock) was two miles nearer Spottsylvania than was Lee's right (Longstreet)."[†] The initiative rested with Grant; Lee could not move until he saw what Grant was going to do. Yet Lee's army, or part of it, beat Grant's in the race for Spottsylvania,

*Von der Goltz.

[†]Lecture of Captain Ferguson, U. S. Corps of Engineers.

and blocked the way to that place. Grant withdrew his army from the Wilderness battle-field by corps from his right—the flank farthest from Spottsylvania; while Lee started with his right corps, also—the flank nearest Spottsylvania. As the line was five miles long, it gave Warren's corps three miles farther to go than Longstreet's [under Anderson] had. This circumstance, however, is not the reason why Anderson beat Warren to the Court House, for Warren started at 8.30 p.m. and Anderson did not start till 11 p.m. The reason is found in the effective hindrance made by Fitzhugh Lee's cavalry to Warren's progress. Warren, also, stopped to rest his corps from 3.30 a.m. to 6.00 a.m. on the 8th. When one remembers that General Lawton's division at El Caney and San Juan, in 1898, marched most of the time from about 2 p.m., June 30, till daylight July 1; fought all day July 1; and marched nearly all that night and until noon July 2, one cannot understand why Warren's corps had to rest two hours and a half, at such a time of emergency, after marching only seven hours.

(256) It was a great mistake not to have Sheridan's cavalry blocking the road against Anderson's column. If the bulk of this cavalry had pushed out to Todd's Tavern, and on the Catharpin Road by way of Corbin's Bridge to the Shady Grove Church—Spottsylvania road, it could have stopped or delayed Anderson's column. Of course it would have had to defeat and drive away Stuart's cavalry, which was guarding Corbin's Bridge and the cross-roads on the flank of the Shady Grove Church Road. We have seen that Wilson's division had actually driven back Rosser's brigade and got possession of Spottsylvania Court House on the morning of the 8th of May, before the arrival of the leading division [Kershaw] of Anderson's [Longstreet's] corps. If Wilson had pushed on to the Po, not two miles from the court house, seized the bridge at the Blockhouse (on the Shady Grove Church Road), and resolutely held it against Kershaw's division, Warren would quickly have brushed Fitzhugh Lee's cavalry out of his way, and been in secure possession of Spottsylvania Court House ahead of Lee's army.

(258) At Spottsylvania Grant had to decide again whether to turn the right or the left of Lee's army. Undoubtedly he continued to move by his own left, because it kept him nearer his base and kept his communications covered better. If, however, without stopping to fight a serious battle at Spottsyl-

vania, Grant had turned Lee's left flank and moved toward Richmond, Lee would promptly have fallen back behind the North Anna. This would have taken him out of the Wilderness into the open country. If Grant had made such a movement as this, on the 9th or 10th, it would greatly have embarrassed Lee's army, for it would have cut this army off from its immediate base of supplies, which, at this time, was Louisa Court House, thirty miles southwest of Spottsylvania, on the Virginia Central Railway. It was fortunate for Lee that Hancock was recalled from the right bank of the Po on the 10th of May. If, instead of recalling Hancock, Grant had sent Warren's corps to reinforce him, Hancock would have turned Lee's left and cut him off from his depot at Louisa.*

In the movement from Spottsylvania Hancock's corps was sent to Guiney's Station with the hope of alluring Lee's army after it. This hope was not realized; Lee sent a corps [Ewell] at first to guard the crossing of the North Anna on the Richmond Road; he marched the rest of his army to Hanover Junction as soon as he was satisfied that Grant's whole army had moved. Hancock started more than twelve hours ahead of Ewell; if he had taken the direct road to Hanover Junction he would have arrived there several hours ahead of Ewell. In fact Hancock's leading division [Barlow] was at Milford Station,* eight or ten miles south of Guiney's and only half as far from Hanover Junction as was Spottsylvania Court House, before Lee knew that the Union movement had begun. True, Hancock's men had marched all night; but if they had pushed on, after resting three or four hours, they would still have beaten Ewell in the race for Hanover Junction; while Warren's and the other two Union corps, by taking the direct road, could have gotten there ahead of Lee's other two corps. Instead of marching on to Hanover Junction, Hancock's corps halted and intrenched, in expectation of an attack by Lee's army.

As soon as General Grant learned that Lee had not taken his bait, but had started for Hanover Junction, he made for the same place; but he had learned it too late; Lee got there first. And the reason of it was, the "eyes and ears" of Grant's army were out of place, like those of Lee's army in the Gettysburg campaign. Grant appears to have been satisfied with the result of Sheridan's raid; yet there is hardly any doubt that, if Sheridan's squadrons had been with the army at this time,

*Alexander.

they would have rendered more effective service to the campaign than they rendered by their long and hazardous raid. They would not only have warned Grant promptly of Lee's movement, but, by throwing themselves in front of Lee's columns and upon their flanks, could have retarded their march to Hanover Junction. In summing up the results of Sheridan's raid the only thing General Grant mentions, which had any material effect upon the campaign, was that it "freed us from annoyance by the cavalry of the enemy for more than two weeks." But the enemy's cavalry was back in its proper place now, and gave Lee timely warning of Grant's movement. General Alexander says Sheridan's raid "had made no impression on the campaign." Let it go down, then, as another perilous and useless expenditure of horse-flesh, as were most of the other cavalry raids of the Civil War.

LECTURE XXIV.

SIEGE OF PETERSBURG.

(268) In the early days of June, 1864, after the battle of Cold Harbor, the military situation in the general theater of war in the United States was about as follows:

The main Union army, under General Grant, consisting of the Army of the Potomac, under the immediate command of Meade, and certain attached troops, was behind its earthworks in front of Lee's main army at Cold Harbor. Butler with the Army of the James, now only about 10,000 infantry and 4,600 cavalry (Smith with part of the Tenth and Eighteenth Corps being with Grant), was held within his intrenchments at Bermuda Hundred by Beauregard with about 9,000 Confederates. General Hunter, who had succeeded Sigel in command of the Union forces in the Shenandoah Valley, had defeated the Confederate detachment in that quarter and was moving toward Lynchburg. Sherman, in Georgia, was gradually forcing Joseph E. Johnston back upon Atlanta.

It was partly with a view to prevent Lee from sending reinforcements against Hunter that Grant suspended the attacks at Cold Harbor. "To aid the expedition under Hunter," Grant said to Meade, "it was necessary to detain all the army then with Lee until Hunter got well on his way to Lynchburg. This would be more effectually done by keeping the enemy out of the intrenchments of Richmond than by forcing him into them."*† However this might be, Grant began a movement within a fortnight to transfer his army to the south side of the James, for the purpose of shutting Lee's army up within the intrenchments of Richmond.

(269) Further to make the investment effective, Sheridan was started westward with his cavalry on the 5th of June, under orders to break up the Virginia Central and the Fredericksburg Railways. This was Sheridan's Trevilian Raid. Sheridan was also to form a junction with Hunter at Charlottesville. He bore orders that he was to deliver to Hunter directing that commander to join the main army with his

*Humphreys.

†From this it appears that General Grant had come to the opinion held by Rosecrans, when Grant was urging him to drive Bragg out of East Tennessee.

forces. This part of his task Sheridan was unable to carry out, for the reason that he found Wade Hampton's cavalry, which Lee had dispatched to oppose him, intrenched across his path at Trevilian Station. In the dismounted combat that took place here in a dense wood, Hampton was defeated; but he kept his force in front of Sheridan. On account of the scarcity of ammunition, and for other reasons, Sheridan decided to turn back. He reached White House on the 21st of June, and from there escorted a train of 900 wagons to Charles City Court House. His right flank-guard [Gregg] was attacked on the way by Hampton and it "retired in some confusion"; but none of the wagons were captured. Thus ended another useless cavalry raid.

Meantime another famous raid was in progress. On account of bad health Ewell had surrendered the command of his old corps to Early, who was started, on the 13th of June, toward the Shenandoah Valley to attack Hunter in rear. Hunter retreated across the mountains into West Virginia, and Early, pursuant to his orders from Lee, pushed on down the Shenandoah, crossed into Maryland, and, meeting very feeble resistance, arrived at the end of Seventh Street, near the edge of Washington, on the afternoon of the 11th of July. There were already troops enough in Washington to repel Early, but Wright, who had been hurried up from Virginia with two divisions of the Sixth Corps, arrived at the Capital on the 12th of July, and General Emery also arrived with a part of the Nineteenth Corps from New Orleans. Early concluded not to attack the city, and retreated by way of Leesburg into Virginia. Wright followed him. The sequel to this raid was the operations in the Shenandoah Valley, in which Sheridan, who was sent to the Valley to command the Union forces, succeeded in expelling Early, and in so thoroughly devastating that granary of the Confederacy that "a crow," as Sheridan expressed it, "would have had to carry its rations if it had flown across the valley."

(268) At this time, June, 1864, Richmond was defended on the north side of the James by a line of works extending from the river-bank above, around to Chapin's Bluff, about seven miles by road below the town. Halleck proposed to Grant, a few days after the battle of Cold Harbor, to invest Richmond on the north side of the river. "This would give greater security to Washington"; but it would never have accomplished the fall of the city or the surrender of Lee's

army, because it would not have cut off the lines of supply from the south and west. These lines were the Richmond and Danville, the Southside or Lynchburg, and the Weldon Railways. So Grant decided to operate by the south bank of the James.

On that side of the river was, first, Beauregard's line of works, stretching from nearly opposite Chapin's Bluff down to the Appomattox River above Port Walthall, "bottling up" Butler's army at Bermuda Hundred; and south of the Appomattox a circle of strong works had been erected as early as 1862, some two miles outside of Petersburg.* In June, 1864, Petersburg was garrisoned only by General Wise with his brigade of Confederates and some local troops. On the 9th of June Butler sent a force of 3,000 infantry, under General Gillmore, and 1,500 cavalry, under General Kautz, to "capture the city and destroy the bridge across the Appomattox."* Gillmore claimed that the noise made by Kautz's cavalry in crossing the bridge at Port Walthall "could be heard for miles," and "put the enemy on his guard"; consequently he found the earthworks so strongly manned that he decided not to assault. He waited four or five hours to hear something from Kautz; then, failing to receive any news from him, withdrew.

Kautz, on his part, at about noon made three formal attacks on the intrenchments across the Jerusalem Plank Road, and was repulsed. He then turned these intrenchments and advanced close to the water-works at the southeastern edge of the town. Here he came upon infantry and artillery behind an earthwork and stockade, and withdrew. He was followed by Dearing's Confederate cavalry brigade.

Grant now prepared to cross his forces to the south bank of the James. His object was to capture Petersburg, then to turn Beauregard's intrenchments in front of Butler and move on Richmond. The capture of Petersburg would leave Richmond with no unbroken railway entering it except the Danville Railway. This road Grant purposed seizing later, thus completely cutting off the means of supply of Richmond and Lee's army. The latter, however, might abandon Richmond and retreat toward Danville or Lynchburg to escape investment.

The movement to the James and the passage of the river were carefully planned to keep Lee in ignorance of them as long as practicable. Wilson's cavalry division was to cover

*Humphreys.

the front and right flank of the columns, as well as to bring up the rear and guard the trains. A pontoon-train was to accompany each column. The withdrawal of the main body from Cold Harbor began immediately after nightfall on the 12th of June. A part of Wilson's cavalry crossed the Chickahominy by a pontoon-bridge at Long's Bridge an hour or two after midnight, and marched to Riddell's Shop, encountering Confederate cavalry on the way. It was soon relieved by Warren's corps [Fifth], and moved on to Charles City, clearing the roads for the other columns. Warren had crossed the Chickahominy by two pontoon-bridges near Bottom's Bridge.

(270) Warren intrenched his corps east of Riddell's Shop, covering the flank of the movement upon the roads leading from Richmond. The Second Corps [Hancock] crossed the Chickahominy by the bridges used by the Fifth Corps, and hurried on to Wilcox's Landing. The Sixth [Wright] and Ninth [Burnside] crossed at Jones's Bridge.* By noon of the 14th these four corps were assembled at Wilcox's Landing, in a bend, on the north bank of the James. The Eighteenth Corps [Smith] marched to White House, and from there returned to Butler at Bermuda Hundred by water.

By midnight of the 14th the Federal engineers had completed a pontoon-bridge more than 2,000 feet long† across the James, and by midnight of the 16th the army with all of its artillery and trains was on the south bank. Wright's corps [Sixth] covered the passage on the north side, and was the last to cross. Wilson's cavalry had remained upon the right and rear, at Malvern Hill and White Oak Swamp, until it was called in by Wright and sent over the bridge just ahead of the Sixth Corps. "The navy assisted with its armored ships and gunboats in covering the passage of the river,"‡ and in obstructing it by sinking several vessels above the point of crossing.

On the morning of June the 13th Lee discovered that the Union army had withdrawn from his front, and he was informed that it was moving on Richmond by way of Long's Bridge. He naturally supposed that Grant was marching his

*Alexander.

†General Alexander says this was "the greatest bridge the world has seen since the days of Xerxes. At the point selected the river was 2,100 feet wide, 90 feet deep, and had a rise and fall of tide of 4 feet, giving very strong currents. A draw was necessary for the passage of vessels." The bridge was built in eight hours.

‡Humphreys.

army to a position on the north side of the James opposite Butler's army at Bermuda Hundred, in order that the two forces, with the coöperation of the navy, might act conjointly against Richmond.* Promptly, therefore, Lee moved his two corps, Anderson's [Longstreet's] and Hill's, to the south side of the Chickahominy, and placed them in position from Malvern Hill to White Oak Swamp, covering the roads to Richmond. They had some skirmishing with Wilson's cavalry, which withdrew in the night to St. Mary's Church. On the afternoon of the 14th and morning of the 15th the Union cavalry reconnoitered the Confederate position. This cavalry was mistaken for the advance of Grant's army, which strengthened Lee's conviction that this army designed to attack the Confederate capital by the north bank of the James, and induced him to hold his own army on that bank; while the Union army, unopposed, was making its passage to the south bank. The strategy of General Grant's movement completely deceived Lee, and its well-managed execution kept him under delusion for three days, the 15th, 16th, and 17th of June. During those three days Lee retained Longstreet's and Hill's corps on the north side of the James, while Grant was massing his troops against the feeble garrison of Petersburg on the south side.*

The Eighteenth Corps [Smith] reached Bermuda Hundred by way of the James on the 14th June, and Smith received orders through Butler to move at daylight of the 15th against Petersburg. Besides his own corps, some 10,000 men, Smith was to be accompanied by Kautz's cavalry division, 2,400 troopers, and a part of Hinks's negro division, 3,700 men. Hancock, whose corps was to be the first one to cross at Wilcox's Landing, would join him from that point. Hancock's corps did not await the completion of the bridge, but was ferried over the river by the transports during the night of the 14th, and might have started for Petersburg before sunrise on the 15th; but General Grant, who had arranged the operation with Butler, had failed to inform Meade of the hour when Smith was to start. Meade, therefore, ordered Hancock to await the arrival of his rations, which delayed his march until after ten o'clock. Meade, moreover, did not inform Hancock that Petersburg was to be assaulted; he only directed him to take up a certain position near the town, and Hancock's maps were so defective that he lost much time in looking for

*Alexander.

the position.* It was night before his corps reached the vicinity of Petersburg.†

Kautz was to cross the Appomattox by a pontoon-bridge at Point of Rocks, near the left of Butler's line, at 1 a.m. the 15th, and threaten the Confederate intrenchments near the Norfolk and Petersburg Railway. Hinks was to follow Kautz and take position across the Jordan's Point road; the Eighteenth Corps was to form on Hinks's right. The only Confederate troops that Beauregard had in the Petersburg works at this time, besides artillery, were Wise's infantry brigade of 1,200 men, some militia, and Dearing's cavalry brigade,—not 3,000 men all told.

Smith's command got away from the bridge over the Appomattox about daybreak, and then had five or six miles to march. Smith soon encountered a dismounted cavalry regiment and a battery that Beauregard had sent out to retard him. He drove the cavalry back and captured one of the guns, but was delayed three hours. This delay was important to Beauregard, as he expected Hoke's Confederate division to arrive from Drewry's Bluff about dark.† Another mile and a half of marching brought Smith's command to the line of felled timber in front of the Confederate works. Beauregard had this space so well covered by artillery that Smith's columns could not move within sight of the works, and their march was so much obstructed by the woods and broken ground beyond that they did not finish their deployment before 1.30 p.m. The rest of the afternoon Smith spent in making a cautious but careful reconnaissance. He discovered only a few signs of infantry; yet concluded, erroneously, that so much artillery must be supported by a strong force of infantry. At length he was ready for his artillery to open the attack; but the battery horses had gone to water! This caused another hour's wait, and probably saved Petersburg from capture. (271) In the meanwhile Kautz's cavalry had been engaged all day with Dearing's, aided by the fire of a few guns in a redan, outside of the works between the Norfolk Railway and the Jerusalem Plank Road. Having heard no sound of battle from Smith, Kautz withdrew about 6 p.m., and went into bivouac.†

At about 7 p.m. Smith's artillery opened a concentrated fire upon a salient of the works, Redans Nos. 5 and 6, but

*Humphreys.

†Alexander.

evoked no reply. The Confederate gunners were holding their fire for the assaulting columns, which they expected to follow soon. But no columns charged. Smith sent forward Hinks's negro division in a swarm of skirmishers, which "overran the works and captured the guns still loaded with double canister and defended by only a skirmish line of infantry." The division lost 507 men, but captured four guns and 250 prisoners.* By nine o'clock Smith's command had captured five more redans toward the left, including No. 11, and a mile and a half of the Confederate intrenchments; and had learned, too late, that the works had been defended by a very small force of infantry.†

(270) About 4 p.m. Smith received word that Hancock with the Second Corps was marching to join him by the road from Windmill Point, but it was after seven o'clock when the head of Hancock's corps came up. Having learned that the Confederates were also receiving reinforcements, Smith had, in the meantime, ordered a suspension of the assault. He asked Hancock, upon his arrival, to relieve his forces, which Hancock did with the Second Corps. It took till 11 p.m. to complete the relief, and it was then too late and too dark, in Hancock's judgment, to renew the attack.

When the Union army withdrew from Cold Harbor Beauregard was fearful that Petersburg was to be its objective. He, therefore, asked Lee to send him troops enough to defend the town. As Lee believed that Richmond was the point to be assailed, he would not, as we have seen, withdraw Hill and Anderson from the north side of the James, but consented, on the 14th, for Hoke's division to return to Beauregard from Drewry's Bluff. This division reached Petersburg on the evening of the 15th, and was placed in the works between Wise's left and the Appomattox. That night Beauregard also withdrew Bushrod Johnson's division, 3,500 men, from the Bermuda Hundred line and put it into the Petersburg works. This left only about 1,000 Confederates in the trenches at Bermuda Hundred. Taking advantage of this condition, Terry advanced from Butler's line, before daylight on the 16th, and captured these trenches. In the afternoon of the 17th they were retaken by Pickett's Confederate division, which had been hurried over from the north side of the James. (272) By early morning on the 16th Beauregard had some 14,000

*Alexander.

†Humphreys.

men in the intrenchments in front of Petersburg. The left of his line rested on the Appomattox; but its right did not reach "the Jerusalem Plank Road by half a mile,"* and from there to the Appomattox, west of the town, four miles and a half, the works were unoccupied. Dearing's cavalry was outside of them watching the left of the Federal forces.

The other Union army-corps were pushed forward to Petersburg as fast as they got across the James. The Ninth came up at 10 a.m. on the 16th and took its place on the left of the Second; the Fifth reached Petersburg at midnight (16th). The Sixth was the last to come up. During the forenoon of the 16th Hancock, who was now in command on the ground, made reconnaissances in his front and captured Redan No. 12. At 6 p.m. he attacked with his own corps and parts of the Eighteenth and the Ninth, and, after suffering severely, captured Redans Nos. 4, 13, and 14, and the connecting trenches. The Confederates were driven back all along the line. During the night they made several attempts to recover their works, but failed. They now occupied a temporary intrenchment just west of Harrison Creek, behind the captured redans.

At dawn on the 17th Potter's division [Ninth Corps] moved forward silently, and captured the works in front of the Shand house, catching the Confederates there asleep on their arms. Potter then advanced but was soon stopped by troops of the enemy in intrenchments on the west bank of Harrison Creek. Later in the day Willcox's division [Ninth Corps] attacked these intrenchments and was repulsed; still later Ledlie's division [Ninth Corps], after losing heavily, carried a part of them, but was soon afterwards driven back. Ledlie's attack had been supported on the left by Crawford's division [Fifth Corps], and on the right by Barlow's division [Second Corps]. In the course of the day the divisions of Gibbon and Birney [Second Corps] had gained a position close to the Confederate intrenchment west of Harrison Creek.

Up to midnight of the 17th the Confederates still held Redan No. 3 and the intrenchments along the high ground west of Harrison Creek to the Norfolk Railway. (273) After that hour Beauregard withdrew his line to high ground across a ravine, where he intrenched a shorter and stronger position.

All this while Beauregard had been reporting to General

*Humphreys.

Lee that Grant's army was massing at Petersburg, and he had been begging for reinforcements; but Lee could not be divested of the belief that Grant was advancing against Richmond by the north bank of the James. As late as the afternoon of the 17th he had ordered W. H. F. Lee, at Malvern Hill, to find out what had become of Grant's army. Between 1 and 3 a.m. on the morning of the 18th three of Beauregard's staff officers came to Lee's headquarters in quick succession, bringing evidence of Grant's presence in front of Petersburg and of the urgency of the situation there; but not until the General had heard the third messenger's report was he convinced. He then issued orders for A. P. Hill's corps and the rest of Longstreet's to hasten to Petersburg. A part of Longstreet's corps had already started.*

On the 17th the bulk of the Eighteenth Corps had been withdrawn from the Union line in front of Petersburg and returned to Butler at Bermuda Hundred. That night Meade issued orders for a general assault to be made on the Confederate works at four o'clock on the morning of the 18th. In advancing to this assault the Federals found that the Confederates had withdrawn from the intrenchments they had held so strongly the day before. Meade ordered his line to press forward against the new position taken up by Beauregard, hoping to carry it before the Confederates could complete the intrenchments and before the arrival of their reinforcements. Meade had learned by this time how weak a garrison Beauregard had, and, also, that Lee was on the way to reinforce it with the rest of the Confederate army. Two divisions of the Confederate reinforcements arrived before the first assault was made, however, and Hill's corps had begun to come up before the assault of the afternoon.

The Confederate position was noway definitely known in the morning. The Second Corps (now under Birney, Hancock's Gettysburg wound having broken out afresh) came upon it at the Hare house, within three hundred yards of the old position; but on the left the Ninth Corps and the Fifth had to advance a mile before they came upon the new Confederate works. Within the space, however, the Ninth and Fifth Corps encountered hostile troops in the cut of the Norfolk Railway, and had a hard fight to dislodge them. The ground was very unfavorable for attack, being cut up by ravines and ditches, and swept by the Confederate artillery

*Alexander.

and musketry fire. Where there were woods they had been prepared by slashing. The result was, the earlier attacks of the day were not made at the same time; late in the afternoon the attacks were repeated and were better timed. But none of them succeeded in carrying the Confederate works, and the losses on the Union side were very heavy. The Union corps, however, gained positions very close to the Confederate works. There they intrenched, and the lines of hostile works on that side of Petersburg were not materially changed in position during the rest of the siege.

(274) Grant now concluded that the Petersburg works could not be carried by assault, and resolved to invest the place as far as practicable; to intercept the railways leading into it; and to watch for opportunities to "attack Lee's army in unexpected quarters south, or even north, of the James."* Accordingly, orders were issued on the 21st of June for extending the Union lines all the way round to the Appomattox west of Petersburg. Intrenchments were already occupied by the Eighteenth, Ninth, and Fifth Corps extending from the Appomattox east of the town, to the Jerusalem Plank Road. The Second and Sixth Corps were ordered to prolong the line to the left. In moving to their positions on the 22d these two corps lost connection in the woods and gave A. P. Hill an opportunity to push in between them. Lee had learned of the movement ordered by Grant, and had sent Hill out with two divisions of his own corps and Bushrod Johnson's division to resist it. Suddenly Hill fell upon the left flank and rear of the Second Corps and drove it back, capturing 1,700 prisoners, four guns, and several colors.

The Sixth Corps formed on the left of the Second, about parallel to the Jerusalem Plank Road, and a mile west of it, and the two corps intrenched. In the general positions now occupied the two hostile armies remained for several weeks. On the 22nd of June the Ninth and the Fifth Corps were engaged during the greater part of the day with the Confederate troops in their front. The firing continued during the night also.

(275) In pursuance of the plan to cut off the railway lines into Richmond and Petersburg, Wilson with his own and Kautz's cavalry division was started on the 22nd of June for the railway junction of Burkesville [Burke's Station]. Wilson's orders were to break up the Danville and the Southside

*Humphreys.

[Lynchburg] Railways, keeping up his work of destruction until driven away by superior forces of the enemy.

This raid ended at Light House Point on the 2nd of July. In these ten days Wilson marched more than 300 miles, resting nowhere longer than six hours, and during his last four days not longer than four hours at any place. He was followed almost from the start by W. H. F. Lee; intercepted at Stony Creek by Hampton; met at Reams's Station by Mahone's infantry; attacked in flank by Fitzhugh Lee; and chased as far as the Blackwater Creek. He had to double on his tracks and dodge in a very lively manner, for he was surrounded and cut off by superior numbers. He fought several combats, and lost 240 men killed and wounded and 1,261 missing; he abandoned a dozen guns, and had to burn his wagon-train to save it from capture. As the Confederates promptly repaired the sixty miles of railway destroyed by his command, this cavalry raid, like most of the rest, must be accounted a dismal failure.

(276) We have seen that the Sixth Corps [Wright] was withdrawn from the left of the Union line and dispatched to Washington at the time of Early's raid. This happened between the 6th and the 10th of July; the left was then drawn back to the Jerusalem Plank Road and refused.

Toward the end of June Lieutenant-Colonel Pleasants of the 48th Pennsylvania Regiment conceived a scheme for placing a mine under the Confederate work known as Elliott's Salient. It was at a point in front of Burnside's part of the Union line, where the hostile intrenchments were very close together. The scheme was approved and Burnside's corps was ordered to carry it out. The 48th Pennsylvania, a regiment of miners, was charged with preparing the mine. Ferrero's negro division was selected to lead the assault, and drilled specially for it; but the selection was not approved by General Grant. The assignment was then made by lot, and fell to Ledlie's division.

(268) In order to aid the project by causing the withdrawal of some of the Confederate troops from the Petersburg intrenchments, as well as with some hope of capturing Richmond by a sudden dash, and with the further purpose of destroying the railways north of Richmond, the Second Corps [Hancock] and Sheridan's cavalry were sent upon an expedition to the north of the James. They crossed the river at Deep Bottom on the 27th of July, but were met at Bailey's

Creek by three divisions of Confederate infantry and two of cavalry sent over by Lee to oppose them. To this extent only the enterprise succeeded. Some fighting took place and the Union loss numbered about 300 men. On the night of the 29th (July) the force recrossed the James in order to co-operate with Burnside's assault, which was set for the morning of the 30th.

(276) A detailed order of more than 500 words was issued on the 29th for this assault. The Union parapets and abatis were to be prepared beforehand so that the assaulting columns could move out promptly; the mine was to be sprung at 3.30 a.m.; all the available artillery was then to open on points of the Confederate works from which fire could sweep the ground to be crossed in the assault. The Ninth Corps was to charge the breach made by the mine, followed by the Eighteenth, now commanded by Ord; the Fifth Corps was to support the Ninth on its left; the Second was to support it on its right; Sheridan was to cover the left of the army with his cavalry and move against the enemy by the roads from the southward and westward of Petersburg.

A defect in the fuse delayed the firing of the mine until near 5 a.m. It was then set off and the artillery opened and kept down the Confederate fire everywhere but at two points; Ledlie's division charged and piled helter-skelter into the crater of the mine—all save Ledlie, who had stayed in a bomb-proof back in the Union lines. The Confederates had gotten wind of the projected mine and had driven nearly 400 feet of counter-mines; but they had not succeeded in determining where the Union mine was situated. General Long says that, at the moment of the explosion, the defenders "lay in peaceful slumber, unconscious of the terrible storm that was about to burst upon them." Two hundred men were killed by the explosion, and a gap was torn in the Confederate lines 150 feet long, ninety-seven feet wide, and thirty feet deep.*

It was a half-hour after the explosion before the Confederates had recovered from their shock enough to open fire with musketry upon the crater, and fully an hour before their artillery began to fire. But Ledlie's men "could not be got forward";† they stayed in the crater. Potter's and Willcox's divisions advanced on the right and left, and finally, after more than an hour, Ferrero's division went forward—save Ferrero,

*Alexander.

†Humphreys.

who stayed with Ledlie in the bomb-proof. Most of the negroes crowded through the crater, but some of them were led off to the right and captured 200 prisoners and a color.*

Confederate troops were hurried to the endangered point. Mahone's division was the first to arrive. By ten o'clock the Union attack had been suspended; at half-past twelve the troops were ordered to withdraw to the Union lines; the order was sent to the brigade commanders, "leaving them to consult and decide upon the time and manner of the withdrawal."* Before they had arrived at a decision the Confederates attacked and drove them back. Although the distance to the Union intrenchments was only a hundred yards the troops lost heavily in retiring. The Federal loss in this fiasco was 4,400 killed, wounded, and missing. The negro division suffered most, losing 176 killed, 688 wounded, and 801 missing.

The adventure ought to have succeeded; the Confederates were taken by surprise, and there was time, before they recovered, for the assaulting columns to make a lodgment in the works. The assault "failed from mismanagement and misbehavior on the part of several of the chief actors."* General Burnside, for instance, had been ordered to prepare his parapets and abatis for the passage of the troops, but had neglected to do so; this delayed the advance.

"Between this time and the month of March, 1865, several movements of portions of the Army of the Potomac and of the Army of the James were made to the right and to the left, which resulted in the extension of" the Union "lines of intrenchments in both directions, and caused a corresponding extension of the Confederate intrenchments" to the right, "and the occupation in stronger force of their intrenchments on the north bank of the James."* Each of these movements had at the time some special purpose besides extending the lines. Toward the end of July, for example, Hancock was again sent to the north bank of the James in command of his own corps [Second] and the Tenth Corps [Birney]. The special object of this expedition was to prevent General Lee from detaching troops to Early in the Shenandoah Valley, and, of course, to capture Richmond if a chance offered to do so. Hancock's command remained on the north bank of the James, where it was engaged in several minor actions, until the night of the

*Humphreys.

20th of August, when it was recalled. The two corps resumed their places in the trenches at Petersburg and Bermuda Hundred respectively.

Warren was ordered to withdraw his corps from its intrenchments on the morning of August 18 and to move it to the Weldon Railway; he was to make a lodgment upon the railway near Dr. Gurley's, and destroy it as far south as possible. He was also to consider his movement a reconnaissance in force, "and take advantage of any weakness the enemy might betray." In ordering this movement General Grant said, "I want, if possible, to make such demonstrations as will force Lee to withdraw a portion of his troops from the Valley, so that Sheridan can strike a blow against the balance."*

Spear's brigade of cavalry was assigned to Warren, who later was also given three divisions of the Ninth Corps. Warren found nothing but Dearing's Confederate cavalry brigade guarding the railway. He formed his corps along the railway from near the Globe Tavern to a point north of the junction of the Vaughan Road, and began tearing up the track. In front of his right wing was a large field of corn which hid everything from view. Dearing had reported the arrival of Warren, and Heth had been sent out on the Vaughan Road with two brigades to attack him. Concealed by the corn, Heth fell suddenly upon Warren's right wing and drove one of his brigades back. Later Heth was driven back.

(277) On the morning of the 19th Warren extended his right through dense woods and underbrush to connect by a skirmish line with the left of the Ninth Corps in the trenches. In the course of the day the divisions of this corps were sent to reinforce him. That afternoon A. P. Hill, with Heth's command of the day before, reinforced by three brigades under Mahone, and some cavalry and artillery, moved out to the Vaughan Road. About half-past four o'clock Mahone, advancing in the thicket, broke through the skirmish line on Warren's right, and took the right of his main line in flank and rear, rolling a part of it up in confusion, while Heth attacked it in front. Warren managed, however, to rally his troops, and put two divisions of the Ninth Corps into the action; then he drove Mahone's troops "back in great confusion to their intrenchments."*

Warren's loss in this engagement was 382 killed and

*Humphreys.

wounded, and 2,518 missing. Satisfied that the Confederates would renew the attack the next day, and feeling himself at a great disadvantage in the dense unknown brush, Warren withdrew to open ground about a mile farther back and intrenched. On the 21st Hill attacked him in his new position, but was repulsed, and thereafter no more attacks were made upon Warren. The line of Union earthworks was then extended by the Ninth Corps from the Jerusalem Plank Road to connect with Warren's intrenchments on the Weldon Railway.

On the 22nd of August Hancock was sent with two of his divisions and Gregg's cavalry division to break up the Weldon Railway south of Reams's Station. At Reams's Station, on the afternoon of the 25th, he was attacked by A. P. Hill's corps and Hampton's cavalry in an old intrenchment made by troops that had gone out to Wilson's relief. Hancock was defeated and driven out of the intrenchment. Miles's division and Gregg's cavalry fought well, but Gibbon's division "could neither be made to go forward nor to fire"; the division acted disgracefully. Hancock "attributed the bad conduct of some of his troops to their great fatigue and to their heavy losses during the campaign, especially in officers. Besides, there were several regiments largely made up of recruits and substitutes."*

(270) The next movement was made on the north side of the James by a part of Butler's army, and it resulted in the capture of Fort Harrison near Chapin's Bluff, but in nothing more. (278) About the same time Warren with the Fifth Corps, and the Ninth (now commanded by Parke†), and Gregg's cavalry, made a movement to the left, which resulted in extending the Union line considerably in that direction. The intrenchments reached a point about a mile and a quarter northwest of Poplar Springs Church, and from there turned sharply back toward the Vaughan Road. The Confederate line of intrenchments in this quarter covered the Boydton Plank Road and the Southside Railway; it ran nearly parallel to the Boydton Plank Road and ended near the Crow farm at Hatcher's Run.

On the 27th of October Grant made another movement to the left with the purpose of turning Lee's right and seizing

*Humphreys.

†For his conduct in connection with the mine fiasco Burnside was censured by a court of inquiry, and on the 15th of April, 1865, he resigned from the service.

the Southside Railway. Hancock was to move by the Vaughan—Dabney's Mill—Boydton—White Oak—Claiborne roads to the railway, while the Fifth Corps [Warren] and Ninth [Parke] were to attack and turn the Confederate right. Hancock encountered hostile artillery at Burgess's Mill, and Warren and Parke became engaged in the woods on both sides of Hatcher's Run. Meade halted Hancock to wait for Warren to come up and coöperate with him; but before Warren joined him A. P. Hill attacked him, sending Mahone's division through the woods to assail his right flank. The flank-attack had come near succeeding, when Egan's division [Second Corps] fell upon Mahone's flank and drove it back into the woods in confusion. Hill's attack, however, had stopped the movement. The Union troops were withdrawn the next day to their former positions.

In support of this movement against the right of the Confederate line, Butler had been directed to make a demonstration against Richmond on the north side of the James with a part of his command. He sent a column of the Tenth Corps under Terry, and a column of the Eighteenth under Weitzel, which were met and repulsed by troops under Longstreet, who had recovered from his wound and was now in command of the Confederate forces north of the James.

In December Warren made another expedition down the Weldon Railway, and destroyed eighteen to twenty miles of the track, much to Lee's distress. It made the haul by wagon-train longer for the Confederates, and increased the difficulty of supply by so much.

(279) In the early days of February, 1865, another ineffectual movement was made to turn the Confederate right and seize the Southside Railway. The Union force was composed of the Second Corps (now commanded by Humphreys*), the Fifth [Warren], and Gregg's cavalry. This movement, also, was met by the right of Lee's army and checkmated. The Confederate intrenchments now reached across Hatcher's Run at the Crow farm, and from Burgess's Mill along White Oak Road, and west of the Claiborne Road. The Union line had been prolonged to Hatcher's Run near the crossing of the Vaughan Road.

The only other enterprise of special interest before the end of the siege of Petersburg was Gordon's assault upon

*Toward the end of November General Hancock had been ordered to Washington to organize a new First Corps.

Fort Stedman in the Union line. Gordon now commanded Early's corps, which had rejoined, and he held the left of the Confederate works south of the James. Fort Stedman was only about 200 yards in front of his line. The column of assault formed before dawn on March 25; it was 3,000 to 4,000 strong, and was to be supported by another column. It moved forward silently, surprised the Union garrison, and captured the fort; but the supporting column had failed to advance. The cannon of Fort Haskell opened fire upon the victors in the fort, a heavy column of infantry fell upon them, "and something like the scene which followed the mine explosion ensued."* Many of Gordon's men were made prisoners, while many others were killed or wounded.

Grant's repeated movements against Lee's right and left had caused an extension of the Confederate works to a length of more than thirty-five miles. It was plain to Lee that soon or late Grant would break this weak line somewhere, or would succeed in turning it and cutting off his railways; and that his only chance then would lie in making his escape with his army, and uniting it with Joseph E. Johnston's, now in North Carolina. This was exactly what Grant meant to prevent if possible.

Sheridan had rejoined Grant from the Shenandoah Valley and the Sixth Corps had also returned. The Tenth and Eighteenth Corps had been done away with; while the white troops of Butler's army had been organized into the Twenty-fourth Corps under Ord, and the negro troops of that army had been organized into the Twenty-fifth Corps under Weitzel. At this time Grant had 101,000 infantry, 14,700 cavalry, and 9,000 artillery; Lee had 46,000 infantry, 6,000 cavalry and 5,000 artillery. On the 29th of March Grant's last movement to the left began. Sheridan with the cavalry went by way of Dinwiddie Court House to strike the Southside and the Richmond and Danville Railways, which intersect at Burkesville [Burke's Station]. (275) The rest of the army, or the bulk of it, moved to envelop the Confederate right. (279) Perceiving this movement, Lee hurried as large a force as he could spare to his trenches along the White Oak Road, where A. P. Hill was in command. Then, as in every case before, Hill, instead of waiting to be attacked, moved out himself, and attacked the Union left flank, while it was entangled in the swampy forest.

*Long.

He rolled up Warren's left flank at first, but later was driven back to his trenches.

Sheridan advanced toward Five Forks, but was met on the way by Fitzhugh Lee's cavalry, supported by Pickett's and Johnson's divisions of infantry, which had been sent out to stop him. He was driven back to Dinwiddie Court House. Pickett then fell back to Five Forks, where he made the mistake of halting and intrenching, instead of returning to the right of the main army four miles away. Here he was assaulted and defeated, on the 1st of April, by Sheridan, who had been reinforced by Warren with the Fifth Corps.

On the 2nd of April Grant renewed his assault on the Confederate right, breaking the line and forcing it back. The Federals then took possession of the Southside Railway, and the Confederates fell back toward Petersburg, pursued by the Federals. The pursuit continued until it was arrested by the guns of Fort Gregg.* Here Longstreet's corps, which had been called in all haste from before Richmond, came into the fight.†

(280) That night Lee's army quitted Petersburg and Richmond and started westward. Grant followed on the south side of the Appomattox. Lee hurried toward the Danville Railway, hoping to reach either Danville or Lynchburg ahead of the Union army, and to unite with Johnston. He had arranged to ration his army at Amelia Court House, but by some blunder his provisions were not stopped there but were carried on to Richmond, "and nearly twenty-four hours were lost in endeavoring to collect, in the country, subsistence for men and horses."‡ Sheridan with his cavalry and the Second and Sixth Corps led in the pursuit. Both he and Lee made for Burkesville [Burke's Station]; he beat in the race.

Lee now had Union columns upon his flank and behind him, and Sheridan's cavalry was riding far ahead to cut off his retreat. A running fight was kept up all the way. At Sailor's Creek, on the 6th of April, Ewell's corps, which formed the rear guard, "was cut off, surrounded and captured, some 8,000 men."§ For four days the Confederates had nothing to eat

*Long.

†In this last day's battle A. P. Hill was slain; he had borne a conspicuous part in every battle the Army of Northern Virginia had fought, except Spottsylvania, where he was sick.

‡Lee's letter to Jefferson Davis.

§Dodge in *B. & L.*

but a little parched corn. At Farmville Lee crossed to the north side of the Appomattox, setting fire to the bridges. The Second Corps [Humphreys] came up in time to save one of the bridges. It attacked the Confederate rear and was repulsed with a loss of 600 men. At Appomattox Court House Sheridan's cavalry stood across Lee's path, and the end was at hand. There Lee surrendered to Grant on the 9th of April, and some 28,000 hungry Confederates were fed and paroled.

In these closing operations the Union army had lost about 10,000 men.

COMMENTS.

(268) Grant's movement from Cold Harbor to the south bank of the James belongs to a class of strategical operations which are considered among the most hazardous and difficult in warfare. It was a flank movement involving the crossing of close and wooded country by narrow roads, and the passage of two difficult streams, the Chickahominy and the James, over which pontoon-bridges had to be laid. Grant appreciated the hazard of the undertaking, but he says, "The move had to be made, and I relied upon Lee's not seeing my danger as I saw it." There was really nothing else left for him to do. Lee's army was intrenched squarely in front of him, and his repulse at Cold Harbor had convinced him that it could not be destroyed or driven away by frontal attacks.

Grant had fifty-odd miles to go, and Lee was in possession of the bridges of the Chickahominy, better roads, and a better knowledge of the country to aid him in attacking the right flank of Grant's columns. The movement was skilfully carried out. The army was "got out of a position but a few hundred yards from the enemy in the widest place"* and Wilson's cavalry and the Fifth Corps [Warren] covered its right flank so effectively as to induce Lee to believe that it was making for Richmond by the north bank of the James, and to keep him in ignorance or uncertainty as to its whereabouts and destination, from the time when Grant withdrew, the night of the 12th of June, till the morning of the 18th, when he had completed the difficult movement and concentrated his army in front of Petersburg. When one considers how unexpected the

*Grant.

movement was to General Lee, and how long he was kept in doubt and uncertainty; how skilfully all the difficulties of logistics were surmounted, and how quickly the movement was made, one must reckon it, in conception and execution, among the very finest achievements of strategy to be found in our military history.

Grant's failure to defeat Lee's army, or to capture Richmond by operations on the north side of the James, and his ultimate success by way of the south side, justify the belief that McClellan might have succeeded in a similar manner in 1862 if he had not been stopped by General Halleck. McClellan might, in fact, have made quicker work of it than Grant did, for he might have captured Petersburg before the town was completely intrenched and defended by Lee's army. Petersburg was the key to the situation; if it could have been taken at the start, while Lee still kept the bulk of his forces on the north bank of the river watching for Grant to advance on that bank, the fall of Richmond and the surrender of Lee's army would probably have taken place many weeks earlier. General Grant took measures for its early capture; it was for this that Smith was hurried back by water to Bermuda Hundred by way of White House, and Hancock was hurried across the James before the pontoon-bridge was laid. Hancock's march from the James to Petersburg was delayed to await the arrival of his rations, but Smith arrived in front of Petersburg in time. Grant says, "I believed then, and still believe, that Petersburg could have been easily captured at that time. It only had about 2,500 men in the defenses, besides some irregular troops, consisting of citizens and employees in the city who took up arms in case of emergency." In fact, Butler ought to have captured Petersburg weeks before—early in May. His corps-commanders urged him to let them do so, while the town was practically defenseless; but Butler refused.

Hancock's waiting for his rations on the morning of June the 15th was the fatal mistake in the Federal operations of this campaign. Those six hours of delay probably prolonged the life of the Confederacy several months. Smith, having frittered away the whole day, opened his assault upon the scantily manned works of Petersburg at 7 p.m. If Hancock had been there then with the whole, or a large part, of the Second Corps, it is hard to doubt that the works would have been carried and Petersburg taken that evening; but if Hancock had started at sunrise, instead of after ten o'clock, he would

have reached Petersburg several hours before 7 p.m. Yet no blame attaches to General Hancock's splendid record; the fault was mainly General Grant's. He forgot, or otherwise failed, either to name the hour for Hancock's start, or to inform Hancock, or his immediate commander, Meade, when Smith was going to start; and Meade even failed to inform Hancock that there was to be an assault upon Petersburg in which Hancock was expected to take part.

General Alexander says the omission was due to "the political necessity of placing Butler in command of the Army of the James." Smith belonged to that army, and General Grant, it appears, felt himself under the necessity of going to the headquarters of Butler to consult that incompetent, but politically powerful, soldier about the project, and thus failed to attend to a vital detail at his own headquarters. If American youth could be taught in their schools how much the "political necessity," which gave important commands to Butler and Banks and Patterson and Sigel and Shields and scores of others, cost our country in treasure and time and blood, it is impossible to believe that such a necessity would be tolerated in a future war. But the weakest thread in the fabric of the American boy's education is his knowelge of the real truth of his own country's military history.

In the long siege of Petersburg Lee had the advantage of interior lines of operation and of a better knowledge of the intricate wooded country and cross-roads. He made such good use of his advantages as to meet every movement of his enemy to right or left, up to the very last, with a force large enough to stop him. Not until Lee's line of works had stretched to more than thirty-five miles, with only about 1,000 men to the mile to hold it, and Sheridan's large force of cavalry was threatening his only line of supply and retreat, was Lee driven back from his outer line of intrenchments, and forced to flee with his army.

Looking only to a prolongation of the war, Lee ought to have withdrawn his army from Richmond and Petersburg many weeks sooner—before his troops had become thoroughly disheartened by hardships and the conviction that they would have to lay down their arms in the end. From a purely military point of view he ought not to have stopped with his army at all in Richmond and Petersburg after Grant crossed the James. There were political reasons: the Presidential elec-

tion in the United States would take place in November, 1864, and there was the chance of the election of a Democratic President; a large proportion of the people of the United States were heartily tired of the war; the draft-law and the high war-taxes were very much disliked; gold had risen to 285 in July, and the expenses of the war amounted to nearly \$4,000,000 a day; Grant's campaign as far southward as the Chickahominy had been one of tactical defeats with heavy losses, which carried sorrow home to every part of the land; the last battle, Cold Harbor, was the costliest repulse the Union army had suffered; the morale of Lee's army was as good as ever. If Grants' army could be held at bay until after the election, and the Confederate government could be guarded securely in its capital until the same time, there was hope that terms of peace could be arranged with the United States, in case the election should go against Mr. Lincoln. Whereas, if Lee should abandon Richmond before November, the Confederate government would have to withdraw, and Grant could take the Confederate capital, which for four years had been the goal of the Union army. This would not only make the reelection of Mr. Lincoln all the more certain, but would lessen the chances of making terms of peace even if Mr. Lincoln should by any possibility be beaten in the election.

General Alexander believes that the South had a better chance of obtaining favorable terms of peace in the summer and fall of 1864 than at any other time of the war. Nothing else at that time would have strengthened the Administration with the people of the United States and assured its reelection in November like ending the war upon terms creditable to the United States. The people of the North, as, also, the people of the South, were sick and tired of war; they longed for peace. If President Lincoln could have proclaimed peace in the land at any time before the day of the election his return to the White House would have been assured. The Confederate authorities failed to take advantage of the opportunity, and soon events occurred in other theaters that lifted the despondency of the North and made the reelection of Mr. Lincoln and the further prosecution of the war certain. These events were the successes of Farragut in Mobile Bay; of Sherman against Hood at Atlanta, toward the end of August; and the victories of Sheridan in the Shenandoah Valley in September.

After the reelection of Mr. Lincoln there does not appear to have been any political reason for Lee's remaining at Rich-

mond. He knew, and the Confederate president must have known, that he should have to retreat sooner or later. Early in March it was agreed between him and Mr. Davis "that as soon as the roads would admit of movement"* Lee should withdraw his army from the Richmond and Petersburg lines and hasten to unite it with Joseph E. Johnston's army in North Carolina for a combined attack on Sherman. Grant was on the watch for such a movement, and says in his *Memoirs*, "One of the most anxious periods of my experience during the rebellion was the last few weeks before Petersburg. I felt that the situation of the Confederate army was such that they would try to make an escape at the earliest practicable moment, and I was afraid, every morning, that I would wake from my sleep to hear that Lee had gone, and that nothing was left but a picket line."

It is hard to see what real good Lee hoped to accomplish by the assault of Fort Stedman. Some historians have stated that the object of the assault was to induce Grant to transfer troops from his left to his right, which would make it easier for Lee to withdraw his army and begin his retreat. Lee's biographer, General Long, says: "It was one of those military movements whose purpose is left in abeyance, the future policy of the commander being dependent upon his measure of success and the change in the situation thereby occasioned." The fewer movements a commander makes with such indefinite objects as General Long's language implies, the better it is for the cause he serves. Every military operation should have a definite object. General Alexander says simply that before undertaking to evacuate Richmond and Petersburg, and march to North Carolina to join Johnston, "which was felt to be an almost impossible task," Lee "determined upon one last effort to break up Grant in his immediate front, in spite of all his fortifications." If this was Lee's purpose, with such odds against him, despair had warped his judgment.

It was the two railways, the Southside [Lynchburg] and the Danville, but particularly the Danville line, that enabled Lee to maintain his army at Richmond and Petersburg for so many months. Without those lines of supply he would have had to retreat or surrender many weeks sooner. If Petersburg had been taken at the start, Lee would undoubtedly first have tried to hold the line of the Appomattox River and also to guard

*Humphreys.

the Danville Railway. When turned out of that line, if still tied to Richmond, he would, within a few weeks, have been driven across the James into Richmond, or shut up in a line of earthworks having both of its flanks resting on the south bank of the James. This, however, would have been to surrender the Danville Railway to the enemy. Nothing but the orders of President Davis would have induced Lee to put his army into such a trap. He would rather have placed his back to the Richmond and Danville Railway and defended it as long as practicable; then, when turned or driven from it, he would have retreated toward Danville or Lynchburg.

Richmond, chosen as the capital only as a sop to Virginia, of course, was always the point of greatest weakness in the Southern Confederacy. The choice really was the worst thing that could have been imposed upon Virginia, for it subjected her soil to four years of steady campaign. Strategically considered, Chattanooga should have been made the seat of the Confederate government. It is possible, however, that a newly established government, which has to fight for its existence, would get along better with no fixed capital, or with one easily shifted, like that of our forefathers of the Revolution.

As the primary object of Grant's campaign was to get possession of the two railways leading into Richmond from the south and southwest, it looks, at first glance, as if he ought to have succeeded in less than nine months. It looks as if he could have left a comparatively small force intrenched in front of Petersburg, and moved the bulk of his army against those railways. He might have done this, as the Japanese did with Port Arthur, if Lee's army had been shut up within limited fortifications at Petersburg; but Lee's army never was invested. This army was so favored by the relative positions of Richmond and Petersburg, and the conformation of the James and the Appomattox, that Grant could not shut it up in either town. He could not leave a small force in front of Petersburg and march off with his main army without thereby giving Lee an opportunity to turn the position of the small force and fall upon his base on the James. So Grant had to continue his wearing-out policy, gradually extending his left all the while toward the railways.

The work of Sheridan's cavalry in the last phase of this final campaign cannot be commended too highly; instead of going off upon some useless raid, as it had done on a former occasion,

it stayed with the main army and did most effective work. It cut off Lee's retreat upon Danville and turned it toward Lynchburg; and then blocked the way to that town. But for the Union cavalry Lee might have reached the mountains of Virginia.

This suggests the inquiry, why did Lee want to reach the mountains and prolong the struggle further? He knew, and the moribund government at Richmond knew, that the war could not last much longer; why, then, did he not end the hardships of his army, and the further shedding of blood, by surrendering in front of Richmond? It was the hope of securing better terms of peace for his army and the South that made him retreat. He could scarcely have hoped for more generous terms than those granted by General Grant at Appomattox.

LECTURE XXV.

THE CAMPAIGN OF ATLANTA.

(281) After the battle of Chattanooga, November 25, 1863, we left Bragg, with the Confederate army, in full retreat along his line of communications to the southeast. He was not vigorously and persistently pursued, but was allowed to hold his army and intrench it in front of Dalton, within twenty-five miles of the field of his defeat. In his *Memoirs* General Grant says, "Chattanooga now being secure to the National troops beyond any doubt, I immediately turned my attention to relieving Knoxville, etc."

The Confederate army at Dalton was not further molested during the winter. In response to the dissatisfaction publicly expressed against Bragg at the South, and in accordance with his own request, President Davis relieved him of the command, but manifested abiding faith in his ability, by calling him to Richmond as chief-of-staff. Toward the end of December Joseph E. Johnston was transferred from Mississippi to take command at Dalton. The Richmond authorities were anxious for Johnston to assume the offensive as soon as possible, and try to recover Tennessee. But the strength, morale, means of transportation, and supplies of the army were not such as to let Johnston believe that he should succeed, if he took the initiative. "I can see no other mode of taking the offensive here," he wrote Mr. Davis, "than to beat the enemy when he advances, and then move forward."* So Johnston remained on the defensive at Dalton, doing what he could to improve the condition of his command. He organized it into two army-corps, under Hardee and Hood respectively. A few days after the campaign began, in May, General Polk joined him with another corps, raising the strength of his command to about 60,000. Wheeler commanded his cavalry, organized as a corps, which numbered at the start less than 2,000 horsemen.

The Federal forces in Tennessee did little during the rest of the winter. General Grant remained in command, until he was made lieutenant-general and commander-in-chief of all the land forces, as we have seen, in March, 1864. He was suc-

*Johnston's *Narrative*.

ceeded by General Sherman in Tennessee. The bad condition of the roads in the early spring, the difficulty of transporting enough supplies by the single line of railway from the base at Nashville, and the temporary depletion of the ranks, due to the so-called "veteran act," made it impracticable for Sherman to take the offensive against Johnston before the first of May.*

Meantime some changes were made in the organization of Sherman's forces. The Eleventh and Twelfth Corps were consolidated into a single corps, the Twentieth, and placed under command of Hooker; and Howard replaced Gordon Granger in command of the Fourth Corps. McPherson came into command of the Army of the Tennessee, consisting of the Fifteenth and Seventeenth, and part of the Sixteenth Corps. Schofield had succeeded Burnside in command of the Army of the Ohio, now consisting of the Twenty-third Corps only. General Thomas still commanded the Army of the Cumberland, now composed of the Fourth, the Fourteenth, and the Twentieth Corps. Some other changes in commanders were made before the end of the campaign.

As finally organized the army was distributed as follows just before the campaign opened: the Army of the Ohio [Schofield], 13,559, near Red Clay, on the railway thirteen miles north of Dalton; the Army of the Cumberland [Thomas], 60,773, near Ringgold, on the Chattanooga railway, twelve miles northwest of Dalton; the Army of the Tennessee [McPherson], 24,465, at Lee and Gordon's Mill, twenty miles northwest of Dalton.† The Union front, from Red Clay to Lee and Gordon's Mill, was twenty miles long. The cavalry, though nominally attached to the three subordinate armies, was, during the campaign, organized in four divisions which were assigned to duty by General Sherman as circumstances required. One division was usually on each flank, and one covering the line of communications, whilst the fourth was ready for expeditions to the front. The nearest subordinate army-commander usually exercised authority over the cavalry coöperating with him.‡

*The Veteran Volunteer Act provided that all men that should reenlist for the period of the war should receive transportation home, a month's furlough, and a bounty of \$400. The law had the desired effect, but seriously depleted Sherman's ranks during the absence of the veterans on their furlough. The last of them were not due to return before the 1st of May.

†Sherman in *B. & L.*

‡Bigelow's *Principles of Strategy*.

We learned in the lecture on the battle of the Wilderness that General Grant's instructions to Sherman for his part in the general plan of combined operations, in the spring of 1864, directed him "to move against Johnston's army, to break it up, and to get into the interior of the enemy's country as far as you can, inflicting all the damage you can against their war resources. . . ." Atlanta, eighty-five miles from Dalton, was Johnston's base. It was a large town at the junction of several railways of strategic importance: one leading through Dalton to Chattanooga, was the line of communications of both hostile armies; one to Virginia, by way of Danville, was the line of communication between Johnston and Lee; one through the heart of Georgia to the coast; and one to Montgomery, Alabama. After Johnston's army, Atlanta was obviously Sherman's next most important objective, and it was the most important place for Johnston to guard. General Sherman says, "Atlanta was known as the Gate-City of the South, was full of foundries, arsenals, and machine-shops, and I knew that its capture would be the death-knell of the Southern Confederacy."*

The country between Chattanooga and Atlanta was generally wooded, and all except the space between the Oostanaula and the Etowah Rivers was rugged and hilly. In front of Dalton was a north-and-south ridge some thirty miles long, that could be crossed by an army at two places only—at the gap where the railway passed through it, and fourteen miles farther south, at Snake Creek Gap. Just south of the Etowah the railway broke through another rocky barrier by way of Allatoona Pass. Farther south, in front of Marietta, was another line of rather disconnected hills, the principal ones of which were Brush Mountain, Kenesaw Mountain, and Lost Mountain, and a little farther to the north, Pine Mountain. Crossing the theater, athwart the route from Dalton to Atlanta, were the Oostanaula, the Etowah, and the Chattahoochee Rivers and their branches. All of the roads were of the poorest kind, made worse by weeks of rain during the operations.

Finding Johnston's position at Dalton too strong to attack, Sherman resolved to turn it. The operation began on the 7th of May. McPherson, with the Army of the Tennessee, preceded by Kilpatrick's cavalry division, made the turning-

*Sherman's *Memoirs*.

movement by way of Villanow and Snake Creek Gap. Thomas, with the Army of the Cumberland, supported him by making a strong demonstration against Tunnel Hill and Rocky Face Ridge, the front of Johnston's position. On the 9th Schofield, with the Army of the Ohio, moved down from the north. E. M. McCook's cavalry division covered Schofield's left, and was worsted in a dismounted skirmish with Wheeler's cavalry at Varnell's station.

Having put to flight a Confederate cavalry brigade about to occupy Snake Creek Gap, McPherson, by the afternoon of the 9th of May, was close upon Resaca. His orders were to capture the railway, in order to compel Johnston either to detach a large force for its recovery or to evacuate the position altogether at Dalton.* But McPherson considered the position at Resaca too strong to assault; so, with the discretion allowed him in his order, he retired to the southern end of Snake Creek Gap, and there took up a strong position in order to hold the Gap.

Thereupon Sherman moved his whole army to Snake Creek Gap, except the Fourth Corps [Howard] and Stoneman's cavalry division, which were left to cover his communications. By the 12th of May he had the army concentrated at McPherson's position. Johnston received information of this movement from the scouts on the left of his line. Wheeler moved his cavalry round the north end of the ridge, and, driving back Sherman's cavalry, confirmed the information. Thereupon Johnston, on the morning of the 13th (May), withdrew his army to Resaca. There he was joined by Polk's corps.

Johnston took up a position behind intrenchments, on an irregular curve, covering Resaca, the bridges, and the railway. His right and left flanks rested on the Connasauga and the Oostanaula Rivers respectively. The Fourth Corps [Howard] and Stoneman's cavalry followed Johnston through Dalton. Sherman deployed his army against the position at Resaca, and made a partial attack on the 14th. Pressing the enemy's front and right on the 15th, Sherman dispatched a division of infantry and Kilpatrick's cavalry to cross the Oostanaula by pontoon-bridge at Lay's Ferry, five miles southwest of Resaca. The cavalry advanced upon Calhoun. At the same time Garrard's cavalry division was started from Villanow, by way of Rome, to break up the railway between Cal-

*Sherman.

houn and Kingston. These operations forced Johnston to withdraw from Resaca during the night of the 15th of May. He burned the railway bridge behind him. Johnston hoped to find a "favorable position near Calhoun," but there was none; so, after resting his army for eighteen or twenty hours at that place, he resumed his retreat to Adairsville on the 17th. Here his army was increased by the junction of a force of 3,700 cavalry, under W. H. Jackson.

On the 16th Sherman took up the pursuit. Jeff. C. Davis's division [Fourteenth Corps] marched to the support of Gerrard's cavalry in the capture of Rome. This town was important, on account of the Confederate machine-shops and iron-works, as well as the large quantities of cotton and stores collected there. The Army of the Tennessee [McPherson], on the right, advanced by way of Lay's Ferry; Thomas, in the center, followed the railway; Schofield, on the left, crossed the river six or eight miles east of Resaca.* The cavalry was out on both flanks, with instructions to reach the enemy's rear if possible. The hostile armies were now in comparatively open, rolling country, where Sherman's superior numbers would have a better chance of winning a decisive victory, in case Johnston could be brought to battle.†

Johnston had expected to make a stand at Adairsville, and to place his line across the valley in which the railway lay, with his flanks upon the heights on each side. Finding the valley, however, too wide for the front of his army, in order of battle, he adopted other methods. Two roads led southward from Adairsville, one directly to Cassville, the other by way of Kingston. These two places were about seven miles apart. Johnston retreated with Hardee's corps on the Kingston road, and those of Polk and Hood on the Cassville road. The two hostile armies were now, on the 18th of May, marching with wider fronts than at any time before.† The flanks of the Federal army were, however, farther apart than those of the Confederate army.

Johnston purposed taking advantage of this situation, by having Polk's corps make a stand on the Cassville road, while Hardee should guard the flank toward Kingston, and Hood should fall upon the left of Schofield, as Schofield deployed to attack Polk. The project failed through Hood's fault. Under the belief that the Federal column to the east of him had

*Sherman.

†Bigelow.

turned his own right, Hood faced his corps to his right and rear. "The time thus lost frustrated Johnston's design, for success depended upon timing the attack properly." Johnston then took up a strong defensive position with his three corps, on a ridge immediately south of Cassville.*

On the 19th of May Schofield from the north and Thomas by way of Kingston closed upon the Confederates at Cassville, and skirmished with them until dusk. Johnston meant to give battle in this position, but that night Hood and Polk, who were on the right, insisted that they should be exposed to enfilade artillery fire, and should be unable to hold their part of the line.* Johnston, consequently, retired before daylight of the 20th, upon a strong position at Allatoona Pass.† The position at Allatoona was too strong to assail in front; Sherman, therefore, after giving his army three days of rest, set out on the 23rd with twenty days' supplies in his wagons to turn the position, converging his columns, including Davis's division from Rome, upon Dallas. Stoneman's cavalry division covered his left, Garrard's his right, and McCook's cleared the front for his center.‡ Kilpatrick's covered the rear and guarded the crossings of the Etowah.‡

Finding his position at Allatoona about to be turned, Johnston withdrew and took up a new position at New Hope Church. Driving back the Confederate cavalry, Sherman's army appeared before this position on the 26th of May, with McPherson at Dallas, Thomas in front of New Hope Church, and Schofield on Thomas's left. Owing to the rugged and wooded character of the ground it took several days of skirmishing for the Federals to develop the Confederate position. On the 1st of June the Union army shifted bodily to the left, bringing McPherson in front of New Hope Church. The Union cavalry [Stoneman and McCook] seized Allatoona. By the 6th of June Sherman's army was again across the railway at Ackworth. McPherson and Thomas had passed by the rear of Schofield, reversing the order in line of the subordinate armies. In the new line Schofield was on the right, McPherson on the left, and Thomas in the center. A new depot was at once set up at Allatoona. Meantime Johnston had shifted his position to the right, and his line now reached from Lost

*Johnston in *B. & L.*

†Bigelow.

‡Lecture by Captain Stuart, C. E.

Mountain to Brush Mountain, a distance of about twelve miles. Pine Mountain, an isolated hill in front of this line, was also occupied at first. Wheeler's cavalry guarded the left and Jackson's the right. The Confederate corps stood in line from left to right in the following order: Hardee's, Polk's, Hood's.* The position covered Marietta, the railway back to Atlanta, and the bridges over the Chattahoochee on Johnston's line of retreat.

(282) By the 11th of June the Federal line had moved up closer to that of the Confederates, the left of which had been drawn in to Gilgal Church. On the 14th Thomas deployed before Pine Mountain. General Johnston, with Hardee and Polk, was on that hill observing, when a shell fired from a Union battery struck General Polk, killing him instantly. Loring succeeded to the command of Polk's corps. That night the Confederate troops were withdrawn from Pine Mountain.

The Federal line moved up closer to the Confederate main line. On the 16th the Federals continued to press the Confederate line until Johnston abandoned the position at Gilgal Church, drawing in his left closer about Marietta. (283) Before daylight of the 19th Johnston had still further contracted his line about Marietta. The line now included the crest of Kenesaw Mountain, from end to end.† Sherman followed up close to the Confederate trenches with his line. These operations were all greatly hindered by the continual rains, which turned brooks into torrents and roads into mires.*

On the night of the 21st Johnston, becoming concerned about the pressure on his left, shifted Hood's corps from the right to the left of his line. In this quarter two of Hood's divisions engaged one of Hooker's divisions and one of Schofield's brigades, and suffered a heavy loss on the 22nd. Skirmishing between the hostile lines went on for three or four days without any decisive result. At length, on the 27th of June, Sherman assaulted the strong position on Kenesaw Mountain with the Armies of the Cumberland and the Tennessee, while Schofield threatened Johnston's left. The assault fell mainly upon the corps of Hardee and Loring, and was repulsed with a loss of about 3,000 men. The entire Confederate loss did not exceed 500.*

(284) Between the 28th of June and the 3rd of July

*Captain Stuart.

†Johnston.

Thomas, in the center, extended his line a little to the right; McPherson moved his army in rear of Thomas and formed it on his right; Schofield, with the right wing, moved down the Sandtown Road, and intrenched a line to the south of the Confederate position; Stoneman's cavalry reached the Chattahoochee near Sandtown. Johnston withdrew to a strong position at Smyrna, resting his flanks on Nickajack and Rottenwood Creeks.* Thomas advanced through Marietta and developed the position at Smyrna, while McPherson passed beyond Schofield and pushed his advance down the Sandtown Road to the Chattahoochee. Schofield stayed behind in reserve. On the 4th of July Johnston retired into intrenchments covering the railway bridge.† Besides this bridge, Johnston had several pontoon-bridges laid in his rear, and above all these bridges there were several good fords.‡

Thomas, supported by McPherson, followed up Johnston's withdrawal, while Schofield marched by the rear of Thomas to the mouth of Soap Creek. On the 7th Stoneman's cavalry pushed down the river, and Garrard's seized Roswell. By the 9th Schofield had made a lodgment on the left bank of the river, near the mouth of Soap Creek. (285) On this day Johnston withdrew to the left bank of the river. From the line of the Chattahoochee Sherman wheeled his army to the right. Thomas, on the pivot, took the shortest road to Atlanta; McPherson, on the left, with Garrard's cavalry on his outer flank, moved by way of Roswell on Decatur; Schofield, in the center, also moved on Decatur.† At the beginning of this wheel the army was upon a front of fifteen miles. Johnston took up a position behind Peachtree Creek, from which he "might engage the enemy, if he should expose himself in the passage of the stream."‡ He was prevented from actively opposing Sherman's passage of the Chattahoochee by the width and difficult character of Peachtree Creek near its mouth, which his army would have had to straddle.

(286) Further to add to Johnston's troubles, about this time a Union cavalry force, under General Rousseau, was organized at Decatur, Ala., for a raid. This force destroyed about twenty-five miles of the Montgomery and Atlanta Rail-

*Captain Stuart.

†Bigelow.

‡Johnston in *B. & L.*

way, one of Johnston's main lines of supply, and marched on to Marietta, where it arrived on the 22nd of July.*

(285) On the evening of July 17 Johnston received a telegram from Richmond, directing him to turn over the command of his army to Hood. The reason stated in the telegram for relieving Johnston was that he had failed to arrest the advance of the enemy to the vicinity of Atlanta, and expressed no confidence that he could defeat or repel him.† Cheatham succeeded to the command of Hood's corps. Loring had already been succeeded in command of Polk's old corps by A. P. Stewart. At the time of his accession to the command Hood claimed that the army numbered only 48,750 effectives, including 1,500 Georgia militia, which had just joined.*

On the evening of July 19 the Union armies had reached the following positions: Thomas was in the act of crossing Peachtree Creek; Schofield, in the center, was also about to cross this creek east of the Buckhead Road; and McPherson, on the left, was approaching Decatur. In this position the flanks of the enemy were fully ten miles apart, and there was a wide interval between Thomas's left and Schofield's right. To close this interval Thomas ordered Howard with two divisions toward the left, to connect with Schofield. This, however, left an interval of two miles between Howard's detachment and the left of Thomas's line. Hood determined to take advantage of the wide dispersion of Sherman's columns to attack Thomas as soon as he should get across Peachtree Creek. He placed Cheatham's corps, and a force of Georgia militia under General G. W. Smith, on the 20th, to hold off Schofield and McPherson, with the aid, also, of Wheeler's cavalry on the extreme right; and, in the afternoon, assaulted Thomas in flank through the interval left by Howard. The attack was made through dense woods and was well concealed up to the moment of the onset; but it was repulsed by Thomas.‡ This was the battle of Peachtree Creek.

On the 21st the Federal left continued its wheel. Garrard's cavalry was sent to destroy the railway to the east, and McPherson was ordered to destroy the track thoroughly, as he passed over it, from Decatur toward Atlanta. (287) Hood withdrew from his position behind Peachtree Creek into intrenchments already prepared close around Atlanta. Sher-

*Captain Stuart.

†Johnston in *B. & L.*

‡Bigelow. Howard and Hood in *B. & L.*

man was misled by this withdrawal into the belief that Hood had evacuated Atlanta; Thomas and Schofield, therefore, pushed forward, on the morning of the 22nd, and McPherson, on the left, issued orders putting his army "in pursuit to the south and east of Atlanta."* But instead of retreating, Hood had projected an assault upon the left of the Union line, by Hardee's corps and Wheeler's cavalry, supported by Cheatham's corps. By a night march of fifteen miles Hardee gained a position on McPherson's flank and rear, which were left uncovered by the departure of Garrard's cavalry. He took McPherson completely by surprise, and in the attack, which he began at noon on the 22nd, rolled up part of the Union army and got possession of Decatur, where some of the trains were parked; he was, after all, checked and repulsed. In this engagement, known as the battle of Atlanta, the Confederate loss aggregated 8,000, and the Union loss 3,500,† including McPherson, who was killed. Howard succeeded to the command of the Army of the Tennessee.‡

Sherman drew in his lines closer about the Confederate works around Atlanta. By the 25th of July the Federal army occupied an intrenched line stretching from a point south of the Georgia Railroad and east of Atlanta to a point beyond Atlanta to the northwest. (281) Hood's main line of supply was the Macon Railway. Sherman's next objective was to be that railway.§ His plan was to move the Army of the Tennessee [Howard] to the right, rapidly and boldly, against the railway below Atlanta, and, at the same time, to send all the cavalry round by the right and left to make a lodgment on it about Jonesboro.¶ (288) The cavalry was assembled in two strong divisions, that of McCook, including Rousseau's brigade, to the right rear, at Turner's Ferry; that of Garrard and Stoneman, united for the occasion under Stoneman, to the left rear, near Decatur.¶

*Sherman's report to Halleck August 15, 1864, and McPherson's last recorded order. See *Sherman's Historical Raid*.—Boynton.

†Captain Stuart.

‡Howard's promotion to succeed McPherson overslaughed Hooker, who ranked Howard. Hooker, in dudgeon, resigned command of the Twentieth Corps, and was succeeded by Slocum. Palmer, also, a little later, took offense at being ordered to serve under Schofield, whom he claimed to rank, and resigned command of the Fourteenth Corps. He was succeeded by Jeff. C. Davis.

§Bigelow.

¶Sherman.

These movements began on the morning of July 27. Howard marched his army to the right in rear of Schofield and Thomas. To oppose these movements Hood had started Stephen D. Lee's corps* to cover the roads on the west of the railways. On the afternoon of the 28th Lee came unexpectedly upon Howard at Ezra Church already upon ground that he had expected to occupy. He assaulted Howard and, though reinforced later by Stewart's corps, was repulsed.† (286) Stoneman, who appears to have been more concerned to make a "grandstand play" by capturing the Confederate prison at Andersonville, south of Macon, than to coöperate with the other cavalry column in making a lodgment on the railway near Jonesboro, detached Garrard's cavalry within ten miles of Atlanta, and, with his own command, 2,100 troopers, hastened toward Macon. (His orders were to send Garrard back from Jonesboro.) He attacked Macon on the 30th of July, but was repulsed by the militia. He now found himself practically surrounded, and he bent all his efforts to make his escape, but between Clinton and Monticello he was surrounded and captured. About 500 of his horsemen cut their way out and escaped.‡ McCook fared little better. At Newnan, on the 30th, he was defeated by a part of Wheeler's cavalry, losing 500 men and his artillery. He withdrew to the rear of the army, and Kilpatrick's division, from the rear, took his place on the right of the army.

(288) Sherman was awaiting the result of these cavalry operations when the month of July closed. His infantry line was strongly intrenched, but was "drawn out from the Augusta road on the left to the Sandtown road on the right, a distance of full ten measured miles."§ During the first three or four days of August General Sherman received full reports of the failure of his cavalry raids. "I now became satisfied," he says, "that cavalry could not, or would not, make a sufficient lodgment on the railroad below Atlanta, and that nothing would suffice but for us to reach it with the main army."§ The General ought to have known beforehand that cavalry raids cannot effectually destroy the communications of an army in its own country.

In furtherance of the plan of attacking Hood's communi-

*Lee had succeeded Cheatham in command of Hood's old corps on the 26th of July.

†Howard and Hood in *B. & L.*

‡Captain Stuart.

§Sherman.

cations with the main army, Thomas and Schofield moved by Howard's rear, extending the Union line to the south. Schofield was ordered to make a bold attack on the railway about Eastpoint. This attack, made August 5, failed on account of the insubordination of General Palmer, who refused to serve under Schofield, whom he claimed to rank.* The Union lines continued their extension to the west and south until August 18.†

(281) Meantime Wheeler had been raiding the Union communications as far back as Dalton, and had done considerable damage. Attracted by the zeal and activity of Kilpatrick as a cavalry leader, and taking advantage of the absence of Wheeler's cavalry, Sherman resolved to suspend the general movement of his main army, and again to try cavalry against Hood's communications. Accordingly Kilpatrick was dispatched with his small division against the railway at Jonesboro, in the hope that the operation would force Hood to evacuate Atlanta, and, maybe, expose him to attack in the confusion of retreat.* This raid, like the others, achieved very little. Kilpatrick got off on the night of the 18th, and returned on the 22nd, having made the complete circuit of Atlanta. He brought back some prisoners, and reported having destroyed three miles of railway, which he said it would take the enemy ten days to repair. But on the 23rd trains were seen going into Atlanta from the south.* Sherman says that he then "became more than ever convinced that the cavalry could not, or would not, work hard enough to disable a railroad properly." He returned, therefore, to the plan of a general movement with the main army.

(288) Accordingly the Twentieth Corps [Slocum] was left to guard the bridge at the Chattahoochee, and rations to last fifteen days were issued to the rest of the army. The movement began on the 25th of August and, by the evening of the 27th, the army was echeloned along the Atlanta-Sandtown road, Schofield on the left, facing Eastpoint; the mass of the army facing south. On the 28th the army began a general left wheel, pivoting on Schofield. Howard, on the right, upon an arc with a radius of twenty-five miles, aimed at Jonesboro. Thomas took the middle course. By night Howard had reached Fairburn, and Thomas was at Redoak Station, on the Montgomery Railway. Schofield stood fast on the pivot until the

*Sherman.

†Captain Stuart.

trains were well on their way, then moved his corps into the line a mile northeast of Mount Gilead. The right and center spent the 29th of August in destroying some twelve miles of the Montgomery Railway. Schofield moved into connection with Thomas at Redoak.

On the 30th of August Schofield advanced about a mile and a half in the direction of Eastpoint, and again covered the army's trains. (281) Howard and Thomas continued the wheel, meeting Confederate cavalry. This cavalry was covering Hardee, who, with about half of Hood's army, was this day dispatched by Hood to fall upon the Union army. On the 31st Hardee attacked Howard, and was repulsed. Schofield advanced and seized the railway at Rough-and-Ready. Thomas struck the railway between there and Jonesboro; he and Howard marched for Jonesboro, tearing up the track on the way.

Finding his communications in possession of the Federal army, Hood evacuated Atlanta on the 1st of September, and reunited his army at Lovejoy's Station.* Sherman withdrew his army to Atlanta and its neighborhood, to rest and prepare for further operations. The Army of the Cumberland [Thomas] occupied the city; the Army of the Tennessee [Howard], Eastpoint; and the Army of the Ohio [Schofield], Decatur. The cavalry covered the flanks and rear from Roswell to Sandtown.

The Confederate army was prevented from making any immediate movement by the necessity of covering Andersonville, ninety miles south of Lovejoy, where 34,000 Union prisoners were held in confinement. The Atlanta Campaign was at an end.

COMMENTS.

The Atlanta Campaign began on the 5th of May, 1864, and ended with the evacuation of Atlanta by Hood, on the 1st of September—four months, less four days. By skilful maneuvering, far more than by his assaults at Dalton, Resaca, and Kenesaw, Sherman had forced the Confederate army back ninety-odd miles, and had captured the important city of Atlanta.

During the same time Grant, in Virginia, had forced Lee

*Captain Stuart.

back from the line of the Rapidan to the works in front of Petersburg and Richmond; but it was not until the following April that the Union commander-in-chief succeeded in capturing these two cities. The armies of Grant and Sherman were of practically the same strength, about 100,000 each; those of Lee and Johnston, also, were about equal to each other, numbering some 60,000 each. But Grant, by this time, had lost upwards of 60,000 men, while Sherman had lost not many more than 20,000. Grant's was a campaign of "hammering," while Sherman's was one of maneuvering. Both campaigns were made in difficult country; there were heavy woods in both theaters; in Georgia the topography was more broken by ridges and hills, while in Virginia the rivers, especially the James, were more difficult to cross; the incessant rains during the Georgia campaign made the roads as bad in that theater as they were in the swamps of Virginia.

Though Sherman's operations were of the same general character as those of Rosecrans in the Tullahoma Campaign, and the results achieved were similar, far greater fame has attached to the Atlanta Campaign than to the Tullahoma Campaign. The numbers engaged on either side were greater in the Atlanta Campaign, and its outcome was a far heavier blow to the Confederacy, no doubt, than was that of the Tullahoma Campaign. Several modern American and foreign writers on the subject of strategy have discussed it as a typical campaign; and they have generally found little to criticize, either in Sherman's offensive strategy or in Johnston's defensive strategy. Hamley says of it with approval: "Except in attacking the Kenesaw Mountain on the 27th of June, the character of Sherman's operations was, throughout, the same. To protect his main line from a counter-attack, he left a force intrenched across it. He then reinforced his flanking wing to a strength sufficient to cope with the whole army of the enemy, and directed it by a circuit off the main line, upon the Confederate rear. In every case the operation was successful, obliging Johnston forthwith to abandon his strongest positions, and to retreat."

The only two mistakes General Sherman has usually been taxed with were: first, his not sending Thomas, with the large Army of the Cumberland, to turn Johnston's position by way of Snake Creek Gap, at the outset of the campaign; and second, his assaulting the strong position at Kenesaw Mountain, instead of turning it. In the first case, however, Mc-

Pherson's command was large enough to accomplish the task assigned to it if McPherson had not made the mistake, so often made by commanders, of overestimating the strength of the enemy in front of him. Sherman criticizes him in these words: McPherson "had not done the full measure of his work. He had in hand 23,000 of the best men in the army, and could have walked into Resaca (then held only by a small brigade), or he could have placed his whole force astride the railroad above Resaca, and there have easily withstood the attack of all of Johnston's army, with the knowledge that Thomas and Schofield were on his [Johnston's] heels."* General Johnston also testifies that Resaca was held by a very small force of Confederates at that time.† The two commanders, however, are not at all agreed upon what would have been the consequences if McPherson had taken Resaca and made a lodgment upon the railway. Sherman says it would have forced Johnston to retreat eastward, "and we should have captured half his army and all his artillery and wagons. . . ." Johnston says all his army "would have been upon" McPherson "at the dawn of the next day . . . making a most auspicious beginning of the campaign for the Confederates." The student is not obliged to accept either of these views wholly. Judging from the skill Johnston displayed in all of his withdrawals in this campaign one can believe it quite possible he might have escaped without great loss; but he would have been thrown off his communications with Atlanta, his base. Judging, however, by all that General Johnston did in the Civil War, both before and after this time, we have no reason to believe that he would have inflicted much damage upon McPherson. General Johnston commanded in only one offensive battle in the whole war; that was the battle of Seven Pines, which was, as General Alexander remarks, "phenomenally mismanaged."

Sherman apparently had an opportunity to destroy Johnston's army at Resaca, but neglected to take advantage of it. In the first place, after McPherson failed to take Resaca, Sherman marched the rest of his army, except the Fourth Corps and Stoneman's Cavalry, to McPherson's position at the mouth of Snake Creek Gap, within three or four miles of Resaca. He had his army assembled there by the 12th of May. Johnston did not withdraw from Dalton to Resaca until the 13th.

*Sherman.†Johnston in *B. & L.*

Why Sherman did not attack Resaca at once himself is not understood. He does not appear to have deployed before Resaca until the 14th, and then he let Johnston get away on the night of the 15th instead of destroying him. "When two armies are in order of battle, and one has to retire over a bridge, while the other has the circumference of the circle open, all the advantages are in favor of the latter. It is then a general should show boldness, strike a decided blow, and maneuver upon the flank of his enemy. The victory is in his hands."* This was the case at Resaca, where Johnston's army was in a plight similar to that of Napoleon's at Leipzig. If Sherman had shown boldness and attacked Johnston with the whole strength and vigor of his army on the 14th, or even on the 15th, he must have captured a large part of Johnston's army before it could have gotten across the river. But, instead of trying to destroy Johnston's army, Sherman simply maneuvered it out of its position. That he made no real fight there is shown by his own words: "May 13th-16th our loss was 2,747 and his 2,800"†—that is, Sherman's loss was less than three per cent. of his strength.

Another opportunity that Sherman had to strike the Confederate army a terrible blow, but failed to take advantage of, occurred during Hood's retreat from Atlanta to Lovejoy. Hood had to make a flank march by the heads of Sherman's three armies, and he was allowed to do so unmolested. The only part of Hood's army that was attacked during this hazardous march was Hardee's corps behind intrenchments near Jonesboro. Hood says himself, in his account of this campaign in *Battles and Leaders*: "I have often thought it strange Sherman should have occupied himself with attacking Hardee's intrenched position instead of falling upon our main body on the march round to his rear."

"The attack at Kenesaw has been much criticized, and General Sherman, himself, apologizes for it in his report. However, circumstances all favored it. It was a choice between an assault and a turning movement. The army was tired of marching, and wanted to fight. The incessant rains had produced a state of roads and stage of streams that would make the next turning movement especially hard. If the assault succeeded, all well and good; if it failed, hard marching would

*Napoleon's *Maxim XXV*.

†Sherman.

not appear so unattractive.”* The assault was tactically well made, and it was gallantly delivered; but the position proved to be too strong.

While Johnston's retreat was carried out with the greatest skill, and with the least loss of men and matériel; while with an army of 60,000 he kept an army of 100,000 two months and a half (May 5 to July 18) making eighty-five miles, hardly more than a mile a day; his operations, nevertheless, amounted merely to a passive defense. And the great length of time taken by Sherman in gaining the distance from Dalton to the works about Atlanta was due more to the difficulty of the weather and roads and transport than to the direct resistance made by Johnston.

(286) If, instead of falling back directly upon his line of communications, from one position to another, in his retreat from Dalton, Johnston, having made arrangements beforehand, had taken advantage of the Oostanaula River to cover his flank, and had retreated to Rome, instead of Cassville, he might then have taken up a flank-position, facing the railway from Dalton to Atlanta. Near Rome he could have taken a position behind the Etowah, with his left flank protected by the Coosa, and with the whole State of Alabama, as yet untouched by the enemy, as his base, and the railway from Selma, Alabama, to Blue Mountain as his line of communications.†

If Johnston had done this, Sherman's main army would have had to turn away from the line of the railway and the geographical and political objective of the campaign, Atlanta, to follow him. For, if Sherman had continued his march on Atlanta, he would have exposed his communications to attack by Johnston. In the meantime the governor of Georgia would have had to assemble all the State militia at Atlanta, in order to fortify that city and guard it against capture by detachments from Sherman's army.

The adoption of a flank position like this was the favorite mode of an active defense advocated by Clausewitz, and it was the plan proposed by Moltke on three different occasions, to protect Berlin, in case of an invasion of Prussia. It is, also, the method most highly recommended by von der Goltz, for an active defense.

*Captain Stuart.

†This railway, which now goes from Selma to Chattanooga, was completed only as far north as Blue Mountain in 1864. Sherman's *Memoirs*.

From Rome Johnston could have continued to fall back to the southwest, toward Montgomery, 150 miles away, drawing Sherman after him, farther and farther away from his line of railway. Sherman has given it as his opinion that his army could not have operated a hundred miles distant from a railway. In all this retreat Johnston would have had excellent ground for defensive operations. His left flank would have been protected all the way by the Coosa, a very formidable obstacle; while parallel to the Coosa and just thirty miles east of it was the Tallapoosa; and the numerous branches of these two streams traversed the wooded space between, forming at every few miles good lines to defend.

As we have learned, Johnston saw "no other mode of taking the offensive than to beat the enemy when he advances, and then move forward." This he might possibly have done if his enemy had been rash enough to dash himself to pieces against his impregnable positions; but this ought not to have been expected of so cunning a soldier as Sherman.

(281) In Sherman's wide turning movements, or the frequent shifting of his armies from one flank to the other, it should seem that Johnston ought to have found some chance to strike in between the far-separated Federal columns, or to attack them at a disadvantage while moving by the flank. In the advance from the Etowah to Dallas the Union columns started upon a front reaching from Cartersville to Rome, sixteen miles in an air-line; the country was thickly wooded, and the roads were of the worst kind, and wholly unknown to the Union commanders. The result was considerable confusion. For example, Hooker crossed the river by the bridge assigned to Schofield, and later got into the road in front of Thomas and blocked his column.* The Union army for a day or two was simply groping in an unknown wilderness. Then, if ever, was Johnston's chance to take advantage of the better knowledge of the roads and mountain trails that many of the men of his army must have possessed, to strike a blow at his enemy's columns; but he only took up positions and intrenched to stop them. Indeed, one cannot study this campaign without being persuaded that both General Sherman and General Johnston were trying to carry on war with as little fighting as possible. Yet even when General Johnston would make up his mind to fight, as he says he did at Adairsville and at Cassville, he would

*Howard in *B. & L.*

be stopped by the mistakes or the arguments of his corps-commanders.

Had Johnston not been relieved of command, he, like Lee at Petersburg, might possibly have kept Sherman at bay in front of Atlanta, and protected his communications with Macon and Montgomery, for many months. Hood, however, "was forced to an aggressive policy by the mere fact of his appointment."* He was also, like Bragg, naturally aggressive. His attacks at Peachtree Creek on the 20th of July, and in the battle of Atlanta on the 22nd, were both well planned and promised to be successful. Hood charges the failure in each case to Hardee. He says that Hardee, as his small losses proved, did not attack vigorously on the 20th; and that on the 22nd he did not carry his turning movement far enough round to reach the rear of McPherson's line, but shattered his command against Federal intrenchments. Hardee's losses were very heavy. General Alexander says, to trace the cause of Hood's failure "further would bring it home to himself for failure to supervise the execution of important orders—a sort of failure from which even the most eminent commanders have *never* been exempt."

Johnston made a serious mistake at the outset of the campaign in not occupying and fortifying Snake Creek Gap. Had he taken this precaution, "the problem confronting General Sherman at the beginning of the campaign would have been more difficult than any he had to face later. . . . There would have been nothing left but a dangerous turning movement, probably north of Dalton, to open the campaign."* This would have exposed Sherman's communications, and required a wide circuit to reach Johnston's, which, from that side, were covered by the Connasauga River and its branches.

It is rather curious to note that Johnston made no effort to defend the rivers across his line of retreat, by taking positions behind them; and that he appeared rather to prefer having a river at his back, as at Resaca and at the Chattahoochee. He was careful to provide plenty of bridges for his retreat, and, by destroying them at the right time, he hindered the pursuit.

Both hostile armies in this campaign made constant use of fieldworks. It was only by means of intrenching that Sherman was able to hold Johnston with a small force in front, while he dispatched the bulk of his command upon the wide

*Captain Stuart.

turning-movements. Both armies marched, and maneuvered, and fought like trained soldiers; and such they were, for, in the two years since the battle of Shiloh, where both sides fought like raw militia, these troops had passed through the best of training schools.

LECTURE XXVI.

THE CAMPAIGN OF FRANKLIN AND NASHVILLE.

AFTER THE CAPTURE OF ATLANTA.

(289) General Sherman admits that in taking Atlanta he "had not accomplished all, for Hood's army, the chief objective, had escaped."* Yet Hood's demoralized army was left unmolested for three weeks at Lovejoy's Station, only thirty miles from Atlanta, and was itself the first to resume offensive operations. The Union army spent this time of truce mainly in resting from the fatigues of the three-month campaign, and in making itself secure and comfortable at Atlanta. General Sherman says in his *Memoirs*: "All the army, officers and men, seemed to relax more or less, and sink into a condition of idleness. . . . Generals Blair and Logan went home to look after politics. Many of the regiments were entitled to, and claimed, their discharge, by reason of the expiration of their term of service; so that with victory and success came also many causes of disintegration." Sherman ejected all the inhabitants from the city, and turned it into a military camp, about which he built a close circle of fortifications.

He had not decided what to do next. His line of communications, which had to be guarded all the way back to Louisville, was already 400 miles long. To pursue Hood farther southward would only result in prolonging the Union communications without destroying the Confederate army. Wheeler, who had gone into Tennessee to harass those communications, was still there, and Forrest took his command thither from Mississippi about the middle of September for the same purpose. To oppose these forces, and to prepare for "any other emergency," Sherman dispatched Newton's division [Fourth Corps] and Morgan's division [Fourteenth Corps] to Tennessee,† and Corse's division [Seventeenth Corps] to Rome; and he instructed Rousseau at Nashville, Granger at Decatur, and Steedman at Chattanooga, to employ the most active measures to protect the railways.‡

*Sherman in *B. & L.*

†Colonel Stone in *B. & L.*

‡Sherman's *Memoirs*.

Meanwhile several letters passed between Sherman and Grant concerning Sherman's future operations. At this time Grant was with the Army of the Potomac in front of Lee at Petersburg; General Canby, at New Orleans, was preparing to act with a land force against Mobile in conjunction with Admiral Farragut's fleet; and a combined land and naval force was preparing for the capture of Fort Fisher and Wilmington, at the mouth of Cape Fear River, in North Carolina. "What you are to do with the forces at your command," General Grant wrote in a letter to Sherman dated September 12, "I do not exactly see." In his reply, dated September 20, General Sherman, after suggesting that Savannah should be captured immediately after Wilmington, said: "I should keep Hood employed and put my army in fine order for a march on Augusta, Columbia, and Charleston; and start as soon as Wilmington is sealed to commerce, and the city of Savannah is in our possession."

HOOD TAKES THE OFFENSIVE.

At this stage of the correspondence Hood forced Sherman to a decision and prompt action by himself taking the initiative. On the 20th of September he shifted his army to Palmetto, on the Atlanta and Montgomery Railway, twenty-five miles southwest of Atlanta. He had already sent an order to Wheeler recalling him from Tennessee. At Palmetto Hood was visited by President Davis, and a plan for the immediate operations was arranged. According to this plan Hood was to move against Sherman's communications with Chattanooga; if this caused Sherman to fall back to attack him, as was expected, Hood would take up a strong position and give battle, provided the morale of his army warranted it; otherwise he would retreat toward Gadsden, Alabama, where supplies would be collected. There, near the State-line, a large auxiliary force of militia and home-guards from both Georgia and Alabama could be assembled, and, if Sherman followed so far, a decisive battle would be fought. If Sherman should not pursue as far as Gadsden, but should return to Atlanta and march toward the sea, he was to be pursued by Hood.*

Hood now had an effective force of about 40,000 men, and its morale, which he had reported as "greatly impaired by the

**The Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government*,—Jefferson Davis.

recurrence of retreat," was somewhat improved. He hoped by taking the aggressive wholly to restore it. General Hardee, whom Hood had blamed with his defeats, had been transferred from the army, and General Cheatham was now in command of Hardee's old corps. Beauregard had just been assigned to the command of the Military Division of the West, which included Hood's army* as well as such Confederate troops as were in Alabama and Mississippi, under the territorial command of General "Dick" Taylor. West of the Mississippi River there were Confederate forces scattered from Missouri to Texas, all included in Kirby Smith's territorial command, known as the Trans-Mississippi Department. The line of the Mississippi was, however, held so fast by the Union forces that the Confederates in the West were effectually cut off from all coöperation with those east of the river.

On learning of Hood's change of position to Palmetto, and his preparations there for a movement against the Union communications, General Sherman sent Thomas and Schofield back to the headquarters of their departments at Nashville and Knoxville, respectively, while he himself remained in Atlanta to await Hood's initiative.† Sherman had not long to wait, for Hood's army, preceded by Jackson's cavalry division, crossed the Chattahoochee River on the 1st of October. The same day Jackson sent a detachment of cavalry forward to operate against the railway between the Chattahoochee and Marietta, but it was met by the Union cavalry under Kilpatrick and Garrard, which was on the lookout for Hood's army. East of the Chattahoochee the Army of the Tennessee [Howard] and a division of the Twenty-third Corps [Schofield] had been sent out to reconnoiter and to seize the bridges in rear of Hood's army. To these bridges, however, Hood was wholly indifferent, as he expected to base himself upon Alabama, and would have the Blue Mountain-Selma Railway as a line of communications.‡ Selma was one of the principal manufacturing arsenals of the Confederacy.

On the 3rd of October Hood dispatched Stewart's corps against the railway north of Marietta and marched his main army upon Dallas, where he arrived on the 6th October.

**B. & L. Davis. Hood in B. & L.*

†*Sherman in B. & L.*

‡This railway is shown on map No. 289 as the Alabama and Tennessee Railroad.

Stewart captured the small Union posts at Big Shanty* and Ackworth and rejoined the main column with Loring's division before it reached Dallas. French's division [Stewart's corps] had moved on to Allatoona. This place, where there was a large depot of Federal supplies, had been occupied by only a small garrison; but General Corse had been ordered to reinforce the garrison with his division from Rome in case the enemy came up from the south. Corse reached Allatoona with a few regiments on the 4th. French assaulted him vigorously on the forenoon of the 5th. Corse made a very gallant defense and repulsed French several times. Learning that heavy Union reinforcements were coming up from the south, French gave up the effort to capture the place, and marched away to rejoin the main Confederate army.

The Union reinforcements that French heard of were the leading troops of General Sherman's main army. On learning that Hood's army was north of the Chattahoochee and a part of it upon his railway, Sherman started the Fourth Corps [Stanley] northward on the 2nd of October, and followed it the next day with the rest of his army, except the Twentieth Corps, which was left to hold Atlanta. From Kenesaw Mountain Sherman witnessed Corse's gallant defense of Allatoona, while signaling him that reinforcements were hurrying to him.†

From Dallas Hood continued his march northward, crossed the Coosa River ten miles below Rome on the 11th, and, advancing on Resaca, destroyed the railway between that place and Tunnel Hill, and captured Dalton on the 13th. French, whose division was in the rear, had covered the column so thoroughly that for five days, from the 5th to the 10th, it was not known at Sherman's headquarters whether Hood's army was marching northward or westward. In the vicinity of Rome Wheeler had rejoined the army with a part of his cavalry on its way back from Tennessee. The Union garrison at Resaca had been reinforced before Hood arrived in front of it, and he refrained from assaulting it. General Hood says: "As the road between Resaca and Tunnel Hill had been effectually destroyed, the army was put in motion the next morning (the

*Big Shanty was a station on the railway between Ackworth and Kenesaw Mountain.

†*History of the Army of the Cumberland*.—Van Horne.

14th) in the direction of Gadsden, and camped that night near Villanow.”*

It is very likely that the advance of Sherman's army had something to do with hastening Hood's withdrawal by way of Snake Creek Gap to Villanow. Learning, on the 10th, that Hood was marching toward Rome, Sherman concentrated his columns on the 11th at Kingston with the view of supporting Corse at Rome. But, as we already know, Hood did not stop at Rome; and again the Federal cavalry lost touch with his main body. As soon, however, as Sherman found which way Hood had gone, he started after him. He arrived at Resaca on the 14th, and, finding that Hood had retreated, undertook to shut him up in Snake Creek Gap by sending Stanley with his own corps [Fourth] and Davis's [Fourteenth] by way of Tilton to intercept him at the northern end of the gap, while Howard detained him at its southern end. But Wheeler's cavalry alone tarried to skirmish with Howard, and Stanley was not in time to cut off the retreat of the column.

Hood continued his retreat to Cross Roads, nine miles south of Lafayette, where he arrived on the 15th. Here, Hood says, he meant to select a position and give battle, as he had lured Sherman as far north as he had hoped to. He was, moreover, near the Alabama line, and had the Blue Mountain-Selma Railway immediately behind him to fall back upon if defeated. Upon consulting his corps-commanders, however, he was advised that the morale of the troops did not warrant risking battle against the large force which, according to Wheeler's report, was pursuing him. After resting two days, therefore, at Cross Roads, he directed his march upon Gadsden,* where he concentrated his entire force on the 22nd.†

Sherman followed Hood no farther than Gaylesville, where he halted to watch his movements. From this time forward these two commanders marched their armies in opposite directions—Sherman's marched to the Atlantic Ocean and Hood's toward the Ohio River. For several weeks General Sherman's mind had dwelt upon the project of marching his army through the heart of Georgia to the seacoast, and thence, ultimately, northward through the Carolinas to a junction with Grant in Virginia. He had written General Grant several letters upon the subject, but had not, as yet, persuaded him that it was not necessary to destroy Hood's army before undertaking the

*Hood in *B. & L.*

†Colonel Stone in *B. & L.*

march to the sea. But now Sherman was convinced that he could not catch that army, and that, if he allowed it to decoy him out of Georgia into Tennessee, he should do precisely what the Confederate authorities wanted, and what Hood was working for; and he should surrender all he had gained by his campaign against Atlanta. On a sudden, however, Hood's army appeared in front of Decatur, on the Tennessee River seventy-five miles northwest of Gadsden, and General Grant gave his consent. On the 2nd of November he wired Sherman to go ahead with his march to the sea, and within a day or two Sherman had the bulk of his forces assembled at Rome and Kingston.*

HOOD'S PLAN.

While General Hood was resting with his army at Cross Roads he wrought out, in his mind, a plan of campaign which, if it had succeeded as he hoped it would, might have had far-reaching consequences. It was, briefly, as follows: to cross the Tennessee River at or near Gunter's Ferry and destroy the railway bridge at Bridgeport, and the Nashville and Chattanooga Railway; to attack and, if possible, defeat the troops of Thomas and Schofield in Tennessee before they could concentrate; then to capture the Federal base at Nashville; and, having crossed the Cumberland River at some point where the Union gunboats could not interfere with him, to march on into Kentucky and take position with his left near Richmond, and his right toward Hazel Green.† Here he would threaten Cincinnati and, at the same time, recruit his army from Kentucky and Tennessee. He hoped to do all this while Sherman was making up his mind whether to follow him or to march through Georgia to the seashore. If Sherman should march to the coast, as Hood believed he would, Sherman would have to make a long journey by sea and land to go to the defense of Ohio and Kentucky; if, on the other hand, Sherman should follow Hood into Tennessee and Kentucky, Hood hoped to have his own army so much improved in morale by its successes, and so much strengthened in numbers by recruitment, as to be able to offer battle with every chance of victory. If victorious he would then send reinforcements to Lee in Vir-

**Campaigns of the Civil War*,—Jacob D. Cox.

†Richmond is a hundred miles south of Cincinnati and Hazel Green is fifty miles east of Richmond.

ginia, or march through the gaps of the Cumberland Mountains and attack Grant's army in rear. He reckoned that he could take the latter course even though he should be defeated. If Sherman should march to the seacoast, and from there northward to join Grant, Hood calculated that he could make his movement through Tennessee and Kentucky and strike Grant in rear two weeks before Sherman could reach Virginia.*

At Gadsden Beauregard visited Hood, and Hood unfolded the plan to him. Beauregard approved the plan but stipulated that all of Wheeler's cavalry must be left to hang upon Sherman's army and harass it in its march to the sea; to make up for this loss, however, he sent an order to Forrest to join Hood's army as soon as it should cross the Tennessee.

HOOD'S ADVANCE TO THE TENNESSEE.

Hood says the order to advance into Tennessee put his troops in high spirits. With twenty days' rations in their haversacks and wagons they set out for Guntersville, on the 22nd of October, by all the roads leading from Gadsden in that direction; but before the army had marched two days Hood received word that Forrest, who was then at Jackson, Tennessee, would be unable to join him in the neighborhood of Guntersville, on account of the high water in the rivers he would have to ford. Hood, therefore, turned his columns westward, toward Florence. This change of direction eliminated at once the destruction of the railway bridge at Bridgeport from Hood's plan.

On the 26th Hood's army appeared before Decatur, which was held by a single Union regiment. By the close of the day the garrison had received reinforcements. Hood contented himself with making a demonstration against the town, and pushed on to Tuscumbia, forty-five miles farther west, on the south side of the river, opposite Florence. By the last day of October Hood had his headquarters at Tuscumbia with one corps [Lee] at Florence, on the opposite side of the river. Here Hood had expected to find supplies awaiting him, and to be joined promptly by Forrest; but he was to be disappointed. The Memphis and Charleston Railway needed to be repaired from Corinth before the stores could be hauled, and heavy

*Hood in *B. & L.*

rains delayed the work for two weeks. So it was not until the 19th of November that Hood was ready to march northward from Florence. Forrest had joined him there on the 18th,* having been much delayed in his march by mud and high water.

Hood's movement northward from Georgia had "created intense alarm all over the North," and all available troops had been hurried to General Thomas in Tennessee in order to enable him to protect Sherman's communications and depots.† Notwithstanding the efforts to reinforce Thomas, when Hood's army first appeared on the Tennessee there were only about 26,000 infantry and 5,000 cavalry within the whole District of Tennessee, scattered in detachments from Chattanooga nearly to the mouth of the Ohio, guarding railways and depots and the line of the Tennessee River.‡§ Forrest was at the time in the western part of the State attacking Union posts, capturing gunboats and transports, and making general havoc. Sherman said in a telegram to General Grant: "Forrest seems to be scattered from Eastport to Jackson, Paris, and the lower Tennessee."¶ The only Federal troops at hand to dispute Hood's passage of the Tennessee River were Croxton's brigade of cavalry, which was watching the river at that point. This brigade could make little hindrance, and fell back behind Shoal Creek, where it was joined by Hatch with his division of cavalry. The combined cavalry force did not exceed 3,500 horsemen; it could offer little active resistance to the advance of Hood's army, but was able to keep the Union commanders in rear informed of its movement and to obstruct the roads and fords by felling trees in them.**

As soon as Sherman, who was still at Gaylesville, had received word that Hood's army was approaching Decatur, he dispatched the Fourth Corps [Stanley] to Thomas. One division reached Pulaski, on the railway forty miles north of Decatur, on the 1st of November, and was joined there four days later by the other two.†† "Learning from Thomas that the new

**Life of Forrest*,—Wyeth. In his account of this campaign in *Battles and Leaders* General Hood says Forrest reported on the 14th of November. But Hood has either made a mistake in the date or he meant that Forrest reported by wire or letter.

†Van Horne.

‡Cox.

§The divisions of Morgan and Newton had returned to Georgia.

¶Wyeth.

**Cox. General Wilson in *B. & L.*

††Colonel Stone in *B. & L.*

troops promised by Grant were coming forward very slowly," Sherman also ordered the Twenty-third Corps [Schofield] to go to Tennessee and reinforce Thomas. A. J. Smith, who was in the western part of Missouri with three divisions of the Sixteenth Corps operating against Sterling Price, was also ordered to Tennessee, but he did not arrive in time to take part in any operations before the battle of Nashville.* General James H. Wilson had been sent to Thomas to command his cavalry; Wilson reached Nashville on the 6th of November and at once set about organizing a cavalry corps and procuring mounts for it.

In the meanwhile Forrest was keeping up great activity along the Tennessee River, in the western part of the State, on his way up the river to report to Hood. On the 4th of November he bombarded the Union post at Johnsonville, an important depot eighty miles west of Nashville, throwing the garrison into a panic and starting it in flight toward Nashville. "Three gunboats, eight transports, and some barges were moored to the river-bank, and great quantities of stores in warehouses at the landing. All these were abandoned and burned by the crews and garrison."† Schofield reached Nashville that day with his leading brigade and was hurried on to Johnsonville by Thomas. He found, upon his arrival at the town, that Forrest had not stayed long enough to cross the river. Schofield returned to Nashville and, on the 11th, was sent to Pulaski to take command of the forces assembling there.‡ By the 15th he had at Pulaski about 18,000 infantry and artillery, consisting of the Fourth Corps and Cox's division of the Twenty-third, except one brigade which was at Columbia. The cavalry, under Hatch, now increased by Capron's brigade to about 4,300 troopers, was covering the front and right toward Florence and Waynesboro.§

HOOD ADVANCES AGAINST NASHVILLE.

On the 19th of November Hood began his movement toward Nashville by starting Forrest's cavalry forward; his

*A small part of this corps arrived in time to be at the battle of Franklin.

†Cox.

‡General Stanley, who was at Pulaski, ranked Schofield, but the latter took command over him by virtue of being a department commander. Stone in *B. & L.*

§Cox, Stone, and Wilson in *B. & L.*

whole army was in motion at daybreak on the 21st. Stewart's corps marched by the Lawrenceburg road, Cheatham's by the Waynesboro road, and Lee's by an intermediate road. Hood hoped to turn the position of Schofield's force at Pulaski and cut off its retreat, before it could reach Duck River at Columbia.* Thomas had hoped that he should have time to concentrate his forces to stop Hood south of Duck River, but he failed to do so. Smith had not come from Missouri, new regiments had not joined as fast as old ones had been discharged, men had been furloughed to go home to vote, and Wilson had not gotten horses for his dismounted cavalry. Thomas could, therefore, do nothing but order Schofield to fall back to Columbia.†

COLUMBIA.

Hatch's cavalry made such resistance as it could to Forrest's superior numbers, but it was driven back; and on the 22nd Hood's right-hand column was at Lawrenceburg, sixteen miles west of Pulaski. Schofield now had no time to lose. The two divisions of Cox [Twenty-third Corps] and Wagner [Fourth Corps]‡ were at once started back toward Columbia. Stanley was to escort the trains the next day with the other two divisions of the Fourth Corps. Cox arrived, on the morning of the 24th, within nine miles of Columbia, when he heard the sound of firing to the west. He marched to the sound and reached the ground just in time to check Forrest's cavalry, which was driving Capron's cavalry brigade on the Mount Pleasant Pike. Within an hour, but for Cox's timely arrival, Forrest would have had possession of the bridge at Columbia, and Schofield's line of retreat would have been blocked. The head of Stanley's column reached Columbia and connected with Cox's line in front of the town at 9 a.m., having marched from Pulaski, thirty miles, since 2 p.m. the day before. Stanley had halted and bivouacked at Lynneville; but he had his command awakened at 1 a.m. on the 24th and resumed the march.§ Hatch with his own division and Croxton's brigade of cavalry had covered the retreat from Pulaski. As fast as the troops arrived at Columbia they were put to

*Hood in *B. & L.*

†Van Horne. Stone in *B. & L.*

‡Formerly Newton's division.

§Stone in *B. & L.*

throwing up earthworks, covering the approaches to the town from the south; the trains were sent across the river.

There had been rain and sleet and snow, and the roads were in such a frightful state that Hood's army, with all effort, could make no more than ten miles a day. The last of it did not, therefore, arrive in front of Columbia until the 26th. In the meanwhile Ruger had come with one brigade of his division of the Twenty-third Corps from Johnsonville, and another of his brigades had been sent to guard the crossing of Duck River at Williamsport. Wilson had come forward from Nashville and taken command of the Union cavalry at the front, and it was here strengthened to about 7,000 horses by the arrival of several regiments from the remount camp at Louisville. Wilson placed it along the north bank of the river to watch the enemy's movements either to the right or to the left.*

Pursuant to orders previously received from Thomas, General Granger, on the day that Schofield fell back from Pulaski, withdrew the troops from Decatur, Athens, and Huntsville, to reinforce the garrison at Stevenson and Murfreesboro on the Nashville and Chattanooga Railway.

SPRING HILL.

(290) Being anxious to preserve the railway bridge at Columbia for future use, Thomas, hoping for the arrival of A. J. Smith's division, urged Schofield to hold on to his position there. Hood gave no signs of an intention to attack, but Schofield soon became convinced that he was going to cross the river above the town to turn the position. Schofield, therefore, could not hazard staying longer on the south bank, and withdrew his army to the north bank on the night of the 27th. On the evening of the 28th Forrest forded the river with his cavalry between Columbia and Huey's Hill, at a point about eight miles above the town, and pushed out to the front and right. Wilson had collected his scattered squadrons as quickly as practicable to oppose Forrest, and by 7 p.m. had them all assemble at Hurt's Corner. By nightfall he had learned that Forrest was followed by Hood's infantry, which had a pontoon-bridge across the river at Huey's Mill. A message dispatched to Schofield with this information did not reach him until daylight of the 29th.

*Wilson in *B. & L.*

Hood's pontoon-bridge was, of a truth, at Davis's Ford about three miles above Columbia, and his infantry did not begin to cross until daybreak on the 29th.* Cheatham's corps was in the lead, followed by Stewart's. Lee's corps and the whole of the artillery were left at Columbia "with orders to make strong demonstrations in the morning, and to force the crossing of the river later in the day."†

At eight o'clock in the morning [November 29] Stanley started for Spring Hill, eleven miles back, with two of his divisions, and the trains and reserve artillery. The rest of the Union forces remained temporarily to hold the river crossings. Stanley's leading brigade reached Spring Hill just in time to meet and repel Forrest, who was hurrying by the Mount Carmel road to seize that important point and block the retreat of the Union army. Forrest had advanced against Wilson early in the morning, and by the middle of the forenoon had wholly cut him off from Schofield's main body and driven him beyond Mount Carmel on the Franklin turnpike. Forrest then left a covering detachment at Mount Carmel and hastened with the rest of his command to Spring Hill.

(291) At Rutherford's Creek, seven miles from Spring Hill, Stanley had left Kimball's division to guard the crossing for the troops in rear; he deployed his leading division [Wagner] to hold the village, where the trains were parking. At this point several important roads joined the main highway to Franklin and Nashville. Stanley placed two brigades in a semicircle about the village, from the railway at the north to the pike at the south, and a third [Bradley] upon a knoll nearly a mile farther southeast, covering the approaches from that side. Scarcely had his dispositions been made when Forrest's cavalry appeared north of the village, and Cleburne's division [Cheatham's corps] assaulted Bradley's brigade. In advancing to the attack Cleburne's division turned its right flank to Bradley's brigade and was repulsed. It then changed front and finally drove Bradley back upon the main line. Brown and Bate had, in the meanwhile, come up with their divisions of Cheatham's corps; but before they had gotten well into action, night was falling and Hood suspended the assault till morning. Stewart had been ordered to form his corps in line of battle facing west, on the south side of Rutherford's Creek, and was left there until after dark. Why Stewart

*Hood in *B. & L.*

†Cox.

was ordered to form line of battle south of the creek, and not employed to support Cheatham as soon as possible, has not been satisfactorily explained. General Hood does not admit that he gave such an order. After dark Stewart was ordered to place his corps on Cheatham's right *across* the turnpike; but he bivouacked east of the pike.*

Lee's corps, except Johnson's division which had marched with Stewart, had kept up a demonstration all day at Columbia, but had not been able to force a crossing. Schofield had hastened with Ruger's division to Stanley's assistance, arriving at Spring Hill at seven o'clock. Cox's division had held the crossing at Columbia, and Wood's had formed on the turnpike facing to the east between Kimball and Cox. Soon after dark the line of outposts near the river was strengthened, and Cox's division started for Spring Hill, followed in turn by Wood's and Kimball's as they were passed on the road. The outposts were withdrawn at midnight. From Spring Hill General Schofield hurried the divisions along toward Franklin twelve miles farther. Wagner's division remained in position until all the other troops and the trains were safe on the way. Opdycke's brigade of this division, which was to be the rear-guard, did not quit Spring Hill until 6 a.m. on the 30th.

All night the Federal troops were marching on the road within gunshot of the Confederate bivouacs, and within the light of their fires, yet were not molested. About midnight Hood learned that "stragglers" were passing on the road, and he sent Cheatham an order to have them fired upon. Cheatham then ordered Johnson, whose division had been placed under his command and was on his extreme left nearest the pike, to investigate the matter, "and cut off anything that might be passing." About 2 a.m. Johnson reported to Cheatham that he had ridden "close up to the turnpike, where" he "found everything quiet and no one passing."† Thus passed the last and greatest opportunity of Hood's military career.

FRANKLIN.

(289) Finding, at dawn on the 30th, that Schofield's army had slipped by him, Hood set his own upon the road as quickly as possible. His only hope now was to overtake his enemy at

*General Cheatham in *B. & L.*

†Cheatham and Hood in *B. & L.*

Franklin and capture or destroy him before he could cross the Harpeth River. Lee's corps, which had crossed Duck River after the withdrawal of the Federals in the night, reached Spring Hill at 9 a.m., and, after a short rest, followed the main army.

Schofield had not expected such good fortune as to get safely by Hood at Spring Hill. He had hurried a staff-officer forward to Franklin with an order to A. J. Smith, whose corps he hoped against hope might have arrived there, to hasten on toward Spring Hill. The officer was also to wire General Thomas: "The general says he will not be able to get farther than Thompson's Station to-night. . . . He regards his situation as extremely perilous. . . ." Thompson's Station was only three miles north of Spring Hill; there, at least, Schofield expected to find his path blocked. But it was not so; the way was clear, and the Union army marched on unchecked to Franklin.*

(292) The pontoon-train had been destroyed at Columbia to prevent it from falling into the hands of the Confederates; the old wagon bridge at Franklin was in pieces, and the river, with high water and steep banks, could barely be made fordable. Schofield, who had come on with his first troops, had work begun at once to plank the railway bridge and repair the wagon bridge. By noon they were both done. In the meantime the south side of the river must be held until the trains could be got across.

The little town sat on the southern bank of the Harpeth River in a bend not quite a mile across at its widest part. Columbia Pike and Carter's Creek Pike, the roads by which Hood's army was to be expected, left the town by the same street, but forked at its southern outlet, Columbia Pike running for some distance almost due south, and Carter's Creek Pike southwest. About a mile from the bridges Columbia Pike passed over a low hill, upon which the Carter house stood, five hundred yards west of the point where the river began to curve round the town. Close to this point, between the river-bank and another low hill, the Nashville and Decatur Railway ran, parallel to the turnpike. On the north bank of the stream an earthwork, Fort Granger, stood upon a hill, just a mile from the Carter house hill; it commanded the bridges and the town, and had a fine sweep of the open ground south

*Stone in *B. & L. Van Horne*.

and west of the town. Seven hundred yards northwest of the Carter house hill Carter's Creek Pike crossed another low hill.

Cox's division, which was in the lead of the Federal column, reached the outskirts of Franklin about the hour that the rear-guard was quitting Spring Hill. Spent with marching and fighting night and day for a week, the men, nevertheless, did not lie down to rest until they had thrown up a line of earthworks in their front. As the other troops came up they prolonged the line to right and left, taking in the three knolls already mentioned. By noon the line was finished; with its flanks resting upon the river, it completely covered the town where the wagons were now crowding the streets, awaiting their turns to cross. Near the Carter house was a considerable thicket of young locust trees, some of which were felled to form a sort of abatis; and between the pike and the railway the works were partly sheltered by a stout hedge of osage orange. With these exceptions the ground in front of the line was free from fences or other obstacles and every part of it was in plain sight.* The entire line of intrenchments was about a mile and a half long.

Cox's division [Twenty-third Corps] occupied the line from Columbia Pike to the river southeast of the town; Ruger's division [Twenty-third Corps] was between the two pikes; and Kimball's division [Fourth Corps] between Carter's Creek Pike and the river northwest of the town. Wood's division [Fourth Corps] was sent to the north bank to guard the trains as they passed over, as well as to be on the lookout for any turning movement the enemy might make. Two brigades of Wagner's division [Fourth Corps] were halted across Columbia Pike on a slope a half-mile in front of the main line. Opdycke's brigade of this division, however, which was the last to come up, massed behind the Carter house. The artillery of the Fourth Corps took position on the south side of the stream, and that of the Twenty-third Corps was sent over to the north side.

Between two and three o'clock the head of Hood's column arrived in front of Wagner's line. Stewart's corps deployed to the east of Columbia Pike; Cheatham's corps deployed on the left with Cleburne's division east of the turnpike, Brown's next, west of the pike, and Bate's on the extreme left. Of Lee's corps only Johnson's division had come up, and it was

*Stone in *B. & L.*

held in reserve. Wagner had been directed to hold his advanced position "in observation only till Hood should show a disposition to advance in force, and then to retire within the lines to Opdycke's position to act as a general reserve."* But Wagner's brigades clung to their faulty position until Cleburne's and Brown's divisions in overwhelming numbers charged upon them, enveloped their flanks, and drove them back in headlong flight. The men in the main Union line dared not fire at the pursuing enemy lest they should shoot down their friends, "and the guns, loaded with grape and canister, stood silent in the embrasures." The crowd of fugitives swept over the parapets, carrying part of the main line with them "down the pike past the Carter house toward the town." These soldiers abandoned their guns, leaving a gap in the line of more than a regiment's front on each side of the pike. With exultant cheers the pursuers seized the deserted guns and earthworks.

(293) Thus Hood broke the center of the Union line and was master of its key-point. It looked as if he would surely complete his work by rolling one or the other wing of Schofield's line into the river, and seal the fate of the army by seizing the ford and bridges. But no such fortune awaited him. At this conjuncture Opdycke hurried his brigade from its position in reserve, and hurled it upon the victorious Confederates. He was joined by two regiments of Cox's division which had been in an intrenchment in rear of the main line. In the fierce hand-to-hand struggle that ensued the victorious Confederates were driven out of the works they had taken, leaving 1,000 prisoners in the hands of the Federals. Just before dark, which fell early on this winter's day, Johnson's division went to Cheatham's support and made a desperate charge, but was unable to renew the breach in the Union line. Darkness prevented Hood from putting Lee's other two divisions into the battle. The contest, however, kept up with more or less violence until nine o'clock.

The left of Cheatham's line, Bate's division, had advanced at the same time as Brown and Cleburne. It reached beyond Carter's Creek Pike, but the Union line bent back so far in that quarter that Bate's assault fell considerably later than Brown's and Cleburne's. Finding the works before him stoutly defended, Bate did not push his assault. At the oppo-

*Cox.

site flank Stewart's corps had kept abreast of Cheatham's, and had assaulted Cox's division desperately, but had never succeeded in crossing the parapets, though many men reached the ditches and the osage orange hedge, there to die or surrender.

The battle of Franklin was one of the most fiercely fought of the Civil War, and more general officers are said to have been killed or wounded in it than in any other. General Cleburne was among the slain. The losses, according to Van Horne, were 750 killed, 3,800 seriously wounded, and 702 missing on the Confederate side; 189 killed, 1,033 wounded, and 1,104 missing on the Union side. Hood states that ten days after the battle his effective strength in all arms was only 23,053, and that he had lost 7,547 men since leaving Florence.*

While the infantry combat was going on Forrest, with three of his brigades, had crossed the Harpeth River on Hood's right and become engaged with Wilson's cavalry. As Wilson outnumbered him, he was forced at nightfall to withdraw to the south bank. Chalmer's brigade on the other flank attacked a part of the Union line, but exerted no influence upon the result of the battle.

NASHVILLE.

(289) The whole front being quiet by midnight, Schofield began withdrawing his troops from the field to resume his retreat toward Nashville. His dead and many of his wounded had to be left upon the field. Wood's division, on the north bank of the river, held the bridges until the rest of the infantry and artillery had passed over and gotten on the way, when it took up the march. Wilson's cavalry did not start until daylight; it covered the rear and flanks of the retreating column.

(294) The little army reached Nashville on the morning of the 1st of December, and took its place in the works with the other forces Thomas had assembled there. Wilson's cavalry took station at Edgefield on the opposite bank of the Cumberland River.

Hood followed Schofield on the 1st of December, and, arriving at Nashville on the 2nd, put his army into position in front of the Union works and intrenched it. Lee's corps occupied the center astride the Franklin Pike, Stewart's the left, and Cheatham's the right. The bulk of Forrest's cavalry

*Hood in *B. & L.*

took its place between Stewart's left flank and the river below Nashville.

A. J. Smith with his three divisions [Sixteenth Corps], some 12,000 men, had at last reached Nashville. About 9,000 arrived on November 30, and the rest the next day. By the 2nd of December Steedman had brought a provisional division of 5,200 men from Chattanooga made up largely of "casuals" from Sherman's army. Before the battle of Nashville took place there were enough other "casuals" and new regiments at Nashville to form a second provisional division of more than 5,000 men, which was put under General Cruft; and the employees of the supply departments had also been armed and organized into a division. Most of the Federal detachments from North Alabama, some 8,000 men, had been concentrated at Murfreesboro to guard the Nashville and Chattanooga Railway. They remained there until after the battle of Nashville.

Thomas put his forces into the works upon a line of hills around Nashville—Smith's division on the right, then the Fourth Corps,* then the Twenty-third [Schofield]. Steedman's division prolonged the line from Schofield's left to the Cumberland River.

(289) On the 2nd of December Hood sent Bate's division, reinforced by two infantry brigades, to coöperate with Forrest against the Nashville and Chattanooga Railway and Rousseau's command at Murfreesboro. Forrest and Bate had some success,—they captured a railway train and destroyed several bridges and block-houses,—and advanced upon Murfreesboro. Here Bate was attacked and defeated by a part of Rousseau's command. He was then recalled to Nashville, but Forrest's cavalry, except Chalmers's division, was still absent from Hood's main army when the battle of Nashville took place.

(294) Having gotten his forces assembled within the fortifications at Nashville, General Thomas purposed giving Wilson time to procure horses for the rest of his dismounted cavalry, several thousand, before taking the offensive against Hood. He also needed time to prepare his trains and pontoons in order to pursue after attacking and defeating the enemy. But Mr. Stanton became impatient at once, and telegraphed General Grant on the 2nd of December "to consider the matter," saying that Thomas's purpose looked like "the

*This corps was now commanded by Wood, Stanley having been shot through the neck while charging with Opdycke's brigade in its timely counter-stroke at Franklin.

McClellan and Rosecrans strategy of do nothing.”* Grant, thereupon, began sending telegrams to Thomas urging him to attack. On the 6th Thomas received a telegram from the Commanding General directing him to “attack Hood at once.” Wilson had scoured the country for horses, sparing not even those of Andrew Johnson, the Vice-President-elect of the United States, but he was not quite ready. So necessary did Thomas consider it to have a strong mounted force that he gave Wilson two more days in spite of General Grant’s order. By the 8th Wilson had a force of 12,000 mounted men—it would require a stretch of the term to say that he had a force of 12,000 cavalry. Thomas was now ready to attack. But on the 8th the weather suddenly changed. There was a storm of sleet and snow that covered the ground, and a temperature that turned the surface into a sheet of ice, and made walking upon the hillsides and slopes almost impossible for two or three days. Thomas called his corps-commanders together and asked their opinion upon the advisability of trying to attack. They were unanimous in the view that it was not practicable to attack until the ice should melt. On the 14th a warm rain cleared the ice away, and an order was issued for an attack on the 15th.

In the meanwhile, seeing that his order of the 6th had not been carried out, General Grant had an order written on the 9th relieving Thomas and appointing Schofield in his place. The order was, however, never sent. But on the 13th General Logan, who was still absent from his own corps [Fifteenth], was ordered to Nashville to supersede Thomas; and on the 15th Grant himself reached Washington on his way to Nashville. By this time, however, events were occurring that quickly showed General Grant that neither he nor Logan was needed at Nashville, and halted them in their journeys.

According to Thomas’s plan of attack as finally modified, Smith and Wood, supported by Wilson’s cavalry upon their right flank, were to make the main attack against Hood’s left. Steedman was to make the secondary attack against Hood’s right. Schofield’s corps was to be the general reserve. Cruft’s provisional division was to occupy the works that Steedman should vacate, and General Donaldson’s armed employees were to hold the rest of the interior line of works.†

(295) On the morning of the 15th there was a dense fog

*Van Horne.

†Cox.

until nine o'clock that covered the troops in the early movements toward their positions for assault; but the mud resulting from the rain and thaw made the movements very slow. Wood's corps marched by the right flank until its left rested upon the southernmost angle of the Union works. This point was to be the pivot upon which Wood and Smith were to wheel to the left. Smith formed on the right of Wood, and Schofield in the rear. Wilson moved out to clear the Charlotte and Hardin Pikes of the enemy and to sweep the ground beyond Smith's right.

From the high point upon which the southernmost salient of the Union works rested a clear view could be had of the country round about. A mile to the east was the valley of Brown's Creek, and two miles to the southwest, that of Richland Creek. These two streams rose within a mile of each other in the high Brentwood Hills, four or five miles south of Nashville, and flowed in divergent courses to the Cumberland. The Granny White Turnpike ran southward upon the high ridge between them. Eight other pikes south of the Cumberland River radiated from Nashville. The ground was broken and hilly, with knolls and ridges rising two or three hundred feet above the river; but it was "mostly open, with groves of timber here and there."*

Hood's main line was more than five miles long. It stretched along the series of hills east of the valley of Brown's Creek, from the Chattanooga Railway to the Franklin Pike; thence it crossed the valley of Brown's Creek and passed over the ridge of Granny White Pike to a high knoll near the Hillsboro Pike; here it made a sharp turn, and, reaching the pike, ran along a stone wall at its side. Farther to the southwest, and even across Richland Creek, Hood had erected some detached works upon the hills. On his left, half-way between his main line and the Union line, he had an advanced line of skirmishers with its left strongly posted on Montgomery Hill, at the Hillsboro Pike.*

(296) Steedman moved forward on the Murfreesboro Pike, and, by eight o'clock, had opened his attack on the Confederate right with enough vigor to occupy the attention of Cheatham's corps on that flank. Smith's corps and Wilson's cavalry pushed steadily forward with their wide wheel from the Union right, capturing Hood's detached works one after

*Cox.

another, until by noon they were within striking distance of the Confederate works on the Hillsboro Pike. With a view of gaining the Confederate rear, if possible, Wilson was then ordered to move farther to his right, and Schofield moved the Twenty-third Corps to take Wilson's place on Smith's right.

(297) Smith advanced against the Confederate left behind the stone wall on the Hillsboro Pike, and drove it away. Sam Beaty's division of the Fourth Corps had already taken the strong Confederate outpost position on Montgomery Hill, and General Thomas now ordered Wood to assault the salient on the hill in front of his line. Wood made the assault and carried the salient, and now the whole of the Confederate left wing was shattered and falling back. Schofield's corps, which had come forward on Smith's right, and the cavalry were pushing the enemy's extreme left. The broken line did not stop until it passed the Granny White Pike; the extreme left was driven back to two hills near this pike fully two miles south of the Confederate works. Darkness stopped the pursuit.

(298) After dark Hood formed a new line and intrenched it. Early in the day he had started one division of Cheatham's corps from his right to reinforce his left. As soon as it was dusk the rest of this corps moved to the left of the new line; Stewart's corps was withdrawn to the center of this line; and Lee's, which had scarcely fired a shot during the day, took its place on the right. The new line was a little more than two miles long; its right rested on Overton Hill, just east of the Franklin Pike, and its left on the two hills just mentioned; its middle part was on lower ground and was broken by several branches of Brown's Creek. The line covered the two roads by which Hood's army might retreat. Chalmer's cavalry division, which had been too weak to offer much hindrance to Wilson's squadrons during the day, took post on the extreme left of the new line.

On the morning of the 16th the whole Federal line moved up close to the Confederate position. Steedman was still on the extreme left; Wood was next in the line; then Smith; then Schofield; and Wilson's cavalry was on the extreme right. Johnson's division of the cavalry was several miles away to the southwest, moving across country to strike Hood's line of retreat. About noon the Federal skirmishers advanced close to the Confederate works, "and various points were recon-

noitered to determine the feasibility of an assault.”* Wood’s corps, supported by Steedman’s division, made the first real assault; it assailed the Confederate right, and was repulsed with severe loss. Meantime Wilson’s cavalry had worked its way round to a position in rear of the Confederate left. About four o’clock Schofield and Smith assaulted this part of the line in front and flank, while Wilson’s dismounted troopers charged it from behind. The result was decisive. “The whole Confederate left was crushed in like an egg-shell,” and the rout quickly spread to the rest of the line. In General Hood’s own words, he “beheld for the first and only time a Confederate army abandon the field in confusion.”† The actual losses in killed and wounded had been very light on each side; General Hood admits that he lost fifty-four pieces of artillery; his loss of prisoners was numbered in thousands.

Wilson’s dismounted troopers had made the fatal mistake of leaving their horses too far behind them. This delayed their pursuit until night was upon them; and with night came a drenching rain. Two miles from the battle-field they came upon Chalmers’s cavalry division, which was covering the Confederate retreat. It was strongly posted across the Granny White Pike behind a barricade of fence-rails, and it succeeded in checking the Federal cavalry long enough “to enable the fleeing Confederate infantry to sweep by the danger-point that night, to improvise a rear-guard, and to make good their retreat the next day.”‡ Wood’s corps pursued by way of the Franklin Pike. Smith and Schofield were ordered to follow Wilson the next day. The mass of the fugitives took the Franklin Pike. (289) The next day Wilson’s cavalry caught up with Hood’s rear-guard four miles north of Franklin, and, charging it in front and flank, carried its position, capturing 400 prisoners. At Columbia Forrest rejoined Hood, and his cavalry, with an infantry rear-guard under Walthall, covered the retreat to the Tennessee River. There the pursuit was given up, and by the 10th of January, 1865, the remnant of Hood’s army was at Tupelo, Mississippi. On the 13th Hood telegraphed the Confederate Secretary of War: “I request to be relieved from command of this army.”§

*Cox.†Hood in *B. & L.*‡General Wilson in *B. & L.*§Cox. Hood in *B. & L.*

COMMENTS.

For the military student the Campaign of Franklin and Nashville is one of the most interesting and instructive campaigns of the Civil War. The two chief actors in it, Thomas and Hood, were the exact opposites of each other. One was slow, apparently timid in taking the initiative, but sure in execution; the other was quick and bold to act, but uncertain as to the outcome. One apparently weighed the odds against him too carefully; the other gave no heed to them at all. If the characters and talents of the two men could have been combined in a single general, it would be hard to pick his better.

Little fault can be found with Hood's operations from the time when he quitted Lovejoy on the 20th of September until he arrived with his army at Gadsden a month later. They were bold in conception, brilliant in execution, and resulted in drawing Sherman with his army all the way back to Resaca, seventy miles, and from there to Gaylesville, forty-odd miles farther and away from his railway; and they placed Hood's army in such a position that, if forced to continue the retreat, it could have fallen back along the Blue Mountain-Selma Railway (shown on the map as the Alabama and Tenn. R. R.). It was, however, practically impossible for Sherman to follow Hood much farther; it would have taken Sherman too far from his own base and railway. General Sherman, therefore, halted his army at Gaylesville. There he occupied a very controlling strategic position, a "position," as he wrote General Halleck, "very good to watch the enemy."* So long as he remained there Hood could not move back toward Atlanta into Georgia; he could not move against the railway between Atlanta and Chattanooga; and he could not threaten the railway bridge at Bridgeport or cross the Tennessee River anywhere east of Guntersville to strike at the Memphis and Charleston or the Nashville and Chattanooga Railway; for Sherman was nearer all of those objectives than Hood was. The only aggressive movement that Hood could make, without exposing his army to attack in rear or flank by Sherman from his central strategic position at Gaylesville, was to cross the Tennessee at a point far enough west to be beyond Sherman's reach. That is precisely what Hood did.

*Colonel Stone in *B. & L.*

THE CAMPAIGN IN TENNESSEE.

When their armies reached Gadsden and Gaylesville, respectively, the campaign between Hood and Sherman came to a close. From those points a new series of operations with new purposes and new objectives was to begin on each side. Hood says he had already wrought out the plan of his operations; Sherman, we know, had made up his mind what his should be, if General Grant could be persuaded to give his consent. Hood's movement to Decatur decided Grant to allow Sherman to carry out his plan; if Grant had consented before Hood moved from Gadsden, and Sherman had started back to Atlanta to begin his march to the sea, it is more than probable that Hood would have been required by the Confederate President to follow him. One of Hood's arguments in favor of his invasion of Tennessee was that Sherman would quit Georgia to follow him; one of Sherman's arguments in favor of his march to the sea was that Hood would turn back from the Tennessee to follow him. Neither general prophesied aright. President Davis objected to Hood's movement into Tennessee, but yielded to Hood and Beauregard;* President Lincoln "was anxious, if not fearful," concerning Sherman's march to the sea, but refrained from interfering.† That the strategy of Sherman's plan was good, was proved by its success; that the strategy of Hood's was bad, was not proved by its failure. The best of plans may fail by reason of a bad execution. Even though Hood had not achieved all he hoped for, if he had succeeded in capturing Nashville and threatening Louisville and Cincinnati, the consequences would have been very serious; such alarm might thus have been caused at Washington and throughout the North as to stop Sherman's progress, and even to interfere with Grant's operations at Petersburg.

General Thomas ought to have stopped Hood's army south of Duck River. He says in his report "that, had Hood delayed his advance from Florence ten days longer, he would have met him at Columbia or some other point south of Duck River." But he ought to have done so anyhow; he would not have needed ten days' delay if he had promptly made use of the troops and means at his disposal. His tri-monthly return of November 20, the day that Hood was starting from Florence, showed a force in Tennessee of 59,534 officers and men

*Davis.

†Cox.

"present and equipped"; and he had the railways to use in concentrating them. If we allow the same number of men for the smaller garrisons and railway-guards that were actually left when the concentration was finally made at Nashville, we shall find that Thomas still had an army of 47,000 available for active operations. On the 1st of November Granger was at Decatur with 5,000 men, and Steedman could have joined him with the 5,000 he later took from Chattanooga to Nashville. These combined forces ought to have gone to Schofield at Pulaski. Thomas could have joined Schofield there or at Columbia with all other available troops from Nashville, and would then have had an army superior in numbers to Hood's in everything except cavalry. At that time the only Confederate troops in the theater of operations, besides Hood's army, were Roddey's division of cavalry in North Alabama, which gave no trouble during the campaign, and a small force under Breckinridge making a feeble diversion in East Tennessee. The troops in that part of Schofield's department were able to take care of Breckinridge's command. General Thomas's right policy was promptly to concentrate all his available forces and meet Hood as near the Tennessee River as practicable.*

On the other hand, Hood's long wait at Florence was fatal to his success. He stayed there three weeks, from the last of October until the 21st of November, thus giving time for the Fourth and Twenty-third Corps to go from Georgia to Pulaski to oppose his march; and for Wilson to organize and mount a corps of cavalry, A. J. Smith to bring the Sixteenth Corps from Missouri, and Thomas to concentrate the scattered Union detachments at Nashville and organize a mass of recruits and "casuals,"—all to defeat and destroy him. The only cause that Hood assigns for his delay was the lack of supplies due to a delay in repairing the railway from Corinth to Tuscumbia. There is no doubt, also, that he waited for Forrest to join him from his raid in West Tennessee; and it is very probable, too, that he hoped from day to day to learn that troops were on the way from the Trans-Mississippi Department to reinforce him. This was a vain hope, in view of the close guard held over the Mississippi by the Union forces. Yet, even after his defeat at Franklin, Hood says, "The President was still urgent in his instructions relative to the transference of troops to the Army of Tennessee from

*Cox.

Texas, and I daily hoped to receive the glad tidings of their safe passage across the Mississippi.”*

Columbia is about sixty-five miles from Florence and fifty from Nashville. If Hood had not stopped at Florence, but had pushed on to Columbia, gathering supplies from the country, he could have reached that town by the 4th of November. Stanley had reached Pulaski on the 1st with one of his divisions, and the other arrived four days later. On the 4th Schofield reached Nashville with his leading brigade, and the same day Forrest frightened the Union garrison away from Johnsonville, and might have crossed the river there, if he had chosen to do so, and marched toward Franklin or Columbia. Johnsonville is seventy miles from those towns. Schofield was hurried with his leading troops to Johnsonville, and up to about the 10th of November the only Federal troops between Hood's army and Nashville were Stanley's corps and a few regiments of cavalry. Stanley would have had to fall back, and by the 6th Hood could have been at Franklin, where he might have been joined by Forrest the same day.†‡ Nashville is only thirty miles from Franklin and neither A. J. Smith from Missouri nor Steedman from Chattanooga got there before the end of November, and Wilson's cavalry corps was not organized and mounted before the 8th of December.

Hood would thus have arrived in front of the works at Nashville with an army whose numbers had not been reduced, and whose morale had not been extinguished, by the terrible encounter and defeat at Franklin. To defend his works Thomas would have had, in addition to Stanley's and Schofield's corps, and Hatch's cavalry, ten or twelve thousand unorganized troops, consisting of new regiments, dismounted cavalry, and "casuals," and also his body of armed employees of the supply departments. If, however, Hood was unable to beat Schofield with only the Fourth and Twenty-third Corps at Franklin, behind very hastily constructed earthworks, it is hardly to be supposed that he could have defeated Thomas's superior force

*Hood in *B. & L.*

†This supposes that Hood could have communicated promptly with Forrest, and that Forrest could have crossed the Tennessee, which was probably not the case. Forrest could have crossed at Johnsonville by means of a captured gunboat, but when he tried to cross at another point a few days afterwards, by swimming his horses and ferrying his men upon rafts, he was prevented from doing so by the swift current and drift-wood resulting from the swollen condition of the stream.

‡Wyeth.

if he had attacked it at Nashville; but he would have been in better condition to withstand Thomas's attack, and almost certainly would have brought his army away from the battle of Nashville in better shape.

Hood's stay at Florence, however, came near turning out a strategic advantage for him. By giving Schofield and Stanley time to reach Pulaski with their commands, it gave him a chance to cut them off. If Hood had started before Schofield joined Stanley, the latter, being too weak to make any sort of resistance, would have fallen back very promptly; and even if he could have been cut off and captured, the force involved would have been comparatively small.

From the time when Hood quitted Florence until he reached Spring Hill he made his maneuvers very skilfully. By turning Schofield's position at Pulaski and letting Forrest push ahead with his cavalry, he came very near getting the bridge at Columbia, and cutting off the Federal retreat. The timely arrival of Cox's division was all that saved the bridge. At Columbia Forrest crossed Duck River east of the town, drove back Wilson's cavalry, and cleared the way for Hood's infantry columns to march to Spring Hill. Wilson had as many troopers as Forrest at this time, yet Forrest succeeded, by skilful maneuvers, in forcing him back on the Lewisburg-Franklin road, and in completely cutting him off from Schofield's main column, leaving Schofield, "during the whole of the critical day and night of the 29th (November), without the means of learning Hood's movements, except from his infantry reconnaissances."* It was another example of cavalry's allowing itself to be cut off from the main army by the enemy's column. The moment the cavalry of an army becomes separated from the infantry columns by the enemy it ceases to be of any further use to those columns until it regains touch with them.

SPRING HILL.

As soon as Forrest drove Wilson out of the way he hurried to Spring Hill in order to block the road of the enemy's column. But Stanley reached there with his infantry division just in time to meet Forrest and drive him away.

At Spring Hill Hood had, by skilful maneuvering, com-

*Cox.

pletely turned Schofield's army and placed his own where it ought to have been able to capture or destroy its foe. Then, like Hooker at Chancellorsville, he seemed to let go all hold, and allow his opportunity to slip from his grasp. Stanley was at Spring Hill with a single advanced division, only one brigade of which became engaged. Hood had two full corps [Cheatham and Stewart] with which he might easily have attacked Stanley, but, by his bad management, Stewart's corps was halted more than two miles from the battlefield, and by Cheatham's bad management only one of Cheatham's divisions went into the fight before dark. Yet, in spite of these mistakes, Hood still had the chance to cut off and destroy Schofield's forces. All he needed to do to stop Schofield's march was to place his troops *across* the road near Spring Hill; but that is what he failed to do. His troops bivouacked east of the road, and during the night the Federal army slipped safely by, within 600 yards of the left of their lines.* Stewart had been placed after dark on Cheatham's right, with orders to extend the line across the road; and no satisfactory explanation has been made for his failure to do so.

Primarily Cheatham was to blame for the Confederate failure at Spring Hill, inasmuch as he failed with his whole corps to drive Stanley's single division away from Spring Hill before dark. But Stanley had a large force of artillery and Cheatham had none. Hood, withal, was on the ground—the commanding officer cannot shift responsibility or blame to the shoulders of a subordinate if he himself is present. Hood's greatest mistake was his suspending the attack until morning.† After Stewart's corps and Johnson's division of Lee's came up, about dark, the Confederates so outnumbered Stanley's force that they ought easily to have defeated it even in the dark. During the night, moreover, Confederate sentinels distinctly heard conversation in the passing Federal columns, and one of Forrest's brigades struck those columns on the road three or four miles north of Spring Hill at 11 p.m., and fought them until near daylight.* Yet it appears that Hood was only informed that there were "stragglers" passing in the road; and Johnson, who was sent to stop them, reported that he could not find even "stragglers." On this occasion everybody in Hood's army seems to have been remiss, from the commanding general down to the sentries on post.

*Wyeth.

†Cheatham in *B. & L.*

FRANKLIN.

(292 and 293) The battle of Franklin illustrates more forcibly than any other engagement of the Civil War the mistake of placing troops, in a defensive battle, in an advanced position before the main line; it also illustrates the importance of keeping out a reserve, but more especially the importance of throwing in the reserve at precisely the right place and moment. By holding his two brigades at their advanced position in front of the main line, and apparently trying to stop Hood's whole force, Wagner very nearly caused the destruction of Schofield's army; by throwing his reserve into the breach Opdycke saved the army from destruction.

NASHVILLE.

(289) Having failed to cut off and capture or destroy the Fourth and Twenty-third Corps, and having suffered disaster at Franklin, Hood had scant chance of accomplishing anything by pushing on to Nashville. The fighting spirit of his army was gone, and he says he had only 23,053 effectives left, and knew that he should receive no recruits from Tennessee or Kentucky. He still, however, cherished the vain hope of receiving reinforcements from beyond the Mississippi. He did not expect to attack Thomas, but expected to be attacked by him, and hoped to repulse him, and, in a counter-stroke, to follow upon his heels into Nashville.* It should seem that Hood's better plan now would have been to keep away from Nashville and to maneuver to draw Thomas after him, with a view to finding an opportunity to strike some part of the Federal army at a disadvantage.

(294-298) General Thomas was very slow in making ready to attack Hood, and it is not to be wondered that the Washington authorities, General Grant, and the whole people of the North became anxious and impatient; but when his preparations and the weather were such that he, at length, felt ready to attack, Thomas gained such a splendid and decisive victory as to hush censure for all time. The victory was easily won, as was shown by the small number of killed and wounded on either side; but that fact does noway disparage the excellent conduct of the assault. Of all the attacks made by Union forces in the course of the war none other was as free from

*Hood in *B. & L.*

faults as this one. It was good in plan and in execution. By threatening Hood's right flank on the 15th of December with the "secondary attack," before the main attack reached the left of the Confederate line, Thomas drew Hood's attention to the right of that line, and kept him from sending support to its left until it was too late. Hood's left was unquestionably the proper wing for Thomas's main attack to fall upon. Its flank was in the air, and it had no natural strength in front; whereas the right wing had the valley of Brown's Creek in front of it. On the left of the Confederate line Thomas had unlimited space in which to maneuver his infantry and cavalry, and fine positions for his artillery; while on the opposite flank his movements would have been cramped by the Cumberland River, his columns would have found no cover against the enemy's view and the fire of his artillery, and there were no good positions for the Union artillery. And lastly, by attacking the left of the Confederates Thomas had a better chance of seizing their line of retreat and cutting them off. The attack was carried out as planned, almost without a hitch.

The cavalry did more actual fighting on the Union side than was done by cavalry upon any other battle-field of the war; but it fought dismounted. It was Wilson's dismounted squadrons behind the left of the Confederate line that started the rout. And yet it is more than likely that the fruits of the victory would have been greater if Wilson had kept his troopers near their horses, ready to pursue and cut off the beaten army at the moment when its flight began; for there can be little doubt that Hood's army would soon have broken, even though Wilson's cavalry had not come up behind it.

Among the mistakes on the side of the Confederates the first to be noted is the length of their line of works. It was nearly six miles long, and Hood cannot have had more than 30,000 men to hold it—fewer than three men to the yard. The general trace of the works was concave, which made it necessary to move troops by the circumference, instead of by a chord, in transferring them from one part to another. The right wing of the works, instead of being parallel to Brown's Creek, ought to have bent southward on the east side of the Franklin Pike, in the direction of Overton Hill; and the isolated works on the left added no strength whatever to the position. They were easily taken one after another, and their guns were then turned upon the main works. But Hood's case was hopeless, no matter what form or length of line he might have adopted; Thomas had men enough to contain him in front

and turn his flank, and Hood's troops seemed to have no fight left in them. While Hood's left was being driven back and his right was being threatened on the first day, his center, Lee's corps, was scarcely firing a shot. Why Hood did not draw troops from that part to reinforce his left has not been explained. Hood had no general reserve, doubtless on account of a lack of troops. He had sent Forrest away to raid the Nashville and Chattanooga Railway, a mistake that, General Cox says, "made the opportunity which resulted so gloriously for our arms." If Forrest had been on the ground with his cavalry he would certainly have made the wide wheel of Wilson's cavalry and Smith's and Schofield's corps more difficult for them on the first day; and he would have kept Wilson away from the rear of the Confederate line on the second day. And if he had been present at the beginning of the retreat he would greatly have lessened its difficulties for the infantry columns.

Considering the disorder and rout in which Hood's beaten troops quitted the battle-field, it might seem that they ought to have been cut off and blocked in front by Wilson's horsemen, 12,000 strong, and captured or destroyed by the pursuing infantry. But the earthen by-roads over which the cavalry had to march were in such deplorable condition, the streams with their bridges destroyed were so high, and forage for animals was so scarce in the country, that Wilson, in spite of great exertion, was unable to check the fugitive column before it was safe across the Tennessee River. There the pursuit ended.

SHERMAN'S MARCH TO THE SEA.

On the 12th of November Sherman, with about 62,000 men, and rations for twenty days in his wagon-train, started on his march to the sea. By the 10th of December he was in front of the works about Savannah. He had encountered virtually no opposition, and his march is notable mainly as an example of an army's cutting loose from its base and communications. Its main purpose was to destroy the resources of the Confederacy, which it did effectually over a wide space. Hardee was in command of the Confederate garrison at Savannah. On the 20th of December he evacuated the place, and withdrew to Charleston, with about 18,000 men.

Fort Fisher was captured by General Terry about the middle of January, 1865, and toward the end of that month Sherman's

army started northward, by way of Columbia, South Carolina, to join General Grant in front of Petersburg. Joseph E. Johnston had been sent to the Carolinas to collect the scattered Confederate forces there, and to oppose Sherman's advance. At Averysboro a part of these forces, under Hardee, were encountered on the 16th of March, and the bulk of them, under Johnston, were engaged from the 19th to the 21st, at Bentonville. The Confederates were defeated in both of these actions, and Sherman concentrated his columns at Golsboro for a further movement to the north. He reached Raleigh on the 13th of April, and Johnston surrendered to him the next day.*

MINOR OPERATIONS.

All the main operations of the land forces in our great conflict have now been discussed. There were, besides, a number of interesting raids conducted by such cavalry leaders as Morgan and Forrest, on the Confederate side, and Stoneman, Grierson, and Wilson, on the Union side, in the last two years of the war, which we have not time to discuss; and there were other minor operations of a mixed character in Missouri, Arkansas, and Louisiana.

Of these operations the most important, perhaps, was the one known as the Red River Campaign. Up to 1864 Texas, except at the mouth of the Rio Grande, had not been brought under the authority of the United States. As early as the summer of 1863 Halleck had urged Banks, who was in command of the Union forces in Louisiana, to make an overland expedition into Texas, telegraphing him "There are important (diplomatic) reasons why our flag should be hoisted at some point in Texas without delay"; he suggested that "the high road to Texas for our troops was via Shreveport and the Red River."† In March, 1864, Banks undertook such an expedition. He moved up the Red River, and, after several minor actions, was defeated by a Confederate force under General "Dick" Taylor, at Sabine Cross Roads, April 8, losing his artillery and trains. His army then fell back to Alexandria, and remained there from April 25 to May 13, guarding its flotilla, which was held fast by low water. The retreat was resumed on the 14th of May, and by the 26th of May the un-

*Lecture by Captain Stuart, C. E.

†Lecture by General C. B. Hall.

successful expedition had reached Donaldsonville.* General Charles B. Hall, in a descriptive and critical account of this enterprise, says: "It was conceived in uncertainty, it was born in hope, it was, for a time, sustained with promises; and its ending was so disastrous, because military precautions were neglected, and rules violated, as to call for Congressional investigation and the censure of its commanding general."

*Captain Stuart.

LECTURE XXVII.

THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR.*

Hardly had a month passed after the surrender at Appomattox when General Sheridan was sent to Texas with orders to concentrate an imposing force there, and with confidential instructions to make demonstrations along the Rio Grande border. The object was to hasten the withdrawal of French troops from Mexico; for, taking advantage of the struggle going on in the United States, Napoleon III. had, in 1863, made use of a flimsy excuse to ignore the Monroe Doctrine, land an army in Mexico, overthrow the Republic, and set up an Empire in its place, with the Archduke Maximilian of Austria as its Emperor. The end of the Civil War left the American Government with upwards of a million veteran soldiers at its disposal, hence in the best possible condition to enforce its demand for the withdrawal of foreign troops from its neighbor's soil. Napoleon III. was, therefore, easily persuaded to recall his forces, and Maximilian, left to his fate, was taken by the patriot troops of Mexico and shot to death.

The hosts of veteran volunteers that had brought the Civil War to a successful close were promptly mustered out to return to their homes, and the few thousands of regulars were scattered in small detachments throughout the South to aid in the work of Reconstruction. In August, 1867, the enlisted strength of the regular army numbered 53,962, the largest number of regular troops borne upon the rolls since 1814; but the cry for retrenchment of public expense had set in, and the army became its chief, if not its only, subject. Within two years the enlisted strength was reduced to 34,000; in 1870 a maximum strength of 30,000 was fixed by law, and this was cut down by an act of Congress, in 1874, to 25,000. This law practically remained in effect until the eve of the war with Spain in 1898.

*In the preparation of this lecture practically everything concerning the operations in Cuba and American waters has been taken from Captain Sargent's excellent work, *The Campaign of Santiago de Cuba*, which, in its full and accurate narrative, and its intelligent and scholarly discussion, leaves nothing further to be said to the military student upon the subject. Besides being the only history, in the full sense yet written of the campaign, this work is also an able treatise upon the strategy of land and naval operations.

The United States, in the meanwhile, had several times been threatened with foreign war,—once with Spain herself over the *Virginus* affair in 1873. At that time, no doubt, it would have been an easy matter to raise a large force composed of veterans of the Civil War; but, as the years went by, this great national reserve was less and less to be counted upon. At length, when war actually befell, in 1898, thirty-three years after the last shot fired in the Civil War, there was, of course, hardly a veteran of this war able to shoulder a rifle.

(299) A second insurrection had broken out in Cuba in the spring of 1895, and had dragged along until the winter of 1897. The insurgents had never counted more than 25,000 armed men in the field at one time, while Spain had sent as many as 217,282 reinforcements to the island; hence the insurrection, in spite of the inactive and badly-managed measures of the Spaniards, never had a chance of succeeding without the intervention of the United States. The hope of such intervention, and the assistance furnished by individual Americans, were undoubtedly all that had kept the rebellion alive. Finally the conditions in Cuba became so dreadful, under the administration of General Weyler, that the United States did intervene, and demand his recall. The Spanish government recalled Weyler in October, 1897, and instituted reforms in the administration of affairs in the island. But the reforms had come too late; nothing now would satisfy the Cubans short of independence, for they knew that they could still count upon the active sympathy and support of the American people in their struggle for liberty.

If there be a single national trait or quality amongst our people stronger than all others, it is an unreasoning sentiment that causes them always to sympathize with the side that physically appears the weaker; and the less they know about the real conditions of difference between the parties to a quarrel, the stronger is their sympathy. True, the preponderance of right has not, generally, been on the side of might; but there has usually been some right and some wrong on each side. Our people never ask to see the right on the stronger side, nor do they look for the wrong on the weaker side. It was this sentiment, wrought upon by the "yellow" part of our press, or taken advantage of by this part of the press, that brought us into war with Spain. The national sentiment was tense with sympathy and the sense of outrage when the destruction of the battle-ship *Maine*, in Havana harbor, on the

night of February 15, 1898, added a climax to the situation.

Time was taken to investigate the circumstances; but the will of the American people could not long be held in check, and in response to it Congress, on the 19th of April, passed a resolution declaring "that the people of the Island of Cuba are, and of right ought to be, free and independent," and authorizing the President to use the land and naval forces to carry the resolution into effect. This was tantamount to a declaration of war, and evoked a formal declaration from Spain on April 24. On the 25th Congress passed an act formally declaring that war existed between Spain and the United States.

PLAN OF CAMPAIGN.

It was known that the Spanish forces in Cuba were widely scattered over the island, but that the bulk of them were in the neighborhood of Havana, the most important city in the island, and the seat of Spanish authority there. It was natural, then, and right, that Havana should be chosen as our first objective. But two things were necessary before we could attempt a campaign upon Cuban soil: first, control of the sea; and, second, an army. With our Indian country still to guard we could not think of withdrawing more than 15,000 of our regular troops from the little garrisons in the West. Volunteers must, therefore, be counted upon, and a bill was promptly passed under which the President issued a call for 125,000. A few days later Congress passed an act authorizing a strength of 62,597 men for the regular army, and, on the 11th of May, further authorized the Secretary of War to organize a volunteer brigade of engineers, and an additional volunteer force of 10,000 men who were to be immune "from diseases incident to tropical climates." On the 25th of May the President issued a call for 75,000 more volunteers. Thus an aggregate of more than 260,000 new troops was authorized by Congress, and they were promptly raised. But these raw troops must be armed and equipped, and ought to be trained, before they could be put into active service. Moreover, the sickly summer-season was near at hand in the tropics.

It was, therefore, decided to concentrate the available regulars at New Orleans, Mobile, and Tampa, the most convenient points from which to embark for Cuba, and to assemble the volunteers in large camps of instruction. One such camp was established at Chickamauga Park, Georgia, and another at

Falls Church, Virginia. The bulk of the forces were to be organized into eight army-corps. Besides these eight corps, about 12,000 volunteers were distributed along the seacoast from Maine to New Jersey; five regiments were stationed at different points in the South; and one regiment of regular infantry, three of cavalry, and nearly all of the artillery were left to guard the Indian frontier and garrison the seacoast forts.

Pending the preparations for the main expedition, a detachment of 5,000 regulars was to be organized at Tampa, and dispatched under General Shafter to the coast of Cuba. Its double purpose would be to make a reconnaissance in force in order to gain information, and to carry supplies of arms and ammunition to the insurgents. Before this expedition was ready to set out, however, events had occurred at sea that changed all the plans of the land forces.

THE HOSTILE NAVIES.

(300) While it is well known now that our navy was superior in strength and quality to that of Spain at the outbreak of the war, our naval authorities then believed the superiority to be so slight that the loss of a single battle-ship might turn the scale. On our side of the Atlantic Admiral Sampson had at Key West "one of the most powerful fleets of warships that had ever floated in American waters." Key West had been selected as a base of naval operations, and Sampson's fleet there was in a good position from which to blockade the northern coast of Cuba or to aid an expedition against Havana; while, at the same time, it guarded our Gulf ports, and was within reach of our Atlantic ports. The Flying Squadron, composed of two battle-ships and three cruisers, under Commodore Schley, was held at Hampton Roads mainly for the purpose of "giving a feeling of security to the people of the coast cities"; and a patrol squadron, hastily organized, was guarding the Atlantic coast northward from Hampton Roads. The battle-ship *Oregon* was on its way from the Pacific coast. After a swift and remarkable voyage of 14,700 miles it joined Admiral Sampson's fleet, off the coast of Florida, near the end of May.

On the other side of the Atlantic Spain had two fleets; the smaller one, commanded by Admiral Cámara, was in Spanish waters, and the larger one, commanded by Admiral Cervera,

was at St. Vincent in the Cape Verde Islands. Spain also had a feeble squadron in Manila Bay, while Commodore Dewey commanded an American fleet of second-class vessels which was then in Chinese waters.

Under later orders from the Navy Department, and in order more effectively to blockade the ports of Cuba, Sampson placed the greater part of his vessels to cover Havana and the ports on the northern shore of Cuba connected with that city by rail, while Commander McCalla with a cruiser, a gunboat, and a converted yacht, blockaded Cienfuegos, on the southern coast. There were at this time three inferior Spanish cruisers and a few gunboats in Cuban waters, but they did not molest the American ships.

On April 29 word was forwarded from Washington to Admiral Sampson that, on that very day, Admiral Cervera's fleet had started westward from the Cape Verde Islands. The fleet consisted of four cruisers and three torpedo-boat destroyers. It was reckoned that the Spanish fleet, if it made for the West Indies, would reach their waters on the 8th of May, and would immediately have to go into port to coal. In order to watch for Cervera's fleet Sampson sailed with all his vessels, except a few small ones, toward the north coasts of Haiti and Porto Rico. By the 12th he was at San Juan, Porto Rico, and that day bombarded the harbor of that place to search for the Spanish fleet. Finding that the fleet was not there he started back to resume the blockade of Havana. On the way he was met by the torpedo boat *Porter* with a dispatch from the Navy Department informing him that Cervera's squadron was at the Island of Curaçao (near the coast of Venezuela) on May 14, and, also, that Schley with the Flying Squadron had started from Hampton Roads for the Gulf of Mexico.

Owing to the foul bottom of the *Vizcaya*, and the necessity for towing his torpedo-boat destroyers, Cervera had made a slow voyage. He touched first at the island of Martinique, where he learned that the American navy was blockading the western coasts of Cuba; that Sampson's fleet was about to attack San Juan, Porto Rico; and that Santiago de Cuba was free from blockade. His coal was nearly out, the governor of Martinique would not let him take on a supply there, and he learned that there was none at San Juan, and probably none at Santiago. He, therefore, decided to make for Curaçao, where he expected to find a supply. He reached Curaçao on the 14th, but the colliers he had expected were not there. The

Dutch governor of the island, bound by neutrality regulations, could let him take on only a small quantity of coal. In despair he sailed for Cuba, and, on the morning of the 19th of May, entered the harbor of Santiago.

On the same day the chief signal officer of the army informed the Navy Department at Washington that Cervera's squadron was in the harbor of Santiago. This information was immediately dispatched to Sampson, who was now at Key West. He forwarded it to Schley who had gone to blockade Cienfuegos. Neither of these officers credited the information. Schley believed that he had the Spanish fleet shut up in the harbor of Cienfuegos, as he expressed it, "almost to a certainty." At length Commander McCalla went ashore and learned positively from insurgents that the hostile fleet was not at Cienfuegos.

On receiving this information Schley set out for Santiago with the *Brooklyn*, *Iowa*, *Massachusetts*, *Texas*, *Marblehead*, *Vixen*, *Eagle*, and the collier *Merrimac*. He arrived off Santiago on the evening of the 26th, and found three American auxiliary ships there scouting for the enemy. None of them had any knowledge of Cervera's whereabouts. Schley did not believe that the Spanish fleet was in Santiago harbor, and, being unable to coal from the *Merrimac*, on account of a rough sea, he started for Key West to coal. Almost immediately he was overtaken by the auxiliary *Harvard* bearing an urgent dispatch from the Navy Department, which informed him that all reports indicated that the Spanish fleet was at Santiago, and directed him to secure positive information on the subject. Schley replied that he could "ascertain nothing concerning the enemy," and, for lack of coal in his bunkers, it was "impossible to remain off Santiago"; and he continued on his way to Key West. On the 27th and 28th, however, the sea was calm enough for him to coal his ships from the *Merrimac*, and he put about for Santiago. On the 29th he reconnoitered near the entrance of the harbor and discovered therein the *Colon*, the *María Teresa*, and two torpedo-boat destroyers, which he promptly reported to Washington. In the meantime Admiral Sampson, having become well-nigh convinced that the hostile fleet was at Santiago, had sailed for that point, also, with the *New York*, the *Oregon*, the converted yacht *Mayflower*, and the torpedo-boat *Porter*. He arrived off Santiago on June 1, and took command of the blockade.

On their arrival at Santiago Cervera and his officers were

disappointed to find that not only coal but all other supplies were very scarce. They had expected to find plenty of provisions at this port, as it had not yet been closed by blockade. They were now sorry they had come to Santiago, and wanted to go to San Juan, Porto Rico, where they should find supplies more plentiful. There was coal enough to carry them thither, but before they got away they learned that three American vessels had arrived in front of the harbor—they were three auxiliary ships; and the weather had become so bad that there was danger of the *Colon's* striking bottom upon a rock in the channel leading out of the harbor. After assembling his captains two or three times to discuss the question of going out, Cervera finally decided, on May 26, to defer the sortie "in hopes that the sea will calm down and another opportunity will present itself."* Thus Cervera cast away his last chance of saving any part of his squadron, for Schley came to blockade him on the 28th of May, and Sampson arrived with more ships on June the 1st.

On the 3rd of June Sampson got reliable information that all of Cervera's vessels, except the destroyer *Terror*, were in Santiago harbor; and the same day he received word from Washington that the *Terror*, which had been left at Martinique, had arrived at San Juan, Porto Rico, badly crippled. That night Lieutenant Hobson with a crew of seven sailors, picked from a large number that had volunteered, acting under the Admiral's orders, sank the collier *Merrimac* in the narrow channel, near the mouth of the harbor. The purpose was to seal up the Spanish fleet inside the harbor, in order that a division might safely be detached from the American fleet to act against Cámara's squadron in case it should become necessary; but the collier did not go down athwart the channel, hence did not close it effectually. On the 6th of June Sampson's fleet bombarded the forts guarding the entrance to the harbor. Nearly 2,000 shells were fired, killing sixteen Spaniards and wounding 130. As there were only a few modern guns in the fort, they could make but a feeble reply to the American fire.

(299) In order to secure a safe harbor where he could coal ship in rough weather, and take refuge in case of hurricane, Sampson sent the *Marblehead* and the auxiliary cruiser *Yankee*, on the 7th of June, to capture Guantánamo Bay, about forty miles east of Santiago Bay. The place was defended by

*From Cervera's indorsement upon the proceedings of the council of his captains. May 26, 1898.

a single gunboat and a few block-houses, and was easily taken. The harbor was then garrisoned by a detachment of marines.

At this stage of the general campaign the active work of the navy, for the time being, was at an end. To maintain a blockade of the coasts, and to watch for a sortie of Cervera's squadron at the mouth of Santiago Bay, were now all that the navy could do alone. It had scouted for the hostile fleet, found it, and shut it up; it now had complete command of the sea in the theater of operations. So far as the sea was concerned, the American army could proceed with its operations with little risk; but the navy could do nothing more without the assistance of the army. (301) Morro Castle at the mouth of Santiago harbor was a medieval structure armed with guns of the eighteenth century, and all but a few of the guns in the forts guarding the harbor were of obsolete type; but there were some modern pieces, the narrow channel was planted with mines, and Cervera's fleet was inside. Altogether the risk was far too great for Sampson to undertake to force a passage. At this time our relations with other foreign nations were such that we could not afford to lose a single vessel, and Sampson had received special instructions from the Navy Department not to expose his men-of-war to the fire of land batteries. Yet, so long as Cervera could get provisions from the interior, the Spanish fleet might hold out indefinitely. It was necessary, therefore, in order to capture or destroy it, for an American army to coöperate from the land side with Sampson's fleet.

THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST SANTIAGO.

(299) The naval events briefly related in the last few pages were what changed all the plans of our land forces, and led to the termination of the war without a campaign against the main Spanish army in Cuba, and the capital of the island. It was arranged between the War and Navy Departments that a force of troops should go to Cuba to coöperate with Sampson's fleet at Santiago. Accordingly, on the 30th of May, General Shafter, commanding the Fifth Corps at Tampa, received orders to take his command, under naval escort, to Santiago in order to capture the garrison of that place, and aid the navy in capturing the Spanish fleet in the harbor.

In spite of great confusion in the military arrangements at Tampa, all the troops were aboard the transports, and the fleet was actually under way, by the 8th of June, "when suddenly

there came an unexpected delay." Word was received that two Spanish cruisers, accompanied by torpedo-boat destroyers, had been sighted, on the night of the 7th, near Nicolas Channel. As this channel is almost directly upon the route to Santiago, the fleet had to be recalled and held until the news could be investigated. Within a few days positive information was received from Admiral Sampson that all of Cervera's ships were still in Santiago Harbor; and the transports started again on June 14.

Shafter's command was organized in two infantry divisions under Kent and Lawton, respectively, a dismounted cavalry division, under Wheeler, and an independent brigade under Bates. Each infantry division consisted of three small brigades of three regiments each; the cavalry division consisted of only two brigades, and each cavalry brigade was made up of two squadrons only from each of three regiments; Bates's brigade consisted of two infantry regiments, and had Rafferty's squadron of the 2nd Cavalry, the only mounted troops with the expedition, attached to it. Altogether there were eighteen regiments of regular infantry and two of volunteers; ten squadrons of regular cavalry and two of volunteers. The artillery consisted of four light batteries, four siege guns, four howitzers, eight field mortars, and one dynamite gun; and there were four Gatling guns and one revolving cannon. A battalion of engineers, a detachment of the signal corps, and a balloon detachment also accompanied the expedition. The whole convoy consisted of thirty-two troop-ships, two water-tenders, and three lighters; and the strength of the force on board, according to General Shafter's report, was 815 officers and 16,072 enlisted men.

(301) Without any occurrence of importance, except the loss of one lighter that broke loose at sea, the convoy, escorted by the battle-ship *Indiana* and several smaller vessels, sailed round the eastern end of Cuba and reached the position of Sampson's blockading fleet, off the mouth of Santiago harbor, on the 20th of June. Here General Shafter had a conference with Admiral Sampson and his chief of staff, from whom he learned the situation from the naval point of view, the topography of the coast line, and the views of the naval officers regarding a plan of operations for his command. He then went ashore with Sampson to confer with the insurgent General Garcia, who was at Aserraderos with some 5,000 of his soldiers. From Garcia Shafter obtained information concerning

the topography and condition of the inland country about Santiago, and the number and position of the Spanish troops.

GEOGRAPHY.

(299) The province of Santiago occupies the eastern end of the Island of Cuba and is about 200 miles long from east to west. Its most important towns are Holguin, Sagua de Tanamo, and Baracoa on the northern, Manzanillo, Santiago, and Guantánamo on the southern side of the island. All of these towns, except Holguin, are near the coast; none of them were connected by railways, and the highways throughout the province were of the worst kind. None of them, without repairs, were in fit condition for the passage of artillery or wagons. (301) In the vicinity of Santiago, the coast is rugged and mountainous; for twenty miles on either side of the harbor it has the form of a ridge whose sides are very steep toward the sea. At some points they rise abruptly out of the sea, while at others a strand of three or four hundred yards lies between their base and the water's edge. The ridge varies in height from 150 to 250 feet, and is broken here and there by ravines through which short streams discharge their waters. The longest and largest of these streams is the San Juan River, about three miles east of Santiago Bay. Behind the ridge is a line of foot-hills, and beyond them, five or six miles from the coast, is a low mountain-range called the Sierra Del Cobre.

Upon the shore east of the harbor are several small places, the most important of which are Aguadores, at the mouth of the San Juan River; Siboney, eleven miles from the harbor; and Daiquiri, six miles farther east. West of the harbor are Cabañas and Guaicabon, two and four miles distant respectively. Radiating from the harbor were two short railways. One ran from Las Cruces, just south of Santiago on the bay, to Aguadores, and thence along the strand to Siboney. From there it turned back to Firmeza, a village two miles from the shore. The other line ran northward from Santiago fifteen miles to El Cristo, and there forked, one prong leading to the village of Socorro, and the other by way of Moron and Dos Caminos to San Luis.*

At this time there were in the province of Santiago 36,582 Spanish troops, distributed as follows: in the town of San-

*The railway shown on the map from El Cobre to the western shore of the bay did not exist at the time of the war.

tiago, about the harbor, and along the railway to Siboney, 9,430; at El Cristo, Songo, Moron, Dos Caminos, San Luis, and Palma Soriano, 2,666—all within twenty-five miles of Santiago; (299) at Guantánamo, 5,992; at Manzanillo, 8,668; at Holguin, 8,364; at Baracoa, 742; and at Sagua de Tanamo, 720. All these soldiers, except the detachment at Holguin, were under the command of General Arsenio Linares, whose headquarters were at Santiago. Upwards of twelve thousand of them were close enough to have been concentrated within a few hours at any point near Santiago, Siboney, or Daiquiri.

(301) From General Garcia General Shafter learned that there were probably 12,000 Spanish soldiers in the vicinity of Santiago, about 5,000 of whom were in position between that town and Daiquiri; that there were 300 at Daiquiri, 600 at Siboney, 150 at Jutici, 100 at Sardinero, and 150 at Fort Aguadores. Shafter was also informed that the Cuban General Castillo had 500 insurgent soldiers at a village about three miles east of Daiquiri. Having weighed this information and what he had learned concerning the landing places and the topography of the country, in connection with his orders from the War Department, General Shafter decided to land his army at Daiquiri and advance against Santiago.

The debarkation was accordingly begun on the morning of June 22. In order to confuse and mislead the Spanish the navy shelled not only Daiquiri, but Siboney, Aguadores, and Cabañas at the same time; while Kent's division was anchored in its transports in front of Cabañas, and made a feint of landing there. At the same time the Cuban General Rabi, with a detachment of Garcia's insurgents, made a demonstration by land against the same place. Castillo with his detachment, reinforced by about 500 of Garcia's men, who had been transferred to him by water on the 21st, was to attack Daiquiri from his position. The Americans were to land in the following order: first, Lawton's division; second, Bates's brigade; third, Wheeler's division of dismounted cavalry; fourth, Kent's division; fifth, Rafferty's squadron of the 2nd Cavalry. By night 6,000 troops had been put ashore. The Spaniards made no opposition to the landing, and the detachment stationed at Daiquiri withdrew early in the morning to Firmeza.

As soon as Lawton's division had landed it pushed forward to Siboney. The road was a mere rut in which no more than two men could march abreast. The pace had to be very slow, regiments strung out to almost twice their normal length, and

"flankers" could not penetrate the tropic jungle on either side to guard the column against ambushade. There were several strong positions on the way, where the Spaniards might have stopped or checked the advance, but they made no attempt to do so. On learning, on the 22nd, that the Americans were landing at Daiquiri, General Linares ordered General Rubin, who commanded the troops in the mining region, to withdraw the detachments from Firmeza and Siboney to Sevilla. At the same time he ordered the detachments at Jutici and Sardinero to retire to Aguadores, and then blow up the bridge over the San Juan River at that place. On the 23rd Linares went to Sevilla himself, taking with him two rapid-fire guns and 110 guerrillas. Here he was joined by the troops from Siboney and Firmeza.

As the head of Lawton's column approached Siboney on the 23rd the Spaniards were withdrawing from that place. Castillo followed them with his insurgents, and, in an action with their rear-guard, lost one man killed and nine wounded. He came upon the main body in position across the road, on a line of heights, about a mile southeast of Sevilla, and made a demonstration against it; but he was easily repulsed.

General Shafter's orders for June 24 "contemplated" that Lawton's division should take up a strong position a short distance beyond Siboney; Kent's should be held near that village; Bates's brigade should take a position to support Lawton; and Wheeler's division should stop somewhat in rear, on the Daiquiri-Siboney road. He purposed holding his troops in these positions until he should get his matériel and a "reasonable quantity of supplies" unloaded from the transports.* But Wheeler pushed Young's brigade forward; by midnight of the 23rd it was assembled at Siboney. Wheeler had reached the village in the afternoon, and had learned from Castillo of the Spanish force in position near Sevilla. Contrary to Shafter's plan he started Young's brigade out about 6 a.m. on the 24th to attack this force. Castillo was to support the attack with his insurgents, but he did not arrive on the ground until after the combat was over.

(302) Sevilla is upon the main highway to Santiago, about four miles from Siboney. The road leads away from Siboney up the valley of Las Guásimas Creek, then ascends a steep slope to the position where the Spaniards were intrenched. A

*General Shafter's report.

trail from Siboney passes over the high ridge west of Las Guásimas valley, and joins the main road a few hundred yards beyond the Spanish position. The road and the trail both approach this position through a tangled thicket of trees and underbrush.

Young advanced by the road with a squadron of the 1st Cavalry, a squadron of the 10th Cavalry, and four Hotchkiss mountain guns, 464 men in all; while Colonel Wood with the two squadrons of the 1st Volunteer Cavalry, about 500 men, accompanied by two rapid-fire Colt automatic guns, took the trail over the ridge. The advance-guards of the two columns came upon the Spanish outposts at the same time, about half-past seven o'clock; and both columns quickly deployed and engaged the enemy.

(301) General Rubin was in immediate command of the Spanish troops at the battle of Las Guásimas, Linares having placed his own headquarters at El Pozo, some four miles farther toward Santiago. Linares considered it probable that the Americans, aided by the guns of their fleet, might force a passage of the San Juan River at Aguadores and advance upon Santiago from that direction. He had, therefore, decided to make no determined stand at Sevilla, but to withdraw his forces to the intrenchments close about Santiago, and had ordered Rubin to retire "by echelons with the precaution and deliberation necessary effectually to repel any attack of the enemy."

(302) Accordingly Rubin had his command, which numbered about 2,000, disposed in three lines. The bulk of the troops occupied the advanced position at Las Guásimas, and the rest were at Sevilla and La Redonda. About 1,500 took part in the combat.

While Young's column pushed up the steep slope, through the jungle, against the front of Rubin's position, Wood's advanced against its right flank. The Spaniards received them with volleys, and the fire was so heavy that Wheeler dispatched a message to Lawton for reinforcements. Before the reinforcements arrived the Spaniards had quitted their intrenchments and started in retreat upon Santiago; not, however, until their sick and baggage had gotten safely on the way. In this action the Americans lost one officer and fifteen men killed, and six officers and forty-six men wounded; the Spaniards lost three officers and seven men killed, and eighteen men wounded. Owing to the exhausted condition of the Americans, their total want of cavalry, and the lack of an infantry

reserve, no attempt was made to pursue the Spanish. The victors bivouacked upon the battle-field, where they were joined within an hour or two by the 9th Cavalry and Chaffee's brigade of Lawton's division.

(301) The American army now moved forward and encamped near Sevilla. Bates's brigade stayed at Siboney, with orders to send a strong detachment along the railway toward Aguadores, and to repair the road from Siboney to Sevilla. General Garcia's forces, which had been brought by water to Siboney, made their camp in rear of the Americans on the Siboney-Sevilla road. Shafter remained aboard his transport, the *Segurança*, directing the unloading of the supplies and means of transportation. Owing to the confusion and lack of order and system with which the ships had been loaded at Tampa, the total want of wharves, and the shortage of lighters, this was a tedious and slow performance. Meantime Wheeler, now the senior in command with the army in camp, received positive orders from Shafter not to bring on another engagement.

A coastwise cable had been picked up and cut, and its end had been brought to Siboney. By this means Shafter had received word that General Duffield was on the way to reinforce him with a brigade of volunteers from Camp Alger, Falls Church, Virginia. Shafter was anxious to await the arrival of this brigade, as well as to have his army's supplies and matériel unloaded and sent to the front before he advanced to attack Santiago. Only part of the brigade had arrived, however, and his troops, owing to the terrible road and the slow unloading, were still living from hand to mouth, when, on the 28th of June, he received information that 8,000 Spanish regulars, on the way from Manzanillo, were already within fifty-four miles of Santiago, and were advancing at the rate of twelve miles a day. Shafter decided that he could wait no longer; he must attack Santiago before the arrival of this Spanish column. On the 29th he joined the army in camp. On this day Garcia moved his command to the front of the American forces. Under the direction of Colonel Wagner several young officers, graduates of the Service Schools at Fort Leavenworth, had already reconnoitered and sketched the Spanish positions about Santiago, and the roads leading to them; and Generals Wheeler, Lawton, and Chaffee had personally examined the road toward El Caney and the main road to Santiago. On the morning of the 30th Shafter, accom-

panied by members of his staff, rode forward to El Pozo, whence he got an excellent view of Santiago, San Juan Heights, San Juan Hill, and El Caney. At the same time Lawton and Chaffee were making a reconnaissance of the country about El Caney. Later they reported to Shafter that there were five or six hundred Spanish soldiers at El Caney, and that the place could be captured in about two hours.

Shafter resolved to attack the enemy the next day, July 1, and, after considering all the information that had been obtained, he announced the following plan to his division commanders: Lawton's division supported by Capron's battery was to attack El Caney at daybreak; as soon as this division became engaged the other two divisions supported by Grimes's battery were to advance and deploy in front of San Juan Heights, Wheeler's to the right and Kent's to the left of the Sevilla-Santiago road; as soon as Lawton captured El Caney he was to move toward Santiago and form on Wheeler's right; then the three divisions were to assault San Juan Heights. Garcia was asked to coöperate by moving his command to a position northward of Santiago, in order to cover the Cobre Road and prevent reinforcements from entering on that side. Duffield was to send the 33rd Michigan from Siboney to attack Aguadores, and Admiral Sampson was asked to shell that place, and to make a demonstration at the mouth of Santiago Harbor.

(303) The American encampment at this time was about four miles east of Santiago. A mile east of the city a broken ridge, called San Juan Heights, covers the approaches from the direction of El Caney and Sevilla. The highest part of the ridge is San Juan Hill, around which the Sevilla road passes. Its summit is about 125 feet above the surrounding country. Nearly a half mile east of this hill is Little San Juan Hill, known since the battle as Kettle Hill. In the low ground between the two hills is a large pond, and just at the eastern base of Kettle Hill is the San Juan River, flowing southward. The Aguadores River, which comes from the east, is joined by Las Guamas Creek, which flows southward from El Caney, about 500 yards southeast of Kettle Hill, and it enters the San Juan 500 yards south of the end of this hill. These streams are all fordable hereabouts. The Sevilla-Santiago road followed the valley of the Aguadores, and crossed this stream and the San Juan by fords about 200 yards above their fork. From El Pozo to the Aguadores ford this road passed through nearly a

mile of dense jungle, but the ground between Las Guamas Creek on the east and San Juan Heights on the west was generally open, presenting a clear field of fire from the Spanish positions upon the heights.

(304) El Caney was about three miles north of the American camp. A trail led thither from the camp, but the main road to the village branched from the Sevilla-Santiago road at El Pozo, a mile farther west. The road from El Caney to Santiago, which was the main Guantánamo-Santiago highway, forked with the Sevilla-Santiago road a few hundred yards west of San Juan Heights. The ground about El Caney was generally open.

On the 1st of July General Linares had 10,429 troops of all kinds in and about Santiago and the harbor. At El Caney were 520 men under General Vara de Rey; in the town of Santiago was a reserve of 1,879 made up of firemen and volunteers; at Dos Caminos del Cobre were 500 soldiers; the rest were distributed in unequal detachments at several small forts covering the approaches from the interior, and at the forts near the mouth of the harbor. In intrenchments upon San Juan and Kettle Hills was one company of regulars, 137 men. The defenses of El Caney consisted of a little stone fort upon a commanding hill about 400 yards southeast of the village, and four block-houses. These structures were connected by a broken line of rifle-pits and deep trenches strengthened by wire entanglements.

The Spaniards had no field-artillery except two rapid-fire 3-inch Krupp mountain guns, and no other modern ordnance except ten pieces in the harbor batteries, and one 3.5-inch Honoria gun and two 3-inch Maxims which were held in readiness within the city. There were about two dozen old bronze rifles, seventeen of which were in position at important points in the outskirts of the town. Two 3-inch Placentia guns were brought to the city on the 3rd of July by Colonel Escario's column from Manzanillo. There was no artillery at El Caney.

In preparation for the work of the 1st of July Shafter's army was set in motion on the afternoon of June the 30th. Lawton marched his division by the trail to a position near El Caney, where it bivouacked for the night. Wheeler's division bivouacked at El Pozo. Kent's started for the same place, but did not get there until the next morning. Bates was directed to bring his brigade forward from Siboney and report it to the commanding-general.

Lawton's troops quitted their bivouacks between four and five o'clock on the morning of July 1. Chaffee's brigade, composed of the 7th, 12th, and 17th Infantry, took position 800 yards from the stone fort, on the east side of the village; Ludlow's brigade, composed of the 8th, 22nd, and the 2nd Massachusetts Infantry, marched to the southwest side of the town to seize the Santiago road and cut off the retreat of the garrison; Miles's brigade was held in reserve; two of its regiments, the 4th and 24th, went to the Ducoureau House, south of the village, while the 1st Infantry and Troop D, 2nd Cavalry, supported Capron's battery.

At half-after six the battle was begun by Capron's battery from a hill a little more than a mile south of El Caney. Then the infantry, which had approached to within about 600 yards of the Spanish lines, opened fire. The Spaniards replied promptly. From this hour the combat, instead of ending with the capture of the town in about two hours, as Generals Lawton and Chaffee had predicted, lasted until nearly 5 p.m. Before noon Bates's brigade arrived to reinforce Lawton, raising his strength to 6,653 officers and men, without counting out those already killed or wounded. (305) About one o'clock the brigades of Miles and Bates were ordered forward into the space between Chaffee and Ludlow. About two o'clock Capron's battery advanced to within 1,000 yards of the Spanish position, and its fire became more effective. The Americans gradually, but very slowly, worked their way toward the Spanish lines, creeping, crawling, dragging themselves through the grass, under the deadly fire from the enemy's cover. Being equipped with cartridges of black powder, whose smoke at every discharge of its rifles made the regiment a conspicuous target, the 2nd Massachusetts took little part in the combat; yet it suffered a loss of five per cent.

In the meantime Wheeler's and Kent's divisions were engaged in the main assault at San Juan and Kettle Hills, and Lawton's assistance was needed there. About 2 p.m. Shafter sent Lawton a message saying that his division and Bates's brigade and Garcia "should move on the city and form the right of the line." When Lawton received this message he was engaged in the final assault upon El Caney, and could not withdraw. About three o'clock Capron's guns began to breach the walls of the stone fort, and Chaffee at last ordered the 12th Infantry to charge it. Closely supported by regiments of Miles's and Bates's brigades, this regiment carried the posi-

tion. Then the Spaniards were driven back from one position to another, and at last the few that were left alive and able withdrew from the village. About 120 of them were captured, and 235 had fallen, dead or wounded. The brave General Vara de Rey was among the slain. The Americans had lost four officers and seventy-seven men killed, twenty-five officers and 335 men wounded; total 441.

As soon as General Linares saw, on the morning of July 1, that the Americans had begun an attack at El Caney and were also massing troops in front of San Juan Heights, he reinforced the single company at Kettle and San Juan Hills by the two companies and the two rapid-fire Krupp guns that were near Fort Cañosa. These troops were put into position on San Juan Hill, and along the heights on both sides of the Santiago-Pozo road. Before the assault on San Juan Hill the Spaniards at that point were further reinforced by sixty volunteers from the city, making altogether a force of about 521 men on Kettle Hill and San Juan Heights. Three companies, numbering about 411 men, came up from Forts San Antonio and Santa Inés to take the place of those that had quitted Fort Cañosa. These, together with two guns that had been mounted there on the 13th of June, formed the second Spanish line. A force of 140 mounted guerrillas took post behind a small hill back of Fort Cañosa. Within the city, and surrounding it from the cemetery on the northwest to Las Cruces on the southwest, there were some 4,352 regulars, volunteers, firemen, and sailors, of whom probably 800 to 1,000 were sick in the hospitals.

(306) The combat had been going on at El Caney about two hours when Grimes was ordered to open fire with his battery from the hill at El Pozo on the Spanish block-house upon San Juan Hill. The range was about 2,500 yards and the fire was not very effective. As the guns were using black powder their position was quickly found by the two Krupp guns on San Juan Hill, which were firing smokeless powder. Our battery, however, maintained an unequal duel with the enemy's guns for about three-quarters of an hour.

Meantime Wheeler's division, followed by Kent's, had started forward from El Pozo by the narrow road through the dense jungle. The cavalry division had reached the ford of Aguadores River, and about half of it had changed direction to the right, in pursuance of its orders to deploy to the right of the road, when the war balloon bearing Lieutenant-Colonel Derby, Shafter's chief engineer, settled immediately above the troops.

This started the battle of San Juan. It was precisely 10 a.m. when the Spaniards opened fire upon the balloon.* Part of the American cavalry immediately replied to the Spanish fire, while the rest hastened its deployment.

Kent's division pushed forward in the narrow road, crowding alongside the part of the cavalry column that was still in the road. The ford of Aguadores River was hardly more than 500 yards from the Spanish trench on Kettle Hill, and 800 from that on San Juan Hill; and the Mauser rifles from those trenches poured a deadly fire into the American ranks crowded into the narrow roadway. To deploy to the right or left of the road was impossible on account of the tangled undergrowth. Luckily a trail was found, opposite the mouth of Las Guamas Creek, that led off to the left and crossed the San Juan River just below the mouth of the Aguadores. The 71st New York and the rear two brigades of Kent's division [Wikoff and Pearson] took this trail, thereby relieving the congestion in the main road, and hastening the deployment. Hawkins's brigade, except the 71st New York, kept the main road and formed line in a sunken road within the fork of the San Juan and the Aguadores. The majority of the men of the 71st New York cast themselves upon the ground, and the regular regiments marched forward over their bodies. Wikoff's brigade crossed the San Juan and began to deploy in the sunken road along its bank. The ground was open and within full view of the Spanish line on San Juan Hill, less than 500 yards in front of it. The Spanish fire was terrific. Wikoff was shot almost immediately and died within fifteen minutes. Lieutenant-Colonel Worth, 13th Infantry, then took command of the brigade, and was soon severely wounded. Lieutenant-Colonel Liscum, 24th Infantry, succeeded Worth, but had hardly taken command when he, too, was disabled by a severe wound. The command of the brigade then fell to Lieutenant-Colonel Ewers, 9th Infantry.

Hawkins's brigade had tried to advance. "In its front were a fringe of trees, a barbed-wire entanglement, a grassy field, and the San Juan River,—all in clear view of the Spaniards and covered by the guns and small-arms on San Juan Hill." The 6th Infantry pushed forward to the open field in front, but there it was stopped by the Spanish fusilade, and it lost about a fourth of its men within ten minutes. It was then re-

*The lecturer took out his watch and looked at it when the first shots were fired. The hands marked exactly ten o'clock.

called to the sunken road, where the brigade awaited the deployment of the other two brigades on its left.

In the meanwhile Wheeler's division had completed its deployment in front of Kettle Hill, and, lying in the brush within close range of the enemy, was suffering severely from his fire. The combat was still raging over at El Caney and there was little prospect of Lawton's early arrival on the right of the cavalry division. Sumner, who was in command of the division, Wheeler being sick,* was, therefore, ordered to assault Kettle Hill. The division pushed forward through the thin underbrush and barbed-wire, waded the San Juan, and charged up the hillside, sending the Spaniards in flight from their trench back to San Juan Heights. The brigades had lost their formation in the deployment and assault, and regiments, if not also troops, charged without regard to higher commanders. The regiments on the right of the division carried Kettle Hill, while those on the left connected with the right of Hawkins's infantry brigade in the open space in front of San Juan Hill, and went forward with it.

General Hawkins was at this moment leading the 6th and 16th Infantry to the assault of San Juan Hill. Abreast of him on his left was Ewers's brigade. Supported by the fire of three batteries of artillery at El Pozo, by that of Lieutenant Parker's Gatling guns near the San Juan ford, and that of the cavalry which had just got possession of Kettle Hill, this line crossed the open ground and started up the steep slopes of San Juan Hill. Near the crest it came under the fire of our own artillery and Gatlings, and had to stop. After a few moments the fire from behind ceased, and the line again charged and carried the crest of the hill.

While Hawkins was taking San Juan Hill, the cavalry from Kettle Hill charged across the low ground, around the big pond, and captured the part of San Juan Heights just north of the El Pozo-Santiago road; and Pearson's brigade of infantry crossed the valley and carried the Heights to the south of San Juan Hill.

From all these positions the Spaniards retreated to their second line of intrenchments six or eight hundred yards farther

*When the army moved forward on the afternoon of June 30, General Wheeler was left in his tent ill of a fever. He was still sick on the morning of the 1st July, but, hearing the sound of the battle, he had the ambulance carry him to the front, where he remained during the rest of the combat.

back; the Americans halted upon San Juan Heights, and firing continued between the hostile lines until after dark. Once only in the course of the afternoon the Spaniards attempted to recover their lost ground; they were promptly driven back to the cover of their intrenchments. The Americans intrenched their position.

(301) In accordance with Shafter's plan, General Duffield with the 33rd Michigan, supported by the fire of two of Sampson's vessels, had attacked the Spaniards at Aguadores in order to prevent them from reinforcing the enemy in the vicinity of Santiago.

(307) The combat at El Caney having virtually ended at 4.30 p.m., Bates withdrew his brigade and marched it to San Juan Heights. He arrived there about midnight, after marching and fighting for nearly twenty-seven hours, and took up a position on the left of Kent's division. At about sunset Lawton started with the bulk of his division, also, for San Juan Heights, by the direct road from El Caney to Santiago. In the pitchy darkness his advance-guard was fired upon by hostile sentinels in the road a few hundred yards west of the Ducoureaux House. Thereupon Lawton halted, then retraced his steps by way of Shafter's headquarters. After marching nearly all night his weary division reached the line on San Juan Heights the next morning, and took its place on the extreme right across the Santiago-El Caney road, only a few hundred yards west of where it had been stopped by the Spanish sentries. Later Lawton's division extended its intrenchments to the right until they reached nearly to the head of Santiago Bay, covering all the highways into the city from the north. Garcia intrenched his command of Cubans upon heights northwest of the city covering the Cobre Road.

Firing began about 6 a.m. between the hostile lines on July 2, and kept up until dark; but neither army advanced from its trenches. The casualties were considerable on both sides, the Americans losing about 150 in killed and wounded. About 10 p.m. a terrific fusilade suddenly started up without purpose or reason. Each side thought the other was about to make an assault.

In spite of their victories General Shafter's troops by sunset on the 2nd had become very much dispirited. What with fighting for two days and working on their trenches at night; with no shelter from the broiling tropic sun part of the time, and from pouring rain the rest; with scarcely anything to eat;

and with squatting the whole time in narrow trenches, their fatigue and nervous strain had well-nigh reached the breaking point. So strong came the appeals for relief from the regimental commanders that Shafter held a conference with his division commanders and considered the question of withdrawing to Sevilla Heights. It was decided, however, to hold the position on San Juan Heights.

The next morning General Shafter sent a demand under flag of truce to the Spanish commander, now General Toral, for his surrender.* The demand was not complied with, but it started negotiations that ended with the formal surrender of the Spanish commander, and the occupation of the town by the Americans, on the 17th of July. The total number of troops surrendered by Toral was about 22,700, of which about 13,558 were at Santiago; the rest were at other towns within the territorial military Division of Santiago de Cuba.

There was not much fighting between the hostile land forces from the 3rd to the 17th of July, but other important events occurred on the 3rd. On that day Colonel Escario's column of some 3,500 Spanish soldiers marched unopposed into Santiago by the Cobre Road, notwithstanding that this road was supposed to be guarded by Garcia's force of insurgents. This was the column that had hastened Shafter's decision to attack the town. (299 and 301) It had left Manzanillo on the 22nd of June, and had made a very trying journey, harassed all the way by small bands of insurgents.

On the 3rd, also, occurred the decisive event of the war; namely, the total destruction of Cervera's fleet. Admiral Cervera and his captains had rightly judged that a sortie of his squadron had no chance of succeeding. The Admiral had sent two-thirds of his force ashore to aid Linares in the defense of the city against Shafter's army, and had made up his mind that there was nothing left for him to do but to destroy his own ships in the harbor, in case the city should be taken. After the exchange of several telegrams with the Minister of Marine at Madrid, and with Captain-General Blanco at Havana, to whose orders he was subject, Cervera received a positive command from the latter on the 2nd of July, sent at 5.10 a.m., directing him to reëmbark his men as soon as possible and take his squadron out immediately.

*General José Velazquez Toral was now in command of the Spanish forces at Santiago, Linares having been wounded on the 1st of July.

Accordingly, at 9.30 a.m. on the 3rd, the doomed squadron, led by the brave old admiral in the *Maria Teresa*, started out of the narrow channel. In single column behind the *Teresa* followed the *Viscaya*, the *Colon*, and the *Oquendo*, each about 800 yards behind another. Twelve hundred yards behind the *Oquendo* came the torpedo-boat destroyers *Furor* and *Pluton*. The American ships closed in and opened fire. The *Teresa* turned to the west; in her unequal struggle she was soon reduced to "a burning hulk, a floating slaughterhouse." At 10.15 she was beached. The *Oquendo* met the same fate at 10.20, and at the same moment the *Pluton* was run upon the rocks; a few minutes later the *Furor* was sunk. The *Viscaya* kept afloat for more than an hour before, burning and shot to pieces, she was run ashore twenty miles west of the harbor. The *Colon* was the last to succumb. Closely followed by the *Oregon* and *Brooklyn* she kept up her race for life until 1.15 p.m., when she was beached in a sinking condition fifty-four miles west of the Morro. Thus every one of Cervera's vessels was destroyed. Of the 2,150 Spaniards engaged in this remarkable battle, 323 met their death and 1,782 were captured, 150 of whom had been wounded. Admiral Cervera and Captain Paredes were captured; two of the captains were killed and two wounded. The American loss was one man killed and one wounded.

By the time of the Spanish commander's surrender to General Shafter the tropical climate and the hardships of the campaign had begun to tell heavily upon the health of the American troops. More than half of them "were down with malarial fever, or recovering from its effects; dysentery and typhoid fever were prevalent, and there were cases of yellow fever in every regiment." Early in August the condition had become so alarming that General Shafter, on the 3rd, sent a telegram to the Secretary of War in which he expressed the opinion that, if his command was not immediately transported to the United States, the death rate would be appalling. The same day he forwarded to the War Department the famous "Round Robin" of his division and brigade commanders, in which they said: "This army must be moved at once or it will perish." On August 4 Shafter received instructions to begin the removal of his command to Montauk Point, Long Island. The homeward movement began on the 7th of August, and Shafter himself, with the last detachment, reëmbarked on the 25th. The Fifth Corps was replaced in the captured territory by four of

the Immune Regiments. According to the terms of capitulation our Government transported all the prisoners of war back to Spain.

OPERATIONS IN THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS.

(308) Our war with Spain was not confined to Cuba and its waters, but it also included operations in the Philippine Islands and the Island of Porto Rico. Upon the date of the declaration of war Commodore Dewey had his fleet at Hong Kong, and he was immediately ordered by the governor of that neutral province to withdraw it. Under instructions from the Navy Department he had already prepared his fleet for campaign. Among other things he had purchased two colliers and had them loaded with coal, and he had caused his ships to be painted the slate-grey color of war. The revenue cutter *Hugh McCulloch* and the cruiser *Baltimore* had been added to the fleet. On the 24th of April Dewey received orders from the Navy Department to go at once to the Philippine Islands and capture or destroy the Spanish fleet there.

Dewey quitted Chinese waters on the 27th and started for Subig Bay, where Admiral Montojo then had the Spanish squadron. Warned of Dewey's movement, Montojo withdrew to Cavite in Manila Bay, whither Dewey followed him as soon as he learned through his scout-ships that the Spanish fleet was no longer at Subig. Although Dewey had been informed that the mouth of Manila Bay was defended with mines as well as with batteries he led the way in his flag-ship, the *Olympia*, and slowly, in single column, the squadron steamed into the bay about midnight of April 30. A harmless shot or two were fired from a battery on El Fraile, one of the islands at the mouth of the bay, and rockets were hoisted on Corregidor to warn the Spaniards at Manila and Cavite.

At 5.41 a.m. on May 1 the *Olympia* fired the first shot at Montojo's ships in the harbor or Cavite. Within two hours from that moment the American guns had sunk three of the Spanish men-of-war and set most of the others on fire. Under the mistaken notion that his ammunition was running low, Dewey then suspended his attack. About eleven o'clock the battle was renewed, and at half-after twelve it was at an end. The Spanish losses were eleven vessels destroyed and two captured; 167 men killed and 214 wounded. The American loss

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was seven men slightly wounded. Not an American ship was injured. The next day Dewey took possession of Cavite.

Upon receipt of the news of Dewey's victory the War Department issued orders to assemble a force of 20,000 troops at San Francisco for an expedition to Manila. This force was to be organized as the Eighth Corps under General Merritt. Such was the difficulty encountered in hiring ships that the corps had to be transported in seven detachments, and the task was not finished until October. Early in August, however, Merritt was on the shore of Luzon, three miles south of Manila, with a force of about 8,500 men in position to attack the Spanish works. All the troops were untrained volunteers, except some companies of the 14th, the 18th, and the 23rd regiments of regular infantry, and a few batteries of regular artillery acting as infantry. Within the defenses of Manila there were upwards of 13,000 Spanish troops.

At this time Manila, on the land side, was practically besieged by Filipino insurgents under General Emilio Aguinaldo, while it was closely blockaded on its sea front by Dewey's fleet. Since the treaty of Biac-ná-bato, in which the Spanish authorities virtually agreed to pay the leaders of the Tagalog insurrection of 1896 a large sum of money to suspend hostilities, Aguinaldo had been absent from Luzon; but about the 20th of May Dewey had allowed him to be brought from Hong Kong to Cavite in an American war-ship; Dewey then furnished him arms, and allowed him to organize an insurgent army. Within six weeks from this time Aguinaldo was master of at least seven provinces, and had set up a provisional government. About the only Spanish garrison that still held out against him was that of Manila.

(309) General Merritt, in order to avoid any entanglement with Aguinaldo and his insurgent government, held no intercourse whatever with them, and went about the capture of Manila "without reference to the situation of the insurgent forces."* His command was organized as the 2nd Division, Eighth Army Corps, and consisted of two brigades under Generals Arthur MacArthur and F. V. Greene, respectively. General Thomas M. Anderson was the division commander. Greene's brigade was intrenched across Calle Real with its left on the shore; MacArthur's took position across the Pasay-Singalon road. The country between these two roads was an

*General Merritt's report.

almost impassable swamp. At first, before the arrival of MacArthur's brigade, an insurgent brigade had been intrenched in front of Greene's, but its commander had allowed Greene to move his American line forward and intrench it in front of the Filipino brigade.

The Spanish works consisted of a line of block-houses connected by a more or less continuous intrenchment all around the outskirts of the city. The works ended at the south with Fort San Antonio Abad, within about a hundred yards of the shore. Block-house No. 14 stood at the southeast corner of the works upon the Pasay Road.

Greene was attacked in his intrenchments about midnight of July 31, and lost ten men killed and forty-three wounded. Upon several nights after this, firing took place between Greene's brigade and the Spaniards in its front, but the American losses were small. General Merritt asked Dewey to let his ships shell the Spanish line, believing that it would stop the night firing. But Dewey feared such action might bring on a general engagement before the arrival of the *Monterey*, which he was expecting. He therefore declined to do it unless Merritt's troops were in danger of being driven back; but they were in no such danger. At length, however, the *Monterey* arrived, and MacArthur's brigade had already landed and taken its position. Thereupon Merritt and Dewey jointly called upon the Spanish Governor-General to surrender. Their demand having been declined they arranged for a combined attack.

The attack took place on the 13th of August. Between 9 and 10 a.m. Dewey's guns opened fire upon Fort San Antonio Abad and the right of the Spanish trenches. The bombardment ceased at 10.25 a.m., and Merritt's troops advanced. Greene found Fort San Antonio and the Spanish trenches in his front deserted, but he encountered a second line of the enemy in the streets of Malate. He lost some men in carrying this line, but pushed on through Malate and Ermita, and, according to the plan of battle, occupied Binondo and San Miguel, barrios on the north side of the Pasig River. At the same time MacArthur's brigade had advanced by way of the Pasay Road. It captured Block-house No. 14 without much trouble, but encountered considerable resistance at Singalon. With a loss of five killed and forty-three wounded it succeeded in driving the enemy before it, however, and reached the Pasig River.

Practically all of the town, except the walled city, was now

was to strike the Military Road at Cayey. All these columns had marched several days, and each had encountered Spanish detachments at strong points on the roads and defeated them, when the campaign was brought to an abrupt close by the receipt of news that all hostilities had been suspended between the United States and Spain, pending negotiations for peace.

The expedition to Porto Rico was made up of regular and volunteer troops. It consisted altogether of the 11th and 19th U. S. Infantry and nine volunteer infantry regiments; three troops of regular cavalry and the Philadelphia City Troop; four batteries of regulars and four of volunteers. Its total losses were three men killed and forty wounded.

PEACE.

On July 26 Spain made overtures for peace through the French Ambassador at Washington. On August the 12th the peace protocol and preliminary arrangements were concluded. It was provided that the final treaty of peace should be made by a joint commission that should meet at Paris not later than October 1. After a prolonged discussion a treaty was finally agreed to and signed by this commission on the 10th of December. It was ratified by the Senate of the United States on February 6, 1899, and signed by the Queen Regent of Spain on March 17. By the terms of this treaty Spain relinquished all right and sovereignty over Cuba, and ceded to the United States Porto Rico, Guam, and all the Philippine Islands. On their part the United States agreed to pay Spain \$20,000,000.

COMMENTS.

This is the only war within the history of the United States in which the principal operations of the land forces were secondary to those of the navy. The navy dictated its plan of campaign to the army. An attack by land upon Manila had never been thought of until it became necessary to gather the fruits of Dewey's victory in Manila Bay; and the land campaign against Santiago was undertaken solely for the purpose of aiding Sampson to destroy Cervera's fleet. This fact alone, if there were not much else besides, would place these operations among the most interesting and instructive of all our campaigns for the student of military history.

Our army authorities at Washington were planning a grand campaign against Havana, the political capital of Cuba, when Cervera's hapless entrance into the Harbor of Santiago de Cuba changed everything. At the time, however, that General Shafter was hurriedly ordered to go with his "force to capture garrison at Santiago, and assist in capturing harbor and fleet,"* it had never occurred to the War Department that this expedition might decide the issue of hostilities. It does not appear that our War Department even suspected for a moment that the capture or destruction of Cervera's fleet, which would mean the destruction of Spain's sea power, would make it impossible for Spain longer to maintain her army or her sovereignty in the West Indies.

The navy appears to have understood the situation better. Admiral Sampson clearly set forth in his dispatches that the capture of the Spanish fleet must put an end to the war. The army authorities ought to have seen it as plainly. Cervera's fleet guarded the communications of the Spanish army in Cuba with its base at home. The minute it should be lost those communications would be lost, and Spain would no longer dare send a troop-ship or a supply-ship across the Atlantic.

The trouble was, our combined land and sea problem had not been worked out beforehand. That we should soon have to go to war with Spain had been almost certain for more than a twelvemonth. The Naval War College appears to have worked at the problem, and to have made a solution for the navy; but there was no Army War College at that time, no General Staff, no body of intelligent officers whose duty it was to make war plans against a future need. Consequently there was no plan already worked out. Certainly there was no combined land and sea plan. Such a thing can hardly happen again. War cannot befall so suddenly as to catch us without a plan already worked out, which will make use of all available means. If Congress will provide the means beforehand, the country will find the War Department ready for any emergency.

It does not even appear that our War Department would have waited for the navy to get the mastery of the sea if it had itself been ready to begin its campaign against Havana. It was known that Spain had upwards of 100,000 effective troops in Cuba, and that Havana was well prepared for de-

*Telegraphic order from Headquarters of the Army to General Shafter, May 30, 1908.

fense. Yet, if the Department could have mobilized as many as 60,000 troops, and found means of transporting them by sea, it would have started them off to Cuba forthwith. This would have been a very perilous thing to do. The history of warfare, ancient and modern, points no surer lesson than that it is the height of risk for a nation to undertake to carry on a land campaign overseas without first having the mastery of its enemy upon the water.

From the very outset of hostilities the United States undoubtedly had the advantage of Spain at sea. In eastern waters Montojo's feeble squadron was no match for Commodore Dewey's, while in the Atlantic it was thought that the hostile fleets were more nearly equal; but the strategical advantage was with our navy. So long as the Spanish fleet remained on the eastern side of the ocean ours could blockade Cuba and cut off the sea communications of the Spanish army in that island.* Yet Spain did not dare send all her war vessels to American waters, lest our fleet, or part of it, should descend upon her own coasts. Hence she divided her fleet, sending Cervera's squadron to our side, and keeping Cámara's to guard her own shores. This, as Cervera well knew, gave our navy all the advantage of concentration over dispersion.

Up to this time our own Atlantic fleet had been divided. The cry for protection that came from our Atlantic cities obliged the Administration, for a time, to keep Admiral Schley with the Flying Squadron at Hampton Roads. When the destination of Cervera's fleet, however, became definitely known, Schley was sent to join Sampson in blockading Cuba and watching for the Spanish fleet. Every reason dictated the policy of keeping our warships on this side of the Atlantic. First, though we were at war with Spain, and hence should have been justified in striking wherever we could hurt her, still the main purpose of our operations was to expel Spanish authority from the Island of Cuba. Naturally, then, Cuba and its waters would be first thought of as the theater of our offensive operations. Second, the proximity of the island to our own shores was a really strategic reason for keeping our fleet in its vicinity; for there the fleet could not only blockade

*The successful blockade of the Southern ports during the Civil War showed what the United States navy could do. If the Confederate army had been obliged to depend wholly upon importation for its munitions of war, like the Spanish army in Cuba, it would have laid down its arms much sooner than it did.

its ports, but it was near enough, also, to guard our own coasts. If our whole fleet had made for Spain, it would have exposed our own long coast to attack; while, if part only had gone, it would have given the Spanish fleet an opportunity to defeat ours in detail. Yet, so long as our fleet stayed on this side and the Spanish fleet on the other, our navy could gain no decisive victory, and could not get the complete mastery of the sea. In dividing her fleet, therefore, and sending Cervera's squadron to this side, the Spanish government did precisely the best thing it could have done for us.

Another reason that undoubtedly restrained our Government from dispatching ships to threaten the Spanish coast was its reluctance to enter European waters with hostile intent. Spain had friends and sympathizers among the powers of Europe, who viewed with a disfavor verging upon hostility our arrogating to ourselves the right and duty of chastising one of the oldest and proudest kingdoms of the Continent, because it did not choose to conduct its colonial affairs according to our notions. The United States did not want to take any steps, which could possibly be avoided, to aggravate this feeling against us.

Although Cervera was ordered to West Indian waters against his protest, and came feeling that he was leaving hope behind, his allowing himself to be shut up in Santiago Harbor was his own mistake. Captain Sargent shows conclusively that he could have reached Cienfuegos, or even Havana, if he had taken advantage of his opportunity. In either of these ports he would have had a much better chance than he had at Santiago. Nothing could have forced him out of either harbor except victory by our army on the land side of the seaport, and the chances for such a victory would have been nothing like so good at either place as they were at Santiago. Both of these places were prepared for defense; the great bulk of the Spanish forces were about Havana; and Cienfuegos was only some 200 miles from that city, and was connected with it by rail. Sixty or seventy thousand Spanish troops could easily have been assembled to defend either place.

Cervera went into Santiago Harbor for coal; by the 23rd of May he had done coaling; between that date and the 28th, the day on which Schley's squadron arrived in front of the harbor, he could have made his escape, if he had hazarded a bold effort to do so. The fear that a single ship, the *Colon*, would drag and be injured in going out, was his reason for not

trying. Far better would it have been to risk the loss of a single ship than surely to lose the whole squadron.

When the Spanish government learned of the destruction of Montojo's squadron in Manila Bay it started Cámara's fleet for those waters. But by the time the fleet had reached the Suez Canal Spain's greater disaster had befallen at the mouth of Santiago Harbor. If, after Cervera became "bottled up" at Santiago, Cámara's squadron had gone, with a great sounding of trumpets, to threaten the cities along our northern Atlantic coast, instead of starting to the Orient, it would have created such a panic along the seaboard of the New England and the Eastern States as almost surely to oblige the President to recall Schley's squadron, and maybe Sampson's, also, to protect their seaports. This would have released Cervera's ships. Such a diversion would certainly have been worth trying. As it was, while every American warship was brought into action, Cámara's squadron took no part in the conflict.

There is not space here to discuss the unprepared condition of our land forces at the outbreak of the war; and it is too well known by every one that read the newspapers of the country to need discussion. So, also, is the chaos and confusion, the disease and death, that resulted from it; and the big pension roll that has followed in the wake. For it all, however, neither the War Department nor the army is to blame; the whole blame rests upon the military policy of our Government; upon the Congress that failed to heed Washington's injunction; upon the people themselves. Would that General Upton's great work, *Military Policy of the United States*, which is packed from cover to cover with indisputable and convincing truths, might be read by every lawmaker in the land and taught in every school! The Nation might thus be saved from a future disaster and humiliation in case it shall quarrel with a power having a first class army.

One of the lessons taught by the war concerns the quickness with which events pass. Our War Department was not even hoping to begin its main campaign until October and the healthy season should arrive; it never for a moment expected to put a large army on Cuban soil in the fever summer-season. Spain, also, counted upon hostilities lasting for months. But within ten weeks of the declaration of war the battle of Manila Bay had taken place; the victory of El Caney—San Juan had

been won; Cervera's fleet had been destroyed; and the war was practically over.

The performance of Sampson's fleet at Santiago, and the small effect of its fire upon the Spanish works at the entrance of the harbor, show how nearly impossible it is for warships to damage a seaport city whose harbor is protected by mines and modern fortifications. At the mouth of this harbor the Spaniards had an old stone castle of the eighteenth century, armed with a few small guns of the same period, and three or four earthen forts inadequately armed; and the channel was laid with mines. Sampson's guns fired several thousand rounds, with no other effect than to knock a few rocks out of the old castle walls, and to disable two guns; and the Admiral did not dare to force a passage into the harbor. A modern battle-ship is too expensive a machine, its building takes too long, and it is too vulnerable, to risk close range of the enemy's fortress guns, or passage over his mines.

LAND OPERATIONS AGAINST SANTIAGO.

Daiquiri and Siboney taken together made the best landing places and base of operations for Shafter's army; but no good reason can be seen why the first troops were not put ashore at Siboney rather than at Daiquiri. With any effort worthy of the name, however, the Spaniards could have made the landing very hard, if not altogether impossible, at either place.

Guantánamo Bay, forty miles east of Santiago, would have been a far better place to land troops and supplies, and it was in the possession of our marines. But to land here and make it his base Shafter would have had forty-odd miles of miserable road for his line of communications, with inadequate trains of wagons and pack-mules, and a force of some 6,000 Spanish troops at Guantánamo, twelve miles inland, to defeat before he could have reached his objective, Santiago. And when defeated the force at Guantánamo would have been driven to a junction with those at Santiago. If Shafter had chosen this route, it is more than likely he would have been retarded on the way long enough for the fevers to destroy his army; as they did destroy the British army that undertook such an operation in 1741.

If Shafter had landed at Guaicabon and Cavañas, on the west side of the harbor, his line of communications would have lain so close to the Bay of Santiago as to be exposed to attack

from that side. Although it appears from the map that the Spaniards might have occupied a position between the seashore and the Siboney-Santiago road from which to threaten the line of march actually taken by the Americans, Captain Sargent, who thoroughly knows the country, says that the intervening ground is too rugged, and too dense with jungle, for such a flank position to have been feasible.

Admiral Sampson wanted Shafter to direct his attack upon the batteries at the mouth of the harbor, in order to enable the sailors to remove the mines and admit his ships to the harbor. But to do this Shafter would either have had to divide his forces and attack the batteries on both sides at once; or first to capture those on one side, only, and leaving a detachment to hold them, then to make a new landing and capture those on the other side. Furthermore, the roughness of the ground back of the forts, and the lack of roads and trails, made such an attack impracticable. As made, Shafter's advance kept his communications squarely behind him, but exposed them to attack in flank from the direction of Guantánamo; a fact of which the Spaniards took no advantage.

As we know from many historic examples, the general that allows his enemy to shut him up behind fortifications in a town has little chance of saving his army; but General Linares had no alternative. He might have stoutly disputed every step of ground with his foe; but when forced back upon Santiago he had to stop there and defend the place; because the loss of Santiago meant the loss of Cervera's fleet and the defeat of Spain; for to withdraw from Santiago on the road toward Holguín or Manzanillo, under the supposition that he could have drawn supplies from either of those places as a base, which is very doubtful, he would have had to abandon the batteries defending the harbor against Sampson's fleet.

But Linares ought never to have allowed himself to be forced back upon Santiago; he ought to have destroyed Shafter's little army, and, apparently, his failure to do so cannot be charged to anybody but himself. Surely it cannot be charged to the quality of the rank and file of his army. He had under his command in the province 36,582 Spanish troops, and he knew, in plenty of time to have concentrated his scattered detachments, that Santiago was Shafter's objective; yet, at the critical hour, he had only about 12,000 men in the town and its vicinity, and he fought the battle of El Caney-San Juan with a total of 1,717 soldiers. True, Linares had other troubles to

mind besides the Americans. His troops were distributed throughout his province with a view to guarding the property and persons of loyal inhabitants against the insurgents; but the presence of Americans emboldened the insurgents, and increased the danger from them, rather than otherwise. Yet it cannot be understood why the 5,592 troops at Guantánamo, and those in the small towns within a few leagues of Santiago, were not concentrated for a decisive battle with the Americans. Less than four days of hard marching would have sufficed to assemble 18,000 Spaniards in front of Santiago; but Shafter's army began landing at Daiquiri on the morning of June 22, and it did not make its attack until July 1. Nine days at least Linares had in which to concentrate his forces. If he had done so he would have defeated the Americans and thrown them upon the defensive. But there were also 8,364 Spanish soldiers at Holguin, eighty-five miles from Santiago, and 8,668 at Manzanillo, 110 miles distant. There was ample time to have marched all these troops to Santiago before Shafter's army got there.

LAS GUÁSIMAS.

On the part of the Americans the combat at Las Guásimas was fought without General Shafter's authority, and was contrary to his plan. It gained not a foot of ground that could not have been had without the fight, and the Americans took chances in it which, ordinarily, would have brought disaster. Here 964 Americans assaulted 1,500 Spaniards; at El Caney 520 Spaniards held out nearly all day against 6,653 Americans. What would have happened if the Spaniards had chosen to hold their position at Las Guásimas? Reinforcements would have had to hurry forward to assist Wheeler's little command; they would have arrived on the ground and gone into action by driblets; and our losses would have been very heavy. But luckily the Spaniards had no intention of remaining in that position. General Rubin had bivouacked there overnight, and his orders from Linares for this day were as follows: "After eating breakfast you will march with your entire column to Santiago, retiring from your position by echelons with due precaution and deliberation necessary to repel effectually any attack of the enemy. . . ."

This order was a great mistake on the part of Linares; he ought to have made a decisive stand at Las Guásimas. The

position was a strong one, and a Spanish force intrenched there would have blocked the direct road to Santiago, and it would have been in a position to attack Shafter's flank and communications if he had undertaken to turn it by taking a route more to the north or the south. And despite his failure to concentrate the troops in his province, Linares had, nevertheless, more than 2,000 men he could have brought upon the field at Las Guásimas. Tactically the position could undoubtedly have been turned, just as Santa Anna's was turned at Cerro Gordo; but it was, none the less, probably the strongest position between Siboney and Santiago, and called for no such wide dispersion of his command as Linares felt obliged to make upon the defensive line he had selected nearer the city, from El Caney on the left to Morro Castle on the right.

EL CANEY.

Strategically the attack at El Caney was a mistake and tactically it was badly conducted. Shafter's objective was Santiago and the main Spanish force defending the town. The detachment intrenched at El Caney was a mere outpost three miles away from the main position. Instead of containing this detachment with about one regiment, and concentrating the rest of his army against the main position, Shafter divided his army and sent nearly half of it against the outpost. Even if Lawton had captured the village within an hour or two, as he expected to do, it would have had little effect upon the main issue; whereas the capture of the main position at San Juan Heights would have left the little post at El Caney in helpless isolation.

The great tactical mistake of the attack was the tardiness of the Americans in charging the enemy's position. An intrenched position cannot be taken by fire action alone. After a preponderance of fire has been brought to bear upon it the assault must follow in order to carry it. Knowing the peril of turning their backs upon an enemy and fleeing under fire, men will not quit a trench and run away until they see their foe charging them. Creeping and crawling through the grass and overwhelming the intrenchment with fire will not put the defenders to flight; it will rather make them stick closer to their cover.

Of course our artillery ought to have taken a position at the start close enough to have enabled it to batter down the little

stone fort. It opened fire at 6.30 a.m., but not until 2 p.m. did it move up close enough to be effective. At 3 p.m. it had got the range and begun to breach the walls of the little structure. Not until then, after a small-arm duel of nearly eight hours, did General Chaffee order the 12th Infantry to charge. Other regiments joined in the charge, and the few defenders remaining alive fled from their trenches. It took about two hours more to drive them "from position to position, and from house to house," and capture the village. We had lost 441 officers and men killed and wounded,—exactly seventy-nine fewer than General Vara de Rey had in his command at the beginning of the combat. There is no reason to doubt that, if General Lawton had made his assault as soon as he gained the mastery of fire, he would have driven the Spaniards from their trenches just the same, but with probably no more than one-tenth of his own actual loss.

SAN JUAN AND KETTLE HILLS.

The combat at Kettle and San Juan Hills was started by the appearance of Colonel Derby's balloon, before the Americans had made their deployment. But for this unfortunate incident the deployment might possibly have been completed without drawing the fire of the enemy. As it happened, however, the troops, crowded together in the narrow road and hindered by the thick jungle, suffered heavily. As at El Caney, most of our losses took place before the assault; as soon as our lines charged, the Spaniards quitted their intrenchments and ran away.

Proper reconnaissance had not been made of the Spanish position; nothing was known concerning the strength of the force, and, as usually happens, it was greatly overestimated; the attack was made without form or tactical method; no reserve was held in hand; no attempt was made to envelop the enemy's flank; in fact, no positive direction or control appeared to be exercised over the command as a whole. The conduct of the attack apparently passed into the control of company and battalion commanders. General-officers there were on the field, exposing themselves recklessly and fearlessly to the enemy's fire, leading and inspiring by example such troops as could see them or could hear their voices, but not directing or controlling the attack. As was the case at the battle of the Wilderness, however, most of the tactical faults of this attack may be charged to the dense jungle.

If the six thousand-odd troops uselessly engaged at El Caney had been at hand in reserve, and had followed up the successful assaults by close pursuit, there is little room to doubt that they could have entered and taken Santiago that day. There were, in fact, troops enough already upon the ground to push on into the city, if they had not been already too nearly exhausted with the heat, and the fatigue of combat. They were not stopped, nor even checked, by the enemy's fire at any time after they began their charge. Apparently they stopped simply because they had beaten the enemy away, and taken the ground they were fighting for.

What effect the capture of Santiago on July 1 would have had upon the fate of the Spanish fleet it is hard to say. It might have forced Cervera to make his sortie sooner than he did, or it might have induced him to destroy his ships. At least he could not have turned his guns upon the victorious Americans without doing equal harm to the Spaniards and the city. What the capture of the town that day would have done, however, was to save the American army from seventeen days and more of terrific hardship and fatal sickness.

CAPTURE OF MANILA.

The attack upon Manila, August 13, was made in accordance with a plan proposed by the two brigade-commanders, Generals MacArthur and Greene. It stands among a very small number of offensive tactical operations in American military history that have worked out precisely as planned. In his report General Merritt says: "The orders for attack, and the plan for occupation of the city, were carried out by the troops exactly as contemplated." No doubt this was largely due to the slight resistance made by the enemy; but it was mainly due to the thorough reconnaissance that had been made of his position, and the careful and intelligent preparation of the plan of battle and the means for its execution. Among those means may be mentioned the field-telegraph that was provided. During the progress of the combat the division headquarters, which moved forward with the advancing line far into the city, was kept in connection with two brigade headquarters by the field telegraph,* which insured concert of action in all parts of the line.

*General Anderson's report.

This combat also presents an example of the effective co-operation of naval with land forces in assault. In fact Dewey's fire had driven the Spaniards out of the works on the right of their line before Greene's brigade advanced against them.

It is interesting to compare the battle of San Juan-El Caney with that of Manila. In the first, 1,717 Spaniards in hastily made intrenchments defended themselves stubbornly and heroically against 15,065 Americans, nearly all regulars; in the second a governor-general, after the merest mockery of a defense, surrendered his capital city, a large public fund, 13,000 troops, and 22,000 arms, to fewer than 9,000 Americans, nearly all raw volunteers. The purpose and object of the defense were, however, very different in the two cases. In the first the Spanish commander and his soldiers had a hope to fight for; in the second they could see nothing but despair in any event. At Santiago, so long as Cervera's squadron remained afloat, the army had a chance; it fought to save the squadron. At Manila, on the contrary, the fleet was already lost; the city was besieged by insurgents on one side aching to sack it, and on another by an American army eager to capture it, but bound to save it from the pillage of the insurgents; and Dewey's fleet stood at anchor in the bay closing all communications with the mother-country and the rest of the outside world, and able at any minute to knock the city to pieces with its shells. The case of the Spaniards here was hopeless; the sooner they were able to capitulate to the Americans the better for them; they had nothing left to fight for but their honor.

It is generally believed that it was arranged beforehand between the Spanish Governor-General on one side, and General Merritt and Admiral Dewey on the other, that the white flag of capitulation should be raised as soon as our navy had fired shots enough at Fort San Antonio Abad to satisfy the requirements of Spanish honor; but no hint of anything of the kind appears in General Merritt's report, and the resistance met by Greene in the streets of Malate, and by MacArthur at Singalong, feeble as it was, throws doubt upon the existence of such an arrangement.

CAPTURE OF PORTO RICO.

With the destruction of Montojo's and Cervera's fleets, and the capture of Santiago, Spain's defeat was practically a fact accomplished. Why then, an expedition to Porto Rico? It

was for the double purpose of expelling Spanish sovereignty wholly from American soil, and of having actual possession of that island when the time should come to arrange terms of peace.

General Miles may be criticized for landing his troops in detachments at several points, and starting across the island in four columns too widely separated to support one another. Apparently this would have given a quickwitted and active Spanish commander the opportunity to unite his forces and destroy at least one of the American columns before the others could go to its assistance. But in advising the War Department that he was going to land his expedition at Point Fajardo, and not informing it otherwise until he had actually landed it at a point on the opposite side of the island, General Miles showed a fine appreciation of the great strategic principle of secrecy. He doubtless knew that if he should tell the department beforehand where he really meant to land, the information would leak out and be published to the world by the newspapers. By keeping the secret, and landing where he was not expected by the Spanish commander, he avoided a battle. The Spanish commander had prepared to oppose his landing at Point Fajardo. But while Miles purposely neglected to wire the Secretary of War that he had changed his destination, he did not fail to leave naval vessels to direct and guard the troopships that were to follow those of his first detachment.

APPENDIX

Union and Confederate Commanders in some of the principal campaigns and battles of the Civil War.*

FIRST BATTLE OF BULL RUN OR MANASSAS.

July 21, 1861.

Union Forces, IRVIN McDOWELL, Brig.-Gen., U. S. A.

- First Division*, DANIEL TYLER, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
 - First Brigade*, Erasmus Keyes, Brig.-Gen. Vols., Col. 11th U. S. Inf.
 - Second Brigade*, R. C. Schenck, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
 - Third Brigade*, W. T. Sherman, Brig.-Gen. Vols., Col. 13th U. S. Inf.
 - Fourth Brigade*, I. B. Richardson, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
- Second Division*, DAVID HUNTER, Brig.-Gen. Vols., Col. 3d U. S. Cav.
 - First Brigade*, Andrew Porter, Brig.-Gen. Vols., Col. 16th U. S. Inf.
 - Second Brigade*, A. E. Burnside, Col. 1st R. I.
- Third Division*, S. P. HEINTZELMAN, Brig.-Gen. Vols., Col. 17th U. S. Inf.
 - First Brigade*, W. B. Franklin, Brig.-Gen. Vols., Col. 12th U. S. Inf.
 - Second Brigade*, O. B. Willcox, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
 - Third Brigade*, O. O. Howard, Col. 3d Maine.
- Fourth Division*, THEODORE RUNYON, Brig.-Gen. N. J. Militia.
Nine Regiments not brigaded.
- Fifth Division*, D. S. MILES, Col. 2d U. S. Inf.
 - First Brigade*, Louis Blenker, Col. 8th N. Y.
 - Second Brigade*, T. A. Davies, Col. 16th N. Y.

Confederate Forces.

Army of the Shenandoah, J. E. JOHNSTON, Brig.-Gen.

- First Brigade*, T. J. (Stonewall) Jackson, Col.
- Second Brigade*, F. S. Bartow, Col.
- Third Brigade*, B. E. Bee, Brig.-Gen.
- Fourth Brigade*, A. Elzey, Col.

Army of the Potomac, G. T. BEAUREGARD, Brig.-Gen.

- First Brigade*, M. S. Bonham, Brig.-Gen.
- Second Brigade*, R. S. Ewell, Brig.-Gen.
- Third Brigade*, D. R. Jones, Brig.-Gen.
- Fourth Brigade*, James Longstreet, Brig.-Gen.
- Fifth Brigade*, P. St. G. Cocke, Col.
- Sixth Brigade*, J. A. Early, Col.
- Holmes's Brigade*, T. H. Holmes, Brig.-Gen.

*Taken from *Battles and Leaders of the Civil War*, and Heitman's *Historical Register and Dictionary of the United States Army*.

FORT DONELSON.

February 13-15, 1862.

Union Forces, U. S. GRANT, Brig.-Gen. Vols.*First Division*, J. A. McCLEARNAND, Brig.-Gen. Vols.*First Brigade*, R. T. Oglesby, Col. 8th Ill.*Second Brigade*, W. H. L. Wallace, Col. 11th Ill.*Third Brigade*, W. R. Morrison, Col. Vols.

L. F. Ross, Col. 17th Ill.

Second Division, C. F. SMITH, Brig.-Gen. Vols., Col. 3d U. S. Inf.*First Brigade*, John McArthur, Col. 12th Ill.*Third Brigade*, John Cook, Col. 7th Ill.*Fourth Brigade*, J. G. Lauman, Col. 7th Iowa.*Fifth Brigade*, M. L. Smith, Col. 8th Mo.*Third Division*, LEW WALLACE, Brig.-Gen. Vols.*First Brigade*, Charles Cruft, Col. 31st Ind.*Second Brigade* (attached to the Third Brigade).*Third Brigade*, J. M. Thayer, Col. 1st Neb.*Confederate Forces*, JOHN B. FLOYD, Brig.-Gen.

GIDEON J. PILLOW, Brig.-Gen.

SIMON B. BUCKNER, Brig.-Gen.

Buckner's Division, SIMON B. BUCKNER, Brig.-Gen.*Second Brigade*, W. E. Baldwin, Col.*Third Brigade*, J. C. Brown, Col.*Johnson's Command*, B. R. JOHNSON, Brig.-Gen.*Heiman's Brigade*, A. Heiman, Col.*Davidson's Brigade*, T. J. Davidson, Col.*Drake's Brigade*, Joseph Drake, Col.*Floyd's Division*.*First Brigade*, G. C. Wharton, Col.*Second Brigade*, John McCausland, Col.*Garrison Forces*, J. W. Head, Col.*Cavalry*, N. B. Forrest, Col.**BATTLE OF SHILOH.**

April 6-7, 1862.

Union Forces.*Army of the Tennessee*, U. S. GRANT, Maj.-Gen. Vols.*First Division*, J. A. McCLEARNAND, Maj.-Gen. Vols.*First Brigade*, A. M. Hare, Col. Vols.

M. M. Crocker, Col. 13th Iowa.

Second Brigade, C. C. Marsh, Col. 11th Ill.*Third Brigade*, Julius Raith, Col. Vols.*Second Division*, W. H. L. WALLACE, Brig.-Gen. Vols.*First Brigade*, J. M. Tuttle, Col. 2d Iowa.*Second Brigade*, John McArthur, Brig.-Gen. Vols.*Third Brigade*, T. W. Sweeny, Col. 52d Ill.

- Third Division*, LEW WALLACE, Maj.-Gen. Vols.
First Brigade, M. L. Smith, Col. 8th Mo.
Second Brigade, J. M. Thayer, Col. 1st Neb.
Third Brigade, Charles Whittlesey, Col. 20th Ohio.
- Fourth Division*, S. A. HURLBUT, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
First Brigade, N. G. Williams, Col. 3d Iowa.
 I. C. Pugh, Col. 41st Ill.
Second Brigade, J. C. Veatch, Col. 25th Ind.
Third Brigade, J. G. Lauman, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
- Fifth Division*, W. T. SHERMAN, Brig.-Gen. Vols.,
 Col. 13th U. S. Inf.
First Brigade, J. A. McDowell, Col. Vols.
Second Brigade, David Stuart, Col. 55th Ill.
Third Brigade, Jesse Hildebrand, Col. Vols.
Fourth Brigade, R. P. Buckland, Col. 72nd Ohio.
- Sixth Division*, B. M. PRENTISS, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
First Brigade, Everett Peabody, Col. Vols.
Second Brigade, Madison Miller, Col. 18th Mo.
- Army of the Ohio*, D. C. BUELL, Maj.-Gen. Vols.,
 Col. A. A. G., U. S. A.
- Second Division*, A. McD. McCook, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
 Capt. 3d U. S. Inf.
Fourth Brigade, L. H. Rousseau, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
Fifth Brigade, E. N. Kirk, Col. 34th Ill.
Sixth Brigade, W. H. Gibson, Col. 49th Ohio.
- Fourth Division*, WILLIAM NELSON, Brig.-Gen. Vols.,
 Lieut. U. S. Navy.
Tenth Brigade, Jacob Ammen, Col. 24th Ohio.
Nineteenth Brigade, W. B. Hazen, Col. 41st Ohio.
 Capt. 8th U. S. Inf.
Twenty-second Brigade, S. D. Bruce, Col. Vols.
- Fifth Division*, T. L. CRITTENDEN, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
Eleventh Brigade, J. T. Boyle, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
Fourteenth Brigade, W. Sooy Smith, Col. 13th Ohio.
- Sixth Division*, T. J. WOOD, Brig.-Gen. Vols., Col. 2d U. S. Cav.
Twentieth Brigade, J. A. Garfield, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
Twenty-first Brigade, G. D. Wagner, Col. 15th Ind.

Confederate Forces.

- Army of the Mississippi*, A. S. JOHNSTON, General.
Second in Command, G. T. BEAUREGARD, General.
- First Corps*, LEONIDAS POLK, Maj.-Gen.
First Division, CHARLES CLARK, Brig.-Gen.
 A. P. STEWART, Brig.-Gen.
First Brigade, R. M. Russell, Col.
Second Brigade, A. P. Stewart, Brig.-Gen.
- Second Division*, B. F. CHEATHAM, Maj.-Gen.
First Brigade, B. R. Johnson, Brig.-Gen.
 Preston Smith, Col.
Second Brigade, W. H. Stephens, Col.

- Second Corps*, BRAXTON BRAGG, Maj.-Gen.
First Division, DANIEL RUGGLES, Brig.-Gen.
First Brigade, R. L. Gibson, Col.
Second Brigade, Patton Anderson, Brig.-Gen.
Third Brigade, Preston Pond, Jr., Col.
- Second Division*, J. M. WITHERS, Brig.-Gen.
First Brigade, A. H. Gladden, Brig.-Gen.
Second Brigade, J. R. Chalmers, Brig.-Gen.
Third Brigade, J. K. Jackson, Brig.-Gen.
- Third Corps*, W. J. HARDEE, Maj.-Gen.
First Brigade, T. C. Hindman, Brig.-Gen.
Second Brigade, P. R. Cleburne, Brig.-Gen.
Third Brigade, S. A. M. Wood, Brig.-Gen.
- Reserve Corps*, J. C. BRECKINRIDGE, Brig.-Gen.
First Brigade, R. P. Trabue, Col.
Second Brigade, J. S. Bowen, Brig.-Gen.
Third Brigade, W. S. Statham, Col.

BATTLE OF SEVEN PINES OR FAIR OAKS.

May 31—June 1, 1862.

Union Forces.

Army of the Potomac, G. B. McCLELLAN,
 Maj.-Gen. U. S. A.

- Second Corps*, E. V. SUMNER, Brig.-Gen. U. S. A.
First Division, I. B. RICHARDSON, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
First Brigade, O. O. Howard, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
Second Brigade, T. F. Meagher, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
Third Brigade, W. H. French, Brig.-Gen. Vols.,
 Maj. 2d U. S. Art.
- Second Division*, JOHN SEDGWICK, Brig.-Gen. Vols.,
 Col. 4th U. S. Cav.
First Brigade, W. A. Gorman, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
Second Brigade, W. W. Burns, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
Third Brigade, N. J. T. Dana, Brig.-Gen., Vols.,
 Capt. A. Q. M., U. S. A.
- Third Corps*, S. P. HEINTZELMAN, Maj.-Gen. Vols.,
 Col. 17th U. S. Inf.
- Second Division*, JOSEPH HOOKER, Maj.-Gen. Vols.
Second Brigade, D. E. Sickles, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
Third Brigade, F. E. Patterson, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
- Third Division*, PHILIP KEARNY, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
First Brigade, C. D. Jameson, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
Second Brigade, D. B. Birney, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
Third Brigade, H. G. Berry, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
- Fourth Corps*, E. D. KEYES, Maj.-Gen. Vols., Col. 11th U. S. Inf.
First Division, D. N. Couch, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
First Brigade, J. J. Peck, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
Second Brigade, J. J. Abercrombie, Brig.-Gen. Vols.,
 Col. 7th U. S. Inf.
Third Brigade, Charles Devens, Jr., Brig.-Gen. Vols.

Second Division, SILAS CASEY, Maj.-Gen. Vols., Col. 4th U. S. Inf.
First Brigade, H. M. Naglee, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
Second Brigade, H. W. Wessells, Brig.-Gen. Vols.,
 Maj. 6th U. S. Inf.
Third Brigade, I. N. Palmer, Brig.-Gen. Vols.,
 Maj. 5th U. S. Cav.

Confederate Forces.

Army of Northern Virginia, J. E. JOHNSTON, General.
 G. W. SMITH, Maj.-Gen.
 R. E. LEE, General.

Right Wing, JAMES LONGSTREET, Maj.-Gen.
Longstreet's Division, R. H. ANDERSON, Brig.-Gen.
Kemper's Brigade, J. L. Kemper, Col.
Anderson's Brigade, Micah Jenkins, Col.
Pickett's Brigade, G. E. Pickett, Brig.-Gen.
Wilcox's Brigade, C. M. Wilcox, Brig.-Gen.
Colston's Brigade, R. E. Colston, Brig.-Gen.
Pryor's Brigade, R. A. Pryor, Brig.-Gen.
Hill's Division, D. H. HILL, Maj.-Gen.
Garland's Brigade, Samuel Garland, Jr., Brig.-Gen.
Rodes's Brigade, R. E. Rodes, Brig.-Gen.
Rains's Brigade, G. R. Rains, Brig.-Gen.
Featherston's Brigade, G. B. Anderson, Col.
Huger's Division, BENJAMIN HUGER, Brig.-Gen.
Armistead's Brigade, L. A. Armistead, Brig.-Gen.
Mahone's Brigade, William Mahone, Brig.-Gen.
Blanchard's Brigade, A. G. Blanchard, Brig.-Gen.
Left Wing, G. W. SMITH, Maj.-Gen.
Smith's Division, W. H. C. WHITING, Brig.-Gen.
Whiting's Brigade, E. McL. Law, Col.
Hood's Brigade, J. B. Hood, Brig.-Gen.
Hampton's Brigade, Wade Hampton, Brig.-Gen.
Hatton's Brigade, Robert Hatton, Brig.-Gen.
Pettigrew's Brigade, J. J. Pettigrew, Brig.-Gen.

SEVEN DAYS' BATTLES.

June 25—July 1, 1862.

Union Forces.

Army of the Potomac, G. B. McCLELLAN,
 Maj.-Gen. U. S. A.
Second Corps, E. V. SUMNER, Brig.-Gen. U. S. A.
First Division, I. B. RICHARDSON, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
First Brigade, J. C. Caldwell, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
Second Brigade, T. F. Meagher, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
Third Brigade, W. H. French, Brig.-Gen. Vols.,
 Maj. 2d U. S. Art.
Second Division, JOHN SEDGWICK, Brig.-Gen. Vols.,
 Col. 4th U. S. Cav.
First Brigade, Alfred Sully, Col. 1st Minn.,
 Maj. 8th U. S. Inf.

- Second Brigade*, W. W. Burns, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
Third Brigade, N. J. T. Dana, Brig.-Gen. Vols.,
 Capt. A. Q. M., U. S. A.
Third Corps, S. P. HEINTZELMAN, Maj.-Gen. Vols.,
 Col. 17th U. S. Inf.
Second Division, JOSEPH HOOKER, Maj.-Gen. Vols.
First Brigade, Cuvier Grover, Brig.-Gen. Vols.,
 Capt. 10th U. S. Inf.
Second Brigade, D. E. Sickles, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
Third Brigade, J. B. Carr, Col. 2d N. Y.
Third Division, PHILIP KEARNY, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
First Brigade, J. C. Robinson, Brig.-Gen. Vols.,
 Capt. 5th U. S. Inf.
Second Brigade, D. B. Birney, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
Third Brigade, H. G. Berry, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
Fourth Corps, E. D. KEYES, Maj.-Gen. Vols., Col. 11th U. S. Inf.
First Division, D. N. COUCH, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
First Brigade, A. P. Howe, Brig.-Gen. Vols.,
 Capt. 4th U. S. Art.
Second Brigade, J. J. Abercrombie, Brig.-Gen. Vols.,
 Col. 7th U. S. Inf.
Third Brigade, I. N. Palmer, Brig.-Gen. Vols.,
 Maj. 5th U. S. Cav.
Second Division, J. J. PECK, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
First Brigade, H. M. Naglee, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
Second Brigade, H. W. Wessells, Brig.-Gen. Vols.,
 Maj. 6th U. S. Inf.
Fifth Corps, FITZ-JOHN PORTER, Brig.-Gen. Vols.,
 Col. 15th U. S. Inf.
First Division, G. W. MORELL, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
First Brigade, J. H. Martindale, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
Second Brigade, Charles Griffin, Brig.-Gen. Vols.,
 Capt. 5th U. S. Art.
Third Brigade, Daniel Butterfield, Brig.-Gen. Vols.,
 Lt.-Col. 12th U. S. Inf.
Second Division, GEORGE SYKES, Brig.-Gen. Vols.,
 Maj. 14th U. S. Inf.
First Brigade, R. C. Buchanan, Lt.-Col. 4th U. S. Inf.
Second Brigade, William Chapman, Lt.-Col. 3d U. S. Inf.
Third Brigade, G. K. Warren, Col. 5th N. Y.,
 Capt. U. S. Top. Eng.
Third Division, G. A. McCALL, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
First Brigade, J. F. Reynolds, Brig.-Gen. Vols.,
 Lt.-Col. 14th U. S. Inf.
Second Brigade, G. G. Meade, Brig.-Gen. Vols.,
 Maj. U. S. Top. Eng.
Third Brigade, Truman Seymour, Brig.-Gen. Vols.,
 Capt. 5th U. S. Art.
Sixth Corps, W. B. FRANKLIN, Brig.-Gen. Vols., Col. 12th U. S. Inf.
First Division, H. W. SLOCUM, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
First Brigade, G. W. Taylor, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
Second Brigade, J. J. Bartlett, Col. 27th N. Y.
Third Brigade, John Newton, Brig.-Gen. Vols.,
 Maj. U. S. Eng.

Second Division, WM. F. SMITH, Brig.-Gen. Vols.,
 Capt. U. S. Top. Eng.
First Brigade, W. S. Hancock, Brig.-Gen. Vols.,
 Capt. A. Q. M., U. S. A.
Second Brigade, W. T. H. Brooks, Brig.-Gen. Vols.,
 Capt. 3d U. S. Inf.
Third Brigade, J. W. Davidson, Brig.-Gen. Vols.,
 Maj. 2d U. S. Cav.

Cavalry Reserve, P. ST. G. COOKE, Brig.-Gen. U. S. A.
First Brigade, R. H. Rush, Col. 6th Pa. Cav.
Second Brigade, G. A. H. Blake, Col. 1st U. S. Cav.
Artillery Reserve, H. J. HUNT, Col. A. A. D. C., Maj. 5th U. S. Art.
First Brigade, Wm. Hays, Lt.-Col. A. A. D. C.,
 Capt. 2d U. S. Art.
Second Brigade, G. W. Getty, Lt.-Col. A. A. D. C.,
 Capt. 5th U. S. Art.
Third Brigade, Albert Arndt, Maj. 1st Battalion N. Y. Art.
Fourth Brigade, E. R. Petherbridge, Maj. Md. Art.
Fifth Brigade, J. H. Carlisle, Capt. 2d U. S. Art.

Confederate Forces.

Army of Northern Virginia, R. E. LEE, General.

Jackson's Command, T. J. (Stonewall) JACKSON, Maj.-Gen.

Whiting's Division, W. H. C. WHITING, Brig.-Gen.
First Brigade, J. B. Hood, Brig.-Gen.
Third Brigade, E. McL. Law, Col.

Jackson's Division,

First Brigade, C. S. Winder, Brig.-Gen.
Second Brigade, R. H. Cunningham, Lt.-Col.
Third Brigade, S. V. Fulkerson, Col.
 E. T. H. Warren, Col.
 Wade Hampton, Brig.-Gen.
Fourth Brigade, A. R. Lawton, Brig.-Gen.

Ewell's Division, R. S. EWELL, Maj.-Gen.

Fourth Brigade, Arnold Elzey, Brig.-Gen.
Seventh Brigade, I. R. Trimble, Brig.-Gen.
Eighth Brigade, Richard Taylor, Brig.-Gen.

Hill's Division, D. H. HILL, Maj.-Gen.

First Brigade, R. E. Rodes, Brig.-Gen.
 J. B. Gordon, Col.
Second Brigade, G. B. Anderson, Brig.-Gen.
Third Brigade, Samuel Garland, Brig.-Gen.
Fourth Brigade, A. H. Colquitt, Col.
Fifth Brigade, R. S. Ripley, Brig.-Gen.

Magruder's Command, J. B. MAGRUDER, Maj.-Gen.

Jones's Division, D. R. JONES, Brig.-Gen.
First Brigade, Robert Toombs, Brig.-Gen.
Third Brigade, G. T. Anderson, Col.

McLaws's Division, LAFAYETTE McLAWS, Maj.-Gen.

First Brigade, P. J. Semmes, Brig.-Gen.
Fourth Brigade, J. B. Kershaw, Brig.-Gen.

Magruder's Division.

Second Brigade, Howell Cobb, Brig.-Gen.
Third Brigade, Richard Griffith, Brig.-Gen.

Longstreet's Command, JAMES LONGSTREET, Maj.-Gen.*Longstreet's Division*,*First Brigade*, J. L. Kemper, Brig.-Gen.*Second Brigade*, R. H. Anderson, Brig.-Gen.*Third Brigade*, G. E. Pickett, Brig.-Gen.*Fourth Brigade*, C. M. Wilcox, Brig.-Gen.*Fifth Brigade*, R. A. Pryor, Brig.-Gen.*Sixth Brigade*, W. S. Featherston, Brig.-Gen.*Hill's Division*, A. P. HILL, Maj.-Gen.*First Brigade*, C. W. Field, Brig.-Gen.*Second Brigade*, Maxcy Gregg, Brig.-Gen.*Third Brigade*, J. R. Anderson, Brig.-Gen.*Fourth Brigade*, L. O'B. Branch, Brig.-Gen.*Fifth Brigade*, J. J. Archer, Brig.-Gen.*Sixth Brigade*, W. D. Pender, Brig.-Gen.*Holmes's Division*, T. H. HOLMES, Maj.-Gen.*Second Brigade*, Robert Ransom, Jr., Brig.-Gen.*Third Brigade*, Junius Daniel, Brig.-Gen.*Fourth Brigade*, J. G. Walker, Brig.-Gen.*Cavalry*, J. E. B. STUART, Brig.-Gen.*Reserve Artillery*, WM. N. PENDLETON, Brig.-Gen.

SECOND BATTLE OF BULL RUN OR MANASSAS.

August 29-30, 1862.

*Union Forces.**Army of Virginia*, JOHN POPE, Maj.-Gen. Vols.,

Capt. U. S. Top. Eng.

First Corps, FRANZ SIGEL, Maj.-Gen. Vols.*First Division*, R. C. SCHENCK, Brig.-Gen. Vols.*First Brigade*, Julius Stahel, Brig.-Gen. Vols.*Second Brigade*, N. C. McLean, Col. 75th Ohio.*Second Division*, A. VON STEINWEHR, Brig.-Gen. Vols.*First Brigade*, J. A. Koltes, Col. Vols.*Third Division*, CARL SCHURZ, Brig.-Gen. Vols.*First Brigade*, Henry Bohlen, Brig.-Gen. Vols.*Second Brigade*, Vladimir Krzyzanowski, Col. 58th N. Y.*Independent Brigade*, R. H. Milroy, Brig.-Gen. Vols.*Cavalry Brigade*, John Beardsley, Col. 9th N. Y. Cav.*Second Corps*, N. P. BANKS, Maj.-Gen. Vols.

(This Corps was with wagon-train.)

First Division, A. S. WILLIAMS, Brig.-Gen. Vols.*First Brigade*, S. W. Crawford, Brig.-Gen. Vols.*Third Brigade*, G. H. Gordon, Brig.-Gen. Vols.*Second Division*, G. S. GREENE, Brig.-Gen. Vols.*First Brigade*, Charles Candy, Col. 66th Ohio.*Second Brigade*, Matthew Schlaudecker, Col. Vols.*Third Brigade*, J. A. Tait, Col. Vols.*Cavalry Brigade*, John Buford, Brig.-Gen. Vols.,

Maj. A. I. G., U. S. A.

- Third Corps*, IRVIN McDOWELL, Maj.-Gen. Vols., Brig.-Gen. U.S.A.
First Division, RUFUS KING, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
First Brigade, J. P. Hatch, Brig.-Gen. Vols.,
 Capt. 3d U. S. Cav.
Second Brigade, Abner Doubleday, Brig.-Gen. Vols.,
 Maj. 17th U. S. Inf.
Third Brigade, M. R. Patrick, Brig.-Gen. Vols.,
 Capt. 2d U. S. Inf.
Fourth Brigade, John Gibbon, Brig.-Gen. Vols.,
 Capt. 4th U. S. Art.
Second Division, J. B. RICKETTS, Brig.-Gen. Vols.,
 Capt. 1st U. S. Art.
First Brigade, Abram Duryea, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
Second Brigade, Z. B. Tower, Brig.-Gen. Vols.,
 Maj. U. S. Eng.
Third Brigade, G. L. Hartsuff, Brig.-Gen. Vols.,
 Maj. A. A. G., U. S. A.
Fourth Brigade, Joseph Thoburn, Col. Vols.
Cavalry Brigade, G. D. Bayard, Brig.-Gen. Vols.,
 Capt. 4th U. S. Cav.
Reynolds's Division, J. F. REYNOLDS, Brig.-Gen. Vols.,
 Lt.-Col. 14th U. S. Inf.
First Brigade, G. G. Meade, Brig.-Gen. Vols.,
 Maj. U. S. Top. Eng.
Second Brigade, Truman Semour, Brig.-Gen. Vols.,
 Capt. 5th U. S. Art.
Third Brigade, C. F. Jackson, Brig.-Gen.

Army of the Potomac.

- Third Corps*, S. P. HEINTZELMAN, Maj.-Gen. Vols.,
 Col. 17th U. S. Inf.
First Division, PHILIP KEARNEY, Maj.-Gen. Vols.
First Brigade, J. C. Robinson, Brig.-Gen. Vols.,
 Capt. 5th U. S. Inf.
Second Brigade, D. B. Birney, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
Third Brigade, O. M. Poe, Col. 2d Mich.,
 1st Lt. U. S. Top. Eng.
Second Division, JOSEPH HOOKER, Maj.-Gen. Vols.
First Brigade, Cuvier Grover, Brig.-Gen. Vols.,
 Capt. 10th U. S. Inf.
Second Brigade, Nelson Taylor, Col. 72d N. Y.
Third Brigade, J. B. Carr, Col. 2d N. Y.
Fifth Corps, F. J. PORTER, Maj.-Gen. Vols., Col. 15th U. S. Inf.
First Division, G. W. MORELL, Maj.-Gen. Vols.
First Brigade, C. W. Roberts, Col. 2d Me.
Second Brigade, Charles Griffin, Brig.-Gen. Vols.,
 Capt. 5th U. S. Art.
Third Brigade, Daniel Butterfield, Brig.-Gen. Vols.,
 Lt.-Col. 12th U. S. Inf.
Second Division, GEORGE SYKES, Brig.-Gen. Vols.,
 Maj. 14th U. S. Inf.
First Brigade, R. C. Buchanan, Lt.-Col. 4th U. S. Inf.
Second Brigade, Wm. Chapman, Lt.-Col. 3d U. S. Inf.
Third Brigade, G. K. Warren, Col. 5th N. Y.,
 Capt. U. S. Top. Eng.

Ninth Corps, J. L. RENO, Maj.-Gen. Vols., Capt. U. S. Ordnance.

First Division, I. I. STEVENS, Maj.-Gen. Vols.

First Brigade, B. C. Christ, Col. 50th Pa.

Second Brigade, Daniel Leasure, Col. Vols.

Third Brigade, Addison Farnsworth, Col. 79th N. Y.

Second Division.

First Brigade, James Nagle, Col. 48th Pa.

Second Brigade, Edward Ferrero, Col. 51st N. Y.

Confederate Forces.

Army of Northern Virginia, R. E. LEE, General.

Right Wing, JAMES LONGSTREET, Maj.-Gen.

Anderson's Division, R. H. ANDERSON, Maj.-Gen.

Armistead's Brigade, L. A. Armistead, Brig.-Gen.

Mahone's Brigade, Wm. Mahone, Brig.-Gen.

Wright's Brigade, A. R. Wright, Brig.-Gen.

Jones's Division, D. R. JONES, Brig.-Gen.

Toombs's Brigade, Robert Toombs, Brig.-Gen.

Drayton's Brigade, T. F. Drayton, Brig.-Gen.

Jones's Brigade, G. T. Anderson, Col.

Wilcox's Division, C. M. WILCOX, Brig.-Gen.

Wilcox's Brigade, C. M. Wilcox, Brig.-Gen.

Pryor's Brigade, R. A. Pryor, Brig.-Gen.

Featherston's Brigade, W. S. Featherston, Brig.-Gen.

Hood's Division, J. B. HOOD, Brig.-Gen.

Hood's Brigade, J. B. Hood, Brig.-Gen.

Whiting's Brigade, E. M. Law, Col.

Kemper's Division, J. L. KEMPER, Brig.-Gen.

Kemper's Brigade, M. D. Corse, Col.

Jenkins's Brigade, Micah Jenkins, Brig.-Gen.

Pickett's Brigade, Eppa Hunton, Col.

Evans's Independent Brigade, N. G. Evans, Brig.-Gen.

Left Wing, T. J. (Stonewall) JACKSON, Maj.-Gen.

First Division, WM. B. TALIAFERRO, Brig.-Gen.

First Brigade, W. S. H. Baylor, Col.

Second Brigade, John Seddon, Maj.

Third Brigade, A. G. Taliaferro, Col.

Fourth Brigade, W. E. Starke, Brig.-Gen.

Second Division, A. P. HILL, Maj.-Gen.

Branch's Brigade, L. O'B. Branch, Brig.-Gen.

Pender's Brigade, W. D. Pender, Brig.-Gen.

Thomas's Brigade, E. L. Thomas, Col.

Gregg's Brigade, Maxcy Gregg, Brig.-Gen.

Archer's Brigade, J. J. Archer, Brig.-Gen.

Field's Brigade, C. W. Field, Brig.-Gen.

Third Division, R. S. EWELL, Maj.-Gen.

Lawton's Brigade, A. R. Lawton, Brig.-Gen.

Trimble's Brigade, I. R. Trimble, Brig.-Gen.

Early's Brigade, J. A. Early, Brig.-Gen.

Hays's Brigade, Henry Forno, Col.

Cavalry Division, J. E. B. STUART, Maj.-Gen.

Robertson's Brigade, B. H. Robertson, Brig.-Gen.

Lee's Brigade, Fitzhugh Lee, Brig.-Gen.

BATTLE OF ANTIETAM OR SHARPSBURG.

Sept. 17, 1862.

Union Forces.

Army of the Potomac, G. B. McCLELLAN,
Maj.-Gen. U. S. A.

First Corps, JOSEPH HOOKER, Maj.-Gen. Vols.

First Division, ABNER DOUBLEDAY, Brig.-Gen. Vols.,
Maj. 17th U. S. Inf.

First Brigade, Walter Phelps, Jr., Col. 22d N. Y.

Second Brigade, W. P. Wainwright, Col. Vols.

Third Brigade, M. R. Patrick, Brig.-Gen. Vols.,
Capt. 2d U. S. Inf.

Fourth Brigade, John Gibbon, Brig.-Gen. Vols.,
Capt. 4th U. S. Art.

Second Division, J. B. RICKETTS, Brig.-Gen. Vols.,
Capt. 1st U. S. Art.

First Brigade, Abram Duryea, Brig.-Gen. Vols.

Second Brigade, W. A. Christian, Col. Vols.

Third Brigade, G. L. Hartsuff, Brig.-Gen. Vols.,
Maj. A. A. G., U. S. A.

Third Division, G. G. MEADE, Brig.-Gen. Vols.,
Maj. U. S. Top. Eng.

First Brigade, Truman Seymour, Brig.-Gen. Vols.,
Capt. 5th U. S. Art.

Second Brigade, A. L. Magilton, Col. 4th Pa. Reserve.

Third Brigade, T. F. Gallagher, Col. 11th Pa. Reserve.

Second Corps, E. V. SUMNER, Maj.-Gen. Vols., Brig.-Gen. U. S. A.

First Division, I. B. RICHARDSON, Maj.-Gen. Vols.

First Brigade, J. C. Caldwell, Brig.-Gen. Vols.

Second Brigade, T. F. Meagher, Brig.-Gen. Vols.

Third Brigade, J. R. Brooke, Col. 53d Pa.

Second Division, JOHN SEDGWICK, Maj.-Gen. Vols.,
Col. 4th U. S. Cav.

First Brigade, W. A. Gorman, Brig.-Gen. Vols.

Second Brigade, O. O. Howard, Brig.-Gen. Vols.

Third Brigade, N. J. T. Dana, Brig.-Gen. Vols.

Third Division, W. H. FRENCH, Brig.-Gen. Vols.,
Maj. 2d U. S. Art.

First Brigade, Nathan Kimball, Brig.-Gen. Vols.

Second Brigade, Dwight Morris, Col. Vols.

Third Brigade, Max Weber, Brig.-Gen. Vols.

Fourth Corps.

First Division, D. N. COUCH, Maj.-Gen. Vols.

First Brigade, Charles Devens, Jr., Brig.-Gen. Vols.

Second Brigade, A. P. Howe, Brig.-Gen. Vols.,
Capt. 4th U. S. Art.

Third Brigade, John Cochrane, Brig.-Gen. Vols.

Fifth Corps, F. J. PORTER, Maj.-Gen. Vols., Col. 15th U. S. Inf.

First Division, G. W. MORELL, Maj.-Gen. Vols.

First Brigade, James Barnes, Col. 18th Mass.

Second Brigade, Charles Griffin, Brig.-Gen. Vols.,
Capt. 5th U. S. Art.

Third Brigade, T. B. W. Stockton, Col. 16th Mich.

- Second Division*, GEORGE SYKES, Brig.-Gen. Vols.,
Maj. 14th U. S. Inf.
First Brigade, R. C. Buchanan, Lt.-Col. 4th U. S. Inf.
Second Brigade, C. S. Lovell, Maj. 10th U. S. Inf.
Third Brigade, G. K. Warren, Col. 5th N. Y.,
Capt. U. S. Top. Eng.
- Sixth Corps*, W. B. FRANKLIN, Maj.-Gen. Vols., Col. 12th U. S. Inf.
First Division, H. W. SLOCUM, Maj.-Gen. Vols.
First Brigade, A. T. A. Torbert, Col. 1st N. J.,
Capt. 5th U. S. Inf.
Second Brigade, J. J. Bartlett, Col. 27th N. Y.
Third Brigade, John Newton, Brig.-Gen. Vols.,
Maj. U. S. Eng.
- Second Division*, WM. F. SMITH, Maj.-Gen. Vols.,
Capt. U. S. Top. Eng.
First Brigade, W. S. Hancock, Brig.-Gen. Vols.,
Capt. A. Q. M., U. S. A.
Second Brigade, W. T. H. Brooks, Brig.-Gen. Vols.,
Capt. 3d U. S. Inf.
Third Brigade, W. H. Irwin, Col. 49th Pa.
- Ninth Corps*, A. E. BURNSIDE, Maj.-Gen. Vols.
First Division, O. B. WILLCOX, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
First Brigade, B. C. Christ, Col. 50th Pa.
Second Brigade, Thomas Welsh, Col. 45th Pa.
- Second Division*, S. D. STURGIS, Brig.-Gen. Vols.,
Maj. 4th U. S. Cav.
First Brigade, James Nagle, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
Second Brigade, Edward Ferrero, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
- Third Division*, I. P. RODMAN, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
First Brigade, H. S. Fairchild, Col. 89th N. Y.
Second Brigade, Edward Harland, Col. 8th Conn.
- Kanawha Division*, J. D. COX, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
First Brigade, E. P. Scammon, Col. 23d Ohio.
Second Brigade, August Moor, Col. 28th Ohio.

Confederate Forces.

Army of Northern Virginia, R. E. LEE, General.

- Longstreet's Command*, JAMES LONGSTREET, Maj.-Gen.
McLaws's Division, LAFAYETTE MCLAWS, Maj.-Gen.
Kershaw's Brigade, J. B. Kershaw, Brig.-Gen.
Cobb's Brigade, Howell Cobb, Brig.-Gen.
Semmes's Brigade, P. J. Semmes, Brig.-Gen.
Barksdale's Brigade, William Barksdale, Brig.-Gen.
- Anderson's Division*, R. H. ANDERSON, Maj.-Gen.
Wilcox's Brigade, Alfred Cumming, Col.
Mahone's Brigade, W. A. Parham, Col.
Featherston's Brigade, Carnot Posey, Col.
Armistead's Brigade, L. A. Armistead, Brig.-Gen.
Pryor's Brigade, R. A. Pryor, Brig.-Gen.
Wright's Brigade, A. R. Wright, Brig.-Gen.
- Jones's Division*, D. R. JONES, Brig.-Gen.
Toombs's Brigade, Robert Toombs, Brig.-Gen.
Drayton's Brigade, T. F. Drayton, Brig.-Gen.
Pickett's Brigade, R. B. Garnett, Brig.-Gen.

- Kemper's Brigade*, J. L. Kemper, Brig.-Gen.
Jenkins's Brigade, Joseph Walker, Col.
Anderson's Brigade, G. T. Anderson, Col.
Walker's Division, J. G. WALKER, Brig.-Gen.
Walker's Brigade, Van H. Manning, Col.
Ransom's Brigade, Robert Ransom, Brig.-Gen.
Hood's Division, J. B. HOOD, Brig.-Gen.
Hood's Brigade, W. T. Wofford, Col.
Law's Brigade, E. McL. Law, Col.
Jackson's Command, T. J. (Stonewall) JACKSON, Maj.-Gen.
Ewell's Division, A. R. LAWTON, Brig.-Gen.
Lawton's Brigade, M. Douglass, Col.
Early's Brigade, J. A. Early, Brig.-Gen.
Trimble's Brigade, J. A. Walker, Col.
Hays's Brigade, H. T. Hays, Brig.-Gen.
Light Division, A. P. HILL, Maj.-Gen.
Branch's Brigade, L. O'B. Branch, Brig.-Gen.
Gregg's Brigade, Maxcy Gregg, Brig.-Gen.
Field's Brigade, J. M. Brockenbrough, Col.
Archer's Brigade, J. J. Archer, Brig.-Gen.
Pender's Brigade, W. D. Pender, Brig.-Gen.
Thomas's Brigade, E. L. Thomas, Col.
Jackson's Division, J. R. JONES, Brig.-Gen.
Winder's Brigade, A. J. Grigsby, Col.
Taliaferro's Brigade, E. T. H. Warren, Col.
Jones's Brigade, B. T. Johnson, Col.
Starke's Brigade, Wm. E. Starke, Brig.-Gen.
Hill's Division, D. H. HILL, Maj.-Gen.
Ripley's Brigade, R. S. Ripley, Brig.-Gen.
Rodes's Brigade, R. E. Rodes, Brig.-Gen.
Garland's Brigade, Samuel Garland, Brig.-Gen.
Anderson's Brigade, G. B. Anderson, Brig.-Gen.
Colquitt's Brigade, A. H. Colquitt, Col.
Cavalry, J. E. B. STUART, Maj.-Gen.
Hampton's Brigade, Wade Hampton, Brig.-Gen.
Lee's Brigade, Fitzhugh Lee, Brig.-Gen.
Robertson's Brigade, T. T. Munford, Col.
Reserve Artillery, W. N. PENDLETON, Brig.-Gen.

BATTLE OF FREDERICKSBURG.

December 13, 1862.

Union Forces.

- Army of the Potomac*, A. E. BURNSIDE, Maj.-Gen. Vols.
Right Grand Division, E. V. SUMNER, Maj.-Gen. Vols.,
 Brig.-Gen. U. S. A.
Second Corps, D. N. COUCH, Maj.-Gen. Vols.
First Division, W. S. HANCOCK, Brig.-Gen. Vols.,
 Capt. A. Q. M., U. S. A.
First Brigade, J. C. Caldwell, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
Second Brigade, T. F. Meagher, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
Third Brigade, S. K. Zook, Brig.-Gen. Vols.

- Second Division*, O. O. HOWARD, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
First Brigade, Alfred Sully, Brig.-Gen. Vols.,
Maj. 8th U. S. Inf.
Second Brigade, J. T. Owen, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
Third Brigade, N. J. Hall, Col. 7th Mich.,
1st Lt. 5th U. S. Art.
- Third Division*, W. H. FRENCH, Brig.-Gen. Vols.,
Maj. 2d U. S. Art.
First Brigade, Nathan Kimball, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
Second Brigade, O. H. Palmer, Col. 108th N. Y.
Third Brigade, J. W. Andrews, Col. Vols.
- Ninth Corps*, O. B. WILLCOX, Brig.-Gen.
First Division, W. W. BURNS, Brig.-Gen. Vols.,
Maj. C. S., U. S. A.
First Brigade, O. M. Poe, Brig.-Gen. Vols.,
1st Lt. U. S. Top Eng.
Second Brigade, B. C. Christ, Col. 50th Pa.
Third Brigade, Daniel Leasure, Col. Vols.
- Second Division*, S. D. STURGIS, Brig.-Gen. Vols.,
Maj. 4th U. S. Cav.
First Brigade, James Nagle, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
Second Brigade, Edward Ferrero, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
- Third Division*, G. W. GETTY, Brig.-Gen. Vols.,
Capt. 5th U. S. Art.
First Brigade, R. C. Hawkins, Col. 9th N. Y.
Second Brigade, Edward Harland, Col. 8th Conn.
- Cavalry Division*, ALFRED PLEASANTON, Brig.-Gen. Vols.,
Maj. 2d U. S. Cav.
First Brigade, J. F. Farnsworth, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
Second Brigade, D. McM. Gregg, Brig.-Gen. Vols.,
Capt. 6th U. S. Cav.
- Center Grand Division*, JOSEPH HOOKER, Maj.-Gen. Vols.
- Third Corps*, GEORGE STONEMAN, Maj.-Gen. Vols.,
Maj. 4th U. S. Cav.
First Division, D. B. BIRNEY, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
First Brigade, J. C. Robinson, Brig.-Gen. Vols.,
Maj. 2d U. S. Inf.
Second Brigade, J. H. H. Ward, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
Third Brigade, H. G. Berry, Maj. Gen. Vols.
- Second Division*, D. E. SICKLES, Maj.-Gen. Vols.
First Brigade, J. B. Carr, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
Second Brigade, G. B. Hall, Col. Vols.
Third Brigade, J. W. Revere, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
- Third Division*, A. W. WHIPPLE, Brig.-Gen. Vols.,
Maj. U. S. Top Eng.
First Brigade, A. S. Piatt, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
Second Brigade, S. S. Carroll, Col. 8th Ohio,
Capt. 10th U. S. Inf.
- Fifth Corps*, DANIEL BUTTERFIELD, Maj.-Gen. Vols.,
Lt.-Col. 12th U. S. Inf.
First Division, CHARLES GRIFFIN, Brig.-Gen. Vols.,
Capt. 5th U. S. Art.
First Brigade, James Barnes, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
Second Brigade, J. B. Sweitzer, Col. 62d Pa.
Third Brigade, T. B. W. Stockton, Col. 16th Mich.

Second Division, GEORGE SYKES, Maj.-Gen. Vols.,
Maj. 14th U. S. Inf.

First Brigade, R. C. Buchanan, Brig.-Gen. Vols.,
Lt.-Col. 4th U. S. Inf.

Second Brigade, G. L. Andrews, Maj. 17th U. S. Inf.

Third Brigade, G. K. Warren, Brig.-Gen. Vols.,
Capt. U. S. Top. Eng.

Third Division, A. A. HUMPHREYS, Brig.-Gen. Vols.,
Maj. U. S. Top. Eng.

First Brigade, E. B. Tyler, Brig.-Gen. Vols.

Second Brigade, P. H. Allabach, Col. Vols.

Cavalry Brigade, W. W. AVERELL, Brig.-Gen. Vols.,
Capt. 3d U. S. Cav.

Left Grand Division, W. B. FRANKLIN, Maj.-Gen. Vols.,
Col. 15th U. S. Inf.

First Corps, J. F. REYNOLDS, Maj.-Gen. Vols.,
Lt.-Col. 14th U. S. Inf.

First Division, ABNER DOUBLEDAY, Maj.-Gen. Vols.,
Maj. 17th U. S. Inf.

First Brigade, Walter Phelps, Col. 22d N. Y.

Second Brigade, James Gavin, Col. Vols.

Third Brigade, W. F. Rogers, Col. 21st N. Y.

Fourth Brigade, Solomon Meredith, Brig.-Gen. Vols.

Second Division, JOHN GIBBON, Brig.-Gen. Vols.,
Capt. 4th U. S. Art.

First Brigade, A. R. Root, Col. 94th N. Y.

Second Brigade, Peter Lyle, Col. 90th Pa.

Third Brigade, Nelson Taylor, Brig.-Gen. Vols.

Third Division, GEORGE G. MEADE, Maj.-Gen. Vols.,
Maj. U. S. Top. Eng.

First Brigade, William Sinclair, Col. 6th Pa.,
1st Lt. 3d U. S. Art.

Second Brigade, A. L. Magilton, Col. 4th Pa. Reserve.

Third Brigade, C. F. Jackson, Brig.-Gen. Vols.

Sixth Corps, W. F. SMITH, Maj.-Gen. Vols., Capt. U. S. Top. Eng.

First Division, W. T. H. BROOKS, Brig.-Gen. Vols.,
Maj. 18th U. S. Inf.

First Brigade, A. T. A. Torbert, Brig.-Gen. Vols.,
Capt. 5th U. S. Inf.

Second Brigade, H. L. Cake, Col. Vols.

Third Brigade, D. A. Russell, Brig.-Gen. Vols.,
Maj. 8th U. S. Inf.

Second Division, A. P. HOWE, Brig.-Gen. Vols.,
Capt. 4th U. S. Art.

First Brigade, C. E. Pratt, Brig.-Gen. Vols.

Second Brigade, Henry Whiting, Col. 2d Vt.

Third Brigade, F. L. Vinton, Brig.-Gen. Vols.,
Capt. 16th U. S. Inf.

Third Division, JOHN NEWTON, Brig.-Gen. Vols.,
Maj. U. S. Eng.

First Brigade, John Cochrane, Brig.-Gen. Vols.

Second Brigade, Charles Devens, Jr., Brig.-Gen. Vols.

Third Brigade, T. A. Rowley, Brig.-Gen. Vols.

Cavalry Brigade, G. B. BAYARD, Brig.-Gen. Vols., Capt. 4th U. S. Cav.

Confederate Forces.

Army of Northern Virginia, R. E. LEE, General.

First Corps, JAMES LONGSTREET, Lieut.-Gen.

McLaws's Division, LAFAYETTE McLAWS, Maj.-Gen.

Kershaw's Brigade, J. B. Kershaw, Brig.-Gen.

Barksdale's Brigade, William Barksdale, Brig.-Gen.

Cobb's Brigade, T. R. R. Cobb, Brig.-Gen.

Semmes's Brigade, P. J. Semmes, Brig.-Gen.

Anderson's Division, R. H. ANDERSON, Maj.-Gen.

Wilcox's Brigade, C. M. Wilcox, Brig.-Gen.

Mahone's Brigade, William Mahone, Brig.-Gen.

Featherston's Brigade, W. S. Featherston, Brig.-Gen.

Wright's Brigade, A. R. Wright, Brig.-Gen.

Perry's Brigade, E. A. Perry, Brig.-Gen.

Pickett's Division, G. E. PICKETT, Maj.-Gen.

Garnett's Brigade, R. B. Garnett, Brig.-Gen.

Armistead's Brigade, L. A. Armistead, Brig.-Gen.

Kemper's Brigade, J. L. Kemper, Brig.-Gen.

Jenkins's Brigade, Micah Jenkins, Brig.-Gen.

Corse's Brigade, M. D. Corse, Brig.-Gen.

Hood's Division, J. B. HOOD, Maj.-Gen.

Law's Brigade, E. McL. Law, Brig.-Gen.

Robertson's Brigade, J. B. Robertson, Brig.-Gen.

Anderson's Brigade, G. T. Anderson, Brig.-Gen.

Toombs's Brigade, H. L. Benning, Col.

Ransom's Division, ROBERT RANSOM, Brig.-Gen.

Ransom's Brigade, Robert Ransom, Brig.-Gen.

Cooke's Brigade, J. R. Cooke, Brig.-Gen.

Second Corps, T. J. (Stonewall) JACKSON, Lieut.-Gen.

Hill's Division, D. H. HILL, Maj.-Gen.

First Brigade, R. E. Rodes, Brig.-Gen.

Second Brigade, George Doles, Brig.-Gen.

Third Brigade, A. H. Colquitt, Brig.-Gen.

Fourth Brigade, Alfred Iverson, Brig.-Gen.

Fifth Brigade, Bryan Grimes, Col.

Light Division, A. P. HILL, Maj.-Gen.

First Brigade, J. M. Brockenbrough, Brig.-Gen.

Second Brigade, Maxcy Gregg, Brig.-Gen.

Third Brigade, E. L. Thomas, Brig.-Gen.

Fourth Brigade, J. H. Lane, Brig.-Gen.

Fifth Brigade, J. J. Archer, Brig.-Gen.

Sixth Brigade, W. D. Pender, Brig.-Gen.

Ewell's Division, J. A. EARLY, Brig.-Gen.

Lawton's Brigade, E. N. Atkinson, Col.

Trimble's Brigade, R. F. Hoke, Col.

Early's Brigade, J. A. Walker, Col.

Hays's Brigade, H. T. Hays, Brig.-Gen.

Jackson's Division, W. B. TALIAFERRO, Brig.-Gen.

First Brigade, E. F. Paxton, Brig.-Gen.

Second Brigade, J. R. Jones, Brig.-Gen.

Third Brigade, E. T. H. Warren, Col.

Fourth Brigade, Edmund Pendleton, Col.

Reserve Artillery, W. N. PENDLETON, Brig.-Gen.

Cavalry, J. E. B. STUART, Maj.-Gen.
First Brigade, Wade Hampton, Brig.-Gen.
Second Brigade, Fitzhugh Lee, Brig.-Gen.
Third Brigade, W. H. F. Lee, Brig. Gen.

BATTLE OF STONES RIVER.

December 31, 1862—January 2, 1863.

Union Forces.

Army of the Cumberland, W. S. ROSECRANS,
 Maj.-Gen. Vols.,
 Brig.-Gen. U. S. A.

Right Wing, A. McD. MCCOOK, Maj.-Gen. Vols., Capt. 3d U. S. Inf.
First Division, J. C. DAVIS, Brig.-Gen. Vols., Capt. 1st U. S. Art.
Second Brigade, W. P. Carlin, Brig.-Gen. Vols.,
 Capt. 6th U. S. Inf.

Third Brigade, W. E. Woodruff, Col. Vols.
Second Division, R. W. JOHNSON, Brig.-Gen. Vols.,
 Capt. 5th U. S. Cav.
First Brigade, August Willich, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
Second Brigade, E. N. Kirk, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
Third Brigade, P. P. Baldwin, Col. Vols.
Third Division, P. H. SHERIDAN, Brig.-Gen. Vols.,
 Capt. 13th U. S. Inf.

First Brigade, J. W. Sill, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
Second Brigade, Frederick Schaefer, Col. Vols.
Third Brigade, G. W. Roberts, Col. Vols.
Center, G. H. THOMAS, Maj.-Gen. Vols., Col. 5th U. S. Cav.
First Division, L. H. ROUSSEAU, Maj.-Gen. Vols.
First Brigade, B. F. Scribner, Col. 38th Ind.
Second Brigade, John Beatty, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
Third Brigade, J. C. Starkweather, Col. 1st Wis.
Fourth Brigade, O. L. Shepherd, Lt.-Col. 18th U. S. Inf.
Second Division, J. S. NEGLEY, Maj.-Gen. Vols.
First Brigade, J. G. Spears, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
Second Brigade, T. R. Stanley, Col. 18th Ohio.
Third Brigade, J. F. Miller, Col. 29th Ind.

Third Division,
First Brigade, M. B. Walker, Col. 31st Ohio.

Left Wing, T. L. CRITTENDEN, Maj.-Gen. Vols.
First Division, T. J. Wood, Brig.-Gen. Vols., Col. 2d U. S. Cav.
First Brigade, M. S. Hascall, Brig.-Gen. Vols.,
 Col. 17th U. S. Inf.

Second Brigade, G. D. Wagner, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
Third Brigade, C. G. Harker, Col. 65th Ohio.
Second Division, J. M. PALMER, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
First Brigade, Charles Cruft, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
Second Brigade, W. B. Hazen, Brig.-Gen. Vols.,
 Capt. 8th U. S. Inf.

Third Brigade, William Grose, Col. 36th Ind.
Third Division, H. P. VAN CLEVE, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
First Brigade, Sam. Beatty, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
Second Brigade, J. P. Fyffe, Col. Vols.
Third Brigade, S. W. Price, Col. 21st Ky.

Cavalry, D. S. STANLEY, Brig.-Gen. Vols., Capt. 4th U. S. Cav.
Cavalry Division, JOHN KENNETT, Col. Vols.
First Brigade, R. H. G. Minty, Col. 4th Mich. Cav.
Second Brigade, Lewis Zahm, Col. 3d Ohio Cav.

Confederate Forces.

Army of Tennessee, BRAXTON BRAGG, General.

Polk's Corps, LEONIDAS POLK, Lieut.-Gen.

First Division, B. F. CHEATHAM, Maj.-Gen.

First Brigade, D. S. Donelson, Brig.-Gen.

Second Brigade, A. P. Stewart, Brig.-Gen.

Third Brigade, George Maney, Brig.-Gen.

Fourth Brigade, A. J. Vaughan, Jr., Col.

Second Division, J. M. WITHERS, Maj.-Gen.

First Brigade, J. Q. Loomis, Col.

Second Brigade, J. R. Chalmers, Brig.-Gen.

Third Brigade, J. P. Anderson, Brig.-Gen.

Fourth Brigade, A. M. Manigault, Col.

Hardee's Corps, W. J. HARDEE, Lieut.-Gen.

First Division, J. C. BRECKINRIDGE, Maj.-Gen.

First Brigade, D. W. Adams, Brig.-Gen.

Second Brigade, J. B. Palmer, Col.

Third Brigade, William Preston, Brig.-Gen.

Fourth Brigade, R. W. Hanson, Brig.-Gen.

Jackson's Brigade, J. K. Jackson, Brig.-Gen.

Second Division, P. R. CLEBURNE, Maj.-Gen.

First Brigade, L. E. Polk, Brig.-Gen.

Second Brigade, St. J. R. Liddell, Brig.-Gen.

Third Brigade, B. R. Johnson, Brig.-Gen.

Fourth Brigade, S. A. M. Wood, Brig.-Gen.

McCown's Division, J. P. McCOWN, Maj.-Gen.

First Brigade, M. D. Ector, Brig.-Gen.

Second Brigade, J. E. Rains, Brig.-Gen.

Third Brigade, Evander McNair, Brig.-Gen.

Cavalry, JOSEPH WHEELER, Brig.-Gen.

Wheeler's Brigade, Joseph Wheeler, Brig.-Gen.

Buford's Brigade, Abraham Buford, Brig.-Gen.

Pegram's Brigade, John Pegram, Brig.-Gen.

Wharton's Brigade, J. A. Wharton, Brig.-Gen.

CHANCELLORSVILLE CAMPAIGN.

April 29—May 6, 1863.

Battle of Chancellorsville.

May 2-3.

Union Forces.

Army of the Potomac, JOSEPH HOOKER, Maj.-Gen. Vols.,
 Brig.-Gen. U. S. A.

First Corps, J. F. REYNOLDS, Maj.-Gen. Vols.,

Lt.-Col. 14th U. S. Inf.

First Division, J. S. WADSWORTH, Brig.-Gen. Vols.

First Brigade, Walter Phelps, Jr., Col. 22d N. Y.

Second Brigade, Lysander Cutler, Brig.-Gen. Vols.

- Third Brigade*, G. R. Paul, Brig.-Gen. Vols.,
Col. 8th U. S. Inf.
- Fourth Brigade*, Solomon Meredith, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
- Second Division*, J. C. ROBINSON, Brig.-Gen. Vols.,
Maj. 2d U. S. Inf.
- First Brigade*, A. R. Root, Col. 94th N. Y.
- Second Brigade*, Henry Baxter, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
- Third Brigade*, S. H. Leonard, Col. Vols.
- Third Division*, ABNER DOUBLEDAY, Maj.-Gen. Vols.,
Maj. 17th U. S. Inf.
- First Brigade*, T. A. Rowley, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
- Second Brigade*, Roy Stone, Col. 149th Pa.
- Second Corps*, D. N. COUCH, Maj.-Gen. Vols.
- First Division*, W. S. HANCOCK, Maj.-Gen. Vols.,
Capt. A. Q. M., U. S. A.
- First Brigade*, J. C. Caldwell, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
- Second Brigade*, T. F. Meagher, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
- Third Brigade*, S. K. Zook, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
- Fourth Brigade*, J. R. Brooke, Col. 53d Pa.
- Second Division*, JOHN GIBBON, Brig.-Gen. Vols.,
Capt. 4th U. S. Art.
- First Brigade*, Alfred Sully, Brig.-Gen. Vols.,
Maj. 8th U. S. Inf.
- Second Brigade*, J. T. Owen, Brig.-Gen. Vols.,
1st Lt. 5th U. S. Art.
- Third Brigade*, N. J. Hall, Col. 7th Mich.,
1st Lt. 5th U. S. Art.
- Third Division*, W. H. FRENCH, Maj.-Gen. Vols.,
Maj. 2d U. S. Art.
- First Brigade*, S. S. Carroll, Col. 8th Ohio.
- Second Brigade*, William Hays, Brig.-Gen. Vols.,
Capt. 2d U. S. Art.
- Third Brigade*, J. D. MacGregor, Col. 4th N. Y.
- Third Corps*, D. E. SICKLES, Maj.-Gen. Vols.
- First Division*, D. B. BIRNEY, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
- First Brigade*, C. K. Graham, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
- Second Brigade*, J. H. H. Ward, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
- Third Brigade*, S. B. Hayman, Col. 37th N. Y.,
Maj. 10th U. S. Inf.
- Second Division*, H. G. BERRY, Maj.-Gen. Vols.
- First Brigade*, J. B. Carr, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
- Second Brigade*, J. W. Revere, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
- Third Brigade*, Gershom Mott, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
- Third Division*, A. W. WHIPPLE, Brig.-Gen. Vols.,
Maj. U. S. Eng.
- First Brigade*, Emlen Franklin, Col. Vols.
- Second Brigade*, S. M. Bowman, Col. 84th Pa.
- Third Brigade*, Hiram Berdan, Col. 1st U. S. Sharpshooters.
- Fifth Corps*, G. G. MEADE, Maj.-Gen. Vols., Maj. U. S. Eng.
- First Division*, CHARLES GRIFFIN, Brig.-Gen. Vols.,
Capt. 5th U. S. Art.
- First Brigade*, James Barnes, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
- Second Brigade*, James McQuade, Col. 14th N. Y.
- Third Brigade*, T. B. W. Stockton, Col. 16th Mich.
- Second Division*, GEORGE SYKES, Maj.-Gen. Vols.,
Maj. 14th U. S. Inf.

- First Brigade*, R. B. Ayres, Brig.-Gen. Vols.,
 Capt. 5th U. S. Art.
Second Brigade, Sidney Burbank, Col. 2d U. S. Inf.
Third Brigade, P. H. O'Rourke, Col. 140th N. Y.,
 1st Lt. U. S. Eng.
Third Division, A. A. HUMPHREYS, Brig.-Gen. Vols.,
 Lt.-Col. U. S. Eng.
First Brigade, E. B. Tyler, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
Second Brigade, P. H. Allabach, Col. Vols.
Sixth Corps, JOHN SEDGWICK, Maj.-Gen. Vols., Col. 4th U. S. Cav.
First Division, W. T. H. Brooks, Brig.-Gen. Vols.,
 Maj. 18th U. S. Inf.
First Brigade, H. W. Brown, Col. Vols.
Second Brigade, J. J. Bartlett, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
Third Brigade, D. A. Russell, Brig.-Gen. Vols.,
 Maj. 8th U. S. Inf.
Second Division, A. P. Howe, Brig.-Gen. Vols.,
 Capt. 4th U. S. Art.
Second Brigade, L. A. Grant, Col. 5th Vermont.
Third Brigade, T. H. Neill, Brig.-Gen. Vols.,
 Capt. 5th U. S. Inf.
Third Division, JOHN NEWTON, Maj.-Gen. Vols., Maj. U. S. Eng.
First Brigade, Alexander Shaler, Col. 65th N. Y.
Second Brigade, W. H. Browne, Col. 36th N. Y.
Third Brigade, Frank Wheaton, Brig.-Gen. Vols.,
 Capt. 4th U. S. Cav.
Light Division, HIRAM BURNHAM, Col. 6th Me.
Eleventh Corps, O. O. HOWARD, Maj.-Gen. Vols.
First Division, CHARLES DEVENS, JR., Brig.-Gen. Vols.
First Brigade, Leopold von Gilsa, Col. Vols.
Second Brigade, N. C. McLean, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
Second Division, ADOLPH VON STEINWEHR, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
First Brigade, Adolphus Buschbeck, Col. Vols.
Second Brigade, F. C. Barlow, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
Third Division, CARL SCHURZ, Maj.-Gen. Vols.
First Brigade, Alex. Schimmelfennig, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
Second Brigade, Wladimir Krzyzanowski, Col. 58th N. Y.
Twelfth Corps, H. W. SLOCUM, Maj.-Gen. Vols.
First Division, A. S. WILLIAMS, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
First Brigade, J. F. Knipe, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
Second Brigade, Samuel Ross, Col. 20th Conn.,
 Capt. 14th U. S. Inf.
Third Brigade, T. H. Ruger, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
Second Division, J. W. GEARY, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
First Brigade, Charles Candy, Col. 66th Ohio.
Second Brigade, T. L. Kane, Brig. Gen. Vols.
Third Brigade, G. S. Greene, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
Cavalry Corps, GEORGE STONEMAN, Brig.-Gen. Vols.,
 Maj. 4th U. S. Cav.
First Division, ALFRED PLEASANTON, Brig.-Gen. Vols.,
 Maj. 2d U. S. Cav.
First Brigade, B. F. Davis, Col. 8th N. Y. Cav.,
 Capt. 1st U. S. Cav.
Second Brigade, T. C. Devin, Col. 6th N. Y. Cav.
Second Division, W. W. AVERELL, Brig.-Gen. Vols.,
 Capt. 3d U. S. Cav.

First Brigade, H. B. Sargent, Col. 1st Mass. Cav.

Second Brigade, J. B. McIntosh, Col. 3d Pa. Cav.,
1st Lt. 5th U. S. Cav.

Third Division, D. McM. GREGG, Brig.-Gen. Vols.,
Capt. 6th U. S. Cav.

First Brigade, Judson Kilpatrick, Col. 2d N. Y. Cav.,
1st Lt. 1st U. S. Art.

Second Brigade, Percy Wyndham, Col. Vols.

Reserve Brigade, John Buford, Brig.-Gen. Vols.,
Maj. A. I. G., U. S. A.

Artillery, H. J. HUNT, Brig.-Gen. Vols., Maj. 5th U. S. Art.

Confederate Forces.

Army of Northern Virginia, R. E. LEE, General.

First Corps (Longstreet with divisions of Hood and Pickett absent in Southeastern Virginia).

McLaws's Division, LAFAYETTE McLAWS, Maj.-Gen.

Wofford's Brigade, W. T. Wofford, Brig.-Gen.

Semmes's Brigade, P. J. Semmes, Brig.-Gen.

Kershaw's Brigade, J. B. Kershaw, Brig.-Gen.

Barksdale's Brigade, William Barksdale, Brig.-Gen.

Anderson's Division, R. H. ANDERSON, Maj.-Gen.

Wilcox's Brigade, C. M. Wilcox, Brig.-Gen.

Wright's Brigade, A. R. Wright, Brig.-Gen.

Mahone's Brigade, William Mahone, Brig.-Gen.

Posey's Brigade, Carnot Posey, Brig.-Gen.

Perry's Brigade, E. A. Perry, Brig.-Gen.

Second Corps, T. J. (Stonewall) JACKSON, Lieut.-Gen.

Light Division, A. P. HILL, Maj.-Gen.

Heth's Brigade, Henry Heth, Brig.-Gen.

Thomas's Brigade, E. L. Thomas, Brig.-Gen.

Lane's Brigade, J. H. Lane, Brig.-Gen.

McGowan's Brigade, Samuel McGowan, Brig.-Gen.

Archer's Brigade, J. J. Archer, Brig.-Gen.

Pender's Brigade, W. D. Pender, Brig.-Gen.

D. H. Hill's Division, R. E. RODES, Brig.-Gen.

Rodes's Brigade, R. E. Rodes, Brig.-Gen.

Colquitt's Brigade, A. H. Colquitt, Brig.-Gen.

Ramseur's Brigade, S. D. Ramseur, Brig.-Gen.

Doles's Brigade, George Doles, Brig.-Gen.

Iverson's Brigade, Alfred Iverson, Brig.-Gen.

Early's Division, J. A. EARLY, Maj.-Gen.

Gordon's Brigade, J. B. Gordon, Brig.-Gen.

Hoke's Brigade, R. F. Hoke, Brig.-Gen.

Smith's Brigade, William Smith, Brig.-Gen.

Hays's Brigade, H. T. Hays, Brig.-Gen.

Trimble's Division, R. E. COLSTON, Brig.-Gen.

First Brigade, E. F. Paxton, Brig.-Gen.

Second Brigade, J. R. Jones, Brig.-Gen.

Third Brigade, E. T. H. Warren, Col.

Fourth Brigade, F. T. Nicholls, Brig.-Gen.

Cavalry, J. E. B. STUART, Maj.-Gen.

Second Brigade, Fitzhugh Lee, Brig.-Gen.

Third Brigade, W. H. F. Lee, Brig.-Gen.

BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG.

July 1-3, 1863.

Union Forces.

Army of the Potomac, G. G. MEADE, Maj.-Gen. Vols.,
Maj. U. S. Eng.

First Corps, J. F. REYNOLDS, Maj.-Gen. Vols.,
Lt.-Col. 14th U. S. Inf.

ABNER DOUBLEDAY, Maj.-Gen. Vols.,
Maj. 17th U. S. Inf.

JOHN NEWTON, Maj.-Gen. Vols., Maj. U. S. Eng.

First Division, J. S. WADSWORTH, Brig.-Gen. Vols.

First Brigade, Solomon Meredith, Brig.-Gen. Vols.

Second Brigade, Lysander Cutler, Brig.-Gen. Vols.

Second Division, J. C. ROBINSON, Brig.-Gen. Vols.,

Maj. 2d U. S. Inf.

First Brigade, G. R. Paul, Brig.-Gen. Vols.,

Col. 8th U. S. Inf.

Second Brigade, Henry Baxter, Brig.-Gen. Vols.

Third Division, T. A. ROWLEY, Brig.-Gen. Vols.

First Brigade, Chapman Biddle, Col. Vols.

Second Brigade, Roy Stone, Col. 149th Pa.

Third Brigade, G. J. Stannard, Brig.-Gen. Vols.

Second Corps, W. S. HANCOCK, Maj.-Gen. Vols.,

Capt. A. Q. M., U. S. A.

JOHN GIBBON, Brig.-Gen. Vols., Capt. 4th U. S. Art.

First Division J. C. CALDWELL, Brig.-Gen. Vols.

First Brigade, E. E. Cross, Col. Vols.

Second Brigade, Patrick Kelly, Col. 88th N. Y.

Third Brigade, S. K. Zook, Brig.-Gen. Vols.

Fourth Brigade, J. R. Brooke, Col. 53d Pa.

Second Division, JOHN GIBBON, Brig.-Gen. Vols.,

Capt. 4th U. S. Art.

First Brigade, William Harrow, Brig.-Gen. Vols.

Second Brigade, A. S. Webb, Brig.-Gen. Vols.,

Capt. 11th U. S. Inf.

Third Brigade, N. J. Hall, Col. 7th Mich.,

1st Lt. 5th U. S. Art.

Third Division, ALEXANDER HAYS, Brig.-Gen. Vols.,

Capt. 16th U. S. Inf.

First Brigade, S. S. Carroll, Col. 8th Ohio.

Second Brigade, T. A. Smyth, Col. 1st Del.

Third Brigade, G. L. Willard, Col. 125th N. Y.

Third Corps, D. E. SICKLES, Maj.-Gen. Vols.

First Division, D. B. BIRNEY, Maj.-Gen. Vols.

First Brigade, C. K. Graham, Brig.-Gen. Vols.

Second Brigade, J. H. H. Ward, Brig.-Gen. Vols.

Third Brigade, P. R. de Trobriand, Col. 38th N. Y.

Second Division, A. A. HUMPHREYS, Brig.-Gen. Vols.,

Lt.-Col. U. S. Eng.

First Brigade, J. B. Carr, Brig.-Gen. Vols.

Second Brigade, W. R. Brewster, Col. 73d N. Y.

Third Brigade, G. C. Burling, Col. 6th N. J.

- Fifth Corps*, GEORGE SYKES, Maj.-Gen. Vols., Maj. 14th U. S. Inf.
First Division, JAMES BARNES, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
First Brigade, W. S. Tilton, Col. 22d Mass.
Second Brigade, J. B. Sweitzer, Col. 62d Pa.
Third Brigade, Strong Vincent, Col. 83d Pa.
Second Division, R. B. AYRES, Brig.-Gen. Vols.,
 Capt. 5th U. S. Art.
First Brigade, Hannibal Day, Col. 6th U. S. Inf.
Second Brigade, Sidney Burbank, Col. 2d U. S. Inf.
Third Brigade, S. H. Weed, Brig.-Gen. Vols.,
 Capt. 5th U. S. Art.
Third Division, S. W. CRAWFORD, Brig.-Gen. Vols.,
 Maj. 13th U. S. Inf.
First Brigade, William McCandless, Col. Vols.
Third Brigade, J. W. Fisher, Col. 5th Pa.
- Sixth Corps*, JOHN SEDGWICK, Maj.-Gen. Vols., Col. 4th U. S. Cav.
First Division, H. G. WRIGHT, Brig.-Gen. Vols., Maj. U. S. Eng.
First Brigade, A. T. A. Torbert, Brig.-Gen. Vols.,
 Capt. 5th U. S. Inf.
Second Brigade, J. J. Bartlett, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
Third Brigade, D. A. Russell, Brig.-Gen. Vols.,
 Maj. 8th U. S. Inf.
Second Division, A. P. HOWE, Brig.-Gen. Vols.,
 Capt. 4th U. S. Art.
Second Brigade, L. A. Grant, Col. 5th Vermont.
Third Brigade, T. H. Neill, Brig.-Gen. Vols.,
 Capt. 5th U. S. Inf.
Third Division, JOHN NEWTON, Maj.-Gen. Vols., Maj. U. S. Eng.
First Brigade, Alexander Shaler, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
Second Brigade, H. L. Eustis, Col. 10th Mass.
Third Brigade, Frank Wheaton, Brig.-Gen. Vols.,
 Capt. 4th U. S. Cav.
- Eleventh Corps*, O. O. HOWARD, Maj.-Gen. Vols.
First Division, F. C. BARLOW, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
First Brigade, Leopold von Gilsa, Col. Vols.
Second Brigade, Adelbert Ames, Brig.-Gen. Vols.,
 1st Lt. 5th U. S. Art.
Second Division, ADOLPH VON STEINWEHR, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
First Brigade, C. R. Coster, Col. 134th N. Y.,
 Capt. 12th U. S. Inf.
Second Brigade, Orland Smith, Col. 73d Ohio.
Third Division, CARL SCHURZ, Maj.-Gen. Vols.
First Brigade, Alex. Schimmelfennig, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
Second Brigade, Wladimir Krzyzanowski, Col. 58th N. Y.
- Twelfth Corps*, H. W. SLOCUM, Maj.-Gen. Vols.
First Division, A. S. WILLIAMS, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
First Brigade, A. L. McDougall, Col. Vols.
Second Brigade, H. H. Lockwood, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
Third Brigade, T. H. Ruger, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
Second Division, J. W. GEARY, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
First Brigade, Charles Candy, Col. 66th Ohio.
Second Brigade, G. A. Cobham, Col. 111th Pa.
- Cavalry Corps*, ALFRED PLEASANTON, Maj.-Gen. Vols.,
 Maj. 2d U. S. Cav.
First Division, JOHN BUFORD, Brig.-Gen. Vols.,
 Maj. A. I. G., U. S. A.
First Brigade, William Gamble, Col. 8th Ill. Cav.
Second Brigade, T. C. Devin, Col. 6th N. Y. Cav.

- Reserve Brigade*, Wesley Merritt, Brig.-Gen. Vols.,
Capt. 2d U. S. Cav.
- Second Division*, D. McM. GREGG, Brig.-Gen. Vols.,
Capt. 6th U. S. Cav.
- First Brigade*, J. B. McIntosh, Col. 3rd Pa. Cav.,
1st Lt. 5th U. S. Cav.
- Second Brigade*, Pennock Huey, Col. Vols.,
- Third Brigade*, J. I. Gregg, Col. 16th Pa. Cav.,
Capt. 6th U. S. Cav.
- Third Division*, JUDSON KILPATRICK, Brig.-Gen. Vols.,
1st Lt. 1st U. S. Art.
- First Brigade*, E. J. Farnsworth, Brig.-Gen. Vols.,
- Second Brigade*, G. A. Custer, Brig.-Gen. Vols.,
1st Lt. 5th U. S. Cav.
- Artillery*, H. J. HUNT, Brig.-Gen. Vols., Maj. 5th U. S. Art.

Confederate Forces.

Army of Northern Virginia, R. E. LEE, General.

- First Corps*, JAMES LONGSTREET, Lieut.-Gen.
- McLaws's Division*, LAFAYETTE McLAWS, Maj.-Gen.
- Kershaw's Brigade*, J. B. Kershaw, Brig.-Gen.
- Semmes's Brigade*, P. J. Semmes, Brig.-Gen.
- Barksdale's Brigade*, William Barksdale, Brig.-Gen.
- Wofford's Brigade*, W. T. Wofford, Brig.-Gen.
- Pickett's Division*, G. E. PICKETT, Maj.-Gen.
- Garnett's Brigade*, R. B. Garnett, Brig.-Gen.
- Armistead's Brigade*, L. A. Armistead, Brig.-Gen.
- Kemper's Brigade*, J. L. Kemper, Brig.-Gen.
- Hood's Division*, J. B. Hood, Maj.-Gen.
- Law's Brigade*, E. McL. Law, Brig.-Gen.
- Anderson's Brigade*, G. T. Anderson, Brig.-Gen.
- Robertson's Brigade*, J. B. Robertson, Brig.-Gen.
- Benning's Brigade*, H. L. Benning, Brig.-Gen.
- Second Corps*, R. S. EWELL, Lieut.-Gen.
- Early's Division*, J. A. EARLY, Maj.-Gen.
- Hays's Brigade*, H. T. Hays, Brig.-Gen.
- Hoke's Brigade*, I. E. Avery, Col.
- Smith's Brigade*, William Smith, Brig.-Gen.
- Gordon's Brigade*, John B. Gordon, Brig.-Gen.
- Johnson's Division*, EDWARD JOHNSON, Maj.-Gen.
- Steuart's Brigade*, G. H. Steuart, Brig.-Gen.
- Nicholl's Brigade*, J. M. Williams, Col.
- Stonewall Brigade*, J. A. Walker, Brig.-Gen.
- Jones's Brigade*, J. M. Jones, Brig.-Gen.
- Rodes's Division*, R. E. RODES, Maj.-Gen.
- Daniel's Brigade*, Junius Daniel, Brig.-Gen.
- Iverson's Brigade*, Alfred Iverson, Brig.-Gen.
- Doles's Brigade*, George Doles, Brig.-Gen.
- Ramseur's Brigade*, S. D. Ramseur, Brig.-Gen.
- O'Neal's Brigade*, E. A. O'Neal, Col.
- Third Corps*, A. P. HILL, Lieut.-Gen.
- Anderson's Division*, R. H. ANDERSON, Maj.-Gen.
- Wilcox's Brigade*, C. M. Wilcox, Brig.-Gen.
- Mahone's Brigade*, William Mahone, Brig.-Gen.
- Wright's Brigade*, A. R. Wright, Brig.-Gen.
- Perry's Brigade*, David Lang, Col.
- Posey's Brigade*, Carnot Posey, Brig.-Gen.

Heth's Division, HENRY HETH, Maj.-Gen.
First Brigade, J. J. Pettigrew, Brig.-Gen.
Second Brigade, J. M. Brockenbrough, Brig.-Gen.
Third Brigade, J. J. Archer, Brig.-Gen.
Fourth Brigade, J. R. Davis, Brig.-Gen.

Pender's Division, W. D. PENDER, Maj.-Gen.
First Brigade, Abner Perrin, Col.
Second Brigade, J. H. Lane, Brig.-Gen.
Third Brigade, E. L. Thomas, Brig.-Gen.
Fourth Brigade, A. M. Scales, Brig.-Gen.

Cavalry, J. E. B. STUART, Maj.-Gen.
Fitzhugh Lee's Brigade, Fitzhugh Lee, Brig.-Gen.
Hampton's Brigade, Wade Hampton, Brig.-Gen.
W. H. F. Lee's Brigade, J. R. Chambliss, Col.
Jenkins's Brigade, A. G. Jenkins, Brig.-Gen.
Robertson's Brigade, B. H. Robertson, Brig.-Gen.
Imboden's Brigade, J. D. Imboden, Brig.-Gen.

THE VICKSBURG CAMPAIGN.

May 1—July 4, 1863.

Union Forces.

Army of the Tennessee, U. S. GRANT, Maj.-Gen. Vols.

Ninth Corps (joined June 14-17), J. G. PARKE, Maj.-Gen. Vols.,
 Capt. U. S. Eng.

First Division, THOMAS WELSH, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
First Brigade, Henry Bowman, Col. 36th Mass.
Third Brigade, Daniel Leasure, Col. Vols.
Second Division, R. B. POTTER, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
First Brigade, S. G. Griffin, Col. 6th N. H.
Second Brigade, Edward Ferrero, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
Third Brigade, B. C. Christ, Col. 50th Pa.

Thirteenth Corps, J. A. McCLELLAND, Maj.-Gen. Vols.
 E. O. C. ORD, Maj.-Gen. Vols., Maj. 4th U. S. Art.

Ninth Division, P. J. OSTERHAUS, Brig.-Gen. Vols.,
 A. L. LEE, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
First Brigade, T. T. Garrard, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
 A. L. Lee, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
 James Keigwin, Col. Vols.
Second Brigade, L. A. Sheldon, Col. 42d Ohio.
 D. W. Lindsey, Col. Vols.

Tenth Division, A. J. SMITH, Brig.-Gen. Vols., Maj. 1st U. S. Cav.
First Brigade, S. G. Burbridge, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
Second Brigade, W. J. Landram, Col. 19th Ky.

Twelfth Division, A. P. HOVEY, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
First Brigade, G. F. McGinnis, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
Second Brigade, J. R. Slack, Col. 47th Ind.

Fourteenth Division, E. A. CARR, Brig.-Gen. Vols.,
 Capt. 4th U. S. Cav.

First Brigade, W. P. Benton, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
 H. D. Washburn, Col. 18th Ind.
 David Shunk, Col. 8th Ind.
Second Brigade, C. H. Harris, Col. 11th Wis.
 W. M. Stone, Col. 22d Iowa.
 M. K. Lawler, Brig.-Gen. Vols.

- Fifteenth Corps*, W. T. SHERMAN, Maj.-Gen. Vols.,
Col. 13th U. S. Inf.
- First Division*, FREDERICK STEELE, Maj.-Gen. Vols.,
Maj. 11th Inf.
- First Brigade*, F. H. Manter, Col. Vols.
B. G. Farrar, Col. 30th Mo.
- Second Brigade*, C. R. Woods, Col. 76th Ohio,
Capt. 9th U. S. Inf.
- Third Brigade*, J. M. Thayer, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
- Second Division*, F. P. BLAIR, JR., Maj.-Gen. Vols.
- First Brigade*, G. A. Smith, Col. Vols.
J. A. G. Lightburn, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
- Second Brigade*, T. K. Smith, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
- Third Brigade*, Hugh Ewing, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
- Third Division*, J. M. TUTTLE, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
- First Brigade*, R. P. Buckland, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
W. L. McMillen, Col. 95th Ohio.
- Second Brigade*, J. A. Mower, Brig.-Gen. Vols.,
Capt. 1st U. S. Inf.
- Third Brigade*, C. L. Matthies, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
J. J. Woods, Col. Vols.
- Sixteenth Corps*, C. C. WASHBURN, Maj.-Gen. Vols.
- First Division*, W. S. SMITH, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
- First Brigade*, J. M. Loomis, Col. Vols.
- Second Brigade*, S. G. Hicks, Col. Vols.
- Third Brigade*, J. R. Cockerill, Col. 70th Ohio.
- Fourth Brigade*, W. W. Sanford, Col. Vols.
- Fourth Division*, J. C. LAUMAN, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
- First Brigade*, I. C. Pugh, Col. 41st Ill.
- Second Brigade*, Cyrus Hall, Col. 14th Ill.
- Third Brigade*, G. E. Bryant, Col. Vols.
A. K. Johnson, Col. Vols.
- Provisional Division*, NATHAN KIMBALL, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
- Engleman's Brigade*, Adolph Engleman, Col. 43d Ill.
- Richmond's Brigade*, Jonathan Richmond, Col. Vols.
- Montgomery's Brigade*, Milton Montgomery, Col. 25th Wis.
- Seventeenth Corps*, J. B. McPHERSON, Maj.-Gen. Vols.,
Capt. U. S. Eng.
- Third Division*, J. A. LOGAN, Maj.-Gen. Vols.
- First Brigade*, J. E. Smith, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
M. D. Leggett, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
- Second Brigade*, Elias S. Dennis, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
M. F. Force, Col. Vols.
- Third Brigade*, J. D. Stevenson, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
- Sixth Division*, JOHN McARTHUR, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
- First Brigade*, H. T. Reed, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
- Second Brigade*, T. E. G. Ransom, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
- Third Brigade*, William Hall, Col. Vols.
John Shane, Col. Vols.
- Seventh Division*, M. M. CROCKER, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
- I. F. QUINBY, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
- J. E. SMITH, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
- First Brigade*, J. B. Sanborn, Col. Vols.
- Second Brigade*, S. A. Holmes, Col. Vols.
G. B. Raum, Col. 56th Ill.
- Third Brigade*, G. B. Boomer, Col. Vols.
Holden Putnam, Col. Vols.
C. L. Matthies, Brig.-Gen. Vols.

- Herron's Division*, F. J. HERRON, Maj.-Gen. Vols.
First Brigade, William Vandever, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
Second Brigade, W. W. Orme, Brig.-Gen. Vols.

Confederate Forces.

J. C. PEMBERTON, Lieut.-Gen.

- First Division*, W. W. LORING, Maj.-Gen.
First Brigade, Lloyd Tilghman, Brig.-Gen.
 A. E. Reynolds, Col.
Second Brigade, W. S. Featherston, Brig.-Gen.
Third Brigade, Abram Buford, Brig.-Gen.
Stevenson's Division, C. L. STEVENSON, Maj.-Gen.
First Brigade, S. M. Barton, Brig.-Gen.
Second Brigade, E. D. Tracy, Brig.-Gen.
 I. W. Garrott, Col.
 S. D. Lee, Brig.-Gen.
Third Brigade, Alfred Cumming, Brig.-Gen.
Fourth Brigade, A. W. Reynolds, Col.
Texas Legion, T. Waul, Col.
Forney's Division, J. H. FORNEY, Maj.-Gen.
Herbert's Brigade, Louis Herbert, Brig.-Gen.
Moore's Brigade, J. C. Moore, Brig.-Gen.
Smith's Division, M. L. SMITH, Maj.-Gen.
First Brigade, W. E. Baldwin, Brig.-Gen.
Vaughn's Brigade, J. C. Vaughn, Brig.-Gen.
Third Brigade, F. A. Shoup, Brig.-Gen.
Bowen's Division, J. S. BOWEN, Maj.-Gen.
First Brigade, F. M. Cockrell, Col.
Second Brigade, M. E. Green, Brig.-Gen.
 T. P. Dockery, Col.

Johnston's Forces.

JOSEPH E. JOHNSTON, General.
 (Engaged at Raymond and Jackson only.)

- Gregg's Brigade*, John Gregg, Brig.-Gen.
Crist's Brigade, P. H. Colquitt, Col.
Walker's Brigade, W. H. T. Walker, Brig.-Gen.

BATTLE OF CHICKAMAUGA.

September 19-20, 1863.

Union Forces.

Army of the Cumberland, W. S. ROSECRANS,
 Maj.-Gen. Vols.,
 Brig.-Gen. U. S. A.

- G. H. THOMAS, Maj.-Gen. Vols., Col. 5th U. S. Cav.
First Division, ABSALOM BAIRD, Brig.-Gen. Vols.,
 Maj. A. I. G., U. S. A.
First Brigade, B. F. Scribner, Col. 38th Ind.
Second Brigade, J. C. Starkweather, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
Third Brigade, J. H. King, Brig.-Gen. Vols.

- Second Division*, J. S. NEGLEY, Maj.-Gen. Vols.
First Brigade, John Beatty, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
Second Brigade, T. R. Stanley, Col. 18th Ohio.
 W. L. Stoughton, Col. 11th Mich.
Third Brigade, William Sirwell, Col. Vols.
Third Division, J.-M. BRANNAN, Brig.-Gen. Vols.,
 Capt. 1st U. S. Art.
First Brigade, J. M. Connell, Col. Vols.
Second Brigade, J. T. Croxton, Col. 4th Ky. M't'd Inf.
 W. H. Hays, Col. Vols.
Third Brigade, F. Van Derveer, Col. 35th Ohio.
Fourth Division, J. J. REYNOLDS, Maj.-Gen. Vols.
First Brigade, J. T. Wilder, Col. 17th Ind.
 (Mounted and detached.)
Second Brigade, E. A. King, Col. 6th U. S. Inf.
 M. S. Robinson, Col. 75th Ind.
Third Brigade, J. B. Turchin, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
Twentieth Corps, A. McD. MCCOOK, Maj.-Gen. Vols.,
 Capt. 3d U. S. Inf.
First Division, J. C. DAVIS, Brig.-Gen. Vols., Capt. 1st U. S. Art.
Second Brigade, W. P. Carlin, Brig.-Gen. Vols.,
 Capt. 6th U. S. Inf.
Third Brigade, H. C. Heg, Col. Vols.
 J. A. Martin, Col. 8th Kans.
Second Division, R. W. JOHNSON, Brig.-Gen. Vols.,
 Maj. 4th U. S. Cav.
First Brigade, August Willich, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
Second Brigade, J. B. Dodge, Col. Vols.
Third Brigade, P. P. Baldwin, Col. Vols.
 W. W. Berry, Col. Vols.
Third Division, P. H. SHERIDAN, Maj.-Gen. Vols.,
 Capt. 13th U. S. Inf.
First Brigade, W. H. Lytle, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
 Silas Miller, Col. Vols.
Second Brigade, Bernard Laiboldt, Col. Vols.
Third Brigade, L. P. Bradley, Col. 51st Ill.
 N. H. Walworth, Col. Vols.
Twenty-first Corps, T. L. CRITTENDEN, Maj.-Gen. Vols.
First Division, T. J. Wood, Brig.-Gen. Vols., Col. 2d U. S. Cav.
First Brigade, G. P. Buell, Col. 58th Ind.
Third Brigade, C. G. Harker, Col. 65th Ohio,
 Capt. 15th U. S. Inf.
Second Division, J. M. PALMER, Maj.-Gen. Vols.
First Brigade, Charles Cruft, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
Second Brigade, W. B. Hazen, Brig.-Gen. Vols.,
 Capt. 8th U. S. Inf.
Third Brigade, William Grose, Col. 36th Ind.
Third Division, H. P. VAN CLEVE, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
First Brigade, Samuel Beatty, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
Second Brigade, G. F. Dick, Col. 86th Ind.
Third Brigade, S. M. Barnes, Col. Vols.
Reserve Corps, GORDON GRANGER, Maj.-Gen. Vols.,
 Capt. 3d U. S. Cav.
First Division, J. B. STEEDMAN, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
First Brigade, W. C. Whitaker, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
Second Brigade, J. G. Mitchell, Col. 113th Ohio.

*Second Division.**Second Brigade*, Daniel McCook, Col. 52d Ohio.*Cavalry Corps*, R. B. MITCHELL, Brig.-Gen. Vols.*First Division*, E. M. McCook, Col. 2d Ind. Cav.*First Brigade*, A. P. Campbell, Col. Vols.*Second Brigade*, D. M. Ray, Col. Vols.*Third Brigade*, L. D. Watkins, Col. 6th Ky. Cav.,

Capt. 5th U. S. Cav.

Second Division, GEORGE CROOK, Brig.-Gen. Vols.,

Capt. 4th U. S. Inf.

First Brigade, R. H. G. Minty, Col. 4th Mich. Cav.*Second Brigade*, Eli Long, Col. 4th Ohio Cav.,

Capt. 1st U. S. Cav.

*Confederate Forces.**Army of Tennessee*, BRAXTON BRAGG, General.*Right Wing*, LEONIDAS POLK, Lieut.-Gen.*(Polk's Corps.)**Cheatham's Division*, B. F. CHEATHAM, Maj.-Gen.*Jackson's Brigade*, J. K. Jackson, Brig.-Gen.*Maney's Brigade*, George Maney, Brig.-Gen.*Smith's Brigade*, Preston Smith, Brig.-Gen.

A. J. Vaughan, Jr., Col.

Wright's Brigade, M. J. Wright, Brig.-Gen.*Strahl's Brigade*, O. F. Strahl, Brig.-Gen.*Hill's Corps*, D. H. HILL, Lieut.-Gen.*Cleburne's Division*, P. R. CLEBURNE, Maj.-Gen.*Wood's Brigade*, S. A. M. Wood, Brig.-Gen.*Polk's Brigade*, L. E. Polk, Brig.-Gen.*Deshler's Brigade*, James Deshler, Brig.-Gen.

R. Q. Mills, Col.

Breckinridge's Division, J. C. BRECKINRIDGE, Maj.-Gen.*Helm's Brigade*, B. H. Helm, Brig.-Gen.

J. H. Lewis, Col.

Adams's Brigade, D. W. Adams, Brig.-Gen.

R. L. Gibson, Col.

Stovall's Brigade, M. A. Stovall, Brig.-Gen.*Reserve Corps*, W. H. T. WALKER, Maj.-Gen.*Walker's Division*, S. R. GIST, Brig.-Gen.*Gist's Brigade*, S. R. Gist, Brig.-Gen.

P. H. Colquitt, Col.

L. Napier, Lt.-Col.

Ector's Brigade, M. D. Ector, Brig.-Gen.*Wilson's Brigade*, C. C. Wilson, Col.*Liddell's Division*, St. J. R. LIDDELL, Brig.-Gen.*Liddell's Brigade*, D. C. Govan.*Walthall's Brigade*, E. C. Walthall, Brig.-Gen.*Left Wing*, JAMES LONGSTREET, Lieut.-Gen.*(Polk's Corps.)**Hindman's Division*, T. C. HINDMAN, Maj.-Gen.

J. P. ANDERSON, Brig.-Gen.

Anderson's Brigade, J. P. Anderson, Brig.-Gen.

J. H. Sharp, Col.

Deas's Brigade, Z. C. Deas, Brig.-Gen.*Manigault's Brigade*, A. M. Manigault, Brig.-Gen.

- Buckner's Corps*, S. B. BUCKNER, Maj.-Gen.
Stewart's Division, A. P. STEWART, Maj.-Gen.
Johnson's Brigade, B. R. Johnson, Brig.-Gen.
Brown's Brigade, J. C. Brown, Brig.-Gen.
 E. C. Cook, Col.
Bate's Brigade, W. B. Bate, Brig.-Gen.
Clayton's Brigade, H. D. Clayton, Brig.-Gen.
Preston's Division, WM. PRESTON, Brig.-Gen.
Gracie's Brigade, Archibald Gracie, Jr., Brig.-Gen.
Trigg's Brigade, R. C. Trigg, Brig.-Gen.
Kelly's Brigade, J. H. Kelly, Col.
Johnson's Division, B. R. JOHNSON.
Gregg's Brigade, John Gregg, Brig.-Gen.
 C. A. Sugg Col.
McNair's Brigade, E. McNair, Brig.-Gen.
 D. Coleman, Col.
Longstreet's Corps, J. B. HOOD, Maj.-Gen.
McLaws's Division, LAFAYETTE McLAWS, Maj.-Gen.
Kershaw's Brigade, J. B. Kershaw, Brig.-Gen.
Humphreys's Brigade, B. G. Humphreys, Brig.-Gen.
Hood's Division, J. B. HOOD, Maj.-Gen.
 E. McL. LAW, Brig.-Gen.
Jenkins's Brigade, Micah Jenkins, Brig.-Gen.
Law's Brigade, E. McL. Law, Brig.-Gen.
 J. L. Sheffield, Col.
Robertson's Brigade, J. B. Robertson, Brig.-Gen.
 Van. H. Manning, Col.
Anderson's Brigade, G. T. Anderson, Brig.-Gen.
Benning's Brigade, H. L. Benning, Brig.-Gen.

Cavalry.

- Wheeler's Corps*, JOSEPH WHEELER, Maj.-Gen.
Wharton's Division, J. A. WHARTON, Brig.-Gen.
 First Brigade, C. C. Crews, Col.
 Second Brigade, Thomas Harrison, Col.
Martin's Division, W. T. MARTIN, Brig.-Gen.
 First Brigade, J. T. Morgan, Col.
 Second Brigade, A. A. Russell, Col.
 Roddey's Brigade, P. D. Roddey, Brig.-Gen.
Forrest's Corps, N. B. FORREST, Brig.-Gen.
 Armstrong's Division, F. C. ARMSTRONG, Brig.-Gen.
 Armstrong's Brigade, J. T. Wheeler, Col.
 Forrest's Brigade, G. G. Dibrell, Col.
Pegram's Division, JOHN PEGRAM, Brig.-Gen.
 Davidson's Brigade, H. B. Davidson, Brig.-Gen.
 Scott's Brigade, J. S. Scott, Col.

THE BATTLES AROUND CHATTANOOGA.

November 23-27, 1863.

- Union Forces*, U. S. GRANT, Maj.-Gen. U. S. A.
Army of the Cumberland, G. H. THOMAS, Maj.-Gen. Vols.,
 Brig.-Gen. U. S. A.
Fourth Corps, GORDON GRANGER, Maj.-Gen. Vols.,
 Capt. 3d U. S. Cav.
First Division, CHARLES CRUFT, Brig.-Gen. Vols.

- Second Brigade*, W. C. Whitaker, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
Third Brigade, William Grose, Col. 36th Ind.
Second Division, P. H. SHERIDAN, Maj.-Gen. Vols.,
 Capt. 13th U. S. Inf.
First Brigade, F. T. Sherman, Col. 88th Ill.
Second Brigade, G. D. Wagner, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
Third Brigade, C. G. Harker, Col. 65th Ohio,
 Capt. 15th U. S. Inf.
Third Division, T. J. Wood, Brig.-Gen. Vols., Col. 2d U. S. Cav.
First Brigade, August Willich, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
Second Brigade, W. B. Hazen, Brig.-Gen. Vols.,
 Capt. 8th U. S. Inf.
Third Brigade, Samuel Beatty, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
Fourteenth Corps, J. M. PALMER, Maj.-Gen. Vols.
First Division, R. W. JOHNSON, Brig.-Gen. Vols.,
 Maj. 4th U. S. Cav.
First Brigade, W. P. Carlin, Brig.-Gen. Vols.,
 Capt. 6th U. S. Inf.
Second Brigade, M. F. Moore, Col. 69th Ohio.
Third Brigade, J. C. Starkweather, Brig.-Gen.
Second Division, J. C. DAVIS, Brig.-Gen. Vols., Capt. 1st U. S. Art.
First Brigade, J. D. Morgan, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
Second Brigade, John Beatty, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
Third Brigade, Daniel McCook, Col. 52d Ohio.
Third Division, ABSALOM BAIRD, Brig.-Gen. Vols.,
 Maj. A. I. G., U. S. A.
First Brigade, J. B. Turchin, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
Second Brigade, F. Van Derveer, Col. 35th Ohio.
Third Brigade, E. H. Phelps, Col. Vols.
 W. H. Hays, Col. Vols.
Army of the Tennessee, W. T. SHERMAN, Maj.-Gen. Vols.,
 Brig.-Gen. U. S. A.
Fifteenth Corps, F. P. BLAIR, JR., Maj.-Gen. Vols.
First Division, P. J. OSTERHAUS, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
First Brigade, C. R. Woods, Brig.-Gen. Vols.,
 Capt. 9th U. S. Inf.
Second Brigade, J. A. Williamson, Col. 4th Iowa.
Second Division, M. L. SMITH, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
First Brigade, G. A. Smith, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
 N. W. Tupper, Col. Vols.
Second Brigade, J. A. J. Lightburn, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
Fourth Division, HUGH EWING, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
First Brigade, J. M. Loomis, Col. Vols.
Second Brigade, J. M. Corse, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
 C. C. Walcutt, Col. 46th Ohio.
Third Brigade, J. R. Cockerill, Col. 70th Ohio.
Seventeenth Corps.
Second Division, J. E. SMITH, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
First Brigade, J. I. Alexander, Col. Vols.
Second Brigade, G. B. Raum, Col. 56th Ill.
 F. C. Deimling, Col.
 C. R. Wever, Col. 17th Iowa.
Third Brigade, C. L. Matthies, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
 B. D. Dean, Col. Vols.
 Jabez Bantury, Col. Vols.

Army of the Potomac.

- Eleventh Corps*, O. O. HOWARD, Maj.-Gen. Vols.
Second Division, A. VON STEINWEHR, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
First Brigade, Adolphus Buschbeck, Col.
Second Brigade, Orland Smith, Col. 73d Ohio.
Third Division, CARL SCHURZ, Maj.-Gen. Vols.
First Brigade, Hector Tyndale, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
Second Brigade, Wladimir Krzyzanowski, Col. 58th N. Y.
Third Brigade, Frederick Hecker, Col. Vols.
Twelfth Corps, JOSEPH HOOKER, Maj.-Gen. Vols.
Second Division, J. W. GEARY, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
First Brigade, Charles Candy, Col. 66th Ohio.
W. R. Creighton, Col. Vols.
T. J. Ahl, Col. Vols.
Second Brigade, G. A. Cobham, Jr., Col. 111th Pa.
Third Brigade, David Ireland, Col. 137th N. Y.
Cavalry, Second Brigade (Second Division), ELI LONG,
Col. 4th Ohio Cav., Capt. 4th U. S. Cav.
Artillery Reserve, J. M. BRANNAN, Brig.-Gen. Vols.,
Maj. 1st U. S. Art.
Engineers, W. F. SMITH, Brig.-Gen. Vols., Maj. U. S. Eng.

Confederate Forces, BRAXTON BRAGG, General.

- Hardee's Corps*, W. J. HARDEE, Lieut.-Gen.
Cheatham's Division, J. K. JACKSON, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
Jackson's Brigade, C. J. Wilkinson, Col.
Walthall's Brigade, E. C. Walthall, Brig.-Gen.
Moore's Brigade, J. C. Moore, Brig.-Gen.
Wright's Brigade, M. J. Wright, Brig.-Gen.
J. H. Anderson, Col.
Stevenson's Division, C. L. STEVENSON, Maj.-Gen.
Brown's Brigade, J. C. Brown, Brig.-Gen.
Pettus's Brigade, E. W. Pettus, Brig.-Gen.
Cumming's Brigade, Alfred Cumming, Brig.-Gen.
Reynolds's Brigade, A. W. Reynolds, Brig.-Gen.
Cleburne's Division, P. R. CLEBURNE, Maj.-Gen.
Lowrey's Brigade, M. P. Lowrey, Brig.-Gen.
Polk's Brigade, L. E. Polk, Brig.-Gen.
Liddell's Brigade, D. C. Govan, Col.
Smith's Brigade, H. A. Granburry, Col.
Walker's Division, S. R. GIST, Brig.-Gen.
Gist's Brigade.
Wilson's Brigade, C. C. Wilson, Brig.-Gen.
Maney's Brigade, G. E. Maney, Brig.-Gen.
Breckinridge's Corps, J. C. BRECKINRIDGE, Maj.-Gen.
Hindman's Division, J. P. ANDERSON, Brig.-Gen.
Anderson's Brigade, W. F. Tucker, Col.
Manigault's Brigade, A. M. Manigault, Brig.-Gen.
Deas's Brigade, Z. C. Deas, Brig.-Gen.
Vaughan's Brigade, A. J. Vaughan, Brig.-Gen.
Breckinridge's Division, W. B. BATE, Brig.-Gen.
Bate's Brigade, R. C. Tyler, Col.
A. F. Rudler, Col.
J. J. Turner, Lt.-Col.

Lewis's Brigade, J. H. Lewis, Brig.-Gen.
Finley's Brigade, J. J. Finley, Brig.-Gen.
Stewart's Division, A. P. STEWART, Maj.-Gen.
Stovall's Brigade, M. A. Stovall, Brig.-Gen.
Strahl's Brigade, O. F. Strahl, Brig.-Gen.
Clayton's Brigade, J. T. Holtzclaw, Col.
Adams's Brigade, R. L. Gibson, Col.

BATTLES OF THE WILDERNESS.

May 5-6, 1864, and

SPOTTSYLVANIA COURT HOUSE.

May 8-21, 1864.

Union Forces, U. S. GRANT, Lt.-Gen. U. S. A.

Army of the Potomac, G. G. MEADE, Maj.-Gen. Vols.,
 Brig.-Gen. U. S. A.

Second Corps, W. S. HANCOCK, Maj.-Gen. Vols.,
 Maj. Q. M., U. S. A.

First Division, F. C. BARLOW, Brig.-Gen. Vols.

First Brigade, N. A. Miles, Col. 61st N. Y.

Second Brigade, T. A. Smyth, Col. 1st Del.

Third Brigade, Paul Frank, Col. 52d N. Y.

Fourth Brigade, J. R. Brooke, Col. 53d Pa.

Second Division, JOHN GIBBON, Brig.-Gen. Vols.,
 Capt. 4th U. S. Art.

First Brigade, A. S. Webb, Brig.-Gen. Vols.,
 Capt. 11th U. S. Inf.

Second Brigade, J. T. Owen, Brig.-Gen. Vols.

Third Brigade, S. S. Carroll, Col. 8th Ohio,
 Capt. 10th U. S. Inf.

Third Division, D. B. BIRNEY, Maj.-Gen. Vols.

First Brigade, J. H. H. Ward, Brig.-Gen. Vols.

Second Brigade, Alexander Hays, Brig.-Gen. Vols.,
 Capt. 16th U. S. Inf.

Fourth Division, GERSHOM MOTT, Brig.-Gen. Vols.

First Brigade, Robert McAllister, Col. 11th N. J.

Second Brigade, W. R. Brewster, Col. 73d N. Y.

Fifth Corps, G. K. WARREN, Maj.-Gen. Vols., Capt. U. S. Eng.

First Division, CHARLES GRIFFIN, Brig.-Gen. Vols.,
 Capt. 5th U. S. Art.

First Brigade, R. B. Ayres, Brig.-Gen. Vols.,
 Capt. 5th U. S. Art.

Second Brigade, J. B. Sweitzer, Col. 62d Pa.

Third Brigade, J. J. Bartlett, Brig.-Gen. Vols.

Second Division, J. C. ROBINSON, Brig.-Gen. Vols.,
 Maj. 2d U. S. Inf.

First Brigade, S. H. Leonard, Col. Vols.

Second Brigade, Henry Baxter, Brig.-Gen. Vols.

Third Brigade, A. W. Denison, Col. 8th Md.

- Third Division*, S. W. CRAWFORD, Brig.-Gen. Vols.,
Maj. 13th U. S. Inf.
First Brigade, Wm. McCandless, Col. Vols.
Third Brigade, J. W. Fisher, Col. 5th Pa.
- Fourth Division*, J. S. WADSWORTH, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
First Brigade, Lysander Cutler, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
Second Brigade, J. C. Rice, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
Third Brigade, Roy Stone, Col. 149th Pa.
- Sixth Corps*, JOHN SEDGWICK, Maj.-Gen. Vols., Col. 4th U. S. Cav.
H. G. WRIGHT, Brig.-Gen. Vols., Maj. U. S. Eng.
- First Division*, H. G. WRIGHT, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
First Brigade, H. W. Brown, Col. Vols.
Second Brigade, Emory Upton, Col. 121st N. Y.,
1st Lt. 5th U. S. Art.
Third Brigade, D. A. Russell, Brig.-Gen. Vols.,
Maj. 8th U. S. Inf.
Fourth Brigade, Alexander Shaler, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
- Second Division*, G. W. GETTY, Brig.-Gen. Vols.,
Maj. 5th U. S. Art.
First Brigade, Frank Wheaton, Brig.-Gen. Vols.,
Maj. 2d U. S. Cav.
Second Brigade, L. A. Grant, Col. 5th Vermont.
Third Brigade, T. H. Neill, Brig.-Gen. Vols.,
Maj. 11th U. S. Inf.
Fourth Brigade, H. L. Eustis, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
- Third Division*, J. B. RICKETTS, Brig.-Gen. Vols.,
Maj. 1st U. S. Art.
First Brigade, W. H. Morris, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
Second Brigade, Truman Seymour, Brig.-Gen. Vols.,
Capt. 5th U. S. Art.
- Ninth Corps*, A. E. BURNSIDE, Maj.-Gen. Vols.
- First Division*, T. G. STEVENSON, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
First Brigade, Sumner Carruth, Col. Vols.
Second Brigade, Daniel Leasure, Col. Vols.
- Second Division*, R. B. POTTER, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
First Brigade, Z. R. Bliss, Col. 7th R. I.,
Capt. 8th U. S. Inf.
Second Brigade, S. G. Griffin, Col. 6th N. H.
- Third Division*, O. B. WILLCOX, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
First Brigade, J. F. Hartranft, Col. 51st Pa.
Second Brigade, B. C. Christ, Col. 50th Pa.
- Fourth Division*, EDWARD FERRERO, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
First Brigade, J. K. Sigfried, Col. 48th Pa.
Second Brigade, H. G. Thomas, Col. 79th U. S. Col. Inf.
- Cavalry Corps*, P. H. SHERIDAN, Maj.-Gen. Vols.,
Capt. 13th U. S. Inf.
- First Division*, A. T. A. TORBERT, Brig.-Gen. Vols.,
Capt. 5th U. S. Inf.
First Brigade, G. A. Guster, Brig.-Gen. Vols.,
Capt. 5th U. S. Cav.
Second Brigade, T. C. Devin, Col. 6th N. Y. Cav.
Reserve Brigade, Wesley Merritt, Brig.-Gen. Vols.,
Capt. 2d U. S. Cav.
- Second Division*, D. McM. GREGG, Brig.-Gen. Vols.,
Capt. 6th U. S. Cav.
First Brigade, H. E. Davies, Jr., Brig.-Gen. Vols.

Second Brigade, J. I. Gregg, Col. 16th Pa. Cav.,

Capt. 6th U. S. Cav.

Third Division, J. H. WILSON, Brig.-Gen. Vols.,

Capt. U. S. Eng.

First Brigade, T. M. Bryan, Jr., Col. 18th Pa. Cav.

Second Brigade, G. H. Chapman, Col. 3d Ind. Cav.

Artillery, H. J. HUNT, Brig.-Gen. Vols., Lt.-Col. 3d U. S. Art.

Confederate Forces.

Army of Northern Virginia, R. E. LEE, General.

First Corps, JAMES LONGSTREET, Lieut.-Gen.

R. H. ANDERSON, Maj.-Gen.

Kershaw's Division, J. B. KERSHAW, Brig.-Gen.

Kershaw's Brigade, J. W. Henagan, Col.

Humphreys's Brigade, B. G. Humphreys, Brig.-Gen.

Wofford's Brigade, W. T. Wofford, Brig.-Gen.

Bryan's Brigade, Goode Bryan, Brig.-Gen.

Field's Division, C. W. FIELD, Maj.-Gen.

Jenkins's Brigade, Micah Jenkins, Brig.-Gen.

(Killed at the Wilderness.)

Anderson's Brigade, G. T. Anderson, Brig.-Gen.

Law's Brigade, E. McI. Law, Brig.-Gen.

Gregg's Brigade, John Gregg, Brig.-Gen.

Benning's Brigade, H. L. Benning, Brig.-Gen.

Artillery, E. P. ALEXANDER, Brig.-Gen.

Second Corps, R. S. EWELL, Lieut.-Gen.

J. A. EARLY, Maj.-Gen.

Early's Division, J. A. EARLY, Maj. Gen.

Hays's Brigade, H. T. Hays, Brig.-Gen.

Pegram's Brigade, John Pegram, Brig.-Gen.

Gordon's Brigade, John B. Gordon, Brig.-Gen.

Johnson's Division, EDWARD JOHNSON, Maj.-Gen.

Stonewall Brigade, J. A. Walker, Brig.-Gen.

Steuart's Brigade, G. H. Steuart, Brig.-Gen.

Jones's Brigade, J. M. Jones, Brig.-Gen.

Stafford's Brigade, L. A. Stafford, Brig.-Gen.

Rodes's Division, R. E. RODES, Maj.-Gen.

Daniel's Brigade, Junius Daniel, Brig.-Gen.

Ramseur's Brigade, S. D. Ramseur, Brig.-Gen.

Doles's Brigade, George Doles, Brig.-Gen.

Battle's Brigade, C. A. Battle, Brig.-Gen.

Johnston's Brigade, R. D. Johnston, Brig.-Gen.

Artillery, A. L. LONG, Brig.-Gen.

Third Corps, A. P. HILL, Lieut.-Gen.

Anderson's Division, R. H. ANDERSON, Maj.-Gen.

Perrin's Brigade, Abner Perrin, Brig.-Gen.

Mahone's Brigade, William Mahone, Brig.-Gen.

Harris's Brigade, N. H. Harris, Brig.-Gen.

Wright's Brigade, A. R. Wright, Brig.-Gen.

Perry's Brigade, E. A. Perry, Brig.-Gen.

Heth's Division, HENRY HETH, Maj.-Gen.

Davis's Brigade, J. R. Davis, Brig.-Gen.

Cooke's Brigade, J. R. Cooke, Brig.-Gen.

- Kirkland's Brigade*, W. W. Kirkland, Brig.-Gen.
Walker's Brigade, H. W. Walker, Brig.-Gen.
Archer's Brigade, J. J. Archer, Brig.-Gen.
Wilcox's Division, C. M. WILCOX, Maj.-Gen.
Lane's Brigade, J. H. Lane, Brig.-Gen.
Scale's Brigade, A. M. Scales, Brig.-Gen.
McGowan's Brigade, Samuel McGowan, Brig.-Gen.
Thomas's Brigade, E. L. Thomas, Brig.-Gen.
Artillery, R. L. WALKER, Col.
Cavalry Corps, J. E. B. STUART, Maj.-Gen.
Hampton's Division, WADE HAMPTON.
Young's Brigade, P. M. B. Young, Brig.-Gen.
Rosser's Brigade, T. L. Rosser, Brig.-Gen.
Butler's Brigade, M. C. Butler, Brig.-Gen.
Fitz-Lee's Division, FITZHUGH LEE, Maj.-Gen.
Lomax's Brigade, L. L. Lomax, Brig.-Gen.
Wickham's Brigade, W. C. Wickham, Brig.-Gen.
W. H. F. Lee's Division, W. H. F. LEE, Maj.-Gen.
Chambliss's Brigade, J. R. Chambliss, Brig.-Gen.
Gordon's Brigade, James B. Gordon, Brig.-Gen.

ATLANTA CAMPAIGN.

May 3—September 8, 1864.

- Union Forces*, W. T. SHERMAN, Maj.-Gen. Vols.,
 Brig.-Gen. U. S. A.
Army of the Cumberland, G. H. THOMAS, Maj.-Gen. Vols.,
 Brig.-Gen. U. S. A.
Fourth Corps, O. O. HOWARD, Maj.-Gen. Vols.
 D. S. STANLEY, Maj.-Gen. Vols., Maj. 5th U. S. Cav.
First Division, D. S. STANLEY, Maj.-Gen. Vols.,
 Maj. 5th U. S. Cav.
 WILLIAM GROSE, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
 NATHAN KIMBALL, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
First Brigadé, Charles Cruft, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
 I. M. Kirby, Col. 101st Ohio.
Second Brigade, W. C. Whitaker, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
 J. E. Taylor, Col. 40th Ohio.
Third Brigade, Wm. Grose, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
 P. S. Post, Col. 59th Ill.
 J. E. Bennett, Col. 75th Ill.
Second Division, JOHN NEWTON, Brig.-Gen. Vols., Maj. U. S. Eng.
First Brigade, F. T. Sherman, Col. 88th Ill.
 Nathan Kimball, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
 Emerson Opdycke, Col. 125th Ohio.
Second Brigade, G. D. Wagner, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
Third Brigade, C. G. Harker, Brig.-Gen. Vols.,
 Capt. 15th U. S. Inf.
 L. P. Bradley, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
Third Division, T. J. Wood, Brig.-Gen. Vols., Col. 2d U. S. Cav.
First Brigade, August Willich, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
 W. H. Gibson, Col. 49th Ohio.
 R. H. Nodine, Col. Vols.
 C. T. Hotchkiss, Col. 89th Ill.

- Second Brigade*, W. B. Hazen, Brig.-Gen. Vols.,
Capt. 8th U. S. Inf.
O. H. Payne, Col. 124th Ohio.
P. S. Post, Col. 59th Ill.
- Third Brigade*, Samuel Beatty, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
Frederick Knefler, Col. 79th Ind.
- Fourteenth Corps*, J. M. PALMER, Maj.-Gen. Vols.
R. W. JOHNSON, Brig.-Gen. Vols.,
Maj. 4th U. S. Cav.
J. C. DAVIS, Brig.-Gen. Vols., Capt. 1st U. S. Art.
- First Division*, R. W. JOHNSON, Brig.-Gen. Vols.,
Maj. 4th U. S. Cav.
J. H. KING, Brig.-Gen. Vols.,
Lt.-Col. 14th U. S. Inf.
W. P. CARLIN, Brig.-Gen. Vols.,
Maj. 16th U. S. Inf.
- First Brigade*, W. P. Carlin, Brig.-Gen. Vols.,
Maj. 16th U. S. Inf.
A. G. McCook, Col. 2d Ohio.
M. C. Taylor, Col. Vols.
- Second Brigade*, J. H. King, Brig.-Gen. Vols.,
Lt.-Col. 14th U. S. Inf.
W. L. Stoughton, Col. 11th Mich.
M. F. Moore, Col. 69th Ohio.
J. R. Edie, Maj. 15th U. S. Inf.
- Third Brigade*, B. F. Scribner, Col. 38th Ind.
Josiah Given, Col. 74th Ohio.
M. F. Moore, Col. 69th Ohio.
- Second Division*, J. C. DAVIS, Brig.-Gen. Vols., Capt. 1st U. S. Art.
J. D. MORGAN, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
- First Brigade*, J. D. Morgan, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
R. F. Smith, Col. 16th Ill.
C. M. Lum, Col. Vols.
- Second Brigade*, J. G. Mitchell, Col. 113th Ohio.
- Third Brigade*, Daniel McCook, Col. 52d Ohio.
O. F. Harmon, Col. Vols.
C. J. Dilworth, Col. 85th Ill.
J. W. Langley, Lt.-Col. Vols.
- Third Division*, ARSALOM BAIRD, Brig.-Gen. Vols.,
Maj. A. I. G., U. S. A.
- First Brigade*, J. B. Turchin, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
M. B. Walker, Col. 31st Ohio,
Capt. 12th U. S. Inf.
- Second Brigade*, F. Van Derveer, Col. 35th Ohio.
Newell Gleason, Col. 87th Ind.
- Thurd Brigade*, G. P. Este, Col. 14th Ohio.
- Twentieth Corps*, JOSEPH HOOKER, Maj.-Gen. Vols.
A. S. WILLIAMS, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
H. W. SLOCUM, Maj.-Gen. Vols.
- First Division*, A. S. WILLIAMS, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
J. F. KNIPE, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
- First Brigade*, J. F. Knipe, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
W. W. Packer, Col. Vols.
- Second Brigade*, T. H. Ruger, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
- Third Brigade*, J. S. Robinson, Col. 82d Ohio.
Horace Boughton, Col. 143d N. Y.

- Second Division*, J. W. GEARY, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
First Brigade, Charles Candy, Col. 66th Ohio.
 Ario Pardee, Col. 147th Pa.
Second Brigade, Adolphus Buschbeck, Col. Vols.
 J. T. Lockman, Col. 119th N. Y.
 P. H. Jones, Col. 154th N. Y.
 G. W. Mindil, Col. 33d N. J.
Third Brigade, David Ireland, Col. 137th N. Y.
 Wm. Rickards, Col. Vols.
 G. A. Cobham, Col. 111th Pa.
- Third Division*, DANIEL BUTTERFIELD, Maj.-Gen. Vols.,
 Col. 5th U. S. Inf.
 W. T. WARD, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
First Brigade, W. T. Ward, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
 Benjamin Harrison, Col. 70th Ind.
Second Brigade, Samuel Ross, Col. 20th Conn.,
 Capt. 14th U. S. Inf.
 John Coburn, Col. 33d Ind.
Third Brigade, James Wood, Jr., Col. 136th N. Y.
- Cavalry Corps*, W. D. ELLIOTT, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
First Division, E. M. McCook, Brig.-Gen. Vols.,
 1st Lt. 4th U. S. Cav.
First Brigade, J. B. Dorr, Col. Vols.
 J. T. Croxton, Col. 4th Ky. M't'd Inf.
 J. P. Brownlow, Lt.-Col. 1st Tenn. Cav.
Second Brigade, O. H. LaGrange, Col. 1st Wis. Cav.
 J. S. Stewart, Lt.-Col. Vols.
 H. P. Lamson, Lt.-Col. Vols.
 W. H. Torrey, Lt.-Col. Vols.
- Second Division*, KENNER GARRARD, Brig.-Gen. Vols.,
 Maj. 3d U. S. Cav.
First Brigade, R. H. G. Minty, Col. 4th Mich. Cav.
Second Brigade, Eli Long, Col. 4th Ohio Cav.,
 Capt. 4th U. S. Cav.
 B. B. Eggleston, Col. 1st Ohio Cav.
Third Brigade (mounted inf.), J. T. Wilder, Col. 17th Ind.
 A. O. Miller, Col. 72d Ind.
- Third Division*, JUDSON KILPATRICK, Brig.-Gen. Vols.,
 1st Lieut. 1st U. S. Art.
 E. H. MURRAY, Col. 3d Ky. Cav.
 W. W. LOWE, Col. 5th Iowa Cav.,
 Capt. 5th U. S. Cav.
First Brigade, Robert Klein, Lt.-Col. Vols.
 M. T. Patrick, Lt.-Col. Vols.
Second Brigade, C. C. Smith, Col. Vols.
 T. W. Sanderson, Maj. 10th Ohio Cav.
 F. A. Jones, Lt.-Col. 8th Ind. Cav.
Third Brigade, E. H. Murray, Col. 3d Ky. Cav.
 S. D. Atkins, Col. 92d Ill.
- Army of the Tennessee*, J. B. MCPHERSON, Maj.-Gen. Vols.,
 Brig.-Gen. U. S. A.
 J. A. LOGAN, Maj.-Gen. Vols.
 O. O. HOWARD, Maj.-Gen. Vols.
- Fifteenth Corps*, J. A. LOGAN, Maj.-Gen. Vols.
 M. L. SMITH, Brig.-Gen. Vols.

- First Division*, P. J. OSTERHAUS, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
 C. R. WOODS, Brig.-Gen. Vols., Maj. 18th U. S. Inf.
Third Brigade, C. R. Woods, Brig.-Gen. Vols.,
 Maj. 18th U. S. Inf.
 Milo Smith, Col. Vols.
Second Brigade, J. A. Williamson, Col. Vols.
Third Brigade, Hugo Wangelin, Col. 12th Mo.
- Second Division*, M. L. SMITH, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
 J. A. J. LIGHTBURN, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
 W. B. HAZEN, Brig.-Gen. Vols.,
 Capt. 8th U. S. Inf.
- *First Brigade*, G. A. Smith, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
 J. S. Martin, Col. 111th Ill.
 Theodore Jones, Col. 30th Ohio.
Second Brigade, J. A. J. Lightburn, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
 W. S. Jones, Col. 53d Ohio.
- Fourth Division*, WM. HARROW, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
First Brigade, Reuben Williams, Col. Vols.
 J. M. Oliver, Col. 15th Mich.
Second Brigade, C. C. Walcutt, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
Third Brigade, J. M. Oliver, Col. 15th Mich.
- Sixteenth Corps*, G. M. DODGE, Maj.-Gen. Vols.
 T. E. G. RANSOM, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
- Second Division*, T. W. SWEENEY, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
 E. W. RICE, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
 J. M. CORSE, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
- First Brigade*, E. W. Rice, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
Second Brigade, P. E. Burke, Col. 66th Ill.
 R. N. Adams, Lt.-Col. 81st Ohio.
 August Mersy, Col. 9th Ill.
 J. J. Phillips, Lt.-Col. 9th Ill.
- Third Brigade*, M. M. Bane, Col. Vols.
 Wm. Vandever, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
 H. J. B. Cummings, Col. Vols.
 Richard Rowett, Col. 7th Ill.
- Fourth Division*, J. C. VEATCH, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
 J. W. FULLER, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
 T. E. G. RANSOM, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
- First Brigade*, J. W. Fuller, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
 John Morrill, Col. 64th Ill.
 H. T. McDowell, Lt.-Col. Vols.
- Second Brigade*, J. W. Sprague, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
Third Brigade, W. T. C. Grower, Col. Vols.
 John Tillson, Col. 10th Ill.
- Seventeenth Corps*, F. P. BLAIR, JR., Maj.-Gen. Vols.
- Third Division*, M. D. LEGGETT, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
 C. R. WOODS, Brig.-Gen. Vols.,
 Maj. 18th U. S. Inf.
- First Brigade*, M. F. Force, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
 G. E. Bryant, Col. Vols.
- Second Brigade*, R. K. Scott, Col. 68th Ohio.
 G. F. Wiles, Lt.-Col. 78th Ohio.
- Third Brigade*, A. G. Malloy, Col. 17th Wis.
- Fourth Division*, W. Q. GRESHAM, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
 WM. HALL, Col. Vols.
 G. A. SMITH, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
- First Brigade*, W. L. Sanderson, Col. Vols.
 B. F. Potts, Col. 32d Ohio.

Second Brigade, G. C. Rogers, Col. 15th Ill.
 I. C. Pugh, Col. 41st Ill.
 John Logan, Col. Vols.
Third Brigade, William Hall, Col. Vols.
 John Shane, Col. Vols.
 W. W. Belknap, Brig.-Gen. Vols.

Army of the Ohio, J. M. SCHOFIELD, Maj.-Gen. Vols.,
 Capt. 1st U. S. Art.

Twenty-third Corps.

First Division, A. P. HOVEY, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
First Brigade, N. C. McLean, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
 J. A. Cooper, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
 A. D. Owen, Lt.-Col. Vols.
 J. W. Tucker, Maj. Vols.
 Jacob Ragle, Capt. Vols.
Second Brigade, M. S. Hascall, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
 J. R. Bond, Col. 111th Ohio.
 W. E. Hobson, Col. Vols.
Third Brigade, S. A. Strickland, Col. 50th Ohio.
Third Division, J. D. Cox, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
First Brigade, J. W. Reilly, Col. 104th Ohio.
 J. W. Gault, Col. Vols.
Second Brigade, M. D. Manson, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
 J. S. Hurt, Col. Vols.
 M. S. Hascall, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
 J. S. Casement, Col. 103d Ohio.
 Daniel Cameron, Col. 65th Ill.
Third Brigade, N. C. McLean, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
 R. K. Byrd, Col. Vols.
 I. N. Stiles, Col. 63d Ind.

Cavalry Division, GEORGE STONEMAN, Maj.-Gen. Vols.,
 Maj. 4th U. S. Cav.
First Brigade, Israel Garrard, Col. 7th Ohio Cav.
Second Brigade, James Biddle, Col. 6th Ind. Cav.
 T. H. Butler, Col. 5th Ind. Cav.
Third Brigade, Horace Capron, Col. 14th Ill. Cav.

Confederate Forces.

Army of Tennessee, J. E. JOHNSTON, General.
 J. B. HOOD, General.

Hardee's Corps, W. J. HARDEE, Lieut.-Gen.

P. R. CLEBURNE, Maj.-Gen.

Cheatham's Division, B. F. CHEATHAM, Maj.-Gen.

GEORGE MANEY, Brig.-Gen.

J. C. CARTER, Brig.-Gen.

Maney's Brigade, George Maney, Brig.-Gen.

G. C. Porter, Col.

Wright's Brigade, J. C. Carter, Brig.-Gen.

Strahl's Brigade, O. F. Strahl, Brig.-Gen.

Vaughan's Brigade, A. J. Vaughan, Jr.,

M. Magevney, Col.

G. W. Gordon, Brig.-Gen.

Cleburne's Division, P. R. CLEBURNE, Maj.-Gen.

M. P. LOWREY, Brig.-Gen.

Polk's Brigade, L. E. Polk, Brig.-Gen.

Lowrey's Brigade, M. P. Lowrey, Brig.-Gen.

John Weir, Col.

Govan's Brigade, D. C. Govan, Brig.-Gen.

P. V. Green, Col.

Granbury's Brigade, H. B. Granbury, Brig.-Gen.

J. A. Smith, Brig.-Gen.

R. B. Young, Lt.-Col.

Walker's Division, W. H. T. WALKER, Maj.-Gen.

H. W. MERCER, Brig.-Gen.

Jackson's Brigade, J. R. Jackson, Brig.-Gen.

Gist's Brigade, S. R. Gist, Brig.-Gen.

James McCullough, Col.

Stevens's Brigade, C. H. Stevens, Brig.-Gen.

H. R. Jackson, Brig.-Gen.

W. D. Mitchell, Col.

Mercer's Brigade, H. W. Mercer, Brig.-Gen.

W. Barkuloo, Col.

M. Rawls, Lt.-Col.

C. S. Guyton, Col.

C. H. Olmstead, Col.

Bate's Division, W. B. BATE, Maj.-Gen.

J. C. BROWN, Maj.-Gen.

Lewis's Brigade, J. H. Lewis, Brig.-Gen.

Tyler's (or Smith's) Brigade, T. B. Smith, Brig.-Gen.

Finley's Brigade, J. J. Finley, Brig.-Gen.

R. Bullock, Col.

Hood's (or Lee's) Corps, J. B. HOOD, Lieut.-Gen.

C. L. STEVENSON, Maj.-Gen.

B. F. CHEATHAM, Maj.-Gen.

S. D. LEE, Lieut.-Gen.

Hindman's Division, T. C. HINDMAN, Maj.-Gen.

J. C. BROWN, Brig.-Gen.

PATTON ANDERSON, Maj.-Gen.

EDWARD JOHNSON, Maj.-Gen.

Deas's Brigade, Z. C. Deas, Brig.-Gen.

J. G. Coltart, Col.

G. D. Johnston, Brig.-Gen.

H. T. Toulmin, Lt.-Col.

Manigault's Brigade, A. M. Manigault, Brig.-Gen.

Tucker's (or Sharp's) Brigade, W. F. Tucker, Brig.-Gen.

J. H. Sharp, Brig.-Gen.

Walthall's (or Brantley's) Brigade, E. C. Walthall,

Brig.-Gen.

Samuel Benton, Col.

W. F. Brantley,

Brig.-Gen.

Stevenson's Division, C. L. STEVENSON, Maj.-Gen.

Brown's Brigade, J. C. Brown, Brig.-Gen.

E. C. Cook, Col.

J. B. Palmer, Col.

Cumming's Brigade, Alfred Cumming, Brig.-Gen.

C. M. Shelley, Col.

Reynolds's Brigade, A. W. Reynolds, Brig.-Gen.

R. C. Trigg, Col.

J. B. Palmer, Col.

Pettus's Brigade, E. W. Pettus, Brig.-Gen.

Stewart's Division, A. P. STEWART, Maj.-Gen.

H. D. CLAYTON, Maj.-Gen.

Stovall's Brigade, M. A. Stovall, Brig.-Gen.

Abda Johnson, Col.

Clayton's Brigade, H. D. Clayton, Brig.-Gen.

J. T. Holtzclaw, Brig.-Gen.

Bushrod Jones, Col.

- Baker's Brigade*, Alpheus Baker, Brig.-Gen.
Gibson's Brigade, R. L. Gibson, Brig.-Gen.
Cavalry Corps, JOSEPH WHEELER, Maj.-Gen.
Martin's Division, W. T. MARTIN, Maj.-Gen.
Morgan's (or Allen's) Brigade, J. T. Morgan, Brig.-Gen.
W. W. Allen, Brig.-Gen.
Iverson's Brigade, Alfred Iverson, Brig.-Gen.
Kelly's Division, J. H. KELLY, Brig.-Gen.
Allen's (or Anderson's) Brigade, W. W. Allen, Brig.-Gen.
R. H. Anderson, Brig.-Gen.
Edward Bird, Col.
Dibrell's Brigade, G. G. Dibrell, Brig.-Gen.
Hannon's Brigade, M. W. Hannon, Col.
Humes's Division, W. Y. C. HUMES, Brig.-Gen.
Humes's Brigade, J. T. Wheeler, Col.
H. M. Ashby, Col.
Harrison's Brigade, Thomas Harrison, Col.
Grigsby (or Williams's) Brigade, J. W. Grigsby, Col.
J. S. Williams, Brig.-Gen.
Roddey's Command, P. D. RODDEY, Brig.-Gen.

Army of Mississippi.

- Polk's Corps*, LEONIDAS POLK, Lieut.-Gen.
W. W. LORING, Maj.-Gen.
A. P. STEWART, Lieut.-Gen.
B. F. CHEATHAM, Maj.-Gen.
Loring's Division, W. W. LORING, Maj.-Gen.
W. S. FEATHERSTON, Brig.-Gen.
Featherston's Brigade, W. S. Featherston, Brig.-Gen.
Robert Lowry, Col.
Adams's Brigade, John Adams, Brig.-Gen.
Scott's Brigade, T. M. Scott, Brig.-Gen.
French's Division, S. G. FRENCH, Maj.-Gen.
Ector's Brigade, M. D. Ector, Brig.-Gen.
W. H. Young, Brig.-Gen.
Cockrell's Brigade, F. M. Cockrell, Brig.-Gen.
Elijah Gates, Col.
Sears's Brigade, W. S. Barry, Col.
C. W. Sears, Brig.-Gen.
Cantey's (or Walthall's) Division, JAMES CANTEY, Brig.-Gen.
E. C. WALTHALL, Maj.-Gen.
Quarles's Brigade, W. A. Quarles, Brig.-Gen.
Reynolds's Brigade, D. H. Reynolds, Brig.-Gen.
Cantey's Brigade, V. S. Murphy, Col.
E. A. O'Neal, Col.
Cavalry Division, W. H. JACKSON, Brig.-Gen.
Armstrong's Brigade, F. C. Armstrong, Brig.-Gen.
Ross's Brigade, L. S. Ross, Brig.-Gen.
Ferguson's Brigade, S. W. Ferguson, Brig.-Gen.
W. Boyles, Col.

Georgia Militia.

- First Division*, G. W. SMITH, Maj.-Gen.
First Brigade, R. W. Carswell, Brig.-Gen.
Second Brigade, P. J. Phillips, Brig.-Gen.
Third Brigade, C. D. Anderson, Brig.-Gen.
Fourth Brigade, H. K. McCay, Brig.-Gen.

BATTLE OF NASHVILLE.

December 15-16, 1864.

- Union Forces*, G. H. THOMAS, Maj.-Gen. U. S. A.
- Fourth Corps*, T. J. WOOD, Brig.-Gen. Vols., Col. 2d U. S. Cav.
- First Division*, NATHAN KIMBALL, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
- First Brigade*, I. M. Kirby, Col. 101st Ohio.
- Second Brigade*, W. C. Whitaker, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
- Third Brigade*, William Grose, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
- Second Division*, W. L. ELLIOTT, Brig.-Gen. Vols.,
Maj. 1st U. S. Cav.
- First Brigade*, Emerson Opdycke, Col. 125th Ohio.
- Second Brigade*, John Q. Lane, Col. 92d Ohio.
- Third Brigade*, Joseph Conrad, Col. 15th Mo.
- Third Division*, SAMUEL BEATTY, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
- First Brigade*, A. D. Streight, Col. 51st Ind.
- Second Brigade*, P. S. Post, Col. 59th Ill.
- Third Brigade*, Frederick Knefler, Col. 79th Ind.
- Twenty-third Corps*, J. M. SCHOFIELD, Maj.-Gen. Vols.,
Brig.-Gen. U. S. A.
- Second Division*, D. N. COUCH, Maj.-Gen. Vols.,
- First Brigade*, J. A. Cooper, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
- Second Brigade*, O. H. Moore, Col. 25th Mich.,
Capt. 6th U. S. Inf.
- Third Brigade*, John Mehringer, Col. 91st Ind.
- Third Division*, J. D. Cox, Maj.-Gen. Vols.
- First Brigade*, C. C. Doolittle, Col. 18th Mich.
- Second Brigade*, J. S. Casement, Col. 103d Ohio.
- Third Brigade*, I. N. Stiles, Col. 63d Ind.
- Detachment Army of the Tennessee*, A. J. SMITH, Maj.-Gen. Vols.,
Lt.-Col. 5th Cav.
- First Division*, JOHN MCARTHUR, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
- First Brigade*, W. L. McMillen, Col. 95th Ohio.
- Second Brigade*, L. F. Hubbard, Col. 5th Minn.
- Third Brigade*, S. G. Hill, Col. 35th Iowa.
- Second Division*, KENNER GARRARD, Brig.-Gen. Vols.,
Maj. 3d U. S. Cav.
- First Brigade*, David Moore, Col. 51st Mo.
- Second Brigade*, J. I. Gilbert, Col. 27th Iowa.
- Third Brigade*, E. H. Wolfe, Col. 52d Ind.
- Third Division*, J. B. MOORE, Col. 33d Wis.
- First Brigade*, L. M. Ward, Col. 14th Wis.
- Second Brigade*, Leander Blanden, Col. 95th Ill.
- Provisional Detachment*, J. B. STEEDMAN, Maj.-Gen. Vols.
- Provisional Division*, CHARLES CRUFT, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
- First Brigade*, Benjamin Harrison, Col. 70th Ind.
- Second Brigade*, J. G. Mitchell, Col. 113th Ohio.
- Third Brigade*, C. H. Grosvenor, Col. 18th Ohio.
- Second Brigade (Army Tenn.)*, A. G. Malloy,
Col. 17th Wis.
- First Colored Brigade*, T. J. Morgan,
Col. 14th U. S. Col. Inf.
- Second Colored Brigade*, C. R. Thompson,
Col. 12th U. S. Col. Inf.
- Garrison of Nashville*, J. F. MILLER, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
- Fourth Division, Twentieth Corps.*
- Second Brigade*, E. C. Mason, Col. 176th Ohio.
- Quartermaster's Division*, J. L. DONALDSON, Col. Q. M., U. S. A.
(Composed of Quartermaster's employees.)

- Cavalry Corps*, J. H. WILSON, Brig.-Gen. Vols., Capt. U. S. Eng.
First Division.
First Brigade, J. T. Croxton, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
Fifth Division, EDWARD HATCH, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
First Brigade, R. R. Stewart, Col. Vols.
Second Brigade, D. E. Coon, Col. 2d Iowa Cav.
Sixth Division, R. W. JOHNSON, Brig.-Gen. Vols.,
Maj. 4th U. S. Cav.
First Brigade, T. J. Harrison, Col. 8th Ind. Cav.
Second Brigade, James Biddle, Col. 6th Ind. Cav.,
Capt. 15th U. S. Inf.
Seventh Division, J. F. KNIPE, Brig.-Gen. Vols.
First Brigade, J. H. Hammond, Lt.-Col. A. A. G. Vols.
Second Brigade, G. M. L. Johnson, Col. 13th Ind. Cav.
- Confederate Forces.*
- Army of Tennessee*, J. B. HOOD, General.
- Lee's Corps*, S. D. LEE, Lieut.-Gen.
Johnson's Division, EDWARD JOHNSON, Maj.-Gen.
Deas's Brigade, Z. C. Deas, Brig.-Gen.
Manigault's Brigade, W. L. Butler, Lt.-Col.
Sharp's Brigade, J. H. Sharp, Brig.-Gen.
Brantly's Brigade, W. F. Brantly, Brig.-Gen.
Stevenson's Division, C. L. STEVENSON, Maj.-Gen.
Cumming's Brigade, E. P. Watkins, Col.
Pettus's Brigade, E. W. Pettus, Brig.-Gen.
Clayton's Division, H. D. CLAYTON, Maj.-Gen.
Stovall's Brigade, M. A. Stovall, Brig.-Gen.
Gibson's Brigade, R. L. Gibson, Brig.-Gen.
Holtzclaw's Brigade, J. T. Holtzclaw, Brig.-Gen.
- Stewart's Corps*, A. P. STEWART, Lieut.-Gen.
Loring's Division, W. W. LORING, Maj.-Gen.
Featherston's Brigade, W. S. Featherston, Brig.-Gen.
Adams's Brigade, Robert Lowry, Col.
Scott's Brigade, John Snodgrass, Col.
- French's Division* (attached to Walthall's).
Sears's Brigade, C. W. Sears, Brig.-Gen.
Ector's Brigade, Daniel Coleman, Col.
- Walthall's Division*, E. C. WALTHALL, Maj.-Gen.
Quarles's Brigade, G. D. Johnston, Brig.-Gen.
Cantey's Brigade, C. M. Shelley, Brig.-Gen.
Reynolds's Brigade, D. H. Reynolds, Brig.-Gen.
- Cheatham's Corps*, B. F. CHEATHAM, Lieut.-Gen.
Brown's Division.
Gist's Brigade, Z. L. Walters, Lt.-Col.
Maney's Brigade, H. R. Field, Col.
Strahl's Brigade, A. J. Kellar, Col.
Vaughan's Brigade, W. M. Watkins, Col.
- Cleburne's Division*, J. A. SMITH, Brig.-Gen.
Lowrey's Brigade, M. P. Lowrey, Brig.-Gen.
Govan's Brigade, D. C. Govan, Brig.-Gen.
Granbury's Brigade, E. T. Broughton, Capt.
- Bate's Division*, W. B. BATE, Maj.-Gen.
Tyler's Brigade, T. B. Smith, Brig.-Gen.
Finley's Brigade, G. A. Ball, Maj.
Jackson's Brigade, H. R. Jackson, Brig.-Gen.
- Cavalry Division*, J. R. CHALMERS, Brig.-Gen.
Rucker's Brigade, E. W. Rucker, Col.
Biffle's Brigade, J. B. Biffle, Col.

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ANNAPOLIS ROYAL, *see* PORT ROYAL.

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